E 



SUBDH 



ERNIN 



ts 



V" 



ther more 
less titan 
ce. See 

'following 
Hons. 



on." This J 



r ISIONS 
G SPACE. 



Or, Space. See Part IX. \ 1. 

v v V V 



(rid, or emp- 
aess. See 
art IX. § 14, 
<d following 
•ciions. 



Possibility, or 
the absence, 
of body. See 
Part IX.% 21, 
and following 
Sections. 



A— we know 

not what. 
See Part IX. 
§ 26, and fol- 
lowing Sec- 
tions. 



Nothing. See 
Part IX.% 30, 
§31. 



A relation. 
See Part IX. 
% 33, and fol- 
lowing Sec- 
tions, to § 59, 
inclusive. 



frontispiece is referred to in a note to § 13. Part X. 



CONTENTS. 



General Preface. 

An Inquiry into the Defects of mere a posteriori Arguments 
for A God. 

Reviews of the Demonstrations by Mr Locke, Dr Samuel Clarke, 
the Rev. Moses Lowman, and Bishop Hamilton, of the 
Existence and Attributes of A Deity. 

Necessary Existence implies Infinite Extension. 

The Argument, a priori, for the Being and Attributes of A 
Great First Cause. 

An Examination of Antitheos's " Refutation of the Argument 
" a priori for the Being and Attributes of God." 



\ 



TABLE 



THE DIVISIONS AND SUBDIVISIONS 



THE OPINIONS CONCERNING SPACE. 



A Substance. Sen Part VII. % S. 



A/ 



The same as 
Matter. See 
Part fIT.%9, 
§10. 



or, Different 
from Matter. 
See Part VII. 
ill. 

V 



Unintelli- 
gent. See 
Part VII. 
Si 12, and 
following 
Sections. 



Intelligent. 

See Part 
VII. § 29, 

ami follow. 

ing ,S ctions. 



Or, A Mode. See Part VIII. § 1. 



Of Matter, 
See Part 
VIII. § 2. 



Of an Infi- 
nite Mind. 
See Part 
VIII. § 3, 

and follow- 
ing Sections. 



Of a finite 
mind. See 
Part X. % a 
and follow, 
in g Sections 
particular- 
ly § 61, Sec 



A 



Or, Space. Sec Part IX. i 1 



V" 



"V" 



A/ 



V" 



PartIX.%10, 
and following 
Sections. 



Void, or emp- 
tiness. See 
P*,-tIX.§U, 
and following 



Possibility, or 
the absence, 
of body. Sec 
Part IX.% 21, 
Tnd following 
Sections. 



not what 
See Part IX. 
% 26, and fol- 
loiving Sec- 



Not! f, 5!si 

Part IX. J 30, 
S 81. 



A relation. 
See Part IX. 
5 33, and fol- 



N.B. The references occurring in this Table are in relation to the " Examination." This Frontispiece is referred to in a note 1 



THE 



NECESSARY EXISTENCE 

OF 

GOD. 



BY WILLIAM GILLESPIE. 

tit* 



NEW EDITION. 



EDINBURGH: 

ADAM & CHARLES BLACK. 

LONGMAN, BROWN, GREEN, & LONGMANS, 
LONDON. 



Ml 



— O 0EO2 o iroirjffag rbv %o<5[iov xai ftavra ra iv avru>, ovrog 
ovgavov xai yYjg Kvgiog btfagyuv, ovx sv yjiooitoiYiroig vaoTg xaroixtT, 
ovds W %eiguv avQgui'jrojv Qsgatfzvzrai wgoffdsof/ssvog rmg, avrbg dtdoug 
itaGt ^qiyiv xai tfvoYiV xai ra <7rdvra- sirotriGe rs e<* svhg al/xarog vrav 
sdvog civQouvruv, xaroixsTv \ie\ <7rav rb vrgoffOMrov rr)g <yr,g, og/ffac wgoff- 
r&rayfisvovg xai^ovg xai rag ogodetiiag r%g xaroixiag avruv Zfirzh 
TON 0EON, £/ agays -^r^a^ffsiav avrov xai supoisv, xairotyz OT 
MARFAN AnO ENG2 EKA2TOT HMflN TIIAPXONTA . 
EN ATTI1 TAP Z II MEN KAT KINOTME0A KAI E2MEN 
ug xai ring roov x.a(f v/j,ag iroiriruv sip-/]xa<rr 

Tov ya% x,ai yzvog sg/jav. 
Ysvog oh ii'rrazyjjvrzg TOT ©EOT, ovx ope/Xofisv vo/^siv x§v<f<p Jj 
Viyfyv % MUtj), yagayfiari r'syjYjg xai sv&vfMr/ffecag &v6g(farov, TO 
0EION sivai Sfioiov. 

St Paul. 



5Snim& at Stationers' ^all. 



By Transfer 

D. C. Public Library 

JUN 7 1938 



GENERAL PREFACE. 



It is ten years since the " Argument, a priori, for the 
" Being and Attributes" first met the public eye : And it 
is three years since the issuing of the first edition of the 
" Examination," which is a diffusion and defence of cer- 
tain portions of the reasoning occurring in its predecessor. 

From the many highly favourable opinions, expressed by 
persons whose authority is entitled to much weight, which 
have been communicated to the author, he feels very con- 
fident as to the ultimate result of his undertaking, to 
establish the necessary existence of Gob. Whatever mis- 
givings the author may have had as to the reception 
which his mode of treating his subject might meet with ; 
he never allowed himself to have any misgivings as to the 
goodness of his cause, generally or particularly : generally, 
or as to the being of A God ; particularly, or as to the 
applicableness and validity of a priori reasonings in re- 
ference to that momentous topic. The age we live in is 
certainly the age of superficialness. Much ground is in- 
deed gone over, but then little of the ground is tho- 
roughly explored : Men rather knowing that there are 



viii 



GENERAL 



many sciences, and having at command a few common- 
places with regard to each, than caring to be complete 
proficients in any one branch of knowledge. But not- 
withstanding this circumstance, the author has now no 
uneasiness as to the fate of his production. The age is 
superficial, but there are exceptions to the general rule : 
And it is very fortunate that no age receives those im- 
pressions which are to be lasting, and to influence the 
sentiments of posterity, from any but the more profound 
thinkers. The skimmers over the surfaces of things may 
make a little noise as they pass along, but in a short 
while all trace of them is vanished. 

The author, then, anticipates that ere long a great 
change will take place in the public mind, in relation to 
the question of the fitness and value of the species of 
reasonings employed in this volume. 'Tis beyond all ques- 
tion, that a priori reasonings on subjects out of the ma- 
thematical sciences have descended to a low point in the 
general estimation, though it is equally certain, that at a 
former period such reasonings used to occupy a very high 
and conspicuous position. But there are signs that bet- 
ter treatment is awaiting argumentation from the neces- 
sity of the case for a Great First Cause. 

The immediate consequences, or rather the concomi- 
tants, of a change so ardently desired, would be the fol- 
lowing — to specify no more at present. 1. A sudden stop 
in the tune of your mere a posteriori men. We should 
no longer have thrust into our hands whole volumes of 
anatomy, botany, astronomy, and what not 1 called, in 
virtue of an exceedingly small sprinkling of other matter. 



PREFACE. 



ix 



treatises on Natural Theology ; we should no longer, I 
say, have such thrust upon us as containing the only 
sound arguments to be met with, for proving the first 
grand article of all religion. We should no longer, 
therefore, be told, that the infinity^ and the unity of the 
Divine Nature cannot be made out. 2. The quick dis- 
appearance of speculative, or avowed, atheism. A con- 
summation, however devoutly to be wished for, which 
has never been brought about under the long, presump- 
tuous reign of the oracular responses issuing from the ex- 
perimental School. 

Who does not at once perceive of what mighty con- 
sequence it were to have the mouth of avowed speculative 
atheism closed for ever % Have not the very bad kinds of 
practical atheism too often been prone to seek shelter 
under the wings of theoretical atheism \ To live in all 
respects as if there were no God : Therefore, to wish 
most anxiously that there were no God : Therefore, to 
confirm one-self in saying that there is no God : — Are 
not these not unfrequently bound together as links in the 
same dreadful chain ] 

There are too many persons among us who are not 
properly aware of the alarming progress which Infidelity, 
Infidelity of the deadliest kind, even downright Atheism, 
is making in the British Isles, and throughout our nu- 
merous and vast Colonies ; in the United States of Ame- 
rica ; and, in short, wherever the English language is 
spoken : To say nothing of the deplorable state of mat- 

t This word is here taken in the popular } that is, the loosest, acceptation. 



X 



GENERAL 



ters on the Continent of Europe, and indeed throughout 
the civilized, or the intelligent and reflecting, portion of 
the world generally. 

And I cannot forbear adverting pointedly to the circum- 
stance, that the age we live in is witness to the existence 
of " a monstrous species of men," who live in spite, as 
'twere, of nature, they are so very odd a sort of com- 
pound : "I mean the zealots in atheism." One might 
beforehand have prophesied, with a lively assurance of 
prophesying correctly, that zeal in behalf of so utter a 
negation as Atheism, "f were a sheer impossibility. An 
Atheistic Propagandist seems a nondescript monster, 
created by nature in a moment of madness. 

:i But so it is," says Addison, in a paragraph needing 
almost no alteration to render it suitable to the present as- 
pect of affairs : " But so it is, that infidelity is propagated 
" with as much fierceness and contention, wrath and in- 
" dignation, as if the safety of mankind depended upon 
" it. There is something so ridiculous and perverse in 
" this kind of zealots, that one does not know how to set 
" them out in their proper colours. They are a sort of 
" gamesters who are eternally upon the fret, though 
" they play for nothing. They are perpetually teasing 

t " What lias atheism to teach but mere negations ? — that there is no 
" First Cause, no Creator, no intention in all the beautiful and beneficial 
" arrangements of nature ; that there is no such thing as mind or spirit in 
" the universe ; no God, no angel, no hereafter for man, no future judg- 
u ment, no heaven or hell, no rewards for virtue or punishments for 
" vice beyond this life. Its object is, in fact, to teach men to disbelieve 
u what all ages have believed.'''' Lectures on the Atheistic Controversy, by 
the Rev. B. Godwin. Lect. VI. 



PREFACE. 



xi 



" their friends to come over to them, though at the same 
£< time they allow that neither of them shall get any 
" thing by the bargain. In short, the zeal of spreading 
" atheism, is, if possible, more absurd than atheism it- 
" self."t 
" But so it is." 

The various pieces which compose this volume were 
never before brought together within one pair of boards. 
Each piece or work is complete in itself : nevertheless, 
the works may be said to have a relation to each other. 
They severally handle the different departments of the 
subject. The one follows the other in a regular order : 
And the consecutive treatises may, not without reason, be 
held to constitute an entire compact body of information 
respecting the a 'priori, or synthetic, method of arguing 
for the existence of God. 

First of all, there are exhibited the defects of mere a 
posteriori arguments for the Being and Attributes of A 
Deity. And the inherent imperfections of the a poste- 
riori plan are exposed for this reason principally, — that 
an impression favourable to the pretensions of the rival 
method may be begotten. The value of the one mode of 
arguing shall be enhanced, by the inferiority of the other 
being established. 

In the next place, the reader is presented with the fail- 
ures of my predecessors in the field of a priori argumen- 
tation : manifesting, as those failures do, the room and 

t Spectator, No. 185. 



xii 



GENERAL 



the need there is for something better ; should it be possi- 
ble to supply the desideratum. Amongst the circumstances 
which have brought the synthetic method into discredit, 
not the least prominent place ought to be reserved for the 
inefficiency of the labours of former demonstrators. The 
whole method generally has been charged with an im- 
potence which is exclusively chargeable on the attempts 
of certain patrons, who purposed better things than their 
fates enabled them to accomplish. To point out the er- 
rors of former reasoners, is to proceed one step in the 
right direction. 

Thirdly, the reader is shown the connection betwixt 
necessary existence and infinite extension ; in order that 
an argument which makes infinite extension an attribute 
of the Being it seeks to reach, may be viewed with a fa- 
vourable eye by all those who admit the existence of a 
necessary Being, the Intelligent Author of the universe. 
Infinite extension — a necessarily existing Mind, the cause 
of all the things of nature : if these are inseparably re- 
lated, he who allows the one, cannot reject the other. In 
short, the third work is a sort of argumentum ad homi- 
nem, to be used with the generality of Theists. 

It is obvious, that none of the three treatises already 
referred to, can be considered as adapted to the case of 
Atheists, as Atheists. 

In the fourth place, " The Argument, a priori, for the 
" Being and Attributes of a Great First Cause," comes 
in sight. 

And, fifthly and lastly, in the " Examination" of An- 
titheos there is a defence, against the assaults of the 



PREFACE. 



xiii 



chosen champion of Atheism, of one of the two precisely 
similarly situated foundations of the " Argument." 

Since the talented and skilful author of the " Refuta- 
" tion" is unable to reply to our " Examination" ;t it 
may be confidently predicted, that no atheist, be he who 
he may, will ever be capable of doing so successfully. In 
fine, by means of the " Examination," the " Argument, a 
" priori" is shown to be, in very deed, an irrefragable 
demonstration. The desideratum (alluded to, above) will 
be perceived to be supplied. 

— The "Examination" contains within it two sub- 
treatises. One of these gives, within the limits of a Part, 
a full proof of " the non- infinite divisibility of extension 
" and of matter." The other, though it takes the hum- 
ble guise of a digression running through several Parts, 
is, in reality, a complete and separable treatise, " Of the 
" Sentiments of Philosophers concerning Space." A piece 
which will perhaps be reckoned not the least valuable — 
as it is likely to be the most generally interesting — por- 
tion of the work wherein it occurs. — 

It need hardly be said, that those two productions, the 
" Argument" and the " Examination," to wit, are to be 
held as especially intended for Atheists. Without doubt, 
some classes of Theists might read the works with profit 
to themselves, were the truths insisted on to be sufficiently 
pondered, and duly digested. Nevertheless, the works are 
adapted and addressed to Atheists, primarily. 

— It is our fervent prayer, that, by the perusal and con- 
sideration of those productions, many who are Infidels, 

t See Postscript thereto. 



xiv 



GENERAL 



as touching the Great Fundamental Doctrine of ONE 
Infinite and Eternal Being, the Cause of all the Phe- 
nomena and of all the Matter in the Universe ; may be 
converted from the error of their portentous disbelief. — 
The sort of relation which the various works in this 
volume bear to each other is, by this time, apparent. 
They are consecutive : and the order of their actual se- 
quence could not be altered without infringing upon the 
order of proper sequence. 

We have demonstrated the All-power fulness, the En- 
tire Freeness, and the Perfect Goodness of the Supreme 
Being.f Whence, then, evil ? for the existence of evil is 
admitted on all hands. Whence evil ? physical evil, and 
moral ? or to put things after a better order, moral evil, 
and physical \ How comes it that evil exists in a world, 
the work of a Being " All-powerful," " Entirely Free," and 
" Perfectly Good V- This is the question of questions, the 
mystery of mysteries. 

No doubt, that, in connection with the a priori proof 
of the Perfect Goodness of an All-powerful and Entirely 
Free Author of nature, that question must arise in the 
mind of every person ; however feeble may be the powers 
of reflection. No doubt, that, in connection with such a 
proof, some relative solution of the grand riddle, the enig- 
ma of the universe, is reasonably to be expected. 

However, the only answer to be afforded at present is 

t See " The Argument, a ipriori" Div. II. Part. II. and Part III. 
Div. III. Sub-Prop. 



PREFACE, 



XT 



a general one ; (one, notwithstanding, which would be 
satisfactory, even were a more particular one not to be 
gotten ;) taken from the Prince of modern Sceptics, if 
not the Prince of modern Atheists also. A more full 
solution of the difficulty, we propose, indeed, to put forth, 
some time or other. But, meanwhile, the public must 
rest satisfied with one to the following effect : — If the 
Perfect Goodness of the Supreme Being is demonstrated 

But let us hear Mr Hume himself. He speaks by 

the mouth of his representative, Philo. 

£C Let us allow, that, if the goodness of the Deity (I 
" mean a goodness like the humanf) could be established 
" on any tolerable reasons a priori, these [evil] pheno- 
" mena, Jioiuever untoward, would not be sufficient to sub- 
" vert that principle ; but might easily, in some unknown 
; ' manner, be reconcileable to it." Dialogues concerning 
Natural Religion. Part XI. 

And in a former Part of the same masterly perform- 
ance, Philo, that is to say, Mr Hume, had laid down 
the same thing, by means of a more extended principle. 
" There are many inexplicable difficulties in the works of 
" Nature, which, if we allow a perfect author to be proved 
" a priori, are easily solved, and become only seeming 
" difficulties," &c. 

In conclusion : It cannot be too often repeated, that 
the being of A God constitutes the fundamental point of 
all religion. To the doctrine of human immortality and 

t Philo means, by like, of the same generic character as, 



xvi 



GENERAL PREFACE. 



future retribution, Theism is a necessary preliminary. 
The Christian faith does not lay, but it builds on, this 
foundation — There is A God. And therefore, to set out 
the proof for the existence of God, is the first step to the 
demolishing of Infidelity, of what description soever the 
Infidelity may be. 



TORBANE-HILL. 

3lst May, 1843. 



m 



INQUIRY INTO THE DEFECTS 

OF 

MERE A POSTERIORI ARGUMENTS 

FOR 

A GOD. 



" By this method of reasoning, you renounce all claim to infinity in any of 
the attributes of the Deity. For, as the cause ought only to be propor- 
tioned to the effect, and the effect, so far as it falls under our cognizance, 
is not infinite ; what pretensions have we, upon your suppositions, to as- 
cribe that attribute to the Divine Being?" 

Mr Hume. 



AN INQUIRY INTO THE DEFECTS, &c. 



CHAPTER I. 
OF THE ARGUMENT FROM EXPERIENCE. 

§ 1. 'Tis evident, on the slightest reflection, that there 
can be no more than two ways of proving the being and 
attributes, or any of the attributes, of the Deity. If it 
be possible to establish his existence at all ; 'tis possible to 
prove, either, merely, that he is ; or, that, besides being, 
he must be. The reasonings which would demonstrate 
his being, are called a priori : Those which give probable 
evidence, only, for his being, a posteriori. 

§ 2. The more common a posteriori argument may be 
called, the argument from experience. Not that expe- 
rience can discover a God ; but this argument infers the 
existence of a God, by a process similar to that by which 
we conclude, that certain appearances have been preceded 
by a cause, which we have discovered almost as often as 
we have set out in the search. This argument takes a 
survey of the universe, — and examines, more minutely, one 
of its parts ; asserts, it there discovers marks of design ; 
and, from these marks of design, infers the existence of a 
designer, or an intelligent cause. It is level to all men's 
capacities. And unless men resolve to shut their eyes, 
and stop the operation of their understanding, they can- 



4 



DEFECTS OF 



not avoid coming to the conclusion, that the phenomena 
of nature imply the existence of a cause of them. 

§ 3. But, though the a posteriori argument be good, so 
far as it goes, yet its discoveries reach only a little way. 
If we confine ourselves merely to its evidence, we shall, 
inevitably, find ourselves surrounded by many serious dif- 
ficulties, — difficulties which will oppress, if they do not 
discourage, the minds of the more inquisitive. 

§ 4. But before taking notice of the disadvantages at- 
tending this argument, if the aid of the other sort of rea- 
soning is nowise introduced, let it be premised, that we 
are not, in any way, to enter upon the merits of that ar- 
gument, but shall take the validity of it, so far as its evi- 
dence reaches, entirely for granted : the object, here, be- 
ing only to point out the defects it labours under, admit- 
ting its inference to be irresistible. 

§ 5. First, One of the disadvantages, then, or, rather, 
a class of disadvantages, attending mere a posteriori rea- 
sonings, is, that they can never make it appear, that in- 
finity belongs, in any way, to God. 

§ 6. First, The a posteriori argument can only entitle 
us to infer the existence of a Being of finite extension : for 
by what rule known in philosophy, can we deduce, from 
the existence of an effect finite in extent, (and nothing is 
plainer than that the marks of design which we can dis- 
cover, must be finite in their extent,) the existence of a 
cause of infinity of extension ? 

§ 7. What becomes, then, of the omnipresence of the 
Deity, according to those who are content to rest satisfied 
with the reasonings from experience ? Those who seek not 
the aid of the other species of reasoning must let their 
system of Theism preserve a cautious silence upon so un- 
accountable a matter. It will be vain to talk of the Deity 
being present by his energy, although he may not be pre- 
sent by his substance, to the whole universe. For, 'tis 



A POSTERIORI ARGUMENTS. 



5 



natural to ask, not so much how it is proved, that God 
can be virtually present, though not substantially present, 
in every part of nature, as what can be meant by being 
every where present by mere energy ? 

§ 8. Add to this, that, even admitting the foolish dis- 
tinction in question, a posteriori reasoning can no more 
make out, that the Deity is omnipresent by his virtue, 
than that he is omnipresent as to his substance. Admit 
the distinction : 'tis of no service. 

§ 9. And from the inaptitude of the reasoning under 
consideration, to show that immensity or omnipresence 
belongs to God, it will be found to follow, directly and 
immediately, that his wisdom and power cannot be shown 
to be more than finite, and that he can never be proved 
to be a free agent. 

§ 10. First, It is very plain, that omnipresence (let it 
be only by energy) is absolutely necessary in a Being of 
infinity t of wisdom. And, therefore, the a posteriori ar- 
gument is unable to evince that the Deity is in posses- 
sion of this attribute. 

§ 11. Secondly, It, likewise, plainly follows from the 
inaptitude of this argument, to show that God is omni- 
present, that, thereby, we cannot prove infinity of power 
to belong to him. For, if the argument cannot make out 
that the Being it discovers is every where present, how 
can it ever make out that he is every where powerful \ 
By careful reflection, too, we may perceive, that omnipo- 
tence of another kind than power which can exert itself 
in all places, requires the existence of immensity. 

§ 12. Thirdly, Without calling in the aid of subtle 
reasoning to prove, that if the argument a posteriori 
cannot show that God is omnipresent, it can never evince 
that he is a free agent ; let those who may contend that 

t The terms infinity, infinite, are frequently employed, in the course 
of this " Inquiry," in their popular, lax sense. 



6 



DEFECTS OF 



by the reasonings from experience, it can be made to ap- 
pear, the Deity is a free agent, be pleased to tell us, what 
is that logical process by which they deduce, from the pre- 
mises they have obtained, such a conclusion. Of what 
nature is the middle term, which puts beyond doubt the 
agreement of subject and predicate in the proposition, that 
the God whom the argument from experience doth reveal 
is entirely free ? 

§ 13. But, indeed, without having been at pains to show, 
that, if we cannot prove the immensity or omnipresence 
of the Deity, we can, for that reason, never show that he 
is omniscient — that he is omnipotent — that he is entirely 
free : It had been sufficient simply to say, that if the 
Deity cannot be proved to be of infinity in any given re- 
spect, it would be nothing less than absurd to suppose 
that he could be proved to be of infinity in any other re- 
spect. 

§ 14. Secondly, Not to lay any weight on the truth 
just announced, that if we cannot prove God to have a 
particular infinite attribute, we can never show that infi- 
nity of any kind whatever belongs to him : or, not here 
to insist on this point, that we shall never be able to make 
out that there is an eternal being, if we be not able to 
make out that there is an immense being ; the eternity of 
a being as much implying his immensity, as his immen- 
sity would evidently infer his eternity : (Truths these 
most unquestionable :) The a posteriori argument can do 
no more than prove, that, at the commencement of the 
phenomena which pass under its review, there existed a 
cause exactly sufficient to make the effects begin to be. 
That this cause existed from eternity, the reasonings from 
experience can, by no means, show. Nay, for aught they 
make known, the designer himself may not have existed 
long before those marks of design which betoken his work- 
manship. 



A POSTERIORI ARGUMENTS. 



7 



§ 15. And, because reasoning of the kind in question 
cannot prove, that the God whom it reveals, has existed 
from all eternity, therefore, for any thing it intimates, 
God may, at some time, cease to be ; and the workman- 
ship may have an existence when the workman hath fallen 
into annihilation. For, of that being only, who never 
had a beginning, the non-existence implies a contradic- 
tion. 

§ 16. Concerning the topics alluded to, the argument 
leaves us quite at a loss. It gives some little information, 
and then is found inadequate to extend our knowledge 
the least way farther. 

§ 17. It would be worse than useless to expend many 
words in showing, that the argument a posteriori cannot 
prove that God is of infinite goodness, and justice, and all 
other infinite moral perfections. Without insisting that 
there must be infinite natural attributes as a foundation 
whereon to build infinite moral attributes : (A thing cer- 
tain :) 'Tis evident, that the same reason that prevents us 
from proving the first, will for ever prevent us from prov- 
ing the second. 

§ 18. Secondly, Another defect that mere a posteriori 
reasonings labour under, is, perhaps, still weightier than 
their inability to prove that infinity, in any way, belongs 
to God. How can such reasonings ever assure us of the 
unity of the Deity ? 'Twill be granted that the question 
as to the unity of God, involves a point of much import- 
ance : the point, perhaps, of greatest moment connected 
with our speculations as to his existence. But, whether 
there be but one God, or not, the argument from expe- 
rience doth, by no means, make clear. It discovers marks 
of design in the phenomena of nature, and infers the ex- 
istence of at least one intelligent substance sufficient to 
produce them. Farther, however, it advances not our 



8 



DEFECTS OF 



knowledge. Whether the cause of the phenomena be one 
God, or many gods, it pretends not to determine, past all 
doubt. 

§ 19. The contrivances we observe in nature, may es- 
tablish a unity of counsel : how can they establish a unity 

of substance ? 

§20. In the phenomena that surround me, I see cer- 
tain means adapted to certain ends. Without hesitation, 
I conclude, there was a designer. But did this designer 
create the matter in which the design appears ? Of this, 
the argument a posteriori cannot convince us. For that 
argument does no more than infer a designing cause from 
certain appearances ; in the same way as we would infer, 
from finding some well contrived machine in a desert, that 
a human being had left it there. But point out marks of 
design, certain means adapted to certain ends, in gross, 
un tractable matter itself ? 

§ 21. Now, because this reasoning cannot convince us 
of such a creation, it cannot convince us that there is not 
a plurality of deities, or of the causes of things. As thus : 
If the designer whom this argument discovers, did not 
create the matter containing the design, but that was 
created by some superior agent, then here is a complete 
destruction of the unity of God. If matter was not 
created at all, then we are involved in the supposition of 
that strange plurality of gods, in which there is, at least, 
one physical substance, and that, it may be, the more an- 
cient member of the Ditheism. 

§ 22. But even though we hold, that the designing 
cause of the phenomena we see, created the matter in 
which they appear, (an opinion for which the argument 
in question gives us no evidence,) what the nearer are we 
to a real proof of the unity of G od ? Did he who created 
and fashioned an inconsiderable part of the universe, 



A POSTERIORI ARGUMENTS. 



9 



create and fashion universal nature \ Perhaps he did not. 
Then, we have no proper evidence for the doctrine of his 
unity. 

§ 23. Besides, to insist on no other topic, if we cannot 
prove the eternity of God, it is not possible that we can 
prove the unity of God. To say that, for any thing we 
know to the contrary, he may not have existed from all 
eternity, being much the same thing as saying, that, for 
any thing we know to the contrary, there may be another 
god or many gods, besides. 

§ 24. We see, then, what the argument a posteriori 
amounts to. That, at the commencement of the pheno- 
mena, or designs which do appear, there existed as the 
cause, an intelligent substance, or several intelligent sub- 
stances, of sufficient extension, wisdom, power, and free- 
ness, goodness, justice, and other moral qualities, to make 
the effects begin to be : this is all that that species of 
reasoning can make known. And if we think that, with- 
out assistance from another source than the reasonings 
from experience, we shall be enabled to ascend higher in 
our investigations, we but weakly impose upon ourselves, 
and mistake, for the exercise of the understanding, the 
uncertain flights of the fancy. 



CHAPTER II. 
OF THE ARGUMENT FROM MIRACLES. 

§ 1. There are some that would prove the existence of 
God, by showing that miracles have happened : a miracle 
affords evidence that there is a God. 

§ 2. There are two distinct kinds of Atheists. First. 
Those who contend that it is impossible there can be a 
God. And, secondly, those who only go the length of 

c 



10 



DEFECTS OF 



saying, that there is no God. Perhaps, this latter class 
of Atheists may be properly sunk in another class, name- 
ly, those who do but maintain that, as yet, they have 
seen no proper evidence adduced to establish the existence 
of a Deity. 

§ 3. The system of Epicurus, in ancient times ; in 
modern, the system of Spinoza, fall to be ranged along 
with those of the first sort. And many other species of 
Atheism, by how few shades soever they differ from the 
systems specified, or from each other, might be pointed 
out as belonging to the same class. All the systems of 
Atheism which would go to show, it is impossible there 
can be a God, may be reduced to the following opinion. 
that there has been a succession, or rather, have been suc- 
cessions, from eternity, of dependent beings, in which are 
included all things that are, or ever were, in the universe. 

§ 4. Now, a miracle pre-supposes a God : at least, if a 
miracle prove the existence of God, it must, beyond all 
contradiction, also pre-suppose that existence. Does it 
not, indeed establish, by first assuming, the being of a 
Deity ? 

§ 5. What sort of an error, then, in logic, do they 
commit who would ask an Atheist, of the first class, to 
believe in a miracle : that is, to believe in a thing which 
would pre-suppose the existence of what he reckons an 
impossibility ? 

§ 6. Besides, if chance, or necessity, or any other word, 
can account for so much, what hinders it to account for 
a little more ? If it sustain, whether or not it caused, 
the universe and all things therein, is it incapable of 
making the further slight exertion of bringing an un- 
common, or hitherto unknown, event to pass, suppose the 
visible antecedent to be any thing whatever ? 

§ 7. With regard to the other kind of Atheists, or 
those who have not yet seen evidence sufficiently strong 



A POSTERIORI ARGUMENTS. 



11 



to compel them to admit there is a God : we may demand 
of him who hopes to convert such men by adducing the 
testimony in favour of miracles, Does the whole visible 
creation, contain no evidence, or not as good evidence, as 
it is possible there should be, of the existence of a Deity, 
that you resort to miracles, in search of proof for this 1 
What is the ground of the preference % None is apparent. 
Tis granted, that a miracle affords evidence of a being- 
much superior to man : but do not the works of nature 
afford proof equally worthy of being relied on, to the 
same purpose ? Do you throw the permanent phenomena 
of nature aside, as utterly insignificant ; and pause till 
you can establish a miracle, before you venture to assert 
the existence of Deity ? 

§ 8. After all, we may despair of bringing, by miracles, 
to the belief of a Deity, the man who is incapable of being 
convinced of the being of a Deity, by the phenomena that 
surround him. If in these, he see no marks of a designer, 
think you, that an event with a new and unexpected an- 
tecedent, must force him into the belief of a being en- 
dowed with power and other excellencies, far beyond the 
human % Why should this be so ? 

§ 9. But there is another consideration, which should 
be carefully kept in mind. Miracles are thought to be 
clogged with difficulties of a most peculiar character. 
The proof against miracles from the nature of the case, 
('tis argued,) is as complete as any proof, from testimony, 
in their favour, can possibly be. Then, would you have 
men suspend their belief in a God, till they get past this 
preliminary difficulty \ This were any thing but making 
the road to Theism shorter and less difficult. 

§ 10. Even let it be supposed that miracles answer the 
purpose for which they are thus brought forward : the 
proof by this method of the being of a God, is attended 



12 DEFECTS OF A POSTERIORI ARGUMENTS. 



with all the defects and disadvantages which attend that 
argument a posteriori, which is in more general use. 

§ 11. Which of the two, — the argument in general use, 
or the one drawn from miracles, for the existence of a 
Deity, gives us the more enlarged, exalted, and correct 
ideas of that Being, would constitute a question, which, 
if it be as important as it is difficult, should be followed 
out by the exclusive supporters of either method of prov- 
ing so fundamental a doctrine. 



REVIEWS 

OF 

THE DEMONSTRATIONS 

BY 

MR LOCKE, DR SAMUEL CLARKE, THE 
REV. MOSES LOWMAN, AND 
BISHOP HAMILTON, 

OF 

THE EXISTENCE AND ATTRIBUTES 



OF 

A DEITY. 



If ever so many of these proofs should fail, and be found not so con- 
clusive as they pretend to be, they can fail only for themselves. 

Bishop Hamilton. 



A REVTEW OF MR LOCKE'S DEMONSTRATION OF THE 
EXISTENCE OF A DEITY. 



§ 1. It admits not of being called in question, that, 
among the causes of speculative or theoretical atheism, 
there fall to be ranked not a few of those arguments which 
have been employed, because supposed, to evidence de- 
monstratively the being of Deity. The reasonings com- 
posing the arguments which we have in view, are of so 
faulty a description, that it need not surprise us if they 
have tended, sometimes, to make those doubt who never 
doubted before. A weak imperfect proof of the existence 
of God, when it does not leave the attentive mind in the 
exact condition in which it was found, will incline it — if 
any direct effect whatever be produced — to take the first 
step in the road to atheism. And the reader need not 
be told, that a bad argument, for a Great First Cause, 
must confirm and encourage the atheist in his disbe- 
lief. 

§ 2. On these accounts, there will be no impropriety, 
but the reverse, in examining some of those a 'priori ar- 
guments which have been more or less relied on as estab- 
lishing the primary truth of religion, and in pointing out, 
succinctly but clearly, wherein they offend against the laws 



4 



REVIEW OF 



of right reasoning. The doctrine of a God is too well 
founded to be damaged by an exposure of the weakness of 
the efforts which have been made by some of its friends. 

§ 3. The first of the arguments, supposed to be de- 
monstrative, which we shall consider, is the celebrated 
one excogitated by the master-mind of John Locke. 

§ 4. This distinguished philosopher prefaces his reason- 
ing in the following maimer. — " Though God has given 

us no innate ideas of Himself ; though He has stamped 

no original characters on our minds, wherein we may 

read his being ;" [At least, such is Mr Locke s opinion.] 
•• yet having furnished us with those faculties our minds 
" are endowed with, He hath not left himself without 
•• witness; since we have sense, perception, and reason, 
•• and cannot want a clear proof of Him, as long as we 
•• carry ourselves about us. Nor can we justly complain 

of our ignorance in this great point, since He has so 
•• plentifully provided us with the means to discover and 
iS know Him, so far as is necessary, to the end of our 
•• being, and the great concernment of our happiness. 
• ; But though this be the most obvious truth that reason 
- discovers, and though its evidence be (if I mistake not) 
• ; equal to" [he does not say identical with] " mathematical 
■• certainty; yet it requires thought and attention, and 

the mind must apply itself to a regular deduction of it 
" from some part of our intuitive knowledge, or else we 

shall be as uncertain and ignorant of this as of other 
• ; propositions, which are in themselves capable of clear 
■• demonstration.''' Essay concerning Human Under- 
standing, Book IV. chapter x. § 1. 

§ 5. Now come we to the proof itself. The first step 
in which, is the assumption, that man knows he himself 
is. Theist and atheist are agreed as to this. 

§ 6. The second step in Mr Locke's ratiocination may 
be said to be composed of the maxim, Nothing cannot 



LOCKE'S DEMONSTRATION. 



5 



produce a being. This, too, the atheist grants, at least 
in words, as readily as the theist. 

§ 7. The third step is constituted by the use made of 
the maxim, which, when taken in connection with the 
assumption, leads Mr Locke (as my Lord Brougham 
has noticed"!*) to the inference, that from eternity there 
has been something. The proof of the legitimacy of the 
inference is to this effect : What was not from eternity, 
had a beginning ; and, What had a beginning, must be pro- 
duced by something else — In other words, Whatever be- 
gins to be must have a cause. This third step, likewise, 
will be admitted by atheists. 

§ 8. The second step consists of the minor premiss, 
and the third of the conclusion, of .an epichirematic hypo- 
thetical syllogism. Or, the third step may be considered 
as consisting of the major proposition itself, — If nothing 
cannot produce the being which is, from eternity there has 
been something ; since what was not from eternity, had a 
beginning, &c. 

§ 9. Or, what we have made out to be the second and 
third steps may be considered as but one, constituted by 
the syllogism whose three propositions we have denoted. 
It is certain, that Mr Locke has made but one step of our 
two. But readers may judge in this matter for them- 
selves. The whole passage in Mr Locke is as follows. 

§ 10. "In the next place, man 
" knows by an intuitive certainty, 
" that bare nothing can no more 
" produce any real being, than it can 
Minor. i cc ^ e e q ua i to two ri g ht an gles. If a 

man knows not that non-entity, or 
the absence of all being, cannot be 
equal to two right angles, it is im- 
\ " possible he should know any de- 
t See passage cited in § 39. 



6 



REVIEW OF 



/ 1 Consequence. " monstration in Euclid. 1 Ifthere- 
i | ( 2 Assumption. " fore we know 2 there is some real 
^ 1 \ 3 Maxim. " being, and that 3 non-entity cannot 
" produce any real being, it is an evi- 

* Consequent. " dent demonstration, that 4 from 
" eternity there has been something ; 

* Proof of the " 6 since what was not from eternity, 
" had a beginning ; and what had a 
" beginning, must be produced by 

\ " something else." § 3. 

§ 11. With the next step in the reasoning begins the 
sophistry ; which as soon as ever we point out, the thing 
will be obvious enough to every reader. We shall not 
leave it to any atheist to put his finger on the weakness 
of the reasoning, and to triumph over a bad argument as 
if he had triumphed over the cause which the argument 
seeks to support, t 

§ 12. The ratiocination is contained in these words : — 
" Next, it is evident, that what had its being and beginning 
" from another, must also have all that which is in, and 
• ; belongs to its being from another too. All the powers 
'• it has must be owing to, and received from, the same 
" source. This eternal source, then, of all being, must 
" also be the source and original of all power ; and so this 
eternal being must be also the most powerful." § 4. 
§ 13. " What had its being and beginning from an- 
;i other, must also have all that which is in, and belongs 
" to its being from another too." Not perhaps too per- 
spicuous ; but it is granted. 



t " To discover," says Dr Fiddes, " the weakness of any argument in 
•• particular which may be brought to prove a fundamental article of reli- 
" gion, is not, as some pious men have too much suspected, to do religion 
" disservice, but only shews it does not stand in need of any artifices, and 
" has nothing to fear from a fair, ingenuous, and free examination." Theo- 
logia tSpeculativa, or a Body of Divinity, chap. vi. Book I. Part II. 



L OKE' S DEM N STR A T ION. 



7 



§ 14. " All the powers it has must be owing to, and 
" received from, the same source." Granted, likewise. 

§ 15. ' ; This eternal source, then, of all being, must 
" also be the source and original of all power ; and so 
" THIS eternal BEING must be also the most powerful." 
Here lies the sophism, and a mighty sophism it is. Mr 
Locke, in the first place, assumed, that I am conscious of 
my own existence. In the second place, laid down the 
maxim, Nothing cannot be the cause of an existence. In 
the third, inferred, that from eternity there has been 
SOMETHING . The nature, however, of the something was 
not determined : Something indeed there was proved to 
have always been, but it was only a vague something. 
But in this fourth step, the vague something is secretly 
held to be NOT a succession, from eternity, of things or 
beings, but an " eternal source" of all other beings, or, in 
other words, an " eternal being" the cause of all other- 
existences. Before, however, the author could have legi- 
timately arrived at such an eternal source or being, it be- 
hoved him to have demolished the hypothesis of the infi- 
nite successions of things, — the grand hypothesis of athe- 
ism, the hypothesis, we may say, into which all atheism 
must run at last.f Dr Clarke's argumentation (as my Lord 
Brougham has hinted J) sets off in pretty much the same 
track as Mr Locke's. And the Doctor (witness what is 
said under his second proposition) saw clearly the neces- 
sity of his getting over infinite successions before he could 
have the truth shining out, " that there must needs have 
" always been some Independent Being, some one at 
" least."|| 

t " All Atheism must in its account of most things * * terminate 
"in it:" So says the great Rector of St James's, (under Prop. II.) 
whose undertaking forced the truth often on his notice. 

% See below § 39. 

S| First marginal note to Prop. II. 



8 



REVIEW OF 



§ 16. The reasoning in the fifth step of Mr Locke's 
proof is of the same vicious description as the reasoning 
of the preceding step, and by the aid of the key which the 
reader must now be possessed of, he will have no diffi- 
culty in detecting the latent fallacy. 

§ 17. " Again, a man finds in himself perception and 
" knowledge. We have then got one step farther ; and we 
" are certain now, that there is not only some being, but 
" some knowing intelligent being in the world." § 5. 

§ 18. Who could at first sight have supposed, that 
under " some being," Mr Locke has an eternal being ; 
and that under " some knowing intelligent being," he has 
an eternal knowing intelligent being ? But it is certainly 
the case. For otherwise, there is no force in the passage. 
If Mr Locke do not secretly mean us to have in our 
minds an eternal knowing intelligent being, as the cause 
of man's " perception and knowledge," then the human 
race itself, for any thing shown to the contrary, has exist- 
ed from all eternity. Mr Locke's taking no notice of the 
hypothesis of the eternal succession of men, and passing 
on at once to some one eternal intelligent being, the cause 
of man ; this is the prodigious sophism. 

§ 19. The author of the Essay next proceeds to say: 
" There was a time then, when there was no knowing 
" being, and when knowledge began to be ; or else, there 
" has been also a knowing being from eternity." But 
is there no third thing which can be supposed? is it 
impossible to conceive an eternal succession of knowing 
beings such as men % or, at any rate, an eternal succes- 
sion of worlds, or systems of worlds ?f Whether the con- 

t " Though we allow, that the argument which proves that the effects 
with which we are surrounded must have been caused, and thus leads 
" us up through a chain of subordinate causes to one First Cause, has in it a 
" simplicity, an obviousness, and a force, which, when we are previously 
" furnished with the idea of God, makes it at first sight difficult to conceive, 



LOCKE'S DEMONSTRATION. 



9 



ceptiqn be possible or not, it is certain that atheists have 
told us that the thing itself is not only possible but pro- 
bable, not only probable but indubitable. How, then, 
came this acute reasoner to overlook so entirely the hypo- 
thesis of eternal successions? Just because he was by no 
means well up to the atheistical controversy : and this 
was, because there were few atheists, comparatively, in 
Mr Locke's time, and because with the writings of the 
few that were, Mr Locke had too little acquaintance^ 

" that men, under any degree of cultivation, should be inadequate to it ; 
" yet, if the human mind ever commenced such an inquiry at all, it is 
" highly probable that it would rest in the notion of an eternal succession 
" of causes and effects, rather than acquire the ideas of creation, in the 
" proper sense, and of a Supreme Creator." Richard Watson : Theo- 
logical Institutes, Page 301, vol. i. third edition. 

Thus the expounder of Methodist Divinity. Listen, next, to the 
founder of Methodism himself. " After carefully heaping up the strongest 
" arguments I could find in either ancient or modern authors, for the 
" very being of a God, and (which is nearly connected with it) the 
" existence of an invisible world, I have wandered up and down, musing 
" with myself: 'What, if all these things which I see around me, 
" c this earth and heaven, this universal frame, has existed from eternity ? 
" e What, if that melancholy supposition of the old poet be the real 
" ' case, — 

0/?j tig (puWuv yzvzri, roirjdt xai avdgojv ; 

" ' What, if the generation of men be exactly parallel with the genera- 
" £ tion of leaves ? if the earth drops its successive inhabitants just as the 
" ' tree drops its leaves ? What, if that saying of a great man be really 
" < true ?— 

" ' Post mortem nihil est, ipsaque mors nihil : 
" ' Death is nothing, and nothing is after death. 

" ' How am I sure that this is not the case ; that I have not followed 
" f cunningly-devised fables ?' — And I have pursued the thought till there 
" was no spirit in me, and I was ready to choose strangling rather than 
" life." Wesley's Works, vol. vi. p. 35G. 

It is true, that J ohn Wesley was but a young man, when he mused 
with himself after such a manner. 

t " I am not so well read in Hobbes and Spinoza, as to be able to 
" say,"— &c. &c.—Mr Locke's third letter to the Bishop of Worcester. 



10 



REVIEW OF 



Atheism would want all serviceable backing, but for her 
gratuitously furnished eternal successions of things. 

§ 20. " If it be said," continues Mr Locke, " there 
" was a time when no being had any knowledge, when 
" that eternal being was void of all understanding ; I 
" reply, that then it was impossible there should ever 
" have been any knowledge." Granting the secret as- 
sumption (one the author had no right to make till he 
had established his claim to it — a thing he never did — ) 
which lies hid in these words, namely, that there is an 
eternal being, the cause of all things else ; if this being 
was at one time void of all understanding, then the con- 
clusion, that no knowledge, or understanding, could ever 
be, is irrefragable : Because, the conclusion just depends 
upon this axiom, That what is not of intelligence cannot 
make intelligence beoin to be — An axiom which is inca- 
pable of proof, and incapable of being doubted. 

§ 21. What follows in the Essay is most unexcep- 
tionable, and let those deniers of a God (they are a 
pitiful minority even of atheists) who ascribe all the in- 
telligence which is in the universe to mere accident, or 
chance, or hap-hazard, look to it. 

§ 22. "It being as impossible that things wholly void 
" of knowledge, and operating blindly, and without any 
" perception, should produce a knowing being ; as it is 
" impossible, that a triangle should make itself three 
" angles bigger than two right ones. For it is as repug- 
" nant to the idea of senseless matter, that it should put 

into itself sense, perception, and knowledge ; as it is 
" repugnant to the idea of a triangle, that it should put 
44 into itself greater angles than two right ones." § 5. 

8 23. Mr Locke then sets himself to give the sub- 
stance of what he had advanced. " Thus," says he, 
" from the consideration of ourselves, and what we infal- 
" libly find in our own constitutions, our reason leads us 



LOCKE'S DEMONSTRATION. 



11 



" to the knowledge of this certain and evident truth, that 
" there is an eternal, most powerful, and most knowing 
". Being ; which, whether any one will please to call God, 
" it matters not." (§ 6.) It matters not, indeed, whe- 
ther an eternal, most powerful, and most knowing Being, 
be called God, or not ; except as testing the worthiness, 
or the perverseness, of men : but it certainly matters, and 
matters very much, whether the existence of an eternal, 
most powerful, and most knowing Being, has been proved. 
That Mr Locke, with all his reasoning powers, has not 
proved it in the passages which we have examined, will 
now be perfectly obvious to all attentive readers. Mr 
Locke has taken no notice whatever of the greatest diffi- 
culty in his way. If there was any obstacle more weighty 
than another in the case, that obstacle he has never once 
regarded. He has not unloosed the knot ; neither has he 
cut it : he never saw it. 

§ 24. After briefly adverting to Des Cartes' argu- 
ment for the existence of a God — which, by the way, 
could be no favourite with the implacable enemy of innate 
principles, of whatever so much as bordered on the re- 
gion of innate principles, or bore the most distant resem- 
blance to them ; — after adverting to Des Cartes' argu- 
ment, Mr Locke proceeds in this manner : " Though 
" our own being furnishes us, as I have shewn, with an 
" evident and incontestible proof of a Deity ; and I be- 
" lieve nobody can avoid the cogency of it, who will but 
" as carefully attend to it, as to any other demonstration 
"of so many parts ; yet this being so fundamental a 
" truth, and of that consequence that all religion and 
" genuine morality depend thereon, I doubt not but I 
" shall be forgiven by my reader, if I go over some 
" parts of this argument again, and enlarge a little more 
; ' upon them/' § 7. 

§ 25. Our author then repeats, and dilucidates, the 



12 



REVIEW OF 



truth, that something (be the thing what it may ) has 
always been. 

§ 26. Next, he divides all things into two classes, to wit, 
" such as are purely material," and such as are " sen- 
" sible, thinking, perceiving beings,'* or, " incogitative" 
and " cogitative" beings ; " which," he observes, " to our 
" present purpose, if for nothing else, are perhaps better 
" terms than material and immaterial.''' § 9. 

§ 27. Mr Locke afterwards proceeds : " If then there 
" must be something eternal, let us see what sort of being 
" it must be. And so that, it is very obvious to reason, 
" that it must necessarily be A cogitative being." (§ 10.) 
Of what character the sophism is which runs through 
this passage, he who reflects on the contents of the 
fifteenth section of this review will be at no loss to com- 
prehend. Something is eternal: this Mr Locke proved. 
But the question is, what is the something ? And Mr 
Locke assumes it, without any proof, to be one being, 
and not a succession of beings, or things. If it has been 
determined, that some one definite being must be eternal, 
it is very well to enter on the question whether it is 
cogitative, or incogitative : But till the something be 
proved to be not a succession of beings, but, on the con- 
trary, only one being, it is rather premature to inquire 
whether the one (the " it") thinks or no. 

§ 28. What in the Essay immediately succeeds the 
words which we last cited, is intended to evince, that 
the purely incogitative, alone, can never be the cause of 
cogitative substance. This, indeed, is shown most tri- 
umphantly. The passage, the incontrovertible passage, 
cannot be too often repeated in the hearing of those 
persons who are chargeable with the stupidly credulous 
folly of conceiving, or rather with the sin of saying they 
can conceive, that Matter, considered as altogether un- 
intelligent, did, by some chance-accident or other, cause 



LOCKE'S DEMONSTRATION. 



13 



the first thinking that ever was to start into existence. 
As we have a wider object in view than that of merely 
considering the merits of Mr Locke's demonstration, we 
need make no apology for introducing so long a quota- 
tion as the one which our reader is about to run over. 
Tis a splendid passage : The argument none the worse 
for having been evolved by both metaphysicians and 
theologians before our author's time, and since. 

§ 29. "It is as impossible to conceive that ever bare 
" incogitative matter should produce a thinking, intelli- 
" gent being, as that nothing should of itself produce 
" matter. Let us suppose any parcel of matter eternal, 
" great or small, we shall find it, in itself, able to produce 
" nothing. For example ; let us suppose the matter 
" of the next pebble we meet with, eternal, closely 
" united, and the parts firmly at rest together ; if there 
" were no other being in the world, must it not eternally 
" remain so, a dead, inactive lump ? Is it possible to 
" conceive it can add motion to itself, being purely 
" matter, or produce anything % Matter, then, by its 
" own strength, cannot produce in itself so much as 
" motion : the motion it has, must also be from eternity, 
" or else be produced, and added to matter, by some 
" other being more powerful than matter ; matter, as is 
" evident, having not power to produce motion in itself. 
" But let us suppose motion eternal too ; yet matter, 
" incogitative matter and motion, whatever changes it 
" might produce of figure and bulk, could never produce 
" thought : knowledge will still be as far beyond the 
" power of motion and matter to produce, as matter is 
" beyond the power of nothing, or non-entity, to produce. 
" AND I APPEAL TO EVERY ONE'S OWN THOUGHTS, 
" WHETHER HE CANNOT AS EASILY CONCEIVE MATTER 
" PRODUCED BY NOTHING, AS THOUGHT TO BE PRO- 
" DUCED BY PURE MATTER, WHEN BEFORE THERE WAS 



14 



REVIEW OF 



" NO SUCH THING AS THOUGHT, OR AN INTELLIGENT 
" BEING EXISTING? Divide matter into as minute parts 
" as you will (which we are apt to imagine a sort of 
" spiritualizing, or making a thinking thing of it), vary 
tk the figure and motion of it as much as you please ; a 
" globe, cube, cone, prism, cylinder, &c, whose diameters 
" are but 1,000,000th part of a gry,t will operate no 
" otherwise upon other bodies of proportionable bulk, 
" than those of an inch, or foot diameter ; and you may 
" as rationally expect to produce sense, thought, and 
" knowledge, by putting together, in a certain figure and 
" motion, gross particles of matter, as by those that are 
" the very minutest, that do any where exist. They 
" knock, impel, and resist one another, just as the 
" greater do, and that is all they can do. So that, if 
" we will suppose nothing first, or eternal, matter can 
" never begin to be : if we suppose bare matter, without 
" motion, eternal, motion can never begin to be : if we 
" suppose only matter and motion first, or eternal, 
" thought can never begin to be." 

§ 30. The proposition which follows, though joined 
to the citation just made by the causal " for," has in 
reality no connection, of the kind the particle was in- 
tended to denote, with that which precedes. The sen- 
tences already quoted by us go to show, that bare matter 
cannot be the free cause of a thinking substance :J The 

f " A gry is one-tenth of a line, a line one-tentli of an inch, an inch 
" one-tenth of a philosophical foot, a philosophical foot one-third of a pen- 
" dulum, whose diadroms, in the latitude of 45 degrees, are each equal to 
" one second of time, or one sixtieth of a minute. I have affectedly made 
" use of this measure here, and the parts of it, under a decimal division, 
" with names to them ; because, I think, it would be of general conve- 
(i nience, that this should be the common measure, in the commonwealth of 
" letters." 

\ We may take this opportunity of remarking, that however excellent 
the sentences alluded to in the text are in themselves, they had no business 



LOCKE'S DEMONSTRATION. 



15 



sentence which succeeds in the Essay touches on a very 
different topic, the impossibility, to wit, there is that 
matter should have been, from all eternity, in necessary 
hypostatical union with thought. The fact we state 
seems to have eluded the observation of Mr Locke's 
critics, who are not always blessed with perfect perspica- 
city :f Indeed, the fact seems to have entirely escaped 
the notice of Mr Locke himself. Let our readers now 
judge whether what we advance be not well-founded. 

§ 31. " FOR it is impossible to conceive that matter, 
" either with, or without motion, could have originally 
" in, and from, itself, sense, perception, and knowledge, 
<: as is evident from hence, that THEN sense, perception, 
" and knowledge, must be a property eternally inseparable 
" from matter, and every particle of it." 

§ 32. Our author continues thus : " Not to add, 
" that though our general or specific conception of mat- 
" ter makes us speak of it as one thing, yet really all 
" matter is not one individual tiling, neither is there any 
" such thing existing as one material being, or one single 
" body, that we know or can conceive." 

§ 33. " And therefore," proceeds Mr Locke, " if 
" matter were the eternal first cogitative Being" — What 
eternal [first cogitative] Being did Mr Locke mean? 
The one eternal Being whose existence he had assumed, 
without, as it happened, any proof for the same. For 
unless he meant that, he was writing beside his purpose. 
" And therefore if matter were the eternal first cogitative 

to make their appearance where they are. Mr Locke is inquiring whether 
the eternal being he speaks of must be supposed cogitative or not : and 
not whether incogitative matter, supposing incogitative matter eternal, 
could have produced intelligence. 

t To instance in living critics : Mr J. A. St John speaks of the Essay's 
'■' rigorous demonstration of the existence of a God." Introductory 
Essay to Mr Locke's " Reasonableness of Christianity/' And for another, 
and a very similar opinion, see § 39 of the text. 



16 



REVIEW OF 



" Being, there would not be one eternal infinite cogitative 
" Being, but an infinite numberf of eternal finite cogi- 
" tative beings, independent one of another, of limited 
" force, and distinct thoughts, which could never produce 
" that order, harmony, and beauty, which are to be found 
" in nature." There seems to be (in one view, at all 
events, of the affair) some, and no slight, confusion of 
thought in this place. The proposition is a hypothetical 
one. In the antecedent, (i. e. " if matter were the eternal 
" first cogitative Being,") matter is for the time identified 
with Mr Locke's one eternal [first cogitative] Being — got 
at as this was by very unjustifiable means — and, so, the mat- 
ter is invested with unity ; we mean, is considered as com- 
posing one whole : while, in the consequent, this procedure 
is secretly held as revoked, and the same matter is viewed 
as a congeries of things, each of which, like so much quick- 
silver, would be ready to break up into parts, upon parts, 
as soon as one should attempt to lay a finger on't. — 
Besides : In the previous sentence, Mr Locke had told us 
(falsely enough, we believe) that there neither is, nor can 
be, " Any such thing existing as ONE material being, or 
" one single body." J How, then, can there be, and he 
supposes there can be, " an infinite number," or at least 
any possible number, of material beings, that is, of bodies \ 
Since there cannot be one, there cannot be many. 

§ 34. Our author concludes the department of the 
subject he is upon, thus : " Since, therefore, whatsoever 
" is the first eternal Being," — whose existence is unwar- 
rantably assumed, — " must necessarily be cogitative ;" 
(of which Mr Locke gave you such proof as he thought 

t As to the absurdity involved in " an infinite number" in the strict 
sense of the terms, see Mr Locke himself in Book II. ch. xvii. § 8. § 13. — 
From these sections, two passages are quoted in the " Examination 
Appendix to Part iv. § 6. 

% The third part of our " Examination" sets at rest, it is trusted, the 
question, whether or no there is one material being, that is, one body, in 
existence. 



LOCKE'S DEMONSTRATION. 



17 



proper ;) " and whatsoever is first of all things, must 
" necessarily contain in it, and actually have, at least, all 
" the perfections that can ever after exist ; nor can it ever 
" give to another any perfection that it hath not, either 
" actually in itself, or at least in a higher degree : it ne- 
" cessarily follows, that the first eternal Being cannot be 
" matter." (§ 10.) Take the two positions which are 
here given as premises, take them, we say, as a whole, 
and they can by no. means be gainsayed; but the mis- 
fortune is that the atheist (and the author, in this place, 
is to be held as dealing with atheists only) — the atheist 
will never be induced to grant that there IS a "first of 
" all things" in the sense in which Mr Locke understands 
the words. Were an atheist to admit Mr Locke! s ori- 
ginal thing, the free cause of all else, he would be no 
longer an atheist. To be a cause, in the proper sense of 
the term, implies to be intelligent.^ 

§ 35. The author of the Essay prosecutes his subject 
in this way : "If therefore it be evident, that something 
" necessarily must exist from eternity, it is also as evident 
" that that something must necessarily be a cogitative 
" Being." It is not even evident, at least atheists say it 
is not evident, that the eternal something must be a Be- 
ing, in contradistinction to a succession, or related suc- 
cessions, of beings. The unity must be proved before Mr 
Locke can legitimately advance to the cogitativeness — 
otherwise, little to his purpose can be accomplished. — 
But we interrupted Mr Locke, who was saying, that his 
" something must necessarily be a cogitative Being : FOR " 
(mark the transition to the proof) " it is as impossible, 
" that incogitative matter should produce a cogitative 

t " Upon an accurate analysis of the meaning of words," [At least, 
upon an accurate analysis of the nature of ideas,] " it will be found that 
" the idea of an efficient cause implies the idea of Mind." — Dugald 
Stewart : Encyclopaedia Britannica, vol. i. p. 2G6. 

B 



18 



REVIEW OF 



k ' Being-, as that nothing, or the negation of all being, should 
" produce a positive being or matter." (§ 11.) It is im- 
possible, that nothing, or negation, should produce any- 
thing : and it is impossible, that incogitative matter 
should produce cogitation : But neither of these two 
true propositions, nor yet both together, do prove that 
Mr Locke's eternal something is not a succession, or 
successions, of things, or that the said ETERNAL SOME- 
THING must be supposed cogitative. Points, these, which 
he who carefully ponders the affair in all its bearings, 
will perceive by abundance of irresistible evidence. 

§ 36. Two things Mr Locke undertakes to do. The 
one is, to demonstrate " the necessary existence of an eter- 

nal mind :"t the other, to make clear, that God is not 
material. Having gone over the proof adduced as to the 
necessary existence of an eternal mind, we are arrived at 
the place where the author begins to unfold a separate 
proof on the point of immateriality. A separate proof, 
I say ; for these two topics, the existence of God, and 
the immateriality of God, are, to some extent, mingled 
together, in portions of the ground we have passed. J 
But inasmuch as the validity of the first of the proofs 
would require to be assumed, ere we could be properly 
enabled to weio-h the intrinsic force of the second; 'tis 
not our intention to follow Mr Locke any farther. Since 
we have been at some pains to expose the inconclusive- 
ness of the first demonstration, we shall by no means take 
for granted now, that it is irrefragable. 

§ 37. We may notice that there is a third distinct 
point which Mr Locke endeavours to establish. The 
third position is to the effect that matter is not co-eter- 
nal with an eternal mind. But throughout the attempt 
to prove the new proposition, the author assumes (what 

t These words are taken from § 12 of the Essay. 
% See, for instance, § 34, above. 



LOCKE'S DEMONSTRATION. 



19 



we cannot well assume), that all the precedent reason- 
ings are unimpeachable. 

§ 38. By way of conclusion, we shall bestow a slight 
consideration on a passage which occurs in the work of a 
famous living author. Lord Brougham has the follow- 
ing paragraph in the fourth section of his " Discourse of 
Natural Theology." 

§ 39. " The tenth chapter of Mr Locke's fourth 
" book does not materially differ, in its fundamen- 
" tal position, from the ' Demonstration of the Being 
" ' and Attributes.' The argument is all drawn from 
(i the truth, assumed as self-evident, ' Nothing can 
" ' no more produce any real being than it can be equal to 
" ' two right angles.' From this, and the knowledge we 
" have of our own existence, it is shown to follow, that 
" * from eternity there has been something ;' and again, 
" ' that this eternal being must have been most power- 
" ' ful and most knowing,' and ' therefore God.' The 
'* only difference between this argument and Dr Clarke s 
' is, that Mr Locke states, as one of his propositions, our 
' knowledge of our own existence. But this difference 
' is only in appearance ; for Dr Clarke really has as- 
' sumed what Mr Locke has more logically made a dis- 
£ tinct proposition. Dr Clarke's first proposition, that 
' something must have existed from all eternity, is de- 
' monstrated by shewing the absurdity of the supposi- 
' tion that ' the things which now are were produced 
£ 1 out of nothing.' He therefore assumes the existence 
• of those things, while Mr Locke more strictly assumes 
' the existence of ourselves only, and indeed states it as a 
c proposition. The other arguments of Mr Locke are 
1 more ingenious than Dr Clarke's, and the whole rea- 
' sorting is more rigorous, although he does not give it 
£ the name of a demonstration, and scarcely can be said 
' to treat it as proving the Deity's existence to be a 



20 



REVIEW OF 



" necessary truth. Were it to be so considered, the ob- 
" jections formerly stated would apply to it. Indeed, if 
" Dr Clarke had stated the different steps of his reason- 
" ing as distinctly as Mr Locke, he would have perceived 
" it to be inconclusive beyond a very limited extent, and 
' ; to that extent inductive "\ 

§ 40. Such are the words of a writer who has made 
out, to his own satisfaction, that Natural Theology is but 
a branch of inductive science. 

§ 41. Whether Mr Locke 1 s " whole reasoning" be as 
" rigorous' 1 as Lord Brougham has represented it to be, 
our readers can now settle for themselves. 

§ 42. Mr Locke " does not give" " the name of a de- 
" monstration" to his reasoning: So Lord Brougham 
would have us understand. But that Mr Locke does 
consider his reasoning to be truly demonstrative, the 
words cited in the [ twenty-fourth section put past all 
doubt. Eut to make assurance doubly sure : In the Es- 
say, Book IV., chapter iii., § 21, it is said, " we have 
" * * * a demonstrative knowledge of the exist- 
" ence of a God." And in the second section of the 
ninth chapter of the same Book, this affirmation occurs : 
" I say then, that we have the knowledge * * * 
" of the existence of God, by demonstration." 

§ 43. And that Mr Locke was not unwilling to give 
his reasoning the name of a demonstration, just because 
he deemed it to have the nature of a real one, is made 
sufficiently obvious by the sentence wherein he insinuates, 
that the evidence of his argument will be found equal to 

t " See particularly Mr Locke's proofs of his first position. (Hum. 
" Understanding, IV. x. sec. 2.)" 

Mr Locke's first position is, Man knows that he himself is. Mr 
Locke's " proofs" of this position may do every thing but prove it. 
Proofs to me, that I am conscious of thinking, were proofs where proofs 
should not be. To prove to myself, that I am, were to doubt it : And not 
to prove it, is to believe it. 



LOCKE'S DEMONSTRATION. 



21 



matfiematical certainty.] Is not mathematical evidence 
demonstration 1 

§ 44. Mr Locks " scarcely can be said to treat" his 
reasoning " as proving the Deity's existence to be a 
" necessary truth." Lord Brougham asserts this, but 
the assertion is directly contrary to the fact ; for, in the 
very chapter where the reasoning in question occurs, the 
author of the Essay alludes to it as constituting a " dis- 
covery" of " the necessary existence of an eternal mind." J 

§ 45. A sad day it would have been for the funda- 
mental truth of all religion, had not kind Heaven de- 
creed otherwise, when his Lordship wrote all that is 
within the boards of his volume, evincing, to his own 
contentment, that Natural Theology is no more than 
one of the branches of Experimental Philosophy. 



A REVIEW OF " A DEMONSTRATION OF THE BEING 
" AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. MORE PARTICULAR- 
« LY IN ANSWER TO MR HOBBES, SPINOZA, AND 
" THEIR FOLLOWERS." BY DR SAMUEL CLARKE. 

§ 1. Nothing appears to be more unaccountable, than 
that, if there be a necessarily existing Being, there can 
be no way of proving it. To say so, seems absurd. And 
if there be any way of proving, there is a necessarily ex- 
isting Being, it must, of course, be by arguments drawn 
from the necessity of the thing. Beasonings a -posteriori 
can show what may be, or, is : they cannot show what 
must be. To hold, therefore, that a priori reasoning 

t See § 4, above. 

| These words -will be found in § 12, as a previous note made the 
reader aware. 



22 



REVIEW OF 



in the matter can never turn to any account, is to hold, 
that we can never prove a necessarily existing Being. 
Indeed, if a priori reasoning in the matter can never turn 
to any account, what does this show but that it is impos- 
sible, there can be a necessarily existing Being? And 
for one to believe what he can have no proof for, and 
what is impossible, is surely extravagant. 

§ 2. Nay, must we not suppose, that if there be, indeed, 
a necessary Being, the demonstration of this existence 
must be very easily reached, and, when set down, irre- 
sistible \ If a necessarily existing Being is not one whose 
being is a sine QUA NON, and must be supposed as a SINE 
QUA non, of every thing else, what can be understood by 
such \ And if we must suppose that Being as a sine qua 
NON of every other thing, surely, the proof of the exist- 
ence of that Being is not difficult to be attained to, or 
rather, is impossible to be avoided. 

§ 3. And, as, if there be a necessary Being, it would 
appear, that the proof must be close within our reach, so, 
there can be, substantially, but oneway of exhibiting the 
demonstration. For a necessarily existing Being is one 
whose Being is a sine qua non of every other thing. 
We can know of his existence only by his modes : His 
modes, therefore, of existing must be the SINE QUA NON 
of all else : We, surely, may easily see what things are 
the SINE QUA NON of every other existence. We know 
of two things,t and two only, that are the SINE QUA NON 
of every other existence. And 'tis attempted to be de- 
monstrated,;!: that, from these two, we must infer the 
existence of a necessarily existing Being, the intelligent 
cause of all things. 

§ 4. Br Clarke, in his " Demonstration of the Being and 
" Attributes of God," " in answer to Mr Hobbes, Spinoza, 

t /. e. Extension and Duration. 

| Vis. in " The Argument, a priori,'' &c. 



CLARKE'S DEMONSTRATION. 



23 



" and their followers," hath not sufficiently attended to 
this, that if there be a necessary Being, his existence 
must be deduced, if deduced at all, from those things that 
are the SINE QUA NON of all else ; those things being the 
modes of his existing. And, accordingly, the Doctor's 
Demonstration is no more than a pretended one. It is 
wholly, and evidently, inconclusive. 

§ 5. The whole of that Demonstration hangs upon the 
second proposition. This Dr Clarke virtually acknow- 
ledges : — " Either there has always Existed some one 
" Unchangeable and Independent Being, from which all 
" other Beings that are or ever were in the Universe, have 
4i receiv'd their Original ; or else there has been an infi- 
" nite Succession of changeable and dependent Beings 
" produced one from another in an endless Progression, 
" without any Original Cause at all. Now this latter 
" Supposition is so very absurd, that tho' all Atheism 
" must in its Account of most things (as shall be shown 
" hereafter) terminate in it, yet I think very few Atheists 
" ever were so weak as openly and directly to defend it." 
Here he confesses that all Atheism must, in its account of 
most things, terminate in the supposition of an infinite 
succession of dependent beings. It is incumbent on him, 
therefore, to get over that barrier. And this he has, in 
the place in question, undertaken to do. So that, if the 
reasoning in this second proposition be sophistical, the 
whole fabric must fall to pieces, of itself. 

§ 6. How, then, does this Author attempt to prove his 
proposition, that there has existed from eternity, some one 
unchangeable and independent Being ? Let us admit the 
goodness of his dilemma : Let us observe how he esta- 
blishes the first member, and disproves the second. This 
he does not do by demonstrating the existence of a Being 
with the supposition of whose existence the supposition 
of an infinite succession of dependent beings, is utterly in- 



24 



REVIEW OF 



compatible : But he attempts to do it by first considering 
and demolishing the hypothesis of infinite succession ; and 
the second member of the dilemma being (he thinks) re- 
moved out of the way, the first remains as true. 

§ 7. We must, then, carefully examine how he pro- 
ceeds to demolish infinite succession. And to be enabled 
to weigh accurately the validity of the process of reason- 
ing which he uses, it must be premised, that an infinite 
succession is an eternal succession, and an eternal succes- 
sion is a necessary succession of dependent beings. An in- 
finite succession means a succession of infinity of duration,! 

t Indeed, an infinite succession is an expression most improper. Thi 
may be drawn from the following passage in Mr Locke. The author is 
more particularly considering one of the kinds of infinity, but the spirit 
of the remarks is, of course, as applicable to infinity of duration, or what 
is of infinity of duration, as to infinity of space. — 

" Difference between infinity of space, and space infinite. — Though our 
" idea of infinity arise from the contemplation of quantity, and the end- 
" less increase the mind is able to make in quantity, by the repeated ad- 
" ditions of what portions thereof it pleases ; yet I guess we cause great 
" confusion in our thoughts, when we join infinity to any supposed idea 
" of quantity the mind can be thought to have, and so discourse or reason 
4i about an infinite quantity, viz., an infinite space, or an infinite duration. 
,( For our idea of infinity being, as I think, an endless growing idea, by 
" the idea of any quantity the mind has, being at that time terminated in 
" that idea (for be it as great as it will, it can be no greater than it is,) 
" to join infinity to it, is to adjust a standing measure to a growing bulk ; 
" and, therefore, I think it is not an insignificant subtilty, if I say, that 
•• we are carefully to distinguish between the idea of the" [Strictly, per- 
haps even the the should not be here.] " infinity of space, and the idea of a 
" space infinite. The first is nothing but a supposed endless progression 
" of the mind, over what repeated ideas of space it pleases; but to have 
" actually in the mind the idea of a space infinite, is to suppose the mind 
" already passed over, and actually to have a view of all those repeated 
: ' ideas of space which an endless repetition can never totally represent 
"to it ; which carries in it a plain contradiction." Essay concerning 
Human Understanding, B. IV. chap. xvii. § 7- 

When, therefore, an infinite succession, or series, or similar phrases are 
here used ; the use being improper, 'tis in compliance merely with the 
language of the proposition which is analyzed. 



CLARKE'S DEMONSTRATION. 



25 



and this is convertible with an eternal succession. If an 
eternal succession be not a necessary succession, what were a 
necessary succession 1 or, why were an eternal not a neces- 
sary succession ? Let it just be added, it is plain enough, 
that an eternal or a nec'essary succession, is one that has 
not, that cannot have, a cause. — We are, now, prepared 
to inquire into the justness of Br Clarke's reasoning*. 

§ 8. " If we consider," says he, " such an infinite Pro- 
" gression, as One entire Endless Series of Dependent Be- 
" ings ; 'tis plain this whole Series of Beings can have no 
;< Cause from without, of its Existence ; because in it are 
" supposed to be included all Things that are or ever were 
; ' in the Universe." We may add another reason why an 
infinite progression can have no cause from without : Sim- 
ply, because it can have no cause at all. Ex hypothesi, it 
is without a cause. 

§ 9. Br Clarke goes on : " And 'tis plain it can have no 
" Reason within itself, of its Existence ; because no one 
" Being in this Infinite Succession is supposed to be Self- 
- ; existent or Necessary, (which is the only Ground or 
" Reason of Existence of any thing, that can be imagined 
; ' within the thing itself, as will presently more fully ap- 
" pear,) but every one Dependent on the foregoing." Here 
an especial reason is given, why an endless series can have 
no reason within itself of its existence : as if it were not 
enough to say, that an endless series can have no cause 
within itself, because it can have no cause at all. That 
succession must sink its pretensions to being infinite, which 
has, which can have, a cause, let the cause be from with- 
out, or within itself. *f 

§ 10. " Where no Part is necessary, 'tis manifest," con- 
tinues Br Clarke, " the Whole cannot be necessary." How 

t Does any meaning lie in tlie words, A thing lias the cause of its ex- 
istence within itself, other than this, The thing is its own cause ? And 
that which is the cause of itself, existed before it existed. And that a 
thing should be while it is not, contradicts, Whatever is, is. 

C 



26 



REVIEW OF 



comes it that we here meet with the parts, with the whole, 
of an infinite succession \ The applying to what is infi- 
nite of these terms, of all terms taken from the category 
of quantity, if they are used otherwise than as mere figures 
of speech, is absurd, in the last degree : unless, (for we 
must limit the assertion,) what is infinite can be finite. 
It may be safely allowed, that the words, Where no part 
is necessary, the whole cannot be necessary, would be to 
the purpose were the question, 7s the succession infinite 
or necessary, or is it not ? For, 'tis certain, no such rea- 
soning ; 'tis certain, no reasoning whatever, can prove a 
necessary succession is not a necessary succession ; else, a 
thing might both be and not be at once. 

§11. An explanation, of absolute necessity succeeds : 
" Absolute Necessity of Existence, not being an extrin- 
" sick, relative, and accidental Denomination ; but an in- 

ward and essential Property of the Nature of the Thing 

which so Exists." Could it be supposed, after what has 
been urged, that these words lay in the way, the first la- 
bour would properly be confined to the humble task of 
discovering fully their meaning. But whatever they are 
intended to bring out concerning absolute necessity, they 
cannot lie in the way : for as long as it holds good, that 
whatever is, is, a necessary succession must continue a ne- 
cessary succession. 

§ 12. Then follows the conclusion, at which Dr Clarke 
arrives by virtue of the foregoing reasoning : " An infinite 

Succession therefore of merely Dependent Beings, with - 
" out any Original Independent Cause ; is a Series of Be- 
" ings, that has neither Necessity, nor Cause, nor any Rea- 
" son or Ground at all of its Existence, either within it- 
" self ox from without.^' That it required any proof (as 

t Wherein is the cause of a thing a whit behind the reason or the 
ground of it ? Let this be pointed out. 

And is an infinite or a necessary series, in truth a series that has no ne- 
cessity ? 



CLARKE'S DEMONSTRATION. 



27 



the illative particle intimates) to shew, that a succession 
or series which can have no cause, has no cause, must, 
under leave, be altogether denied. With the illative 
particle, or without it, the passage, by itself, is faultless ; 
unless an identical proposition be something faulty. 

§ 13. Having proved, as he thinks, that an infinite 
succession of dependent beings has no cause : " That is," 
he adds^ " 'tis" (to wit, an infinite series is) " an express 
" Contradiction and Impossibility ;"[why ?] " 'tis a sup- 
" posing Something to be caused (because 'tis granted in 
" every one of its Stages of Succession, not to be necessarily 
" and of itself ;) and yet that, in the whole, 'tis caused ab- 
" solutely by Nothing." So that the whole of this argu- 
mentation at last resolves itself into this, that a succes- 
sion which has no cause is an impossibility, for the rea- 
son that it has no cause ! 

§ 14. The next sentence proceeds thus : " Which" 
(namely, a supposing something to be caused that is not 
caused) " every Man knows is a Contradiction to imagine 
" done in Time ;" [Nothing more certain.] " and, because 
" Duration in this case makes no Difference, 'tis equally a 
" Contradiction to suppose it done from Eternity''' Was 
it not unnecessary to assign a reason, why it is a contra- 
diction, supposing something to be caused from eternity, 
that is not caused % A reason, nevertheless, is given : 
Because supposing something to be caused that is not 
caused, is a contradiction in relation to time. 

§ 15. No wonder, that by such close and exact reason- 
ing, this author should have succeeded so well in demo- 
lishing an infinite succession of dependent beings \\ 

t The reader may be edified, and seriously amused, by the treatment 
which eternal succession has received from a more modern hand. 

" As to the idea which some atheists have pleaded for, of an eternal 
" succession of finite beings, such as we witness at present without sup- 
" posing any original uncaused Being, it is evidently inconsistent with 



28 



REVIEW OF 



§ 16. In a word, the sophistry, the plain sophistry, 
lies in assuming that a succession which can have no 
cause, must have a cause. If we but remember what in- 
finite succession means, Dr Clarke s reasoning will ap- 
pear nothing- more than ingenious trifling. How far one 
might succeed in shewing, that a succession of dependent 
beings, cannot be infinite, just because it is a succession 
ofdependent beings, needs not here be inquired. "Tis 
certain, that, once grant, a succession is infinite, eternal, 
necessary, it will never do to retract the admission, and 
argue as if the succession were not infinite, or eternal, or 
necessary : which you do, most decidedly, by assuming 
that it must have a cause. 

§ 17. To the same purpose as the preceding examina- 
tion of what Dr Clarke advances in his second proposi- 
tion, are the following remarks of Mr Hume : " In trac- 

••' reason, and with itself. For it affirms that to be true of the parlf 
•• which it denies with respect to the whole :f every particular being in 
" the series, upon that supposition, depends upon a preceding one, yet 
" the whole\ depends upon nothing ; as if it were affirmed that there 
" could be a chain infinitely long, each link of which was supported by 
•• the next, and so on, in each instance, and yet the whole absolutely de- 
•• pended upon nothing.^ The difficulty of supposing a being beginning 
" to exist without a cause, is not at all lessened by supposing an eternal 
" succession of such beings ; for unless there be some first Being, on 

whom all the rest depend, it is evident the whole series hang upon no- 
•• thing, which is altogether as impossible as that any one in particular 
■• should. Hence it is evident, there must have always been some one 
k - intelligent Being, whose existence is uncaused and absolutely eternal, 
" unchangeable and independent." Rev. Robert HalVs Works, vol. v. p. 4. 

A shred of the mantle of the Great Rector of $t James's has been 
caught (too surely !) by his successors in one of the by-paths in theology. 
It has descended, like an heir-loom, in the family of the demolishers of 
that in finite progression which has a limit somewhere. 

t See § 10 of the text. 

X From Wollaston to Hall of Leicester, every destroyer of the eternal progression 
of miites has hung himself in chains over against that chain which, infinitely long 
in itself though it be, has yet a point of suspension, and a topmost link. 



CLARKE'S DEMONSTRATION. 



29 



" ing an eternal succession of objects, it seems absurd to 
" inquire for a general cause or first author. How can 
" any thing, that exists from eternity, have a cause, since 
" that relation implies a priority in time, and a begin- 
££ ning of existence? 

" In such a chain, too, or succession of objects, each 

part is caused by that which preceded it, and causes 
" that which succeeds it. Where then is the difficulty \ 
" But the WHOLE, you say, wants a cause. I answer, that 
" the uniting of these parts into a whole, like the unit- 
" ing of several distinct countries into one kingdom, or 
(S several distinct members into one body, is performed 
" merely by an arbitrary act of the mind, and has no in- 
" fluence on the nature of things. Did I show you the 
" particular causes of each individual in a collection of 
* 4 twenty particles of matter, I should think it very un- 
" reasonable, should you afterwards ask me, what was 

the cause of the whole twenty. This is sufficiently 
" explained in explaining the cause of the parts." Dia- 
logues concerning Natural Religion, Part IX. 

§ 18. T)r Clarke was not so well satisfied with the 
manner in which he had succeeded in destroying infinite 
succession, but that he twice renews the attack ; but 
what has been offered will furnish a key to open up the 
secrets of the sophistry which may be contained in what 
he farther advances. 

§ 19. As we are considering the " Demonstration of the 
" Being and Attributes of God," let us, before leaving the 
subject, attend to the proposition by virtue of which the 
author was entitled to advance to the one which has 
been examined. The faulty reasoning which we have 
observed, is an essential defect ; a defect, therefore, for 
which no correctness throughout the rest of the argu- 
ment could atone : And yet, there is something more that 
is objectionable. 



30 



REVIEW OF 



§ 20. In his first proposition, Dr Clarke undertakes to 
prove, that something always was, from the postulate, 
something* is. He does not lay it down as an axiom, 
Whatever begins to be must have a cause : by means 
of which he might have demonstrated, most strictly, 
that something always was. But without the help of this 
axiom he, magnanimously, sets about proving, that some- 
thing always was, if he is but granted the premiss, some- 
thing is. He is cautious enough, however, to say, that 
there is little need of being particular in the proof. 

§ 21. ' : For since Something now Is, 'tis evident" (it is 
thus he argues) "that Something always Was : Otherwise 
the Things that Now Are, must have been produced 
" out of Nothing, absolutely and without Cause : Which 
" is a plain contradiction in Terms. For, to say a Thing 
" is produced, and yet that there is no Cause at all of 
" that Production, is to say that Something is Effected, 
" when it is Effected by Nothing ; that is at the same time 
" when it is not Effected at all." 

§ 22. There cannot be a better reply to this way of 
speaking than what Mr Hume furnishes : " Whatever is 
" produced without any cause is produced by nothing ; 
4i or, in other words, has nothing for its cause. But no- 
" thing can never be a cause, no more than it can be 
" something, or equal to two right angles. By the same 
" intuition, that we perceive nothing not to be equal to 
"two right angles, or not to be something, we perceive, 
« that it can never be a cause; and consequently must per- 
" ceive, that every object has a real cause of its existence. 
" I believe it will not be necessary to employ many 

« words in shewing the weakness of this argument. 

« 'Tis sufficient only to observe, that when we 

" exclude all causes, we really do exclude them, and nei- 
" ther suppose nothing nor the object itself to be the 
" causes of the existence ; and consequently can draw 



CLARKE'S DEMONSTRATION. 



31 



" no argument from the absurdity of these suppositions 
" to prove the absurdity of that exclusion. If every 
*' thing must have a cause, it follows, that, upon the ex- 
i£ elusion of other causes, we must accept of the object 
" itself or of nothing as causes. But 'tis the very point 
" in question, whether everything must have a cause or 
" not ; and therefore, according to all just reasoning, it 
" ought never to be taken for granted." Treatise of 
Human Nature, Book I. Part iii. Section 3.f 

§ 23. In short, it is impossible ever to set about prov- 
ing, that whatever begins to be must have a cause, with- 
out being guilty of taking for granted the very thing to 
be proved. If we do not lay down that proposition as 
an axiom, there is no alternative but universal scepticism : 
Tho', 'tis true, that very scepticism destroys itself.J 



A REVIEW OF « AN ARGUMENT TO PROVE THE 
" UNITY AND PERFECTIONS OF GOD A PRIORI," 
BY THE REV. MOSES LOWMAN. 



§ 1. It may be naturally enough supposed, that an a 
priori argument to prove the Unity and Perfections of 
God, is one which must, in strictness, be held to take the 
Existence of God for granted. The Unity and Perfections 
of God cannot be evinced, unless God is. 

t See the second note on § 64, of Part III. of our " Examination." 

X " Scepticism is unavoidably destructive of itself." ( Warburton : Div. 
Leg.) Sir James Mackintosh shall supply us with the reason. "Uni- 
" versal scepticism involves a contradiction in terms. It is a belief that 
" there can be no belief." (Dissertation on Ethical Philosophy.) 



32 



REVIEW OF 



§ 2. But 'tis certain, that the Unity and Perfections of 
the Deity cannot be assuredly reached, if the Being of 
Deity have not been previously established. 

§ 3. From what station ought we to look at the Rev. 
Moses Lowman's Argument a priori ? 

§ 4. In all probability, the station wherefrom God's 
Existence appears, not as a thing to be assumed, but as a 
thing to be made out. 

§ 5. Because, though we are told, at the threshold^ 
that an Argument a priori is that which proves Attri- 
butes from Natures, secondary qualities from primary 
qualities ; Unity being subsumed to be no more than an 
Attribute, yea, no more than a secondary quality : J yet, 
the demonstration itself begins with a foundation so low 
down as " the possibility of Existence in general." || 

§ 6. From what position soever the Argument we are 
now concerned with ought to be viewed, five separately laid 
down Definitions, and three separately laid down Axioms, 
will attract the earliest attention of the observer. 

§ 7. The first Definition gives information as to what 
an Argument a priori is, in the estimation of the definer. 

§ 8. " An Argument a priori, is" — so it is written — 

what proves the Attributes, the secondary qualities, or 
" effects of Beings, from their Natures, primary qualities. 
" or definitions." 

§ 9. Proves the effects of Beings from definitions ! 
Then, to prove any effect we desire to have proved, we 

t See below, §§ 7. 8. 

I " Proposition VII. — The Unity o/God may be proved by an Argu- 
" ment a priori. 

"For it is proved from its Nature, and primary attribute of its 
existence, that is necessary Existence ; which is an argument a priori, 
" according to the first Definition." 

[| See below, § 34. 



LOWMAN'S ARGUMENT. 



33 



have no more to do than define so as to bring the pro- 
posed effect about. 

§ 10. The second Definition shall be passed over with- 
out comment. For, in the first place, that Definition 
relates to " An Argument a posteriori" and we meddle 
not here with any a posteriori affair : In the second, the 
author, though he lays down, never uses, the Definition 
in question. 

§ 11. The third Definition is as follows : — 

" Possible Existence is what may be, or whose Existence 
" is not an Impossibility or contradiction." 

§ 12. Thus, possible existence may be in existence : 
possible existence is not an impossible existence : possible 
existence is not contradictory to its own existence. 

§ 13. If great good do not result from the third De- 
finition ; at least, there is no want of truth in the affir- 
mations involved. Indeed, the whole proposition is sur- 
charged with truth. 

§ 14. Definition IV. is composed of these words : — 

" Necessary Existence is what must be, and cannot but 
" be ; or such Existence as arises from the Nature of the 
" thing itself." 

§ 15. We are now aware, that necessary existence must 
be, and cannot but be, in existence. And in the same 
way, tii at which must be, and cannot but be, in existence, 
is necessary existence. 

§ 16. If the Rev. Moses Low man's proof should fail, 
the circumstance can hardly be traced to the assumption 
of too much in a part of the fourth Definition. 

§ 17. The fifth, and last, Definition, is constituted by 
the following affirmation. — 

" Contingent Existence is such as may be, or may not 
" be." 

§ 18. In like manner, that which may be, or may not 
be, in existence, is contingent existence. 



34 



REVIEW OF 



§ 19. The last Definition wants not a certain kind of 
merit. 

§ 20. It is not so plain, how the last, or fifth, Definition 
is to be distinguished from the third, in any fundamental 
regard but a numerical one. 

§ 21. But we are arrived at the author's Axioms. 

Of which the first is : — 

" All Effects must have a Cause." 

§ 22. Every effect involves a cause, effect and cause 
being things relative to each other. But perhaps the 
Rev. Moses Lowman meant his Axiom to be equivalent to 
this proposition, Whatever begins to be must have a cause. 

§ 23. No one can gainsay the second Axiom, but one 
who could gainsay the position of identity itself, f The 
second Axiom being : — 

" Every thing is where it acts," or is acting. 

§ 24. The third, and the last, Axiom, affirms, 

" Nothing has no Affections, or Attributes." 

§ 25. The only objection which we have to urge against 
this Axiom is a very trifling one, flowing from this con- 
sideration, that " nothing" is spoken of too positively. 
Nothing is treated as if 'twere almost something. 'Tis not 
altogether proper to say, Nothing has, or has not, any 
one thing. In short, the Axiom would have been more 
unobjectionable had it ran in these terms, Nothing is — 
nothing. 

§ 26. But the a priori proof, itself, is in sight, and 
should the building beyond be in accordance with the 
vestibule we have traversed, it may be found advantageous 
to let in a little daylight. A lion is in our way : But it is 
an ass which fills the lion's skin. 

§ 27. The demonstration consists of twelve Propositions, 
the first of these being, 

" Existence is possible." 

t Viz. Whatever is, is. 



LOWMAN'S ARGUMENT. 



35 



§ 28. The existence of what ? The existence of heaven 
above \ or the earth beneath ? Or, of a new heaven \ or 
a new earth \ 

§29. Or, is it abstract existence itself which is possi- 
ble? existence well defecated from all the extraneous ad- 
juncts of modes, substances, and relations. 

§ 30. Nay, for such abstract existence is highly im- 
possible. As the author himself says, under the very 
Proposition we are weighing : " All Existence is the 
" Existence of Something" — " the Existence of Nothing 
4 ' is no Existence." And abstract existence is nothing in 
the world. 



§ 31. Therefore, the first Proposition (Existence is 
possible) is tantamount to this position, The existence of 
something is possible ; and, as the existence of something 
is nought apart from the something itself, to this other 
also, Something, or some one thing, is possible. 

§ 32. True. As a relative Scholium observes of the 
equivalent proposition : " This Proposition seems very 
" evident." 

§ 33. " It is," continues our Divine, snuffing the smell 
of a truism, " It is no more than this, that whatever is 
" not impossible is possible ," &c. 

§ 34. The concluding portion of the Scholium is de- 
serving of our most serious approval. " What proves 
" the possibility of Existence in general, will prove 
" all Existence possible, that does not appear impos- 
" SIBLE, or a contradiction." 

§ 35. But enough, perhaps too 

much, of this gallimatia, this most rare logomachy. 
Our readers must be heartily tired of verbiage, for once, 
and we shall not long defer a farewell which, under present 
circumstances, must be so ominous. 

§ 36. To make a long story short ; the Reverend gen- 
tleman's proof, a priori, is a war of words, words, words. 



36 



REVIEW OF 



Even though the digladiation were cunningly conducted ; 
like the passages in the poet's " Long Story," it leads to 
nothing. A hundred such demonstrations could not reach 
even a shadow's shadow. Critically contemplate Low- 
mans Argument, and you perceive it to stand forth an 
unrelieved gallimatia. 

§ 37. The Rev. Br Pi/e Smith penned a preface to an 
edition of our Divine's " Argument," " an exact century" 
after the publication of the same. 

§ 38. Concerning the treatise the Doctor edits, he 
writes thus : "It eminently merits to be reprinted, and 
" so to be again placed within the reach of reading and 
• 2 thinking persons." The republication of the tract, it 
is thought, " will shew more clearly the solid foundations 
" on which the first truths of moral science stand." The 
Doctor esteems the performance, and would have the pub- 
lic esteem it : and this must form our apology to thinking 
persons, for having entered on this criticism. 

§ 39. Br Smith says farther : "I may be allowed to 

express my opinion, that the chain of reasoning (usually 
* ; called the a priori Argument) from the first principles 

of human knowledge, has been, of late and in our own 
" country, too much overlooked." 

§ 40. Why ? A good reason is not far to seek. You 
will find what might be the germ of one in the preceding 
page. " Since atheistical objections have been and are 
" ostentatiously displayed, those who love truth must 
; ' submit to the patient toil of meeting anew those ob- 
" jections" — and so on. 

§ 41. Well; on the whole, what is to be done? We 
are to turn to " the pure and simple enunciation of 
" Lowman."\ But, alas ! 

Non tali auxilio, nec defensoribus istis, 
Tempus eget. 

t "I venture to think that if Lord Brougham had turned from the 
" somewhat disadvantageous form in which the argument was pre- 



LOWMAN' S ARGUMENT, 



37 



§ 42. Our Reverend Doctor felt sure, that " the re- 
" publication of this rare tract will add to the instru- 
" ments of intellectual exercise." With good reason. 
Moses Lowman s argumentation is consigned, from hence- 
forth, to our readers' dialectical gymnasium. 



A REVIEW OF " THE EXISTENCE AND ABSOLUTE 
"PERFECTION OF THE SUPREME UN ORIGINATED 
"BEING, PROVED IN A CONCISE AND DEMON- 
« STRATIVE MANNER," BY HUGH HAMILTON, 
BISHOP OF OSSORY. 



§ 1. In an " Introduction to the Essay on the Exist- 
" ence and Attributes of God," are contained Bishop 
Hamilton s reasons for proposing, in a new form, an Ar- 
gument for proving that Existence, and those Attributes. 
The sum of the reasons are these : that each one of the 
Arguments made use of by our theologian's recognised 
predecessorsf in the same field was, in some important 
respect or other, inconclusive or imperfect ; that, hence, 
there existed a desideratum, whether it could be supplied 
or no ; that it was possible to supply the desideratum ; 
and that, in point of fact, the desideratum could be sup- 

" sented by Dr Samuel Clarke, to the pure and simple enunciation 
" of Lowman, he would have raised higher his valuation of it." 
(Dr Smith's Preface.) Lowman is preferred to Clarice, and there's no 
use in disputing as to tastes. 

t Of whom (with Dr Pye Smith's leave) the Rev. Moses Lowman 
was not one. 



38 



REVIEW OF 



plied, by a process of ratiocination known to the mind of 
the Bishop.t 

§ 2. " On considering the subject" (of " the being and 
" perfections of God") " I was soon satisfied," writes 
our author, nigh the end of his Introduction, " that the 
" truths relating to it were to be ranked among those 

that are in their nature capable of demonstration." 
The Bishop animated by such a conviction ; no wonder, 
he actually attempted " to prove this most important 
" truth, this first article of our creed and foundation of 
" all our faith," (that there is " one only underived, un- 
" originated Being, God the Father Almighty, \ the ori- 
" ginal fountain of all existence,") " in a demonstrative 
" manner." Introduction. Works, Vol. II. p. 77. 

§ 3. And, in the second Corollary from the second 
Proposition, our theologian does more than hint, that 
human knowledge, exerted legitimately in relation to the 
nature and attributes of an unoriginated Being, might be 
made to appear " perfectly demonstrative;" " and that 
" this branch of learning, natural theology, which relates 
" to the most important of all truths, might at length 
" be placed where every one" [at least, every right- 
minded one] " would wish to see it, at the head of the 
" sciences." 

§ 4. The Bishop of Ossory informs his readers, at the 
end of what he delivers in connection with his first Pro- 
position, that he proposed it to himself " as a Problem, 

t When " the Essay on the Existence," &c, first came before the pub- 
lic, the author was Dean of Armagh. The Bishop of Ossory being dead, 
his eldest son published an edition of his works : among which you find 
the Essay in question, with emendations. 

X Bishop Hamilton gives his readers to understand, that, in his trea- 
tise, he does not use the word " God " in any other sense than that which 
denotes the person of God the Father, the only supreme unoriginated Be- 
ing. — Works, vol. ii. p. 31 — 2. 



HAMILTON'S DEMONSTRATION 



39 



" to determine what must be the nature and attributes 
" of a Being who exists without a cause. For some time 
" I thought," he tells us, " this problem hopeless, as it 
" is so very simple, that it affords but a single datum to 
" proceed upon ; however I have given," he goes on, 
" what I apprehend to be a solution of it, in the next five 
" propositions" — viz. Propositions II. III. IV. v. vi. 

§ 5. The single datum afforded by the problem which 
the Bishop is to solve gives, " a Being who exists with- 
" out a cause." The datum is afforded by the problem : 
but is it equally easily afforded by the demonstration it- 
self? What must be the nature and attributes of a Be- 
ing who exists without a cause? forms one question. 
But, must there be such a Being 1 composes another, a 
distinctly different, a naturally prior, interrogation. 
This latter introduces a topic we are under a necessity 
of investigating in conjunction with our demonstrator. 
With respect to him, the affair will become portentous. 

§ 6. How, then, was the single datum afforded by the 
very simple problem, obtained ? 

§ 7. Unfortunately, by the most illegitimate means. 

§ 8. The datum in question was obtained, that is, it 
was supposed to be obtained, in virtue of the argumen- 
tation occurring in connection with the first Proposition. 
The first Proposition, itself, runs thus : — 

" There must be in the universe some one Being, at 
il least, whose non-existence is impossible, whose exist- 
" ence had no cause, no beginning, and can have no end." 

§ 9. Before proceeding to the reasonings adduced in 
support of this affirmation, it may be noticed, that if 
they should be perceived to be some of the weakest, and 
to compose the phantasm, rather than the substance, of 
a demonstration ; a sufficient reason may perhaps be dis- 
covered elsewhere. The Bishop having been of opinion 
that the position, " That there must necessarily exist 



40 



REVIEW OF 



" some one Being, at least, which is eternal and self-ex- 
" istent or unoriginated * * * is usually considered 
" as almost self-evident, and there has hardly ever been 
" any dispute about it."^ Introduction, p. 42. 

§ 10. The demonstration of the truth of our author's 
Proposition commences as follows. — " If there is NO 
" ONE BEING in the universe but such as might possi- 
" bly have not existed, it would follow that there might 
" possibly have been no existence at all." — Now, though 
tliere were no one Being but such as might have not 
existed ; it would not follow, that there might have been 
no existence at all : unless, there were no one series of 
beings, either, but such as might have not existed. In 
fine, the Bishop's hypothetical proposition subsumes, si- 
lently, indeed, but surely, that there has been no eter- 
nal succession of things : And therefore, it does not 
become self-evidently true, till a certain clause be in- 
troduced; as thus, " If there is NO ONE being " — and 
no ONE series OF beings — " in the universe but such 
" as might possibly have not eccisted" &c. The antece- 
dent being amended after this manner, the consequent, 
that " there might possibly have been no existence at 
" all," is rendered indubitable. Otherwise, it is by no 
means, as has been suggested, necessary, and the entire 
Proposition may be false, for any thing shewn to the re- 
verse. 

§ 11. The proof goes on : " And if that (that there 
might possibly have been no existence at all) could be 
" so, it would be also possible that the present existence 
" might have arisen from total non-existence, which is 
" absurd." — Absurd indeed. — Therefore it is not pos- 

t If our theologian Lad Theists in his eye, the assertion is true, but 
irrelevant. If Atheists, it is relevant, but untrue. See what the Bishop, 
himself, admits below, in sections 20, 21, 25. See, too, our Review of 
Dr Clarice's Demonstration, § 5. 



HAMILTON'S DEMONSTRATION. 



41 



<£ sible that there might have been no existence at all." 
— Well drawn, from the premiss. — " Consequently, an 
" impossibility of not existing must be found somewhere, 
*' that is, there must be some Beings, or at least, some 
" one Being, whatever and wherever it is, whose non-ex- 
" istence is impossible." — Admitted, that " an impossibi- 
" lity of not existing must be found somewhere ; " but 
denied, that the admission is simply equivalent to this, 
that " there must be some Beings, or at least, some one 
" Being, whatever and wherever it is, whose non-exist- 
" ence is impossible." An impossibility of not existing 
must be somewhere ; but may not the impossibility be 
with respect to a succession of beings, considered just 
as a succession ? 

§ 12. Our theologian's argumentation is continued in 
these words : " And as this impossibility of his (the one 
" Being's) not existing is absolute, or unconditional, and 
" depends not on any supposition, it must be immove- 
" able, and at all times the same : so that this Being 
" never was nor can oecome non-existent, but has an ex- 
" istence without a beginning, and without a possibility 
" of ending." — All which is very innocent, and, no doubt, 
had been mightily to the purpose, had the previous matter 
been altogether unobjectionable. 

§ 13. The sentence we subjoin forms a note in connec- 
tion with the passage just quoted. " This argument, 
" which proves there is some one Being at least, whose 
M non-existence is impossible, depends not on any relation 
4,4 that such Being may have to others, or on any previous 
" condition or supposition whatever ; it is deduced en- 
** tirely from this truth, that something does now exist, 
" which is indisputable, and is prior, in the order of our 
" thoughts, to all other truths." 

§ 14. It is, indeed, an indisputable truth, that some- 
thing does now exist ; but it is very disputable, and, in 

D 



42 



REVIEW OF 



sooth, to be disputed, that from that truth is deduced, 
by the Bishop of Ossory, this other position, that there 
is some one Being whose non-existence is impossible. 
Something does now exist, but, for aught our author has 
manifested to the contrary, the something may be but a 
world — or no more than an item of a world — in a suc- 
cession of worlds, emerging, one by one, from the depths 
of eternity. 

§ 15. The next position in our demonstrator's text will 
be perceived to have the advantage of a secure founda- 
tion. Nevertheless, our view must be limited to the im- 
mediate basis, since, to take the matter very deep would 
be to overturn the whole affair. 

§ 16. " And as no cause could have determined that 
" this Being" (whom the immediately preceding context 
had invested with " an existence without a beginning 11 ]) 
" should exist, rather than not, or have given to him 
" that existence which it is impossible but he must al- 

ways have had ; he must be unoriginated, and have a 
" principle of existence in himself independent on any 

cause, or be self-existent." 

§ 17. That a Being having " an existence without a 

beginning" is " unoriginated ;" is as certain a point as 
that an unoriginated Being is one who has an existence 
without a beginning. 

§ 18. The text flows on : <; Thus it is proved, that 
" there must be, at least, some one Being, whatever it is, 
" who cannot but exist, whose existence had no cause, 
" no beginning, and can have no end." — Thus it is 
proved, that there must be some one Being who had no 
beginning, no cause : And the precise value of a proof of 
the sort, we have estimated, not without some care. 

§ 19. And that Bishop Hamilton, himself, notwith- 
standing he speaks so bravely, did not, after all, estimate 
t See above, § 12. 



HAMILTON'S DEMONSTRATION. 



43 



the value of his proof at the highest possible rate, is ren- 
dered sufficiently apparent by certain supplementary mat- 
ter. For, to the demonstration of his first Proposition, 
there succeeds an " Observation" that labours with the 
hypothesis which lay so much in his path, and which he 
did not remove. 

§ 20. " Two hypotheses only," — in this way the Ob- 
servation begins, — " and these directly contradictory to 
" each other,! have been contrived to shew that we can 
" conceive the universe might possibly have existed, 
" without any one original, independent Being, from 
" whom all others have derived their existence. 

§ 21. " The ancient atheistical hypothesis was," pro- 
ceeds the Observation, " that the universe consists en- 
" tirely of derived and dependent Beings, each of which 
" owed its existence to the power and efficiency of the 
" one that immediately preceded it, in an infinite series 
*' or succession without a beginning, and without an ori- 
" ginal underived cause at the head of the series" 

§ 22. The ancient atheistical hypothesis was, and, if 
we mistake not, the principal modern atheistical hypo- 
thesis is, that of " an infinite series or succession," that 
is, a series or succession " without a beginning." But 
what cunning atheist, either in ancient or in modern 
times, ever talked of the head of the series or succession 1 
When one fits a head upon an infinite series, he steals 
much more than the tail away ; and one must decapitate 
the succession, if he would restore the infiniteness. To 
be " without a beginning," is to be without a " head," 
when it is a succession or series of things we speak of. 

§ 23. But the grand point is, not whether an infinite 
series, a succession without a beginning, must be without 
a head too, but how the series or succession (headless or 
not) is to be disposed of. The Bishop has raised a some- 
t This cum grano salts. Weigh the quotation made in § 32, below. 



44 



REVIEW OF 



what from the sink of Atheism, and the question is, What 
is he to do with it 1 Is he able to render it for ever use- 
less for service against his party ? We shall see. 

§ 24. " Several writers have shewn," our theologian 
declares, " the weakness and inconsistency of this hypo- 
" thesis," the hypothesis to wit, which he had called " the 
" ancient atheistical hypothesis." And, in a note, he 
particularizes Dr Clarke's Demonstration^ 

§ 25. The note afterwards makes mention of the cir- 
cumstance, that " some learned writers have objected to 
•' the arguments used by Dr Clarke," " as insufficient to 
" overthrow the old atheistical hypothesis, and have 
•• thought it could be confuted only by considerations 
" drawn from an infinite series." " Mr Hume, at the 
• £ ninth part of his Dialogues, has defended," the note goes 
on to say, " this atheistical hypothesis, and objected to 
• ; the arguments brought against it." J Mr Hume de- 
fended the old atheistical hypothesis : " I have therefore 
" proposed," the Bishop of Ossory informs us, "a refuta- 
•• tion of it, which is not liable to any of the former ob- 

t In the Introduction to his Essay, Bishop Hamilton makes his readers 
aware, that Dr Clarice, " proves, in the usual manner, that there must 
" have been some existence from all eternity, and then shews the ahsur- 
•• dity of supposing that there might have been an eternal succession of 
•■ dependent Beings, each deriving its existence from the preceding one, 
" without any original, independent, and underived cause at the head of 
" the series. Hence he very justly concludes," the Bishop assures us, 
" that there must be at least some one Being, whose existence is underived, 
" and independent on all causes whatever," &c. P. 50. On the point of the 
validity of the Doctor's proof, intended to shew the absurdity of sup- 
posing that there might " have been an eternal succession of dependent 
" Beings," we beg leave to refer our readers to what is advanced in our 
Review of the Doctor's Demonstration ; in particular, to sections 8, 9, 10, 
12, 13, &c. 

| Mr Hume certainly defended the atheistical hypothesis thus far : he 
objected to the arguments brought, in (what was then) " the usual man- 
" ner," against it. See our Review of Dr Clarice's Demonstration, § 17- 



HAMILTON'S DEMONSTRATION. 



45 



jections, and saves the trouble of going into the consi- 
u deration of an infinite series." 

§ 26. The affair now thickens, while we hasten to the 
Bishop's text, and the unobjectionable, and trouble-saving 
refutation. 

" I believe it will be sufficient to say," — a refutation 
which will be found so stupendous, is couched in these 
terms, — *" that according to this hypothesis, there is no 
" Being in the universe that has not been once non- 

existent, and whose existence therefore had not a be- 
" ginning and a cause, which is contrary to what is 
" demonstrated by the foregoing proposition." 

§ 27. Now here is the very jugglery of a demonstra- 
tion conducted, in a certain weighty respect, " in the 
" usual manner." The hypothesis which accounts for 
things by series or successions from eternity is to be left 
without a vestige of footing. It stands right between the 
demonstrator and the secure possession of the doctrine of 
" one original, independent Being, from whom all others 
" have derived their existence."! It must, therefore, be 
got out of the road somehow. And how does our theo- 
logian propose to remove the obstruction 1 By looking 
away from it ; leaving it as much in the way as ever it 
was. An illicit, rather than a novel, method of getting 
quit of the difficulty. 

§ 28. But, of a truth, it is the Bishop's method. For, 
observe, that, to demolish all infinite series, the observa- 
tion founds on " what is demonstrated by the foregoing 
proposition;" while the proposition (managed with a mo- 
dicum of sagacity and a deficiency in forethought) neither 
demonstrated, nor pretended to demonstrate, the non- 
existence of any infinite series, though it quietly subsumed 
the non-existence of every infinite series whatever. 

t § 20, above. The reader may consult here our Review of Mr Loclces 
demonstration, § 15. 



46 



REVIEW OF 



§ 29. So, " it is but like a monkey shifting his oyster 
" from one hand to the other."f Our theologian, at his 
setting out, assumes, noiselessly but potently, that the hypo- 
thesis of a universe all made up of series or successions is 
entirely groundless. And when he comes to lay low, in a 
separate effectual way, the eternal series or successions, 
he takes for his fulcrum the righteousness of his assump- 
tion — or, at least, argumentation where, to all intents 
and purposes, the righteousness of the assumption is taken 
for granted. Verily, this is the perfection of demon- 
stration-juggling. The " proposition" never once doubts, 
that there has not been any series from eternity : and 
the u observation" (not to be behind with a good thing) 
never once doubts, that the "proposition" had " demon- 
" strated" what involves, that there has not been any se- 
ries from eternity. In short, our author first gratuitously 
assumes the principal thing he had to prove, and then, by 
way of seriously proving that principal thing, founds upon 
his own gratuitous assumption. Truly, " it is but like a 
" monkey shifting his oyster from one hand to the other." 

§ 30. The Bishop's final movement is no better than a 
random stroke. " The argument here used cannot be 
i; evaded by saying that it is supposed there is nothing 
<; contingent in this series, but that each Being acts neces- 
" sarily when it produces the subsequent one," &c. &c. 
It is possible — let it be granted, at any rate — that the 
argument alluded to cannot be evaded by saying what the 
author has set down. But you may depend upon it, the 
argument can at any time be evaded, easily and effec- 
tually evaded, by a production of such considerations as 
have been placed before our readers. And this is the 
winding up of our criticism on one department of a de- 
monstrative proof, carried on throughout too much " in 
" the usual manner." 

t The simile is from Locke's Essay, B. IV. ch. viii. § 3. 



HAMILTON'S DEMONSTRATION. 



47 



§ 31. There is no occasion that -we should follow the 
Bishop of Ossory any farther, or even so much as touch 
upon what he gives out in relation to Spinoza's hylo- 
theistic scheme, which is designated " the other hypo- 
thesis." With the hypothesis of but one substance in 
nature, and that one matter, we have no present business. 

§ 32. Yet, there may not be great impropriety in 

noticing, that all our author says regarding Spinoza's 
hypothesis is perhaps not very wisely said. With the 
Bishop, the hypothesis of infinite successions, and that of 
but one substance, are " directly contradictory to each 
" other."f Again, he makes the scheme of the apostate 
Jew, who embraced the latter, to declare, that " no Being 
" in the universe hath derived its existence from another, 
" but every Being or substance * * * is necessarily 
" existent, eternal, and uncreated or unoriginated." J All 
which will appear in opposition to truth, when the true 
genius of the old hypothesis, and that of Spinoza's pan- 
theism, are weighed and compared. In witness whereof, 
list to the words of Spinoza himself. " Corpus motum, 
" vel quiescens, ad motum vel quietem determinari debuit 
" ab alio corpore, quod etiam ad motum vel quietem de- 
" terminatum fuit ab alio, et illud iterum ab alio, ET 
" Sic IN infinitum." || [" A body which is in motion, 
" or at rest, must have been determined to move or to be 
" at rest by some other body, which, in its turn, had been 
" determined to move or to be at rest by another body, and 
<: this, in like manner, by still another, AND SO ON TO 
" infinity."] Again : — " Unaquaique volitio non potest 
" eocistere, neque adoperandum determinari ; nisi ab alia 
" causa determinetur et Jmc rursus ab alia ; et sic 
" porro IN infinitum."! [" Every volition had a cause, 



t § 20, above. % Observation. 

|| Par. II. Prop. 13, Lemma 3. % Prop. 33. 



48 



REVIEW, &c. 



; ' whicli, itself, had a cause, and so on infinitely."] 
Now, let it just be considered, that the ancient atheis- 
tical hypothesis does not recognise (what no scheme of 
atheism can recognise) a succession of new substances — 
new, even as to the ultimate atoms — but only a succes- 
sion of new modifications of old substances, — -that is, new 

arrangements of the primeval atoms. 

§ 33. To conclude : We have manifested, that Bishop 
Hamilton's " Attempt to prove the Existence of the Su- 
" preme unoriginated Being" is, at the very threshold of 
the undertaking, chargeable with a fundamental fallacy. 
And no amount of coherence in the superstructure (even 
if such coherence there be) can atone for an essential flaw 
in the groundwork of the fabric. 



NECESSARY EXISTENCE 

IMPLIES 

INFINITE EXTENSION. 



E 



An absolutely necessary Being must exist every where. 

Bishop Butler. 



NECESSARY EXISTENCE IMPLIES INFINITE 
EXTENSION. 



§ 1. Supposing, that there is a necessarily existing 
Substance, the intelligent cause of all things, it may be 
easily shown, that that Substance is infinitely extended. 

§ 2. For there are but three hypotheses which can pos- 
sibly be framed in reference to the extension of the neces- 
sarily existing Substance. The first is : That that Sub- 
stance is of no extension whatever. The second : That 
that Substance is of finite extension only. The third : 
That that Substance is infinitely extended. And, as these 
hypotheses are all that can be made upon the subject ; 
therefore, one of them must be true. 

§ 3. As to the first hypothesis, that the necessarily ex- 
isting Substance has no extension whatever : Can there be 
conceived a greater absurdity than the assertion, that a 
substance, cogitative or incogitative, necessarily existing 
or not necessarily existing, may be without any extension 
whatsoever % To believe this indeed defies human nature. 
If reason can, with certainty, pronounce any thing, it- 
may pronounce this decision, that extension and existence 
are so necessary to each other, that there can be no exist- 
ence without extension. Talk of a substance which has 
no extension ; you present us with words of amusement 



4 



NECESSARY EXISTENCE IMPLIES 



§ 4. If there be a subject on which authority should be 
of weight, such a subject, 'tis plain, is the debate, whether 
we must conceive, that to deny extension is to deny exist- 
ence. And 'tis well that, in behalf of the position, that 
existence cannot be without extension, there are two as 
great authorities, in speculations of this nature, as can any 
where be found. 

§5. "Perhaps," * * * says Mr Locke, " it is near 
" as hard to conceive any existence, or to have an idea of 
" any real being, with a perfect negation of all manner 
" of expansion ; as it is to have the idea of any real exist- 
" ence, with a perfect negation of all manner of duration." 
Essay concerning Human Understanding, Book II. Chap- 
ter xv. § 11. And to have the idea of any real existence 
with a perfect negation of all manner of duration is, surely, 
impossible.f 

§ 6. The Cartesians make mind and matter to be dif- 
ferent in their essence ; and make extension (the correc- 
tion of Des Cartes' opinion, is, solid extension, J) to be 
the essence of matter : Consequently, with them, a think- 
ing substance cannot be extended. Mr Locke wrote at a 
time when these Cartesian opinions were generally re- 
ceived. But yet, we see, he held, that, without extension, 
it is impossible to conceive existence. 

§ 7. " Extension does not belong to Thought" these 
are the words of Dr Samuel Clarke, " because Thought 
" is not a Being ; But there is Need of Extension to the 
" Existence of every Being, to a Being which has or has 
" not Thought, or any other Quality whatsoever." Se- 
cond Letter to Joseph Butler, afterwards Bishop of 
Durham. 

t In the thirty-ninth section of the third Part of the u Examination," 
will be found another extract from the Essay, bearing to the same point. 

X This correction is by Dr Isaac Watts. See his Philosophical Essays, 
Essay II. 



INFINITE EXTENSION. 



5 



§ 8. Tis true, that, in these words, Dr Clarke does 
not say, that he cannot conceive the existence of a being 
without extension, but that, 'tis certain, is what he means. 

§ 9. Upon the whole, one can have no hesitation in 
saying of those who contend that the necessarily existing 
Substance has no extension whatsoever, and no relation 
whatever to space, that, if they be not but uttering words 
all but incomprehensible ; they deny not so much the 
existence, as the possibility of the existence, of such a 
Substance. 

§ 10. As to the second hypothesis, that the necessarily 
existing Substance is of finite extension only : From this 
it follows, in the first place, that that Substance has a 
figure, for figure is just extension with limits. 

§ 11. But shape is utterly inconsistent with necessary 
existence. Can any one hope to be thought knowing who 
shall contend, that the necessarily existing Substance is 
triangular, or square, or circular, or of what other figure 
soever you choose ? We shall search the world in vain, for 
a greater absurdity than what such a position sets forth. 

§ 12. From this hypothesis it follows, in the second 
place, that the necessarily existing Substance is divisible : 
for a limited substance (unless it be an ultimate atom, or 
an indivisible monad) may be conceived to be divided, to 
wit, the parts of it may be conceived to be removed to dif- 
ferent parts of space. 

§ 13. Now, to predicate divisibility of a substance, is 
equal to saying, it has no necessary existence. For 'tis 
as clear as any truth can be, that to suppose a substance 
divided, is no less than to suppose it annihilated as one 
substance. And nothing is so impossible as this, that the 
necessarily existing Substance should be annihilated. For 
that this Substance maybe made to cease to be, is a posi- 
tion which amounts to this, that a substance, to suppose 
the non-existence of which is a contradiction, may yet be 



6 NECESSARY EXISTENCE IMPLIES 



supposed non-existent. Which absurdity following from 
the hypothesis, that the necessarily existing Substance is 
of finite extension only ; 'tis plain, that hypothesis must 
be absurd. 

§ 14. But indeed, it were needless to show, by all that 
is implied in the existence of a substance of finite exten- 
sion only, that the supposition of such a substance neces- 
sarily being, is an absurdity. For the supposition, with- 
out the least regard to what it implies, is, itself, as absurd 
as any thing can be. This cannot be better shown than 
in Dr Samuel Clarke's words. " To suppose Matter, or 
" any Other Substance, Necessarily-existing in a Finite 
" determinate Quantity ; in an Inch-Cube, for instance ; 
" or in Any certain number of Cube-Inches, and no more ; 
" is exactly the same Absurdity, as supposing it to exist 
" Necessarily, and yet for a Finite Duration only : 
" Which every one sees to be a plain Contradiction." 
Third Letter to Joseph Butler, afterwards Bishop of 
Durham. \ 

t The system of the Anthropomorphites, which gives to the necessarily 
existing Substance the figure of a man, because it is, somehow, supposed, 
that substance must be of some form, and a human figure is esteemed the 
most perfect, — at least, the best adapted for a necessary Substance : this 
system, besides that it is chargeable with all the absurdities which follow 
from the hypothesis, that the necessarily existing Substance is of finite ex- 
tension only ; is attended with absurdities which seem peculiar to itself. 
These not being consequences of that hypothesis merely, they with no pro- 
priety fall to be considered here. 

The absurdities which are alluded to, some, at least, of these absurdi- 
ties, are, first, That the necessarily existing Substance is material. For, 
can pure spirit have the form of a man ? 1 And new absurdities follow 

i Baron Swedenborg, a remarkable modern theologue, the founder (with your 
leave) of a New Church, the doctrines of which are, for the most part, built on the 
narrow basis of pure Anthropomorphism; Baron Swedenborg answers, we confess, 
that question in the affirmative. He maintains, that the necessary Being was a pure 
spirit in human form. But since his disciples shun an encounter with such weapons 
as reason can supply, and betake themselves, in the absence of more suitable arms, 
to their favourite's " memorable" ecstasies ; it is impossible for us to combat their>n- 
thropomorphitic imagination. What the trances of the worthy and learned Swede re- 
vealed, is not to be opposed by a profane appeal to the clear decision of human under- 
standing. 



INFINITE EXTENSION. 



7 



§ 15. The third hypothesis, then, must be true : the 
necessarily existing Substance must be infinitely extended.f 
To deny, therefore, that there is an infinitely extended 
Substance, is to deny, that there is a necessarily existing 
Substance, the intelligent cause of all things. 

§ 16. Since such is the sad consequence of denying that 
the necessarily existing Substance, the intelligent cause of 
all things, is infinitely extended, is there not good reason 
that men should pause before they express a doubt upon 
the matter ? Strange things may, at first, be thought to 
attach themselves to the doctrine : But nothing tends so 
effectually to destroy a prejudice as inquiring into its 
foundation. 

from the absurdity which makes the necessary Substance, a material sub- 
stance in human form. But to what purpose the labour of bringing them 
to light ? Secondly, It seems to be urged with force, that the human 
form evinces marks of design. And 'tis a good inference, surely, that be- 
cause man exhibits, in his shape, marks of design, therefore a substance, 
not a man, but like a man, contains also marks of design. This inference 
valid, a substance of that nature, so far from being the first cause, would 
afford evidence that itself was created ; and we might rationally set about 
inquiring into the cause of the existence. 

t The common doctrine of Theologians, that the necessary Substance is, 
at the same time, in every point of space, and every atom of matter, en- 
tire, is just this third hypothesis, that the necessary Substance is infinitely 
extended : Though, 'tis true, all extension is denied to that Substance. 
For to say that the same substance is in different parts of extension, at once, 
without being extended, is no more absurd than to say, extension, itself, 
is not extended. Perhaps, therefore, our position should be qualified, and 
we ought to advance, that the common doctrine of Theologians is just this 
third hypothesis, so far as the doctrine is intelligible at all. 



ARGUMENT, A PRIORI, 

FOR 

THE BEING AND ATTRIBUTES 

OF 

A GREAT FIRST CAUSE. 



rbv sbsiror uvhgzg eoj/usv 

" Aqb'/jTov j&stirai fts Aibg kuGcu (asv ayviai, 
UaGai ft uv&o&irw ayogui, iLi<srr\ h\ ^suXatsm v 
K.at X /jy'evzg- Kavrri ds Aibg nzyy)7)(jji&a tfavrsg- 
T2 ya% xat ysvog s<ffisv. 

Avatus. 



CONTENTS 



DIVISION I. 
PART I. 

Page 

Proposition I. Infinity of Extension is, necessarily, existing. 7 

II. Infinity of Extension is, necessarily, indivisible. 8 

Prolegomena. .... 8 
Demonstration. .... 8 

Scholium .9 

Corollary from Proposition II. Infinity 
of Extension is, necessarily, im- 
moveable. ..... 9 

' 'ft 

Prolegomena. .... 9 

Demonstration. . . . .10 
Scholium. . . . . .10 

III. There is, necessarily, a Being of Infinity of 

Extension. . . . .10 

IV. The Being of Infinity of Extension is, ne- 

cessarily, of unity and simplicity. 12 

Corollary 13 

Scholium. . . . . .13 

Sub-Proposition. The Material Uni- 
verse is finite in extension. . .14 
General Scholium. . . . .15 

V. There is, necessarily, but one Being of In- 

finity of Expansion. . . .16 



4 CONTENTS. 

PART II. 

Page 

Proposition I. Infinity of Duration is, necessarily, existing. 17 

II. Infinity of Duration is, necessarily, indivisible. 18 

Prolegomenon. . . . .18 

Demonstration. . . . .18 

Corollary from Proposition II. Infinity 
of Extension is, necessarily, im- 
moveable. . . . . .18 

Prolegomenon. . . . .18 

Demonstration. . . . .19 

III. There is, necessarily, a Being of Infinity of 

Duration. . . . . .19 

IV. The Being of Infinity of Duration is, neces- 

sarily, of unity and simplicity. . 20 
Scholium I. . . . .21 

Corollary 21 

Scholium II 21 

Sub-Proposition. The Material Uni- 
verse is finite in Duration. . . 22 
Corollary from Sub-Proposition. 
Every succession of substances is 
finite in duration. . . .23 

V. There is, necessarily, but one Being of In- 

finity of Duration. . . .24 



PART III. 

Proposition I. There is, necessarily, a Being of Infinity of 

Expansion and Infinity of Duration. 25 

II. The Being of Infinity of Expansion and In- 

finity of Duration is, necessarily, of 
unity and simplicity. . . .27 

III. There is, necessarily, but one Being of Infi- 

nity of Expansion and Infinity of 
Duration. . . . . .28 



CONTENTS. 



5 



DIVISION II. 



PART I. 

Proposition. The Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expan- 
sion and of Duration, is, necessarily, 
Intelligent and All-knowing. . .29 
Scholium. ...... 30 



PART II. 

Proposition. The Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expan- 
sion and of Duration, who is All-know- 
ing, is, necessarily, All-powerful. . 31 



PART IIL 

Proposition. The Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expan- 
sion and of Duration, who is All-know- 
ing, and All-powerful, is, necessarily, 

entirely Free. . . . . .32 



DIVISION III. 

Proposition. The Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expan- 
sion and of Duration, who is All-know- 
ing, All-powerful, and entirely Free, is, 
necessarily, completely Happy. . . 33 
Sub-Proposition. The Simple, Sole, Be- 
ing of Infinity of Expansion and of Du- 
ration, who is All-knowing, All-powerful, 
entirely Free, and completely Happy, is, 
necessarily, perfectly Good. . . 34 



THE ARGUMENT, A PRIORI, 



DIVISION I. 
PART I. 



Proposition I. Infinity of Extension is necessarily 
eocisting. 

§ 1. Even when the mind endeavours to remove from 
it the idea of Infinity of Extension, it cannot, after all its 
efforts, avoid leaving still there, the idea of such infinity. 
Let there be ever so much endeavour to displace this 
idea, that is, conceive Infinity of Extension non-existent ; 
every one, by a reflex examination of his own thoughts, 
will find, it is utterly beyond his power to do so. 

§ 2. Now, since even when we would remove the no- 
tion of Infinity of Extension out of our minds, we cannot 
but leave the notion of it behind ; from this, it is mani- 
fest, Infinity of Extension is necessarily existing : For. 
every thing the existence of which we cannot but believe, 
is necessarily eocisting. 

§ 3. To deny, therefore, that Infinity of Extension 
necessarily exists, is to utter a downright contradiction. 

§ 4. Infinity of Extension is, then, necessarily existing. 



8 



ARGUMENT. 



Part I. 



Proposition It Infinity of Extension is necessarily 
indivisible. 

Prolegomena. 

§ 1. To say, Infinity of Extension is necessarily indivi- 
sible, is as much as to say, the parts of Infinity of Exten- 
sion are necessarily indivisible from each other. 

§ 2. Indivisible, in this Proposition, means indivisible 
either really or mentally : For there can be no objection 
to a real, which would not apply to a mental divisibility ; 
and a mental divisibility, we must suppose, would imply 
an actual divisibility, of Infinity of Extension. 

§ 3. The Proposition, then, is to the effect, that the 
parts of Infinity of Extension are necessarily indivisible 
from each other really or mentally. 

Demonstration. 
§ 1. That which is divisible really, may be divided 
really : and a thing which is actually divided from an- 
other must have superficies of its own, every way, and be 
removed or separated from that other thing, be it by ever 
so little a distance. If any one should say that things 
really divided from each other have not real superficies 
of their own, every way ; to be able to believe him, we 
must first be able to believe this, that a thing can be, 
and not be, at the same time, and in the same place : And 
if any one should say that things which are really divided 
from each other, which have real superficies of their own 
every way, can possibly be conceived as without a certain 
distance, however little, being between them ; as this, it 
could as soon be believed that in a good syllogism of the 
first figure, the conclusion does not necessarily follow from 
the premises. Being really divided, and being really se- 
parated, mean, thus, the same thing. 



Prop. II. 



DIVISION I. 



9 



§ 2. Now, divisibility meaning possibility of separa- 
tion : As it is an utter contradiction to say, Infinity of 
Extension can be separated ; that is, a part of Infinity of 
Extension separated, by a certain distance, from Infinity 
of Extension ; there remaining Infinity of Extension after 
part of it is taken away : the part of Infinity of Extension 
so removed, being removed from the remaining parts 
to these very same parts; the part, thus, being at rest while 
it is taken away : the part so moved away, being moved 
away from itself ; it still remaining, inasmuch as there is 
necessarily Infinity of Extension ; a that is, though moved 
away, being not moved away : Which could not be, unless 
it be false, that whatever is, is, where it is, and when it 
is. As it is, thus, an utter contradiction to say Infinity 
of Extension can be separated, so it is an utter contradic- 
tion to say it is not indivisible. 

§ 3. Infinity of Extension is, then, necessarily indivisi- 
ble. 

Scholium, 

The parts of Infinity of Extension being necessarily 
indivisible from each other ; it is a necessary consequence, 
that the thing, the parts of which are divisible from each 
other, is not Infinity of Extension ; nor any part of it : 
part, in the sense of partial consideration only, for other- 
wise Infinity of Extension can have no parts. b 

Corollary from Proposition II. Infinity of Extension 
is necessarily immoveable. 

Prolegomena. 

§ 1. Infinity of Extension is necessarily immoveable : 
This is equal to saying, the parts of Infinity of Extension 
are necessarily immoveable among themselves. 

a Prop. I. § 2. b Prop. n. Dem. § 2. 



10 



ARGUMENT. 



Part I. 



§ 2. And immoveable, in the Corollary, means immove- 
able either really or mentally. 

§ 3. The Corollary, therefore, lays down, in effect, that 
the parts of Infinity of Extension are necessarily immove- 
able among themselves really or mentally. 

Demonstration. 

§ 1. Motion of parts supposes, of necessity, separation 
of the parts. He who does not see that motion of parts 
supposes, of necessity, separation of the parts, need never 
be expected to see that because every A is equal to B, 
therefore some B is equal to A. And, Infinity of Exten- 
sion being necessarily incapable of separation,* is, there- 
fore, necessarily immoveable, that is, its parts are neces- 
sarily immoveable among themselves. 

§ 2. Infinity of Extension is, then, necessarily immove- 
able-. 

Scholium. 

The parts of Infinity of Extension being necessarily 
immoveable among themselves ; it is a necessary conse- 
quence, that the thing, the parts of which are moveable 
among themselves, is not Infinity of Extension ; nor any 
part of it : part, in the sense of partial consideration 
only, for otherwise Infinity of Extension can have no 
parts. a 



Proposition III. There is necessarily a Being of 
Infinity of Extension. 

§ 1. Either, Infinity of Extension subsists, or (which 
is at bottom the same thing) we conceive it to subsist, 
without a support or substratum : or, it subsists not, or 

a Prop. II. Dem. § 2. 



Prop. III. 



DIVISION I, 



11 



(which is the same thing) we conceive it not to subsist, 
without a Support or Substratum. 

§ 2. First, If Infinity of Extension subsist without a 
substratum, then it is a substance. And if any one should 
deny, that it is a substance, it so subsisting ; to prove, 
beyond contradiction, the utter absurdity of such denial, 
we have but to defy him to show, why Infinity of Exten- 
sion is not a substance, so far forth as it can subsist by 
itself, or without a substratum. 

§ 3. As, therefore, it is a contradiction to deny that 
Infinity of Extension exists, a so there is, on the supposi- 
tion of its being able to subsist without a substratum, a 
substance or being of Infinity of Extension necessarily 
existing : Though Infinity of Extension, and the being of 
Infinity of Extension are not different, as standing to each 
other in the relation of mode and subject of the mode, 
but are identical. 

§ 4. Secondly, If Infinity of Extension subsist not 
without a Substratum, then, it being a contradiction to 
deny there is Infinity of Extension, 51 it is a contradiction 
to deny there is a Substratum to it. 

§ 5. Whether or not men will consent to call this 
Substratum Substance or Being, is of very little conse- 
quence. For, 'tis certain that the word Substance or 
Being, has never been employed, can never be employed, 
to stand for any thing better entitled to the application 
of the term than the Substratum of Infinity of Exten- 
sion. But to refuse to give such Substratum that name, 
being a thing obviously most unreasonable, let us call the 
Substratum of Infinity of Extension, by the name Sub- 
stance or Being. 

§ 6. There is, then, necessarily, a Being of Infinity of 
Extension. 

a Prop. I. § 3. 



12 



ARGUMENT. 



Part I, 



Proposition IV. The Being of Infinity of Extension 
is necessarily of unity and simplicity. 

§ 1. Because Infinity of Extension is necessarily in- 
divisible, 21 therefore it is of the truest unity, For to 
affirm that though it is necessarily indivisible, even so 
much as by thought, yet it is not of the truest unity, is 
to affirm what is no more intelligible than would be the 
assertion, that a circle, this being a figure contained by 
one line, with every part of that line or circumference 
equally distant from a certain point, is not round. 

§ 2. And as Infinity of Extension is necessarily of the 
truest unity, so it is necessarily of the utmost simplicity. 
For what more can be included in simplicity than is im- 
plied in unity caused by a thing being necessarily indi- 
visible, we can have no conception. 

§ 3. And as, on the supposition that Infinity of Ex- 
tension subsists by itself, there is necessarily a being of 
Infinity of Extension, b so, this supposed, that being is 
necessarily of unity and simplicity. 

§ 4. If Infinity of Extension subsist not without a 
Substratum ; that we cannot, without an express con- 
tradiction, deny, that the Substratum is of the truest 
unity, and utmost simplicity, may be most easily demon- 
strated. 

§ 5. For it is intuitively evident, that the Substratum 
of Infinity of Extension can be no more divisible than 
Infinity of Extension itself. And if any one should affirm 
that though Infinity of Extension is necessarily indivisible, 
yet that its Substratum can be considered as divisible, 
we could no more assent to the proposition than we could 
believe that a subject can never be truly predicated of 
a Prop. II. Dem. § 2. * Prop. III. § 3. 



Prop. -IV. 



DIVISION I. 



13 



itself. And, therefore, as Infinity of Extension is neces- 
sarily indivisible, a so is its Substratum. 

§ 6. And Infinity of Extension being necessarily of 
unity and simplicity because necessarily indivisible, 5 its 
Substratum is so likewise, for the same reason. 

§ 7. And as, on the supposition that Infinity of Ex- 
tension subsists not without a Substratum, there is ne- 
cessarily a Being- of Infinity of Extension, so, this sup- 
posed, that Being is necessarily of unity and simplicity. 

§ 8. The Being of Infinity of Extension is necessarily, 
then, of unity and simplicity. 

Corollary. 

The Substratum of Infinity of Extension being neces- 
sarily indivisible,* 1 that is, its parts being necessarily indi- 
visible from each other : It is a corollary, that its parts 
(parts, in the sense of partial consideration only, d ) are 
necessarily immoveable among themselves : For the same 
reason that the parts of Infinity of Extension are neces- 
sarily immoveable among themselves, because necessarily 
indivisible from each other. 

Scholium. 

On the whole, therefore, the thing, the parts of which 
are divisible from each other, is not the Substratum of 
Infinity of Extension, nor any part of it : And, the thing, 
the parts of which are moveable among themselves, is 
not the Substratum, nor any part of it : Part, in the 
sense of partial consideration only. d 



a Prop. II. Dem. § 2. 
c Prop. III. § 4 & 5. 



b § 1. & 2. 

d Prop. IV. § 5. 



14 



ARGUMENT. 



Part I. 



Sub-Proposition. The Material Universe is finite 
in extension. 

§ 1 . If, then, it should be maintained, that the Mate- 
rial Universe is the Substratum of Infinity of Extension ; 
(which will be maintained, as is most evident, if it be 
contended that the Material Universe is a thorough ple- 
num of Infinity of Extension;) to put to the proof, whether 
or not the Material Universe can be such Substratum, we 
have but to ask, Are the parts of the Material Universe 
divisible from each other ? and, Are they moveable among 
themselves ? For, if they be so divisible, if so moveable, 
then the Material Universe cannot be the Substratum of 
Infinity of Extension. a 

§ 2. Now, we know, of a certainty, that some parts of 
the Material Universe are divisible from each other ; and, 
as far as we know, every part of it to which our minds 
could be directed is as divisible, as are the parts which 
we certainly know are divisible : and this is the conclu- 
sion to which, by the rules of philosophy, we are entitled 
to come. 

§ 3. Therefore, the Material Universe cannot be the 
Substratum of Infinity of Extension. 

§ 4. Again, we are certain that some parts of the Ma- 
terial Universe are moveable among themselves ; and, that 
every part of it to which our minds could be directed is 
as moveable, as are the parts which we certainly know 
are moveable, is (here, as in the other case) what we 
are entitled to conclude. 

§ 5. Therefore, again, the Material Universe cannot 
be the Substratum of Infinity of Extension. 

§ 6. And, if, because the parts of the Material Uni- 
verse are divisible from each other, it is proved that it is 
a Schol. under Prop. IV. 



Prop. IV. 



DIVISION I. 



15 



not the Substratum of Infinity of Extension ; then, be- 
cause the parts of the Material Universe are divisible 
from each other, and moveable among themselves, it is 
proved, much more, (if that were possible,) that the Ma- 
terial Universe is not the Substratum of Infinity of Ex- 
tension. It is proved that the Material Universe is not 
the Substratum of Infinity of Extension ; nor any part 
thereof, for the Substratum of Infinity of Extension can 
have no parts but in the sense of partial consideration : a 
that is, that the Material Universe is finite in extension. 
For were it of Infinity of Extension, it would be the 
Substratum thereof. But it being not that Substratum : 
Therefore, it is not of Infinity of Extension. 

§ 7. The Material Universe, then, is finite in exten- 
sion. 

General Scholium. 

§ 1. The parts of Infinity of Extension, or of its Sub- 
stratum, if it have a Substratum, being necessarily indi- 
visible from each other, b and immoveable among them- 
selves: and the parts of the Material Universe being 
divisible from each other, and moveable among them- 
selves : and it therefore following, that the Material Uni- 
verse is not the Substratum of Infinity of Extension, but 
is finite in extension : Here are two sorts of extension. 
The one sort, that which the Material Universe has : 
And the other, the extension of Infinity of Extension. 
And as Infinity of Extension is necessarily existing, d and 
as the extension of the Material Universe must exist, if 
it exist, in the extension of Infinity of Extension ; a part 
of this, or of its Substratum, if it have a Substratum, 
(part, but in the sense of partial consideration ; e ) must 

a Prop. IV. § 5. b Prop. II. Dem. § 2. & Prop. IV. § 5. 

c Coroll. from Prop. II. Dem. & Coroll. under Prop. IV. 

d Prop. I. § 2. e p rop . n. Dem. § 2. & Prop. IV. § 5. 



16 



ARGUMENT. 



Part I. 



penetrate the Material Universe, and every atom, even 
the minutest atom, of it. 

§ 2. It will be proper, therefore, to distinguish be- 
tween these two kinds of extension. And, accordingly, 
let us confine to matter, namely, to the distance of the 
extremities of matter from each other, the name exten- 
sion ; and apply to the extension of Infinity of Extension, 
a part of which {part, in the sense of partial considera- 
tion only, a ) penetrates all matter to the minutest atom, 
the name Expansion. 

§ 3. And, therefore, every thing which hath been 
proved to be true in relation to that extension which 
matter has not, must be true with regard to Expansion. 



Proposition V. There is necessarily but one Being 
of Infinity of Expansion. 

§ 1. Infinity of Expansion either subsists by itself, or 
it subsists not without a Substratum. b In both cases 
there is necessarily a Being of Infinity of Expansion. 
Now, we are under a necessity of inferring from the ex- 
istence of such a Being, that there is but one such Being. 

§ 2. For, as 'tis evident, there can be but one Infinity 
of Expansion, so, on the supposition that it subsists by 
itself, and so is a being, d there can be but one being of 
Infinity of Expansion. And, as 'tis evident there can no 
more be more than one Substratum of Infinity of Expan- 
sion (whatever that Substratum is) than there can be 
more than one Infinity of Expansion ; and as, therefore, 

a Prop. II. Dem. § 2. 

b Prop. III. § 1. compared with Gen. Schol. § 3. 
e Prop. III. § 3.-4, 5. & Gen. Schol. § 3. 
* Prop. III. § 3. & Gen. Schol. § 3. 



Part II. 



DIVISION I. 



17 



'tis evident, there can be but one Substratum of Infinity 
of Expansion : so, on the supposition that Infinity of Ex- 
pansion subsists not without a Substratum, or Being. 3 
there can be but one Being of Infinity of Expansion. 

§ 3. And, therefore, any one who asserts he can sup- 
pose two or more necessarily existing beings, each of In- 
finity of Expansion, is no more to be argued with than 
one who denies, Whatever is, is. The denying of this 
proposition cannot, indeed, be regarded as more curious 
than the affirming of the other. 

§ 4. There is, then, necessarily, but one Being of Infi- 
nity of Expansion. 



PART II. 



Proposition I. Infinity of Duration is, necessarily, 
existing. 

§ 1. The truth of this is evident from the same sort of 
consideration as shows there is necessarily Infinity of Ex- 
tension ; to wit, that even when we endeavour to remove 
from our minds the idea of Infinity of Duration, we can- 
not, after all our efforts, avoid leaving this idea still 
there. Endeavour as much as we may to displace the 
idea, that is, conceive Infinity of Duration non-existent, 
we shall find, after a review of our thoughts, that to do 
so is utterly beyond our power. 

§ 2. And since, even when we would remove the con- 
ception of Infinity of Duration from the mind, we neces- 
a Prop. III. § 4, 5. & Gen. Scliol. § 3. 



18 



ARGUMENT. 



Part 11. 



sarily leave the conception behind ; 'tis manifest, that In- 
finity of Duration necessarily exists : Because, every thing 
the existence of luhich ive cannot but believe, is necessarily 
existing. 

§ 3. Infinity of Duration is, then, necessarily existing. 



Proposition II. Infinity of Duration is, necessarily, 
indivisible. 

Prolegomenon. 

This Proposition is equivalent to another : to-wit, The 
parts of Infinity of Duration are necessarily indivisible 

from each other ; and indivisible really or mentally. 

Demonstration. 

§ 1. As was laid down before, what is divisible may be 
divided ; and that which is divided from something else 
must have superficies, every way, and be separated from 
the other thing, be the distance ever so small : — There is 
no difference between being divided and being separated. 

§ 2. Then, divisibility meaning possibility of separa- 
tion : Because the parts of Infinity of Duration are ne- 
cessarily inseparable, they are necessarily indivisible. 

§ 3. Infinity of Duration is, then, necessarily indivisible. 



Corollary from Proposition II. Infinity of Dura- 
tion is, necessarily, immoveable. 

Prolegomenon. 

The Corollary is tantamount to this proposition, The 
parts of Infinity of Duration are necessarily immoveable 
among themselves, really or mentally. 



Prop. III. 



DIVISION I. 



19 



Demonstration. 

§ 1. Motion of the parts of Infinity of Duration, would 
necessarily involve separation of its parts. And its parts 
being necessarily incapable of separation^ are, therefore, 
necessarily immoveable among themselves. 

§ 2. Infinity of Duration is, then, necessarily immove- 
able. 

Proposition III. There is, necessarily, a Being of 
Infinity of Duration. 

§ 1. Either, Infinity of Duration exists, or is conceived 
to exist, without a substratum ; or, it exists not, or is 
conceived not to exist, without a Substratum. 

§ 2. First, If Infinity of Duration exist by itself, it is 
a substance. For should any one deny that it is a sub- 
stance, if it so exist ; we shall prove, past contradiction, 
the absurdity of the denial by just demanding the reason 
why Infinity of Duration is not a substance, if it exist 
without a substratum, or by itself. 

§ 3. And therefore, as there is necessarily Infinity of 
Duration, b there is, supposing it to exist by itself, a sub- 
stance or being of Infinity of Duration necessarily exist- 
ing : Infinity of Duration and the being of Infinity of 
Duration being identical, not different. 

§ 4. Secondly, If Infinity of Duration exist not with- 
out a Substratum, there is a Substance or Being of Infi- 
nity of Duration. For the word Substance or Being can 
never, it is certain, stand for any thing having a better 
claim to the application of the term than such Sub- 
stratum. 

§ 5. And as Infinity of Duration is necessarily exist- 
ing, 1 ' so there is necessarily a Substance or Being of In- 
a Part II. Prop. II. Dem. § 2. b Part II. Prop. I. § 2. 



20 



ARGUMENT. 



Part II. 



Unity of Duration, on the supposition that it exists not 
without a Substratum. 

§ 6. There is necessarily, then, a Being of Infinity of 
Duration. 



Proposition IV. The Being of Infinity of Duration 
is, necessarily, of unity and simplicity. 

§ 1 . As Infinity of Duration is necessarily indivisible,*" 1 
so it is necessarily of the truest unity. For, if what is 
necessarily indivisible, even by thought, be not of the 
truest unity, what unity consists in is altogether unintel- 
ligible. 

§ 2. And since Infinity of Duration is necessarily of 
the truest unity, it is, also, of the utmost simplicity. Be- 
cause we can have no conception of what is in simplicity 
that is not in unity caused by a thing being necessarily in- 
divisible. 

§ 3. And as there necessarily is a being of Infinity of 
Duration, on the supposition that Infinity of Duration 
exists without a substratum, b so, this supposed, the being 
is necessarily of unity and simplicity. 

§ 4. If Infinity of Duration exist not without a Sub- 
stratum ; that the Substratum is of the truest unity and 
utmost simplicity, is a thing not difficult to be demon- 
strated. 

§ 5. For, that the Substratum of Infinity of Duration 
is no more divisible than Infinity of Duration, is a self- 
evident truth. Therefore, because Infinity of Duration 
is necessarily indivisible, a so is the Substratum. 

§ 6. And Infinity of Duration, because necessarily in- 



a Part II. Prop. II. Dem. § 2. 



b Part II. Prop. III. § 3, 



Prop. IV. 



DIVISION I. 



21 



divisible, being necessarily of unity and simplicity, a its 
Substratum, for the same reason, is so likewise. 

§ 7. And as there necessarily is a Being of Infinity of 
Duration, on the supposition that Infinity of Duration 
exists not without a Substratum, b so, this supposed, the 
Being is necessarily of unity and simplicity. 

§ 8. The Being of Infinity of Duration is, then, neces- 
sarily of unity and simplicity. 

Scholium I. 

The Substratum of Infinity of Duration being neces- 
sarily indivisible, that is, its parts being necessarily in- 
divisible from each other ; it is a necessary consequence, 
that the thing, the parts of which are divisible from each 
other, is not such Substratum, nor any part thereof. 

Corollary. 

It is a corollary from the proposition, The parts of the 
Substratum of Infinity of Duration are necessarily indi- 
visible from each other, that they are necessarily im- 
moveable among themselves : Just as Infinity of Duration 
is necessarily immoveable, because necessarily indivisible. 

Scholium II. 

And the parts of the Substratum of Infinity of Dura- 
tion being necessarily immoveable among themselves; 
it is a necessary consequence, that the thing, the parts of 
which are moveable among themselves, is not such Sub- 
stratum, nor any part thereof. 



a § 1 & 2. b p ar t II. Prop. III. § 5. 

c Part II. Prop. IV. § 5. 



22 



ARGUMENT. 



Part II. 



Sub-Proposition. The Material Universe is finite 
in duration. 

§ 1. If, then, it should be held, that the Material Uni- 
verse is the Substratum of Infinity of Duration, or a part 
thereof; (which will be held, if it be alleged that the 
Material Universe is of itself of Infinity of Duration : 
Just as it will be maintained, that the Material Universe 
is the Substratum of Infinity of Extension, if it be con- 
tended that the Material Universe is a plenum of Infinity 
of Extension.) Should it be held, that the Material 
Universe is the Substratum of Infinity of Duration, or a 
part thereof; to put to the proof whether or not the 
Material Universe can be such Substratum, or a part 
thereof, we have but to ask, Are the parts of the Mate- 
rial Universe divisible from each other ? and, Are they 
moveable among themselves ? For if they be so divisible 
and moveable, the Material Universe cannot be the Sub- 
stratum of Infinity of Duration, nor any part thereof, a 
the Substratum having no parts in the sense of capability 
of separation. 13 

§ 2. Now, we know, certainly, that some parts of the 
Material Universe, are divisible from each other ; and 
that every part of it to which our minds could be directed 
is as divisible, as are the parts which we certainly know 
are divisible, is the conclusion to which the rules of phi- 
losophy entitle us to come. 

§ 3. Then, the Material Universe cannot be the Sub- 
stratum of Infinity of Duration, nor any part thereof. 

§ 4. Again, we know, certainly, that some parts of the 
Material Universe are moveable among themselves ; and 
that every part of it to which our minds could be directed 

a Part II. Schol. I & II. under Prop. IV. 
b Part II. Prop. IV. § 5. 



Pkop. IV. 



DIVISION I. 



23 



is as moveable, as are the parts which we certainly know 
are moveable, is (in this, as well as in the other case) 
the conclusion to which we are entitled to come. 

§ 5. Then, again, the Material Universe cannot be the 
Substratum of Infinity of Duration, nor any part thereof . 

§ 6. That is, the Material Universe is finite in dura- 
tion. For, were it of Infinity of Duration, it would be 
the Substratum thereof, or, at least, a part of the Sub- 
stratum. But it being not that Substratum, nor any part 
of it : Therefore, it is not of Infinity of Duration. 

§ 7. The Material Universe is, then, finite in duration. 

Corollary from Sub-Proposition. Every succes- 
sion of substances is finite in duration. 

§ 1. Should it, now, be asserted that any succession, or 
successions, of substances finite in extension ; finite in ex- 
tension, for a succession of substances of Infinity of Exten- 
sion were we know not what : Should it be asserted, that 
any successions, Or any one succession, of substances — say 
of minerals, or vegetables, or animals, or all together, or 
of worlds, or of systems of worlds — is of Infinity of Du- 
ration ; the falsity of the assertion is, immediately and 
abundantly, apparent. For, seeing that the whole Ma- 
terial Universe, itself, is finite in duration, a every succes- 
sion of substances which are in the Material Universe 
(and know you of substances finite in extension which are 
out of it?) must, therefore, be finite in duration, too. 

§ 2. Every succession of substances is, then, finite in 
duration. 

a Sub-Prop, preced. 



24 



ARGUMENT. 



Part II. 



Proposition V. There is, necessarily, but one Being 
of Infinity of Duration. 

§ 1. Infinity of Duration either exists without a sub- 
stratum, or, it exists not without a Substratum : a And in 
either case, there necessarily is a Being of Infinity of Du- 
ration^ And we are under the necessity of inferring 
from the existence of such a Being, that there can be no 
more than one such Being. 

§ 2. Because 'tis manifest there can be but one In- 
finity of Duration, therefore, on the supposition that it 
exists without a substratum, and, so, is a being, c there 
can be but one being of Infinity of Duration. And be- 
cause 'tis as manifest there can be but one Substratum of 
Infinity of Duration (whatever the Substratum is), as that 
there can be but one Infinity of Duration; and because, 
therefore, 'tis manifest there can be but one such Sub- 
stratum : therefore, on the supposition that Infinity of 
Duration exists not without a Substratum, or Being, d there 
can be but one Being of Infinity of Duration. 

§ 3. There is, then, necessarily, but one Being of Infi- 
nity of Duration. 

a Part II. Prop. III. § 1. 
b Part II. Prop. III. § 3 & 5. 
o Part II. Prop. III. § 3. 
a Part II. Prop. III. § 4. 



Part III. 



DIVISION I. 



25 



PART III. 



Proposition I. There is, necessarily, a Being of 
Infinity of Expansion and Infinity of Duration. 

§ 1. This will be demonstrated, if it be proved, that 
the necessarily existing Being of Infinity of Expansion, 
and the necessarily existing Being of Infinity of Duration, 
are not different Beings, but are identical. 

§ 2. Now, either, Infinity of Expansion subsists by it- 
self, and, then, it is a being : a and, Infinity of Duration 
exists by itself, and, then, it is a being. b 

§ 3. Or, Infinity of Expansion subsists not without a 
Substratum, or Being : c and, Infinity of Duration exists 
not without a Substratum, or Being. d 

§ 4. To take the former alternative. Every part of 
Infinity of Expansion being in every part of Infinity of 
Duration, every part of the being of Infinity of Expansion 
is in every part of the being of Infinity of Duration. And 
every part of Infinity of Duration being in every part of 
Infinity of Expansion, every part of the being of Infinity 
of Duration is in every part of the being of Infinity of 
Expansion. Part, in all the cases, in the sense of partial 
consideration only. 

§ 5. To-wit, The whole of Infinity of Expansion being 
in the whole of Infinity of Duration, the whole of the 
being of Infinity of Expansion is in the whole of the being 

a Part I. Prop. III. § 1 & 3. compared with Gen. Schol. § 3. 

b Part II. Prop. III. § 1 & 3. 

c Part I. Prop III. § 1 & 5, and Gen. Schol. § 3. 

d Part II. Prop. III. § 1 & 4. 



26 



ARGUMENT. 



Part III. 



of Infinity of Duration. And, The whole of Infinity of 
Duration being in the whole of Infinity of Expansion, the 
whole of the being of Infinity of Duration is in the whole 
of the being of Infinity of Expansion. Whole, in every 
instance, but as a figure. 

§ 6. And this being, most manifestly, impossible, if the 
being of Infinity of Expansion and the being of Infinity 
of Duration be different ; it necessarily follows, that they 
are identical. 

§ 7. That is, Infinity of Expansion is Infinity of Dura- 
tion, and Infinity of Duration is Infinity of Expansion. 
Which conclusion being plainly absurd ; and it necessarily 
following from the supposition, that Infinity of Expansion 
subsists by itself, and that Infinity of Duration subsists by 
Itself, it is proved, that the supposition itself is absurd. 
Therefore, Infinity of Expansion cannot exist by itself, 
and Infinity of Duration cannot exist by itself. 

§ 8. Then, to turn to the other alternative, Infinity of 
Expansion subsists not without a Substratum, or Being : 
and Infinity of Duration subsists not without a Substra- 
tum, or Being. 

§ 9. And, as every part of Infinity of Expansion is in 
every part of Infinity of Duration, therefore, every part 
of the Substratum of Infinity of Expansion is in every 
part of the Substratum of Infinity of Duration. And, as 
every part of Infinity of Duration is in every part of In- 
finity of Expansion, therefore, every part of the Substra- 
tum of Infinity of Duration is in every part of the Sub- 
stratum of Infinity of Expansion. Part, but in the sense 
of partial consideration. 

§ 10. That is, The whole of Infinity of Expansion being 
in the whole of Infinity of Duration, the whole of the 
Substratum of Infinity of Expansion is in the whole of the 
Substratum of Infinity of Duration. And, The whole of 
Infinity of Duration being in the whole of Infinity of 



Prop. II. 



DIVISION I. 



27 



Expansion, the whole of the Substratum of Infinity of 
Duration is in the whole of the Substratum of Infinity of 
Expansion. Whole, in all the cases, used figuratively. 

§ 11. And this being, most manifestly, impossible, if 
the Substratum, or Being, of Infinity of Expansion, and 
the Substratum, or Being, of Infinity of Duration, be dif- 
ferent, it follows necessarily, that they are identical : To- 
wit, the Substratum, or Being, of Infinity of Expansion 
is, also, the Substratum, or Being, of Infinity of Duration. 

§ 12. And this being proved, it is demonstrated, there 
is, necessarily, a Being of Infinity of Expansion, and In- 
finity of Durations 

§ 13. There is, then, necessarily, a Being of Infinity of 
Expansion and Infinity of Duration. 



Proposition II. The Being of Infinity of Expansion 
and Infinity of Duration is, necessarily, of unity and 
simplicity. 

§ 1. The Being of Infinity of Expansion is, necessarily, 
of unity and simplicity . b And, the Being of Infinity of 
Duration is, necessarily, of unity and simplicity. And 
these two being not different, but identical,* 1 it follows, 
that the Being of Infinity of Expansion and Infinity of 
Duration is, necessarily, of unity and simplicity. 

§ 2. The Being of Infinity of Expansion and Infinity 
of Duration is, then, necessarily, of unity and simplicity. 

a § 1. 

b Part I. Prop. IV. § 8, compared with Gen. Schol. § 3. 
e Part II. Prop. IV. § 8. 
a Part III. Prop. I. § 11. 



28 



ARGUMENT. 



Part III. 



Proposition III. There is, necessarily, but one Being of 
Infinity of Expansion and Infinity of Duration. 

§ 1. There is, necessarily, but one Being of Infinity 
of Expansion.' 1 And the Being of Infinity of Expansion 
being also the Being of Infinity of Duration, b it follows, 
that there is, necessarily, but one Being of Infinity of 
Expansion and Infinity of Duration. 

§ 2. There is, necessarily, then, but one Being of Infi- 
nity of Expansion and Infinity of Duration. 

a Part I. Prop. V. § 4. b Part III. Prop. I. § 11. 



Part I. 



DIVISION II. 



29 



DIVISION II. 
PART I. 

Proposition. The Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity 
of Expansion and of Duration, is, necessarily, 
Intelligent, and All-knowing, 

§ 1. For Intelligence either began to be, or it never 
began to be. 

§ 2. That it never began to be, is evident in this, that 
if it began to be, it must have had a cause ; for, ivhatever 
begins to be must have a cause. And the cause of Intel- 
ligence must be of Intelligence ; for, what is not of Intel- 
ligence cannot make Intelligence begin to be. Now, In- 
telligence being, before Intelligence began to be, is a con- 
tradiction. And this absurdity following from the sup- 
position, that Intelligence began to be, it is proved, that 
Intelligence never began to be : to-wit, is of Infinity of 
Duration. 

§ 3. And as Intelligence is of Infinity of Duration, and 
supposes a Being : And no succession of substances, or 
beings, is of Infinity of Duration : a It necessarily follows, 
that there is one Being of Infinity of Duration which is 
of Intelligence. And as there is but one Being of Infinity 
of Duration : b and this Being is of simplicity : c and is 

a Div. 1. Part II. Coroll. from Sub-Prop. 
r b Div. I. Part II. Prop. V. § 3. 
c Div. I. Part II. Prop. IV. § 8, 



30 



ARGUMENT. 



Part I. 



also of Infinity of Expansion : a It follows, that the Simple, 
Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration is 
necessarily of Intelligence. 

§ 4. And that this Being is All-knowing, is no infer- 
ence from the proposition, that the Simple, Sole, Being 
of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration is necessarily of 
Intelligence, for it is, indeed, implied by such proposition : 
A Being of Intelligence who is of Infinity of Expansion 
and of Duration, is convertible with an All-knowing 
Being. 

§ 5. The Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion 
and of Duration, is, then, necessarily Intelligent, and 
All-knowing. 

Scholium. 

The Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of 
Duration, being Intelligent, 15 is a Mind, a Mind conscious 
of itself. An intelligent being who is not a mind, being- 
all the same as an intelligent being who is not, in any 
proper sense of the term, intelligent : And a mind which 
is not conscious of itself, being just a mind which is not 
deserving of the name of mind at all. 

a Div. I. Part III. Prop. I. § 11. 
b Div. II. Part I. § 3. 



Part II. 



DIVISION II, 



31 



PART II. 

Proposition. The Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity 
of Expansion and of Duration, who is All- 
knowing, is, necessarily, All-powerful. 

§ 1. This must be granted, if it be shown, that the 
Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Dura- 
tion, who is All-knowing, made matter begin to be. 

§ 2. As the Material Universe is finite induration, 3 or 
began to be, it must have had a cause ; for, whatever be- 
gins to be must have a cause. And this cause must be. 
in one respect or other, the Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity 
of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing ; inas- 
much as, what being, or cause, independent of that Being, 
could there be \ And therefore, that Being made matter 
begin to be. 

§ 3. And this being shown, it must be granted, that 
that Being is, necessarily, All-powerful . b 

§ 4. The Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion 
and of Duration, who is All-knowing, is, then, necessarily, 
All-powerful. 



* Div. I. Part II. Sub-Prop, 



32 



ARGUMENT. 



Part III. 



PART III. 

Proposition. The Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity 
of Expansion and of Duration, who is All- 
knowing, and All-powerful, is, necessarily, en- 
tirely Free. 

§ 1. This will be evinced, if it be manifested, that the 
Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Dura- 
tion, who is All-knowing, and All-powerful, made motion 
begin to be. 

§ 2. Of all the substances now in motion, none of them 
belongs to a succession of Infinity of Duration, every suc- 
cession of substances being finite in duration. a And the 
moving substances being finite in duration, or having be- 
gun sometime to be, they must have had a cause ; for. 
whatever begins to be must have a cause. And no first 
cause can be assigned, or even thought of, other than the 
Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Dura- 
tion, who is All-knowing, and All-powerful. Therefore, this 
Being made moving substances, or motion, begin to be. 

§ 3. And this being manifested, it is evinced, that that 
Being is, necessarily, entirely Free. b 

§ 4. The Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion 
and of Duration, who is All-knowing, and All-powerful, is, 
then, necessarily, entirely Free. 



Div. I. Part II. Coroll. from Sub-Prop. 



b § 1. 



DIVISION III. 



33 



DIVISION III. 

Proposition. The Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity 
of Expansion and of Duration, who is All- 
knowing, All-powerful, and entirely Free, is, 
necessarily, completely Happy. 

§ 1. Every position which we cannot but believe is a 
necessary truth. But we cannot but believe, that the Sim- 
ple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, 
who is All-knowing, All-powerful, and entirely Free, is 
completely Happy. Therefore, that this Being is com- 
pletely Happy, is a necessary truth. 

§ 2. Before we could righteously predicate unhappiness 
of the Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of 
Duration, who is All-knowing, All-powerful, and entirely 
Free, we would require to know of some sufficient reason 
for the predication. But we can know of none. For 
every kind, and degree, of unhappiness must proceed, or 
be resolvable into what proceeds, from some natural de- 
fect, or imperfection : And what imperfection can that 
Simple Being be subject to, who, only, is of Infinity of 
Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, All- 
powerful, and entirely Free % 

§ 3. And as we can have no sufficient reason for ascrib- 
ing unhappiness to that Being ; so, on the other hand, 
there is a sufficient reason why we cannot help ascribing 
to it Happiness the most complete. The Being is a Mind, a 
a Div. II. Part I. SchoL 

H 



34 



ARGUMENT. 



conscious of itself : that is, it perceives its own attributes, 
or perfections, and is conscious of the thoughts whereby 
it perceives them. How could a Mind conscious of per- 
ceiving, as appertaining to itself, such attributes as Infi- 
nity of Expansion and of Duration, All-powerfulness, en- 
tire Freeness, be supposed otherwise than as most con- 
summately Happy? 

§ 4. Truly, therefore, we cannot but believe, that the 
Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Dura- 
tion, who is All-knowing, All-powerful, and entirely Free, 
is completely Happy. 

§ 5. The Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion 
and of Duration, who is All-knowing, All-powerful, and 
entirely Free, is then, necessarily, completely Happy. 

Sub-Proposition. The Simple, Sole, Being of In- 
finity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All- 
knowing, All-powerful, entirely Free, and com- 
pletely Happy, is, necessarily, perfectly Good. 

§ 1. On the supposition, that the Simple, Sole, Being 
of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All- 
knowing, All-powerful, entirely Free, and completely 
Happy, created intellectual and moral beings — indeed, 
any animal natures whatever ; the only motive, or, if you 
think there were more motives than one, one of the mo- 
tives, to create, must be believed to have been, a desire 
to make happiness besides its own consummate Happiness 
begin to be. Should there be assigned any additional 
motive, it cannot be believed to have been incompatible 
with such desire. The reason is very plain : A being la- 
bouring with incongruous motives cannot be happy. 

§ 2. But 'tis the case, that the Simple, Sole, Being of 
Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-know- 



DIVISION III. 



35 



ing, All-powerful, entirely Free, and completely Happy, 
created intellectual and moral, or, to employ a most com- 
prehensive term, sentient, substances or beings. a 

§ 3. Therefore, the only motive, or, at least, one of 
the motives, to create, must have been, a desire to pro- 
duce creaturely happiness. 

§ 4. The consequentially necessary connection between 
the consummate Happiness of the Simple, Sole, Being of 
Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-know- 
ing, All-powerful, and entirely Free ; and its desire to 
communicate happiness, all possible happiness (for there 
is no sufficient reason why we should suppose the amount 
of happiness to be bestowed on the creatures, as crea- 
tures, to be less than it might be :) the necessary connec- 
tion, we say, is intuitively evident. By no stretch of 
imagination can we conceive, that the Simple, Sole, Being 
of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All- 
knowing, All-powerful, and completely Happy, could be 
the Free Cause of misery, or aught but happiness, to its 
creatures : Unless we can conceive, that happiness, as 
happiness, can give birth to its opposite ; the cause being 
wholly disproportionate to the effect. 

§ 5. Now, to produce, in consequence of desire to pro- 
duce, all possible creaturely happiness, is to be perfectly 
Good. 

§ 6. From all which, it is most obvious, that the Sim- 
ple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Dura- 
tion, who is All-knowing, All-powerful, entirely Free, 
and completely Happy, is, necessarily, perfectly Good. 

§ 7. The Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion 
and of Duration, who is All-knowing, All-powerful, en- 
tirely Free, and completely Happy, is, then, necessarily, 
perfectly Good. 

a Div. II. Part III. § 2. 



AN EXAMINATION 



OF 

ANTITHEOS'S "REFUTATION 

" OF THE 

" ARGUMENT A PRIORI FOR THE BEING AND 
" ATTRIBUTES OF GOD." 



" Did it plainly appear that Space and Duration were Properties of a 
Substance, we should have an easy way with the Atheists : For it would 
at once prove demonstrably an Eternal, Necessary, Self-existent Being; 
that there is but One such ; and that he is needful in order to the exist- 
ence of all other things." 

Bishop Butler. 



CONTENTS, 



Advertisement to the Third Edition, . . . Page 5 
Preface, . . . . . . • • "• 9 

PART I. 

The Relevancy of a priori argumentation for A Real 

Existence, . . . . • • 15 

PART II. 

The " Argument, a priori, for the Being and Attributes 

" of God," an irrefragable Demonstration, . . 37 

PART III. 

The non-infinity divisibility of Extension and of Matter, 55 
PART IV. 

The " Argument, a priori, for the Being and Attributes 

" of God," an irrefragable Demonstration, . . 87 

PART V. 

The " Argument, a priori, for the Being and Attributes 

" of God," an irrefragable Demonstration, . . 106 

PART VI. 

The " Argument, a priori, for the Being and Attributes 

" of God," an irrefragable Demonstration, . .122 

PART VII. 

The " Argument, a priori, for the Being and Attributes 

" of God," an irrefragable Demonstration, . . 136 

Of the Sentiments of Philosophers concerning Space. — 

M. Des Cartes, Mrs Cockburn, and Others, . 143 



4 



CONTENTS. 



PART VIII. 

Of the Sentiments of Philosophers concerning Space. — 
Newton, Clarke, Butler, Price, Locke, Addison, 
Tillotson, Milton, and Others, . . . 158 

PART IX. 

Of the Sentiments of Philosophers concerning Space. — 
Antitheos, Reid, Gleig, Gassendus, Episcopius, 
Leibnitz, and Others, . . . . .176 

PART X. 

Of the Sentiments of Philosophers concerning Space. — 

Law, Watts, Brougham, Kant, Berkeley, . .198 

PART XL 

The " Argument, a priori, for the Being and Attributes 

of God," an irrefragable Demonstration, . . 220 

PART XII. 

The " Argument, a priori, for the Being and Attributes 

" of God," an irrefragable Demonstration, . . 238 



Notes to Part XII 253 

APPENDIX. 

Appendix to Part 1 257 

... ... IV. . . . . . . 25& 

VI. . . . . • • 26$ 

VIII. 

Appendix A, 268 

... b, . . . . • 2 m 

Appendix to Part X. 281 

General Appendix, 282 



ADVERTISEMENT TO THE THIRD EDITION. 



The present edition does not differ very widely from the pre- 
ceding one. Alterations have been made ; but they are by 
no means very numerous, or essential : And there occur several 
not unimportant additions. 

Although a new edition of the " Argument, a priori," appears 
in this volume, we go by that edition which was in Antitheos's 
hands when he set himself to the task of answering. There is, 
indeed, no fundamental difference between the old edition, and 
the new : but we always walk by the words of the old, in or- 
der that our antitheist may not have the shadow of a pretext for 
alleging that any undue advantage has been taken. 

No vital difference exists : This, however, must be understood 
with one notable qualification. In the new edition of the " Ar- 
" gument," we have advanced to the demonstration of the great 
Moral attribute of Goodness : a branch of the subject not 
entered upon in the old edition. But so far as the latter goes, 
there is no radical difference, and there is not a shade of dis- 
agreement. 

Some non-essential differences, nevertheless, there are. And 
that the reader of this work may never be at a loss to know where 
he stands in reference to the precedent demonstration, we subjoin 
the following notices of the points of distinction. 

But first we must advert to the departure from the ancient 
title. The older exhibition of the demonstration was called " An 
Argument, a priori ;" whereas, the present is denominated 



6 



ADVERTISEMENT. 



" The Argument," to the exclusion, as it were, of all other a 
priori methods. Modesty may have suggested the employment 
of the indefinite, but the truth of things really requires the adop- 
tion of the definite, article. " There can be, substantially, but 
" one way of exhibiting the demonstration. "f 

Again, the former title ran, " Argument, a priori, for the 
" Being and Attributes of God :" — for " God," we have substi- 
tuted the words " a great First Cause." And a sufficient rea- 
son for the substitution may be gathered from a single considera- 
tion. God signifies Good — namely, the Good One. And there- 
fore, there is a sort of tautology in the phrase, " Attributes of 
" God :" The term God conveying the idea of the principal at- 
tribute. Goodness involves, and at bottom comprehends in it, all 
relative Moral Perfections. J "We must distinguish then : And 
when we would speak of demonstrating the Being and the Attri- 
butes, we must select a farther expression which does not imply 
the very Attributes to be demonstrated. The Being and Attri- 
butes of a Great First Cause; seems unobjectionable phraseo- 
logy. 

Besides those changes in the language which our readers will 
perceive on comparing the portions of the " Argument" cited in 
this " Examination," with the corresponding places in the pre- 
sent exhibition of the former of these works ; there are changes 
of another description, which we proceed to specify. 

What is now named a " Division," received, in the older edi- 
tion, the title of " Book." 

The " Sub-Proposition " in Part I., and the " Sub-Proposi- 
" tion " in Part II., both in " Division I. ;" were, severally, 
" Scholium I." Part I., and" Scholium II." Part II., in "Book I." 

The " General Scholium " of the new exhibition appeared for- 

f We would respectfully direct attention to the sections which introduce 
our Review of Dr Clarke. Consider, in particular, § 3. 

+ " It was the Opinion of the Wisest of the Philosophers, * * That 
" there is also in the Scale of Being a Nature of Goodness Superior to Wisdom, 
" which therefore measures and determines the Wisdom of God, as his Wis- 
" dom measures and determines his Will, and which the ancient Cabalists were 
" wont to call 'Hj-'O) a Crown, as being the Top, or Crown of the Deity.' 7 
Cudiuorth's Eternal and Immutable Morality. B. I. chap. iii. 



ADVERTISEMENT. 



7 



merly as " Scholium II," Part I. And the present " Corollary 
" from Sub-Proposition" corresponds to what was " Scholium I.," 
Part II. 

The passages which are distinguished as Prolegomena, Demon- 
strations, Scholia, &c. were run together in the previous exhibi- 
tion. The ground for the distinction existed in the language, 
without the application of any distinctive terms. 

The Scholium coming after the demonstration in Part I. Di- 
vision II. appears for the first time. 

To the former edition of the " Argument," there was prefixed 
an " Introduction," which the readers of this volume will in vain 
search for under that designation. By turning to the sixth and 
seventh sectionsf of Part V., the absence of the " Introduction" 
will be found to be satisfactorily accounted for. It appears now 
in a different guise. — The matter which composed that " Intro- 
" duction" has undergone revision. Increase, here : Retrench- 
ment, there : Improvement, on the whole : And yet, after all, 
but slight change, if you take it in the lump. 

With these notifications mastered, no reader can be astray. 

That our readers may have the satisfaction of observing for 
themselves, that we have not dealt unfairly by Antitheos ; 
there is given, in a General Appendix, the whole of that Chap- 
ter in the " Refutation " to which the greatest part of our ani- 
madversions are directed. The Chapter is the one in which that 
gentleman confronts the first three Propositions of the " Argu- 
" ment." By surveying with rigorous minuteness the manner 
in which we act towards our author, our readers will confer a 
favour. And let them be assured, that our conduct has been 
uniform. We have been just as conscientious in the rest of our 
animadversions. — So much with a reference to topics suggested 
by the Examination itself. 

The Preface thereto has undergone, and it admitted, but 
slight modification. One change only requires specification. 

Previous Editions intimated, that we proposed to ourselves, in 

f It may be proper to mention on what principle the sectioning proceeds. 
A section-mark (§) occurs at the beginning of every paragraph • the section- 
marks being used for the sake of reference merely. In short, they denote 
topical as opposed to logical divisions. 



8 



ADVERTISEMENT. 



connection with the discussion waged with the Zetetic Society, 
" to meet and to remove every metaphysical difficulty which 
" atheists can possibly start ;" and, in a word, to " entirely ex- 
" haust the subject, to the complete and everlasting confusion of 
" the deniers of a. God." But the champion of the Zetetics, of 
the Atheists of Scotland, having laid down his arms, and, in a 
manner, confessed himself to be vanquished ; another field must 
be chosen : other atheists must gird themselves for battle. This 
controversy is at an end.f 

+ -See Postscript to this Edition, 



PREFACE 

TO 

EXAMINATION OF ANTITHEOS'S " REFUTATION. 5 



It seems to be a duty which is due to the public in general, 
to give some account of the circumstances which led to the pre- 
sent controversy. Antitheos's production was " called forth" in 
consequence of a challenge, sent by the author of " An Argu- 
" ment, a priori, for the Being and Attributes of God," to a 
society of professed atheists in Glasgovj, " to answer and refute 
" the reasonings contained in the aforesaid work." The letter 
containing the challenge gave a detail of those incidents which 
had conducted to it. And for this reason, and for another to be 
subsequently alluded to, that letter shall be inserted here, word 
for word. 

" To the Society of Atheists which calls itself ' The Areo- 
" ' pagus,' or • The Zetetic Society,' Glasgoiv. 
" Before proceeding to the proper business of this letter, it 
u may be but proper to give you a short account of the manner 
" in which I was led to think of addressing you. 

" Some months ago, seeing, in the window of a small boek- 
" shop in a conspicuous street in this city, a newly printed copy 
f* of Fame's ' Age of Beason,' I determined on speaking to the 
" person who sold the work, in order to know whether he be- 
<l lieved the book to be infamous, and sold it merely for the sake 

K 



10 



PREFACE. 



" of gain, or whether he was, in every sense, a patron of so infa- 
" mous a publication. j* 

" In the book-shop to which I allude, I saw a person who gave 
" me to understand, there was a society of Atheists in Edin- 
" burgh, who met on the Sunday evenings, for the sake of con- 
" firming each other in infidelity. J Subsequently, I met a mem- 
" ber of the Society, (who is said to be one of their best hands,) 
" who, indeed, made no secret of his sentiments. He told me, 
" that there neither was, nor could be, in the universe, any being 
"greater than himself ;|| that his body and brain (for he posi- 
" tively assured me, he had no soul but his brain) had been pro- 
" duced by unintelligent necessary causes ; and that, after his 
" death, the particles of his body and brain might compose a 
" cloud or a dung-hill, but could never, by any chance, compose, 

" again, the person , for so this (by no means fortui- 

" tous) concourse of atoms was called. 

" undertook to answer, with ease, any thing that 

" could be urged in favour of Theism. I challenged him, and, 
" through him, all his atheistical associates, to refute my ' Ar- 
" ' gument, a priori? &c. * * * A copy of which had been for- 
" warded to the body. I was soon informed, that 

f The sight of infidel works in a public shop, was quite new to me six years 
ago. Matters are so much altered since about the beginning of 1837, that 
sheets and volumes of infidelity, much more hideous than Paine's, may be 
seen, any day, in any town, vended in a manner enough public. 

J An atheistical society is no rarity to me now. And that there are socie- 
ties of atheists, and that the societies are studded, thickly studded, over the 
country, every one has been aware ever since the House of Lords, through 
the Bishop of Exeter, (thanks to his Lordship !) directed attention to ths 
subject of the progress of infidelity among us. 

|| All that was here meant to be conveyed was this : That the person 
spoken of asserted, there neither was, nor could be, in the universe, a being 
of a species superior to the human. Surely I never could intend to convey, 
that the atheist in question had maintained, it was a downright impossibility 
that there should be a cleverer man than he in the world. And that, for 
very obvious reasons. 



PREFACE. 



11 



« did not hesitate for a moment to engage to refute me. With 
" regard to the proposed refutation, I imposed on him two con- 
" ditions only. 1st, That the answer should be on paper. And 
" 2dly, That it pointed out some (alleged) specific fallacy in my 
" alleged demonstration. After waiting long for the promised 

" refutation, I was, at length, made aware, by a friend of 

« 's, that the said could not answer it. How- 

" ever, to make up for my disappointment, I was told, that there 
" was a society of Atheists in Glasgow, more numerous, more 
" clever, and more learned, and that there neither was, nor 
" could be, any ground to doubt that the ' Areopagus' would, on 
" being challenged, step forward and (endeavour to) overturn my 
" reasonings. 

" Shortly after receiving this piece of news, I came to the de- 
" termination of challenging you, each of you and all of you : 
" As, accordingly, I now hereby do challenge you to answer and 
" refute the reasonings contained in the aforesaid work. Two 
{< copies of which are herewith sent to you. 

" You challenge the world to prove, to you, that there exists 
" an Intelligent Great First Cause. The work in question 
" professes to demonstrate that matter by the most rigid ratio- 
" cination. It asks you to grant no proposition but those propo- 
" sitions which constitute the starting points of your Atheism, 
" to-wit, that there is Infinity of Duration, and that there is 
" Infinity of Extension, — be that extension of matter merely, or 
" of space merely, or of matter and space together. How plain 
" must those truths be which are insisted on by all sound Theists, 
" (I might have said by all men sound in their minds,) and are 
" the primary assumptions in Atheism itself. 

" We shall soon see whether you are able to do all that you 
! " profess to have a capacity for,t or whether, like the Edinburgh 

t Certainly I formed an estimate of atheistical talent from what I had 
fj seen of the metropolitan atheists. But, it must be confessed, the western 



12 



PREFACE. 



" Atheists, you must be altogether dumb before one of that class 
' : of persons who are (in your opinion) so weak and foolish as to 
" believe in a necessary Being who contains within himself all 
" possible perfections. 

" I have to lay clown to you the same conditions which I 
" imposed on the Atheists here. The conditions are (in one 
" respect) not hard. I am, being very truly desirous of your 
' : attaining to a better mind, 

(Signed) " William Gillespie." 

" Edinburgh, 21 st August 1837." 

To this letter and challenge, a letter, dated Glasgow, 28th 
August 1837, was received in answer, in which it is said : 

" What you say of denying to any one in the universe, 

" an iota of superiority to himself in the scale of intelligence, is 
" not exactly the mode in which atheists commonly express 
" themselves. * * * It has frequently been said, that we 
" know of no intelligence superior to that of man (and I think 
" any one is warranted in so saying)." 

The concluding paragraph, &c. are as follows : " Relative to 
ft your challenge, it is hereby accepted upon your own terms, 
" A reply to your 1 Argument ' will be commenced forthwith ; 
" but as the writer has not much time to spare, it cannot be 
" expected to proceed very rapidly. But as the Society intend 
" publishing it at their own charges, and are anxious that the 
" thing should be proceeded with, you may rely on no time being 
" lost. A copy will be forwarded to you as soon as it comes out 
" of the press. I have the honor to be," &c. 

(Signed) " ." 

" To William Gillespie, Esq." 

antitheists can command talents and acquirements very superior to what 
the easterns have at their service. A certain piece of information alluded 
to in this challenge w&s quite correct. 



PREFACE. 



13 



About the middle of April 1838, I was put in possession, by 
the writer of that letter, according to his promise, of a copy of 
his reply. It is entitled, " Refutation of the Argument a priori 
" for the Being and Attributes of God ; shewing the Irrelevancy 
*' of that Argument, as well as the Fallacious Reasoning of Dr 
u Samuel Clarke and others, especially of Mr Gillespie, in sup- 
" port of it. By Antitheos. '*t 

I have hinted, that there was another reason for giving a 
copy of the letter which contained the challenge. My adversary 
alleges in his Preface, that the letter was guilty of " containing 
" passages which could by no means militate in favor of the 
" writer." After asserting this, need it have been added that 
my respondent wished to take no advantage of the " passages ?" 
What ever operates more to one's prejudice than to say that the 
conduct of one has been faulty in some instance, but the in- 
formant is too charitable to communicate the impropriety ? But 
of the matter before us, the public have now been constituted 
the proper judges. 

" Mr Gillespie" * * * says Mr Gillespie's opponent, 
" has been disappointed, it seems, in finding an antagonist 
" elsewhere,^ notwithstanding his anxious endeavours to pro- 
" voke opposition. The gauntlet was thrown down, but no one 
" was fully prepared to take it up." (Preface.) If Antitheos 
had in his eye, as his words may tend to lead his readers to 
suppose he had, any thing besides the affair with the Edin- 
burgh Atheists, (who certainly, though they had taken up the 
gauntlet, had not been " fully prepared " for the combat ;) he 
might have been informed, had he made inquiry, that very soon 

f Published for the Glasgow Zetetic Society, 1838. 

X Mr Gillespie had been disappointed — not in finding, as Antitheos has it, 
but — in not fueling an atheistic antagonist. See the narration in the chal- 
lenge, (p. 10-11 hereof.) 



u 



PREFACE. 



after the appearance of the " Argument," the author thereof 
found an antagonist, an unchallenged antagonist, an antagonist 
of very considerable and acknowledged metaphysical abilities, an 
antagonist who wrote laborious strictures on the work as lono- 
as the work itself. 

The " Refutation " gives very satisfactory evidence that its 
author is a person of no mean talents, and is, to a very respect- 
able extent, acquainted with his subject. But for which circum- 
stance, indeed, the Examination of that performance would never 
have been set on foot. 

It is to be regretted that Antithcos has not numbered his 
paragraphs. When I quote or animadvert on his words, I 
shall ciive not only the chapter but the paragraph: the reader 
who wishes to look at the passage under discussion must count 
for himself. 

In quoting, I may occasionally leave out, for brevity's sake, or 
perspicuity's sake, words which make nothing to the point as to 
which the passage is adduced. With regard to every such case, 
I most willingly leave it to others to decide, whether I have, to 
the least extent, misrepresented my author. 



EXAMINATION, &c. 



PART I. 

THE RELEVANCY OF A PRIORI ARGUMENTATION 
FOR A REAL EXISTENCE. 

§ 1. There are two things which the author of the 
" Refutation" has undertaken to do. One of them is, to 
shew that the a priori mode of procedure is directed wide 
of the mark when applied to the question of the being of 
A God ; and the other is, to overturn the particular rea- 
sonings of those who have adopted that method of argu- 
mentation. 

§ 2. The first chapter of that work is devoted to the 
former, and the remaining chapters are occupied with the 
latter undertaking. 

§ 3. Our atheist begins by being very merry on the sub - 
ject of the irrelevancy of a priori argument for the exist- 
ence of Deity. " To hear of the existence of a God| 
" being made the subject of demonstration by argument, 
" is," he remarks, "altogether astounding. The announce- 
" ment on the other hand," he adds, " sounds so oddly, 
" as to mitigate the effect of the first impression, if not to 

t We have given capitals to certain of the words used by Antitheos, 
on which he had not bestowed one capital letter. That he is so desirous 
of degrading, so far as he can, certain collocations of letters, is a good 
evidence of something. 



L6 



RELEVANCY OF 



Part L 



" excite ridicule at the wonderful discrepancy between 
" the end in view, and the means laid out for the attain- 
" ment of it." (Chapter I. paragraph 1.) 

§ 4. But when the laugh is over, and it becomes time 
to serve us up something more substantial, we are disap- 
pointed at the meagreness of our fare. Such as it is, we 
shall probe every piece of it. 

§ 5. It being granted, argues our author, that " a God 
" * * must be held as a real being," " argument" (he 
means a priori argument) " appears quite out of place." 
— Now for the proof, Sir, if you please % — " It would 

• never do to talk of proving the existence of the man in 
•• the moon by argument ; neither would it be of any avail 
" to employ a syllogism or a sorites to demonstrate the 

• existence of a navigable channel between the Atlantic 

• and Pacific oceans, through the arctic regions of Ame- 

• rica." — All that is here meant may be quite unobjec- 
tionable. Our author goes on : — " If the reasoning under 
•' review be relevant, these must be so too. If an a 

■ 'priori argument be capable of proving- the existence of 
" one thing, another may be proved by the same * * 
' : process." (Par. 2.) The proof, the proof of this, where 
is it to be found ? 

§ 6. Passing over two pages and a half, where not a 
word on the subject occurs, we come, in the eighth para- 
graph, to something that looks as if it would turn out to 
be what we want. " The truth is, the argument in ques- 
" tion" (the argument a priori ) " is nothing else than an 
" attempt to establish the application of mathematical" 
(this word should be metaphysical^) " reasoning to what 
'- it has nothing in earth or heaven to do with, — namely, 
' : real existences." — The proof? — " How vain and pre- 
" posterous the attempt !" — This metal will not pass. — 
il As well might it be maintained, that as the whole is in 
l - the abstract a perfect quantity, it must contain within 
t See below, § 47, and following sections. 



A PRIORI ARGUMENT. 



17 



*' itself all the qualities of the different parts of which it 
" is composed ; that, as some of these parts are small and 
" some large, some round and some square, some black 
*' and some white ; it must be white and black, and square 
*' and round, and large and small at the same time!" — 
Neither will this do. Where is the proof of the AS WELL 
might it be maintained, &c. \ the proof of the analogy be- 
tween the cases 1 It is to seek. Well, we have had no- 
thing like proof as yet. But we approach a syllogism, 
and Antitheos does not deny, that " every sound argument 
" is capable of being reduced to the syllogistic form." 
We may hope then to get some satisfaction at length. 
" Whatever necessarily possesses absolute perfections 
" is God ; 

: ' Metaphysical abstractions possess absolute perfee- 
" tions ; — 

" Therefore, metaphysical abstractions are God." 

§ 7. " If this be not," says Antitheos, " a fair state- 
• ' ment of the whole argument in the 7nost logical form, 
" I am at a loss to know what is." — But I am not. — 
" Should it be any way wrong, and should some ardent 
*' disciple of the metaphysical school of theology deign 
*' hereafter to take a part in this discussion, it would be 
well were he to consult the Stagyrite and correct it." 
(Par. 9.) I mean to correct it, though I do not know 
that the Stagirite here will be of vast service, for the 
principal fallacy to be pointed out is not of a strictly 
logical character. 

§ 8. Passing over the major proposition, the minor is, 
*' Metaphysical abstractions possess absolute perfections." 
What are metaphysical abstractions ? They compose a 
certain class of thoughts. The minor proposition there- 
fore amounts to this ; A certain class of our thoughts, 
to-wit, metaphysical abstractions, possess absolute perfec- 
tions. — But by the bye, this minor proposition omits a 



18 



RELEVANCY OF 



Part L 



word, to us a very necessary word. Antitheos should have 
known that the Stagirite does not allow the middle term 
as it occurs in the major, to contain a complete element 
not to be found in the middle term when it appears in the 
minor. This instance of high treason against the Prince 
of Logicians cannot be suffered to pass. Supplying the 
word which has been kept back, we have " Metaphysical 
" abstractions" " necessarily" " possess absolute perfec- 

" tions" Do they indeed ? Metaphysics have been in 

very bad repute for a good while. Berkeley and Hume, 
not to mention any other metaphysician, have (it seems) 
brought them into everlasting disgrace with the majority 
of people. But behold how far Antitheos runs in an op- 
posite direction. He is downright in love with metaphy- 
sics. Metaphysical abstractions, he has it, necessarily 
possess absolute perfections. The metaphysical abstrac- 
tions which this gentleman has been conversant with, must 
be very superior indeed to the generality of those with 
which other people have been brought into acquaintance 
in these days.f 

§ 9. After having said so much about the minor, we 
hardly need to draw the conclusion, the full and proper 
conclusion, to the premises set down by our author. It 
runs thus : Therefore, a certain class of our thoughts, to- 
wit, metaphysical abstractions, is God. The conclusion, 
like the minor, speaks for itself. 

. § 10. Having thus paved the way, I proceed to do what 
was promised, and shall now correct Antitheos *s syllogism. 

t Antitheos may say, that the absurdity of this minor proposition is not 
to be fathered upon him, he doing no more than putting a certain collec- 
tion of words into the mouths of your metaphysical theists. The more 
shame to him ! To write sheer nonsense is bad enough. But to write 
sheer nonsense, and call it other people's reasoning, is neither more nor 
less than — what Antitheos has done. But let him keep what is his own, 
and nobody's else. 



m 9-13. 



A PRIORI ARGUMENT. 



19 



I do not mean to say, it will be unobjectionable even in a 
corrected form. But if one make the best that can be 
made of it, he shall do very well. Here then it comes as 
corrected. 

Whatever necessarily possesses absolute perfections is 
God. 

But that about which certain of our metaphysical ab- 
stractions are employed necessarily possesses absolute 
perfections. 

Therefore, that about which certain of our metaphysi- 
cal abstractions are employed is God. 

§ 11. Antitheos next proceeds to say : " Our reasoners 
" a priori have either to acknowledge the absurdity here 
" set forth in mood and figure, or deny that they appro- 
■" priate abstract reasoning to questions of ontological 
" science." These reasoners will not deny, that they ap- 
propriate abstract reasoning to questions of ontological 
science, but they will acknowledge the absurdity there set 
forth in mood and figure, and that even as has been 
shewn. 

§ 12. We go on to the words which succeed : " If their 
" God be a real being — an agent, he cannot be a heap 
" of abstractions," that is, a heap of our thoughts, for 
abstractions are thoughts of ours. — True, He cannot. — 
*' If made up of abstractions," or men's thoughts, " He 
" cannot be an agent." — Most true. — " No reasoning ima- 
" ginable can make Him both." — Surely. — " Yet to no- 
; ' thing short of working out this impossibility does the 
" argument aim." How was that made out ? By the 
syllogism ? Oh, then, as I have corrected the syllogism 
— I say no more. 

§ 13. Well : no great things as yet in the way of prov- 
ing, that if A God be a real beings a priori argument is 
quite out of place. Perhaps we shall alight on the thing 
we are in search of, at last. Of a truth, the proof (such 
as it is) which we are seeking we come up to at the 



20 



RELEVANCY OF 



Part L 



twelfth paragraph, but the reasonings which constitute 
the proof are not Antitheos's own, nor yet those of the 
Reviewer, who is cited, they having been employed by 
Mr Hume, and being very ancient indeed. 

§ 14. " The character of irrelevancy here laid at the 
" door of the a priori argument, is not unwarranted by 
" the authority of good judges among the religious them- 
" selves. Abundance of quotations might be adduced, 
" but I shall content myself with an extract from the 
" Edinburgh Review for October 1830, (vol. lii. p. 113,) 

in an article upon Dr MoreheacVs 4 Dialogues on Na- 

• tural and Revealed Religion.' That the reviewer rea- 
" sons upon theistical principles is evident from the allu- 
" sion he makes to 4 the will of the Creator,' to which, 

I may remark in passing, he allows the most orthodox 
" latitude." (Why, does Antitheos suppose, he may meet 
an atheist at every corner he can turn V) 44 Relative to 
" our argument a priori he observes : — 4 The truth is, it 
u 4 involves a radical fallacy which not only renders it 
• 4 4 useless but dangerous to the cause it is intended to 
" { support. The question as to the being of a God, is 

4 purely a question of fact : HE either exists or HE does 
" 4 not exist. But there is an evident absurdity in pretend- 
4 4 4 ing to demonstrate a matter of fact, or to prove it by 
44 4 argument a priori ; because nothing is demonstrable, 
44 4 unless the contrary implies a contradiction, and this 
44 4 can never be predicated of the negative of any propo- 
4 4 4 sition which merely affirms or asserts a matter of fact. 
44 4 Whatever we conceive as existent, we can also conceive 
44 4 as non-existent, and consequently there is no being 1 
44 4 ivliose non-existence implies a contradiction, or, in 
• 4 4 other words, whose existence is a priori demonstrable. 
4 4 4 This must be evident to every one who knows what 
44 4 demonstration really means. It is a universal law, 
- 4 that all heavy bodies descend to the earth in a line di- 
4 4 4 rected towards its centre. But the contrary of this 



§§ 14-17. 



A PRIORI ARGUMENT. 



21 



" £ may easily be conceived, because it involves no contra- 
*■■ £ diction ; for bodies might have fallen upward, if w^ 
" £ may so express it, as well as downward, had sueli 
" 4 been the will of the Creator. But we cannot cOn- 
(i ' ceive the opposite of one of the demonstrated truths of 
" £ geometry — as, for example, that the three angles of 
li e a triangle should be either greater or less than two 
" ' right angles — because this implies a contradiction. 
4t ' The distinction, therefore, between necessary or de- 
" £ monstrable truths and matters of fact, consists in this, 
" e — that the contrary of the former involves a contra- 
" £ diction, whereas that of the latter does not. But there 
" ■ is no contradiction implied in conceiving the non-ex- 
" £ istence of the Deity ; and therefore His existence is 
" • not a necessary truth, a priori demonstrable.' "| 

§ 15. Of this extract from the Edinburgh Review, the 
words which are here put into italic characters are pre- 
cisely the words of Mr Hume, as they are to be met with 
in the ninth Part of his " Dialogues concerning Natural 
" Religion. " We shall present our reader with the passage 
in the " Dialogues" in which those words are to be found. 
An original, generally, is preferable to a copy. 

§ 16. " There is an evident absurdity in pretending to 
" demonstrate a matter of fact, or to prove it by any ar- 
" guments a priori. Nothing is demonstrable, unless the 
i£ contrary implies a contradiction. Nothing, that isdis- 
" tinctly conceivable, implies a contradiction. Whatever 
" we conceive as existent, we can also conceive as non- 
" existent. There is no being, therefore, whose non- 
" existence implies a contradiction. Consequently there 
" is no being, whose existence is demonstrable." 

§ 17. Mr Hume has emphatically added: " I propose 
" this argument as entirely decisive, and am willing to rest 

the whole controversy upon it." " Dialogues," Part IX. 

t The reader may consult, here, a note to § 33 of Part VI. 



22 



RELEVANCY OF 



Part I. 



§ 18. These words of Mr Hume contain all that is ar- 
gument in the citation made by Antitheos from the Edin- 
burgh Review. All the rest of the citation is mere illus- 
tration or repetition. 

§ 19. Our author thus comments on the passage he 
has quoted : " To add any thing to the foregoing rea- 
• 4 soning of the reviewer were perhaps superfluous. It is 
" clear and satisfactory." (Par. 13.) 

§ 20. Clear and satisfactory the reasoning referred to I 
believe to be, with regard to what the first users of such 
ratiocination had in their view. But whether it be so 
clear and satisfactory in every case, we shall presently see. 

§ 21. For reasons already hinted, I shall address myself 
to the ratiocination as contained in Mr Hume's words 
rather than in those of the Reviewer. 

§ 22. It may be remarked, that since Mr Hume rests 
the whole controversy upon that argument, our atheist 
may be thoroughly assured, that if it turn out to be the 
very reverse of clear and satisfactory, his cause is a mighty 
bad one. Up to this stage of the business, our atheist's 
faith and trust in the argument are boundless. 

§ 23. " There is," says Mr Hume, " an evident ab- 
" surdity in pretending to demonstrate a matter of fact, 
" or to prove it by any arguments a priori." Because Mr 
Hume has said so, many take the existence of the ab- 
surdity for granted, who perhaps have never seriously 
weighed the evidence of its reality. The Sceptic's argu- 
ment against any a priori argument for any matter of 
fact, is happily very easily answered. And for the rea- 
son already brought out,t if it can but be shewn, that it 

t Neither in the Dialogues on Natural Religion, nor in any other 
quarter of his writings, is there offered any other argument against 
the possibility of a valid a priori argument for the being of A Deity. — 
The same argument substantially, a little differently set out, occurs 
again in the " Inquiry concerning Human Understanding." Sect. XII. 
part. iii. 



§§ 18-28. A PRIORI ARGUMENT. 



23 



is weak and most unsatisfactory, we have his authority 
for the good sense there is in pretending to demonstrate 
at least one matter of fact. 

§ 24. He opens his argument in the following manner. 
" Nothing is demonstrable, unless the contrary implies a 
" contradiction. Nothing, that is distinctly conceivable, 
" implies a contradiction." Both these propositions are 
granted to the fullest extent. But that which follows,- — 
" Whatever we conceive as existent, we can also conceive 
" as non-existent" — is most completely to be denied. He 
appeals to the constitution of the human mind : " What- 
" ever WE conceive as existent, WE can also conceive as 
" non-existent." Now, what this constitution is, in re- 
ference to the point at issue, let us call in a few witnesses 
to depose. 

§ 25. "I demand of any one to remove any part of pure 
" space from another, with which it is continued, even 

" so much as in thought." " I would fain meet 

" with that thinking man, that can, in his thoughts, set 
" any bounds to space more than he can to duration ; 
" or, by thinking, hope to arrive at the end of either." 
Locke's Essay, B. II. ch. xiii. § 13, 21. 

§ 26. Ut partium Temporis Ordo est immutabilis, sic 
" etiam Ordo partium Spatii. Moveantur hoe de locis 
" mis, et movebuntur ( ut ita dicam ) de seipsis." [" As 
" the Order of the parts of Time is immutable, so also is 
" the Order of the parts of Space. To remove these from 
" their places, were (as I may say) to remove them from 
" themselves."] Newton's Principia: Schol. ad Defin. 8. 

§ 27. " He that can suppose Eternity and Immensity 
m * * * removed out of the Universe : may, if he 
" please, as easily remove the relation of Equality be- 
" tween twice two and four." Br SI. Clarke's " Demon- 
" stration," under Prop. III. 

§ 28. " We find within ourselves the idea of infinity, 



24 



RELEVANCY OF 



Part I. 



" i. e. immensity and eternity, impossible, even in imagina- 
" tion, to be removed out of being. We seem to discern 
" intuitively, that there must and cannot but be some- 
<; what, external to ourselves, answering this idea, or the 
" archetype of it." Butler s Analogy, Part I. ch. vi. 

§ 29. " "We cannot conceive space possible to be 
" created, since ive cannot conceive it as non-existent and 
* £ creatable, which may be conceived concerning every 
" created being. Nor can we conceive it properly as 
" annihilated or annihilable" Dr. I. Watts'' Philosophi- 
cal Essays, Essay I. Sect. iv. 

§ 30. " We find that we can with ease conceive how 
" all other beings should not be. We can remove them 
*• out of our minds, and place some other in the room of 
" them ; but space is the very thing that we can never 
" remove and conceive of its not being. It is self-evident, 
" I believe, to every man, that space is necessary.'" Rev. 
Jonathan Edwards' 1 Notes. 

§ 31. " We see no absurdity in supposing a body to be 
" annihilated ; but the space that contains it remains ; 
" and to suppose that annihilated, seems to be absurd." 
Br RekVs Essays, Essay II. chap. xix. 

§ 32. " It is certain that where the notions of magni- 
" tude and figure have once been acquired, the mind is 
" immediately led to consider them as attributes of space 
" no less than of body : and (abstracting them entirely 
' ; from the other sensible qualities perceived in conjunc- 
" tion with them) becomes impressed with an irresistible 
" conviction that their existence is necessary and eternal, 
" and that it would remain unchanged if all the bodies 
" in the universe were annihilated." Bugald Stewart's 
Elements, Vol. II. chap. ii. § 3 & 3. 

§ 33. Now, here we have, just by way of specimen, 
eight individuals of the utmost veracity and intelligence, 
asserting in express terms, or in terms from which the 



§§ 29-36. 



A PRIORI ARGUMENT. 



25 



inference is necessary, that they cannot conceive the non- 
existence of space. To those authorities, we shall add 
only one more. 

§ 34. "The first proposition, — ' Infinity of extension 
'•' 4 is necessarily existing? — it would be absurd in the 
" extreme to deny. No more can we imagine any limit 
" prescribable to extension, than we can imagine the out- 
" side of a house to be in the inside of it." Antitheos. 
" Refutation," Chap. VI. par. 3. 

§ 35. " What, now, is the utmost value we can set upon 
" the argument a priori for the being and attributes of 
" God 1 Does it possess any value whatever 1 If it does, 
" it has yet to be shown, for in the hands of the great 
" Rector of St James's, it only proves that something 
" must have existed from all eternity : and in those of a 
" learned and eminent logician of our northern metropolis, 
" nothing more than the necessary existence of infinite 
" space and duration : none of which propositions ivere" 
[or was] " ever disputed" Antitheos. " Refutation," 
Chap. XIII. par. 1. 

§ 36. " To add any thing to the foregoing" authorities 
" were perhaps superfluous." They are " clear and satis- 
" factory." Mr Hume, therefore, is entirely wrong in 
appealing to our mental constitution, when he says : 
" Whatever we conceive as existent, we can also con- 
" ceive as non-existent." We cannot conceive space as 
non-existent. His proposition, therefore, must undergo 
this modification at least, — whatever, with the exception 
of space, we conceive to exist, we can also conceive not 
to exist. The conclusion from his argument, — " Conse- 
" quently there is no being whose existence is demon- 
" stable," — must therefore be limited to this extent, (if 
no farther ;) consequently there is no being, except space, 
or, if space be not a being, the being which it necessarily 
supposes, whose existence is demonstrable. 



26 



RELEVANCY OF 



Part I. 



§ 37. Now as that exhibition of the a priori argu- 
ment for the being of A Deity which we are concerned 
to defendt lays hold on space as its foundation, or ground- 
work ; //"infinite space be a property, or mode of existence, 
as theologians express themselves, of a Supreme Mind. 
then, unless we cannot ascend from the property to the 
substance invested with it, the being of a Supreme Mind 
is a thing demonstrable, is a necessary truth, OUR atheist 

HIMSELF BEING JUDGE. 

§ 38. What has become now of Mr Hume's argument 
against any a priori argument for any matter of fact ? It 
has turned out to be indeed the farthest thing possible 
from being clear and satisfactory. And no wonder, when 
such a one as OUR ATHEIST APPEARED AS AN EVIDENCE 
AGAINST IT. 

§ 39. So much has this gentleman turned the tables 
upon himself by venturing to appropriate the reasoning 
which to him seemed so irrefragable, and upon which he 
shewed no disinclination to peril his cause. What will 
he do now ? It is easy to see what he should do. 

§ 40. Although the " reasoning of the reviewer" ap- 
peared to our author to be " clear and satisfactory," yet 
he follows it up by a remark of his own, which we shall 
notice. " Men have often been made to suffer severely — 
" on some occasions to the loss of life — for denying the 
" being of a God. * * * But was ever any one put to 
" death, or sent to the pillory, for denying that twice two 
" make four? The idea, indeed, is ridiculous; but where- 
' fore should it be so 1 Simply because it is not possible 
" there should be any difference of opinion about the mat- 
" ter." (Par. 13.) Surely it is possible to deny, that 
twice two make four : though it is not possible to con- 
ceive the denial to be correct. And 'tis not to be taken for 

t It is the only proper exhibition. And on this subject we would, 
with all humility, refer to our Review of Dr Clarke's Demonstration, 

§ 3, &c. 



§§ 37-42. 



A PRIORI ARGUMENT. 



27 



granted, without proof, that no one ever denied that 
twice two is four : Things as absurd have been said-t 

§ 41. There may be assigned another reason why the 
civil magistrate in no country ever put any one to death 
for telling a certain lie, and denying that two and two 
are four : which reason is this, — a lie of that kind could 
injure no one's morals ; it could only shew the already 
wretched morals of him who uttered it. A denial of that 
arithmetical truth could go no way to undermine and 
loosen the foundations of civil society, as some other de- 
nials have been supposed to tend to do. I In fine, to say 
that twice two is not four, can never inflict a wound either 
on public or private morality. 

§ 42. It must be granted to Antitheos, that it is not 
possible to conceive the denial of the proposition, that 
twice two make four, to be correct. But at the same 
time we must take care to remember this, that there are 
truths as well as that arithmetical one, which, to use 
Antitheos 's language, " it is not possible there should be 
" any difference of opinion about." To instance in the 
case of the truth, There is infinite space ; that there is 
necessarily such, " is one of the first and most natural 
" conclusions, that any man, who thinks at all, can frame 
" in his mind : And no man can any more doubt of this, 
" than he can doubt whether twice two be equal to four. 
" 'Tis possible indeed a man may in some sense be igno- 
" rant of this first and plain truth, by being utterly stu- 
" pid, and not thinking at all : (For though it is abso- 
" lutely impossible for him to imagine the contrary, yet 

t See Part XII. note C. 

X cc — Those whose principles dissolve the first bonds of association, and 
" society, the Atheists and despisers of God and religion.'''' — Warbur- 
ton's Divine Legation of Moses, B. II. sect. iv. With reference to the 
subject before us, consult the whole of Books I. II. III. of that stupend- 
ous work. 



28 



RELEVANCY OF 



Part L 



" he may possibly neglect to conceive this : Tho' no man 
" can possibly think that twice two is not four, yet he 
<J may possibly be stupid, and never have thought at all 
" whether it be so or not.)"t 

§ 43. I grant all this, Antitheos will say. But what of 
that 1 I was insinuating, not that the propositions con- 
cerning two and two making four, and concerning the 
existence of space, were not on a footing as to real unde- 
niableness, but that the former of the propositions, and 
the one affirming the being of a God, are not on such a 
footing. 

§ 44. The following is the reply which is to be made 
to what Antitheos has been supposed to advance : — 
Though it may require some thought and painstaking to 
rise from the truth, that space is necessary, to the doc- 
trine of the Being who is, so to speak, the substratum, or, 
as logicians would say, the subject of inhesion, of space, 
and to the other properties or attributes of that Being ; 
still IF we can so ascend, by legitimate ratiocination, then 
the proposition affirming the being of a God is on the 
same footing as to true undeniableness with that main- 
taining, two and two are equal to four, — Antitheos being 
to judge, for, as we have seen, he has lent his hand to 
constitute, and make firm for ever, the pillar which sus- 
tains the weight of the edifice. The steps in the reason- 
ing may be many ; the demonstration long : but the 
length of a demonstration is not allowed to be a presump- 
tion against its validity in mathematical affairs : Is there 
any reason why it should be so here ? The truths of 
mathematics are not all intuitive or self-evident. To 
demonstrate the greatest mathematical certainties, re- 

t These words are from Clarke's " Demonstration," under Proposition 
III. They are here used only as accommodations. What the Doctor 
has in view, is somewhat different from what I am upon. But I could 
not think of words better adapted to express my meaning in this place 
than those of his. 



§§ 43-47. 



A PRIORI ARGUMENT. 



29 



quires much thought, labour, and time, for the demon- 
strations can be effected only by means of perhaps some 
thousands of intermediate ideas. 

§ 45. Our atheist, after making the observation we 
have thus noticed, proceeds in this way : " If, however, 
" the dogmas of theology, or even say the primary one," 
(which is the one that maintains the necessary existence 
of space,) " were capable of demonstration as mathema- 
" tical doctrines are, there could be no difference in the 
" respect due to doubts and denials in either case ; or 
<; rather it would be impossible to find doubters and 
" deniers in the one more than in the other." A senti- 
ment this with which we must entirely agree. If the pri- 
mary dogma of theology be not capable of being demon- 
strated, it is because it is rather of the class of self-evi- 
dent truths, and so stands in need of no demonstration : 
as we adduced eight witnesses, and one over and above, 
to depose to. 

§ 46. So much for the " irrelevancy of the argument." 
But the chapter treats of something more ; it considers 
" the character" of the argument. 

§ 47. " The argument in question," says Antitkeos, 
" is nothing else than an attempt to establish the appli- 
" cation of mathematical reasoning to * * real exist- 
" ences."t This is the character Antitkeos gives of the 
argument : It employs mathematical reasoning, says he. 
How sad a misapplication of a word ! Mathematical ! 
What can any branch of the mathematics have to do in 
the case? Arithmetic or Algebra? You jest ! Geome- 
try \ Nonsense ! How can lines and angles and segments 
come this way 1 " How vain and preposterous the at- 
" tempt," indeed, to apply mathematics to the proof of 
real existencies ! 

t These words have been already adduced. See above, § 6. Our pur- 
pose now is different. 

M 



30 



RELEVANCY OF 



Part 1. 



§ 48. It may be mentioned, that this curious misap- 
plication of the word " mathematical" is to be found not 
only several times in this chapter, but very frequently 
throughout the " Refutation."!"" 

§ 49. If Antitheos will point out one line, only one line, 
wherein mathematical reasoning' is employed to prove a 
real existence, in the whole of Br Clarke's " Demonstra- 
tion," or of the " Argument, a priori, for the Being and 
" Attributes of God ;" I shall hold myself as wholly and 
for ever refuted, and reduced to so desperate a condition 
by my rout, as to be incapable of ever again taking up a 
weapon in the cause. 

§ 50. I cannot do better than here quote a passage 
from the Quarterly Review for February, 1836. The 
article is on Lord Broughams Preliminary Discourse. 
,; It is quite absurd to apply the phrase ' mathematically 
" impossible' to a matter of fact." " Clarice might be- 
" lieve, that the existence of Deity is as certain, by me- 
" taphysical evidence, as any proposition in Euclid is by 
" mathematical evidence ; but to speak of the existence 
• ; of the Maker of the universe as mathematically possible 
" or impossible, is of all incongruities the most extrava- 
" gant and ridiculous" P. 401. J 

t See below, § 57— also, Part VIII. § 9, and Part VI. § 2.— &c. 

% All men err at times, : And Clarke himself, in a moment of forget- 
fulness, lost his sense of the fitness, or rather unfitness, (not of things 
— for he never forget that — but) of words, for he speaks of the " Mathe- 
" matical certainty, which in the main Argument was there easy to be 
" obtained." — Evidences : near beginning. 

The simple truth is, this great man should have spoken, not of " ma- 
" thematical certainty," but of a certainty equal in naked demonstrative 
force to mathematical, — of a certainty which, as well as mathematical 
certainty, flows from, yet always rests on, what Stewart would designate 
" an ultimate and essential law of human thought." (See Philosophical 
Essays. Essay II. ch. ii. sect. 2.) 

But though Clarke gave, once, a wrong character to his Demonstration, 



§§ 48-55. 



A PRIORI ARGUMENT. 



31 



§ 51. The truth is, to give the truth in one word, our 
atheist has mistaken metaphysical reasoning for mathe- 
matical. 

§ 52. One great distinction between these two species 
of reasoning is the following. Metaphysical reasoning 
may be exerted, to some extent, on almost any subject : 
Mathematical, that is, geometrical, reasoning, is applica- 
ble to one subject only. 

§ 53. Geometry is the science of abstract magnitude, 
or, of partial considerations of bare extension. In one 
sense, it respects not any thing really existing ; for the 
points, and lines, and superficies, and figures, from which 
it starts, can no where be found in the domain of nature : 
they exist only as conceptions — But indeed we really have 
no ideas corresponding to a line without breadth, and a 
point without magnitude — And so on.j" 

§ 54. — 1. No reasoning can be mathematical which 
does not refer to what we may call the subjects of the 
science, the angles, the triangles, the squares, the circles, 
&c. &c. &c. 2. And no reasoning, even though occurring 
in a professedly geometrical book, can be mathematical, 
unless it works by means of some of those subjects. 

§ 55. Metaphysical reasoning, not unfrequently, is to 
be met with in mathematical authors. Many instances 

this, in sooth, has no mathematics in it. Begging pardon of the Arch- 
bishop of Dublin for saying so : for this accomplished Logician, speaks of 
" the futility" (better, if he had spoken of the non-existence) " of the at- 
" tempt of Clarke * * to demonstrate (in the mathematical sense) the 
" existence of a Deity." Logic, B. IV. ch. ii. § I. (Sixth Edition.) 

Dr Whately, who writes so much about "ambiguous terms," may set 
one word more among his number, in the next edition. 

t This assertion may seem odd, and may shock a mathematician's ears . 
But it is true. And not much reflection will be required to shew that it 
is so. Of course, there is no need to prove here the truth, or, if you will, 
the falsehood, of the assertion. The matter between me and AAtitheos 
lias nothing to do with that. 



32 



RELEVANCY OF 



Part L 



of this might be given,t were these at all necessary. And 
a metaphysician may occasionally turn mathematician. 
But the boundaries of the two sciences remain always 
well-defined. No two things can be more distinct than 
the two species of reasoning. 

§ 56. Thus have we examined what our author has 
advanced on the " character and irrelevancy of the argu- 
" ment." There are various other topics touched upon 
in the first chapter, which shall all be considered in the 
proper places. On one only of these topics shall we say 
something at present. 

§ 57. <; Here, indeed, the grand secret, in managing 
the argument before us lies. It affixes a partial and 
' ; out-of-the-way meaning to words, especially those upon 
" which the whole question turns, and so, misconstrues 
" and misapplies general language. Necessity, for in- 
' ; stance, which by the way is the key-stone of the struc- 
;i ture, is different from what it is found to be any where 
" else, except, perhaps, in some other region of mere 
" speculation. In the premises, it is attenuated to the 
" utmost fineness of its mathematical" (metaphysical) 
" acceptation, although the weight of its common and 

t Ex. gr. Take the first note (the note on the first definition) in Wal- 
lace's Play fair's Euclid 's Elements . (Eighth Edition.) The reasoning 
is pitiable : And the Grecian Geometer's definition, in spite of the Com- 
mentator's assault on it, has as much propriety as ever. 

Who could have suspected it ? But the reasoning in the note in ques- 
tion might be employed, with some success too, in behalf of the doctrine 
of unextended human spirits, — as well as in behalf of other vagaries, as 
wild, (but hardly any wilder,) and accompanied by still worse results. 

How often one falls upon Mathematicians out of their road ! And the 
grand misfortune is, your genuine mathematicians never go out of their 
road, but to be busied about what is sure to land in mischief. If the 
scales and compasses drop down from their hands, and an ill wind should 
blow any thing past problems and theorems up into their heads ; then let 
us look to the consequences. 



§§ 56-G1. 



A PRIORI AKGUME-NT. 



33 



" real meaning is essential to the validity of the conclu- 
" sion." (Par. 11.) 

§ 58. A single remark here in passing. Our atheist 
will find that necessity, and all the cognate words, are 
used, by his opponent, always in the same sense ; in the 
premises they mean what they mean, and nothing more 
than they mean, in the conclusion. Let him detect me 
in an inconsistency in this matter, let him seize me falling 
fairly asleep between my premises and my conclusion, 
and forgetting when I awaken and proceed to the latter, 
the sense in which I had used my words in the former ; 
and I shall grant that the day is Ms. 

§59. It will be a good thing to take the present op- 
portunity to inform my opponent, once for all, what, and 
what only, is to be understood by necessity, and by neces- 
sary existence. In settling these points, we shall be 
affording the materials for answering the question, What 
is, in propriety, to be understood by an a priori argument 
for the being of A Deity 1 A question which here to 
decide is of the utmost importance, for a reason that 
will be immediately gathered. 

§ 60. When Antitheos says : " Up starts the logician 
" of the new school * * It is irrefragably to be 
" proved, not only that a God does exist, but that he must 
" exist, and that too as necessarily as that two and two 
" make four; — that his non-existence, in short, cannot 
" even be conceived." * * * "A being existing by 
" necessity is sought for ; that is (according to the new 
" logic) one whose non-existence it is not in the power of 
" man to imagine." t When, I say, Antitheos writes in 
this manner, he gives the true state of the case, he words 
it as if he knew well enough what ought to be understood 
by an a priori argument. 

§ 61. But when, no more than three pages down, he 

t Paragraphs 5 and 6. 



34 



RELEVANCY OF 



Part I. 



quotes, with the utmost approbation, a writer who, as we 
observed,"]" states the question in this way : " The ques- 
" tion as to the being of a God, is purely a question of 
" fact : HE either exists or HE does not exist" % When, 
I say, Antitheos does this, he seems to have forgotten 
what he himself had laid down. By forgetting the ne- 
cessity, he has suddenly lost his knowledge of what an a 
priori argument is. In fine, his own representations are 
quite inconsistent with each other. 

§ 62. Since, therefore, our atheist's views of an a priori 
argument seem so confused and inconsistent, seem 

" Neither sea, 
" Nor good dry land," 

it becomes highly necessary to attempt setting him in the 
way to bring congruity and order out of the chaos. The 
disorder which exists among his ideas affects the very 
vitals of the subject in controversy.! 

§ 63. What, then, is necessity 1 In what direction is it 
that we are to look for necessity ? 

t Above, § 14. 

I In the very second paragraph (as we have quoted therefrom) the 
same sort of representation occurs. Indeed, throughout the " Refutation," 
sometimes the one sort of representation, sometimes the other, is to be met. 
A singular confusion of ideas ! or, a singular way of making a present 
point good ! Whatever be the cause, the confusion does no insignificant 
service to our atheist. But its services he must henceforth dispense with : 
The consequences of the confusion are not to be allowed. 

|| It is not a singular thing not to have clear conceptions as to what a 
priori argumentation for a real existence is. Nay, to labour under a sad 
delusion upon this subject is not an uncommon case. Many persons know 
not what is the proper meaning of the thing. And finding absurdities in 
their conceptions regarding it (no mighty matter, perhaps, after all), they 
fall to arguing, and to railing, against the production of their own fancy. 
But let them only banish the ugly thing that distracts them, and they may 
be presented with a more sightly shape. What that is which those per- 
sons have poured their wise contempt upon, they perhaps do not yet best 
know. 



A PRIORI ARGUMENT. 



35 



§ 64. Necessity does not concern things in themselves : 
Necessity is no predicate of a thing, any farther than it 
expresses a certain quality of our conceptions regarding 
the existence of the thing. In fine, necessity lies not in 
the objective reality, but in the subjective mind. 

§ 65. To illustrate this doctrine by an example taken 
from the science of magnitude. That the three interior 
angles of every triangle are equal to two right angles, is 
a truth which, if the demonstration has been followed, 
cannot but be believed, when the subject is thought on. It 
is therefore pronounced a necessary truth. But the ne- 
cessity that is in the case is not to be found anywhere but 
in the mind of the demonstrator. One very good proof of 
which is, that — not the visible representatives of the ma- 
thematical lines, and angles, and triangles, but — the 
real mathematical lines, and angles, and triangles them- 
selves, can exist nowhere but in our conceptions. t 

§ 66. In the next place, What are we to understand 
by a necessarily existing being \ A necessary being is 
one whose existence is necessarily believed by us ; — a 
being, in a word, whose non-existence ive cannot conceive. 
But is this all that is meant by a necessary being 1 It 
is indeed all : any thing more is inconceivable. 

§ 67. It will now be very obvious what an a priori 
argument, that is, an argument from the necessity of the 
case, is. It is an argument drawn from those conceptions 
of the human mind of which it cannot be divested. In 
its essential parts, it founds on nothing but those ideas 
which arise in the mind in the very act of thinking, those 
ideas which are the sine qua non of all other ideas. 

§ 68. I shall conclude what I have to say on this 
topic, by an extract from an article in the Quarterly Re- 
view, to which we have been already indebted. " The 
" arguments which have been adduced by theologians in 
t As above, § 53. 



30 



RELEVANCY, &c. 



Part I. 



" favour of Deity, have been generally considered to be 
" of two kinds, viz. arguments a priori, and arguments a 
" posteriori.- In the strictly logical" [or rather, etymo- 
logical] " sense of these terms, neither of these modes of 
" reasoning is applicable to the question. For to reason 
" a priori is to argue from the cause to the effect : this 
" evidently is to assume the cause, the existence of which 
" is the very point which is here to be proved. To rea- 
" son aposteriori, is to argue from the nature of the effect 
" to that of the cause. But this argument, if applied to 
" the question, would assume the world to be an effect, a 
" point equally necessary to be proved before the argu- 
ment can be legitimately applied. Though this is the 
" strict and logical" [etymological] "meaning of theterms, 
" they are often employed, the former to denote specula- 
" tive or abstract reasoning, the latter, that which is 
44 founded on facts or experience." — P. 399-400. f 



t See ArPENDix. 



37 



PART II. 

THE « ARGUMENT, A PRIORI, FOR THE BEING AND 
« ATTRIBUTES OF GOD," AN IRREFRAGABLE DE- 
MONSTRATION. 

§ 1. Having considered the relevancy of a priori argu- 
mentation, when directed to the most important of all 
matters of fact, (the most important fact, if it be a fact at 
all,) we proceed to examine whether Antiiheos has been 
at all successful, or signally unsuccessful, in his attempt 
to exhibit any specific fallacy in the " Argument, a pri- 
" ori, for the Being and Attributes of God." Unless we 
mistake the matter very much, it will be discerned, both 
easily and obviously, that the gentleman in question has 
failed, failed in the most egregious manner, with regard 
to what he undertook to accomplish. 

§ 2. " Mr Gillespie's argument, * * * *" our atheist 
assures us, " is perhaps as well as can be expected of a 
" work of the sort, and may probably supersede every 
" thing of the kind that has gone before it."f Of the 
sort, says he : willing to hint, the best of any kind is bad 
enough. If Antitheos is disposed to see no force ma pri- 
ori reasonings for A God, he is, if any thing, less inclined 
to set value on the a posteriori method. " The argu- 
" ment a posteriori" he remarks, "relies on experience, 
" and deduces causes from their effects. This process, 
" however, is quite illogical. * * It takes for granted 
" the existence of an agent capable of producing the effects 
" contemplated as the source of the argument* — which of 
t Chap. V. par. 1. 

N 



38 



« ARGUMENT, A PRIORI;' 



Part II. 



course is begging the principle. "t There can be no- 
thing worse in argument, than to take for granted the 
principal thing to be proved. In fine, " the approval of the 
i; argument a priori by * * * the most erudite and en- 
" lightened — of the Christian world,"J makes it evident, 
that the strength of the cause is held (by the best judges) 
to lie in the direction, not of the a posteriori method, 
but of the other. And since this is so, it is to the latter 
quarter that atheists must point their most formidable 
artillery. — Upon the whole, we may not unnaturally ex- 
pect to find that our antagonist has brought all his pow- 
ers to bear against Mr Gillespie's exhibition of the argu- 
ment a priori for the existence of Deity. 

§ 3. It is in his fifth chapter that the author of the 
•• Refutation" begins to consider his present opponent's 
work. Antitheos is, in that place, in a sort of rambling 
vein, and he stumbles over a good many matters, in a way 
that shall draw none of our attention at this time. There 
is, however, a certain thing propounded in the chapter 
referred to, which it will be well to take the opportunity 
now presented to set forth. 

§ 4. " Our metaphysical opponents," says our anti- 
theist, " are always for stealing a march upon us. * * * * 
" If Mr Gillespie had even told us what he meant by 
; ' the word being, which he so frequently makes use of, 
" we should have been able to say whether it could be 
- proved necessarily to exist or not."|| — The truth in this 
affair is, that Mr Gillespie% has told what he meant by 

t Chap. I. par. 4. See, to the same effect, Chap. II. last par. 
X Chap. I. par. 1. 

[| The same sort of thing is iterated in another place. — " Mr Gillespie 
" talks of a substance, it is true, a being of infinity of expansion, &c. ; but 
" why has he neglected to tell us of what sort this substance" [or being] 
" is?" Chap. XII. par. 2. 

% We shall occasionally speak of Mr Gillespie in the third person, to 
avoid the too frequent recurrence of a certain personal pronoun, and per- 



§§ 3-4. 



IRREFRAGABLE. 



39 



the word Being, and that as soon as ever he made use of 
it.\ " If a mere abstraction," viz. a mere thought of 
your mind, or of mine, J " is represented by it, we can 
" have no quarrel with any kind of demonstration about 
" it he pleases. * * *" — And no wonder. — " Should it, 
" on the contrary, refer to an agent of any kind — some- 
" thing possessing power — something that acts — a thing, 
4 1 in short, having a real existence, in the same sense as that 
" in which we apply reality of existence to common ob- 
" jects, there can be no objection to his free use of the 
• £ term. The author's subsequent reasoning involves the 
" latter construction (which construction, I may mention 
" once for all. I shall uniformly adopt.)" — Par. 4. 
Who now is the stealer of marches ? Mr Gillespie, in Book 
II., seeks to prove, that the Being treated of in Book I. 
is necessarily an Intelligent, an All-powerful, and a Free 
Being. To give it in Antitheos's words. " This grand 
■" argument is laid out in two books. In the first, the 
" metaphysico-theologian endeavours to prove that some 
<c being exists which is the sine qua non of every other 
" thing in existence. It consists of three parts, or series 
" of propositions, maintaining, first, that Space is this 
" being; second, that Duration is also a being of the same 
" kind ; and third, that these are not different, but iden- 
" tical. The second book ascribes to the subject of the 
" fore-mentioned proofs, the Divine attributes of omni- 
" science, unlimited power, and freedom of agency." || 
And could Mr Gillespie assume, that the Being he 
treats of is a Mind, possessing power, and freeness, be- 
fore he had said one word by way of proof? How 

haps to steer clear of inconvenient circumlocutions in addition to the 
appearances of an offensive monosyllable. The separate, or the conjoined, 
presence of some third reason at times, may be detected. The reader is 
to determine. 

t See Part XI. § 15, note. % See Part I. § 8. 

|| Chap. VI. par. 1. 



40 



" ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," Part It 



would this have been consistent with that " precision of 
" purpose and exactness of arrangement" which Antitheos 
found to be present in the work we have him now com- 
menting onl] No : Mr Gillespie proceeded not to his busi- 
ness so illogically. But, quoth our atheist, I shall argue, 
ay, and uniformly too, against my opponent, as if he had 
done a thing so illogical, as if he did " refer to * * * 
" something possessing power — something that acts" — 
before he had offered aught towards proving the possession 
of power and of agency. Is not this stealing a march 
with a vengeance ? If Antitheos be entitled to steal such 
a march, then one entertaining the whimsical wish to find 
flaws in Euclid's demonstrations, may accuse the Elements 
for not assuming the third book in the second, or the last 
in the first ; one desirous of catching Aristotle at a disad- 
vantage, may censure the Analytics because they do not 
take for granted the doctrine concerning valid syllogisms 
ere that of single propositions has been gone over. An- 
titheos had truly good reasons for calling his production 
a refutation, if his opponent " makes intelligence, and 
" power, and freedom of agency, part of his argument, "J 
before producing any reasons for what he does. 

§ 5. The secret is this : Our atheist is quite unable to 
overturn Mr Gillespie's " Argument," and therefore, as 
he must needs overturn it, he turns it over, and places the 
tail of it where the head should be. But as often as we 
find Antitheos busying fiimself at this play, we shall run 
to the rescue, and lose no time in setting things in their 
natural positions. 

§ 6. The paragraph in Chapter V. from which we have 
been quoting, concludes as follows, the words being con- 
nected with the passage we have cited at large. " For 
" the tenability of his position, however, respecting the 
" necessary existence of such a being, according to his 

t See Chap. V. par. 1. % Chap. V. par. 4. 



m 5-8. 



IRREFRAGABLE. 



41 



" own view of necessity, I would refer him to what has 
" been stated in the first chapter of this Refutation." 
Here he refers to something supposed to be established 
in a previous portion of his work. And in our turn, we 
would point to what the reader will find advanced in re- 
lation to that portion in Part I. 

§ 7. " It is more easy to censure an argument in ge- 
" neral terms, than to meet all its particular parts on fair 
" and open grounds.""!" So says Antitheos, and we shall 
not quarrel with what he says. It may be more easy to 
do one thing than another, while to do, with propriety, 
either the one thing or the other, is very far from being 
easy. In Part I. we have considered the general censure, 
and our present business is to inquire whether or not our 
atheist has met, on fair and open grounds, the particular 
parts of the " alleged demonstration." That the grounds 
on which he has met these are any thing but fair, will, 
we are confident, be very apparent by and bye. But we 
shall have, or we are mistaken, but little to complain of 
on the score of the grounds not being open enough. 

§ 8. " We shall take," says our author, " the most 
" laborious, and, at the same time, least advantageous 
" way J of combating Mr Gillespie's principles, — book by 
" book, and proposition by proposition. This course is 
" the more necessary, as the argument a priori, unlike 
" that derived from experience, depends upon a chain of 
" reasoning, — not upon the pointed putting of a single 
" case, or the tautological repetition of a thousand."! 
" This labour, *" he informs us in another place, 
" I cheerfully undertake, that there may be nothing left 

t Chap. I. last par. 

% Why the " least advantageous way 1 ' ? (Would any way have been 
advantageous ?) Has Antitheos his own defeat in view, and is there a 
willingness on his part to make us anticipate it ? 

J| Chap. VI. par. 2. 



42 



« ARGUMENT, A PRIORI, 



Part II. 



" to suppose on the score of disingenuousness," &c.f Be- 
cause the argument a priori depends on, or rather con- 
sists of, a chain of reasoning ; this appears of itself a 
sufficient reason why it should be examined link by link. 
But Antitheos had assigned another reason for his doing 
that which leaves nothing to be supposed on the score of 
disingenuousness. " Authors," he had remarked, <: are 
" peculiarly jealous of their privileges, and tetchy and 
" fro ward with regard to any freedom used in the treat- 
" ment of their expressions. "J Especially — (it is worth 
while to notice it — ) where the freedom used extends so 
far as to turn the end round upon the beginning.|| 

§ 9. Our atheist is now come to the first of Mr Gillespie's 
Propositions. — " The first Proposition, — ' Infinity of ex- 

' tension is necessarily existing,' — it would," Antitheos 
declares, " be absurd in the extreme to deny," &c. &c.1f 

§ 10. But let us analyze that Proposition, and view 
attentively what it affirms, or, at least, involves. It lays 
down, there is necessarily infinity of extension. And in 
laying down that, it virtually lays down, there is exten- 
sion. To which we would direct very particular notice. 

§ 11. Thus Antitheos admits, to the fullest extent, the 
truth of Proposition I. To me, this is a most important 
admission. For if that Proposition is granted (and who 
can rationally deny it ?) I undertake to make out all the 
rest, by necessary consequence. The other Propositions 
are necessarily true, if this one is so. 

§ 12. As, therefore, the first Proposition is of such vital 
importance, we shall adduce what is said in connection 
with it in the " Argument." 

§ 13. ;< Proposition I. Infinity of Extension is ne- 
" cessarily existing. For even when the mind endeavours 
" to remove from it the idea of Infinity of Extension, it 

t Chap. I. par. 14. I Chap. VI. par. 2. 

|| See above, § 5. *$ See Part I. § 34. 



§§ 9-17. 



IRREFRAGABLE. 



43 



" cannot, after all its efforts, avoid leaving still there, 
" the idea of such infinity. Let there be ever so much 
u endeavour to displace this idea, that is, conceive Infinity 
" of Extension non-existent ; every one, by a review, or 
" reflex examination of his own thoughts, will find, it is 
" utterly beyond his power to do so. 

§ 14. ' ; Now, since even when we would remove Infi- 
" nity of Extension out of our mind, we prove, it must 
" exist by necessarily leaving the thought of it behind, 
" or, by substituting, (so to speak,) Infinity of Extension 
" for Infinity of Extension taken away ; from this, it is 
" manifest, Infinity of Extension is necessarily existing : 
" For, every thing the existence of which we cannot hut 
<c believe, which we always suppose, even though we 
" would not, is necessarily existing. 

§ 15. " To deny that Infinity of Extension exists, is, 
" therefore, an utter contradiction. Just as much acon- 
" tradiction as this, 1 is equal to 1, therefore 1 is not 
- equal to 1, but to 2 ; 2 not being identical with l.f As 
" thus : Infinity of Extension is ever present to the mind, 
" though we desire to banish it ; therefore, it can be re- 
" moved from the mind. This is just an application of 
"the greatest of all contradictions, A thing can be, and 
" not be, at the same time." 

§ 16. Antitheos, then, allows the full truth of Propo- 
sition I. " The same unqualified assent, however, can- 
" not," he alleges, " be accorded to proposition the se- 
" cond ; namely, that ' Infinity of Extension is necessarily 
" 5 indivisible.' "+ 

§ 17* We shall immediately proceed to examine whe- 
ther he has offered any thing of worth to support this 
assertion. For a moment, we turn rather aside, to say 

t " A contradiction which we can no more believe than that 1 is equal 
"to 1, therefore 1 is not equal to 1," &c. Note in " Argument." 
% Chap. VI. par. 3. 



44 



"ARGUMENT, A PRIORI; 



Part II. 



something as to the importance of the second Proposi- 
tion, as a step in the reasoning. 

§ 18. " It would be of no great consequence, 11 our 
atheist maintains, " although the second proposition were 
t( as irrefragable as the first." Why so % " For it bears 
" upon nothing at all applicable to any being, whether 
" real or imaginary."! Bravely said. Let the reader 
note the reason well. 'Tis natural to demand, What is 
the proof which Antitlieos has given of his bold allega- 
tion ? When we mention, that he has not even attempted 
to offer a single word of proof, we imagine the surprise 
into which our readers shall be thrown. The second 
Proposition of no great consequence ! No ? Why we 
have but to turn over a few pages of the " Refutation" 
to perceive that it, subsequently, rose to be of no little 
consequence, even in our atheist's eyes. " The fourth 
" proposition of this ' Argument' — that 4 the Being of 
" ' Infinity of Extension is necessarily of unity and sim- 
" ' plicity,' — is founded upon * * extension" (it should 
be " infinity of extension,"!) "being indivisible,"! &c. i. e. 
is founded upon Proposition II. &c. Is Proposition IV., 
too, of no great consequence? If so, May not every 
Proposition in the alleged demonstration be of no great 
consequence, in like manner ? And a convenient mode 
of setting aside the whole argument, in an easy way, be 
at once happily fallen upon 1 

§ 19. The truth is, a great part of the reasoning in the 
" Argument" is built upon the second Proposition, in 
spite of its being now pronounced to be of no great con- 
sequence. The Proposition in question is founded on, to 
prove, not only that " the Being of Infinity of Extension 

is necessarily of unity and simplicity, 11 but that — But to 
go over all that it is founded on to prove, would be to in- 



t Chap. VI. par. 6. 
|| Chap. VII. par. 1. 



% See below, § 23. 



§ § 18-24. 



IRREFRAGABLE. 



45 



troduce no small portion of the work referred to ; as the 
reader may easily satisfy himself by turning it over, and 
glancing at the references occurring at the bottoms of the 
pages. 

§ 20. Thus much as to the relative importance of Pro- 
position II. Antitheos saw proper to be but brief with 
his objections to it. And his having seen that to be pro- 
per, might be the reason why he has chosen to say, its 
consequence is not great. An insignificant matter had 
no right to detain him long. 

§ 21. And next for the objections themselves. We 
shall find them to be poor indeed : as weak as they are 
brief. But the brevity, great though it be, is out of 
proportion, when compared with the want of strength. — 
However, by reason of a certain interposed discussion, 
(with which Part III. shall be entirely occupied,) and 
because our antitheist has, in a small space, done a great 
deal to involve matters in confusion, (an easy undertaking, 
since 'twas rightly gone about,) a considerable time must 
elapse before we get to the end of those objections. It 
may be thought incumbent on us to unravel the whole 
perplexed clew, — and it cannot be so simple a business to 
get Antitheos l s reader clear of the labyrinth, at it was 
for Antitheos to weave it for him. 

§ 22. That the reader may be able, the more readily 
to pass just judgment upon those objections, we shall pre- 
sent him with what the " Argument" ofiers under the 
second Proposition. The great consequence, too, of the 
Proposition, (under Antitheos 's leave be it spoken,) af- 
fords a warrant which would not otherwise exist for 
making the citation. 

§ 23. " Proposition II. Infinity of Extension is 
" necessarily indivisible. That is, its parts are necessarily 
" indivisible from each other. 

§ 24. " Indivisible in this proposition means indivisible 



46 



" ARGUMENT, A PRIORI;' Part II. 



" either really or mentally : For there can be no objec- 
" tion to a real, which does not apply to a mental divi- 
" sibility; and a mental divisibility, we are under the 
" necessity of supposing, implies an actual divisibility, of 
" Infinity of Extension. 

§ 25. " The parts, then, of Infinity of Extension are 
" necessarily indivisible from each other really or men- 
" tally. 

§ 26. " For that which is divisible really may be 
" divided really : and a thing which is actually divided 
" from another must have superficies of its own, every 
" way, and be removed or separated from that other 
" thing, be it by ever so little a distance. If any one 
" should say that things really divided from each other 
" have not real superficies of their own, every way ; to 

be able to believe him, we must first be able to believe 
• ; this, that a thing can be, and not be, at the same time : 
" And if any one should say that things which are really 
" divided from each other, which have real superficies of 
" their own everyway, can possibly be conceived without 
" a certain distance, however little, being between them ; 
" as this, it could as soon be believed that in a good 
" syllogism of the first figure, the conclusion does not 
" necessarily follow from the premises. Being really 
" divided, and being really separated, mean, thus, the 
• ; same thing."]* 

§ 27. " Now, divisibility meaning possibility of separa- 
" tion : As it is an utter contradiction to say, Infinity of 

f " A division by mathematical lines, (which are lines of length with- 
" out breadth,) of the real existence of Infinity of Extension, does not 
iC infer a greater absurdity than a division of a mathematical line by some- 
" thing really existing : if the division by mathematical lines mean any 
" thing more than a partial apprehension or consideration of Infinity of 
" Extension : which is allowed to be possible, just as it is possible to con- 
u sider length without breadth, or depth without breadth or length. ir 
Note in " Argument." 



§§ 25-30. 



IRREFRAGABLE. 



47 



" Extension can be separated ; that is, a 'part of Infinity 
" of Extension separated, by a certain distance, from In- 
" finity of Extension; there remaining Infinity of Exten- 
" sion after part of it is taken away; the part of Infinity 
" of Extension so removed, being removed from the re- 
" maining parts to these very same parts; the part, thus, 
" being at rest while it is taken away ; the part so moved 
" away, being moved away from itself ; it still remaining, 
" inasmuch as there is necessarily Infinity of Extension ;t 
" that is though moved away, being not moved away : 
<; Which could not be, unless it be false, that whatever is, 
" is : As it is, thus, an utter contradiction to say Infinity 
<; of Extension can be separated, so it is an utter contra- 
" diction to say it is not indivisible." 

§ 28. It will not be amiss to adduce the authority of a 
name than which there is none greater among metaphy- 
sicians ; as to the propriety of the doctrines insisted on 
(we speak not of the truth demonstrated) in the passage 
which has just been quoted from the " Argument." 

§ 29. " The parts of pure space are inseparable one 
" from the other ; so that the continuity cannot be sepa- 
" rated, neither really nor mentally. * * * To divide 
" and separate actually, is, as I think, by removing the 
" parts one from another, to make two superficies, where 
" before there ivas a continuity: and to divide mentally, is 
ki to make in the mind two superficies, where before there 
" was a continuity; and consider them as removed one from 
c; the other ; which can only be done in things considered 
" by the mind as capable of being separated; and by 
" separation of acquiring new distinct superficies, which 
" they then have not, but are capable of : but neither of 
" these ways of separation, whether real or mental, is, as 
I think, compatible to pure space. 
§ 30. " It is true, a man may consider so much of such 
t " Prop. I." Note in " Argument," See above, § 14. 



48 



"ARGUMENT, A PRIORI;' 



Part II. 



" a space as is answerable or commensurable to a foot, 
" without considering the rest, which is, indeed, a partial 
" consideration, but not so much as mental separation or 
" division: since a man can no more mentally divide 
" without considering two superficies, separate one from 
;£ the other, than he can actually divide without making 
" two superficies disjoined one from the other : but a par- 
" tial consideration is not separating." Essay concerning 
Human Understanding. Book II. chap. xiii. § 13. 

§ 31. Again : " Expansion and duration have this 
" farther agreement, that though they are both con- 
" sidered by us as having parts, yet their parts are not 
- separable one from another, no not even in thought." 
Ibid. chap. xv. § 10. 

§ 32. " Here," it is thus that Antitheos unmasks his 
battery, "the author has given up his abstract necessity, 
" and looks for something like experiment as alone capa- 
; ' ble of satisfying him : for" (the proof we shall see is 
very notable) " notwithstanding some unmeaning talk, in- 

tended to explain away this desertion of his own prin- 
" ciples, he evidently insists upon a real division — an 
" actual separation of parts, with some distance, however 
" little between them, as that which he means by divi- 
w sibility."t Unmeaning talk: That's complimentary. 
Unmeaning talk, to explain away the desertion of my 
own principles : Better and better : The compliment, 
like a rolling snow-ball, grows as it advances. Why is 
Mr Gillespie to be brought in guilty of uttering un- 
meaning talk ? Because he cherished the felonious intent 
of explaining away a desertion of his own principles. But 
what is the evidence of the felonious intent ? Because 
he gives up abstract necessity, and looks for experiment. 
How is it proved that he does so \ The answer is truly 
marvellous. Mark it closely. " He evidently insists upon 

t Chap. VI. par. 4. 



31-33. 



IRREFRAGABLE, 



49 



" a real division — an actual separation of parts," &c. 
" as that which he means by divisibility." Where, in 
the name of wonder, does he perpetrate such an offence % 
Insists, evidently insists, upon divisibility meaning real 
division — actual separation! In what words does the 
author of the " Argument" attempt to set forth so re- 
markable a paradox X Present them to us, and we shall 
leave him to enjoy his paradox, undisturbed by any sug- 
gestions of common sense. It was thought, by excellent 
judges, that Des Cartes uttered a bold enough paradox, 
when he laid down, that omnipotent will could change a 
tree into a syllogism — a syllogism into a tree. But this 
paradox of the metaphysical theist, that bare divisibility 
means an actual separation of parts, with some distance 
between the parts, is, every inch of it, as original and 
striking as that of the ingenious Frenchman. If Antitheos 
had said, Mr Gillespie insists on a real divisibility as that 
which he means by a real divisibility, or on a real division 
as that which he means by a real division, (and it may be 
mentioned, that Mr Gillespie knows of no divisibility but 
a real, that is, a true, divisibility, and of no division but 
a real, or true, division :) Antitheos had not spoken so far 
amiss. 

§ 33. No : Mr Gillespie never did insist, either evi- 
dently or secretly, on any such paradox. And his adver- 
sary might have known that well, had it pleased him to 
know it. As the reader is by this time fully aware ; what 
the former insists on, and that evidently enough, is this ; 
" That which is divisible really, may be divided really :" 
And this : "A thing which is actually divided from 
" another must * * * * be removed or separated from 
" that other thing, be it by ever so little a distance."! 
With Mr Gillespie, in a word, divisibility is divisibility 
and not division ; and to be actually divided, is some- 
t See above, § 26. 



50 



"ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," Part II. 



thing more than a mere capacity of being divided. Anti- 
theos* s cranium, we need have no doubt, is divisible into 
two. Is it therefore really divided, actually separated 1 
If so, we may continue the " Examination," but there 
will be no Antitheos to read what shall be written. But 
notwithstanding the divisibility of his encephalon, we 
have hopes of obtaining him for a critic. 

§ 34. Our author's next words are the following : "If 
" Mr Gillespie pleads not guilty to this charge;" the 
charge, to-wit, of evidently insisting upon a real division 
as that which he means by divisibility, and, as a conse- 
quence, of giving up abstract necessity, and looking for 
something like experiment to satisfy him. Of this rea- 
soning, the major, or the suppressed proposition, — To 
insist evidently upon a real division being meant by divi- 
sibility, is to give up abstract necessity, &c. The minor, 
— Mr Gillespie evidently insists upon a real division being- 
meant by divisibility : The conclusion, — Ergo, he gives 
up abstract necessity, &c. : — Are all Antitheos' 's own. 
Nobody but our atheist can claim them. Grant, argues 
Antitheos, that Mr Gillespie gives not up his favourite 
necessity. Yea, and it shall be granted. 

§ 35. Did our atheist not understand what he read I 
or is it that he only pretends not to have comprehended ? 
'Tis difficult to say. For that his opponent gives not up 
necessity, must be as manifest as any thing can be, to him 
who at all weighs the words which have been quoted from 
the " Argument." These words contain the following 
reasoning. — Divisibility is another expression for capa- 
bility of division. That which is actually divided from 
another, must be removed, or separated, from that other 
thing : To be really divided being the same thing as to 
be really separated. Now, therefore, since it is proved, 
that the parts of Infinity of Extension are necessarily in- 
separable, it is proved, that those parts are necessarily 



§§ 34-40. 



IRREFRAGABLE. 



51 



indivisible : That is, that the Infinity of Extension has 
no parts in the sense of capability of being divided. 

§ 36. The proof that the parts of Infinity of Extension 
are necessarily inseparable, the reader has had above, in 
the twenty-seventh section. 

§ 37. And, by the way here, Antitheos has not ven- 
tured to breathe a syllable tending to call that proof in 
question. On the contrary, (and it is worthy of remark 
in this place,) he avows his belief in the entire validity 
of the proof. " In the discussion of his second propo- 
44 sition, the author," says our antitheist, " makes mani- 
" /est the absurdity of supposing space really divisible." 
Chap. VII. par. 4. 

§ 38. I must own, in passing, that I cannot, by any 
means, reconcile the passage which has just been quoted, 
wherein it is admitted, that it is absurd to suppose space 
divisible, with what the author of the " Refutation" has 
advanced elsewhere, namely, that it is not to be accorded, 
infinity of extension, or space, is necessarily indivisible.! 
Let him who can, reconcile the two statements. I must 
confess, that, to me, they look exceedingly like an arrant 
contradiction. 

§ 39. Our author, I repeat, has not called in question 
what goes to prove, infinity of extension cannot be sepa- 
rated. By the very nature of infinity of extension, divi- 
sibility, or the possibility of division, is excluded. If 
infinity of extension were divisible, really or mentally, it 
would not be infinity of extension. " Indeed, that divi- 
" sibility implies finiteness in extension, in the very notion 
" of it, will be evident to every one who considers the 
" relations of his clear ideas." " Argument, a priori " 
&c. Prop. II. § 7. 

§ 40. To return. Divisibility implies capacity of sepa- 
ration : Therefore, infinity of extension is, of necessity, 
t -See above, § 10. 



52 



" ARGUMENT, A PRIORI;' Part II. 



indivisible. This is the reasoning which, Antitheos al- 
leges, renounces abstract necessity, and appeals to expe- 
rience — to prove (I fancy) the necessary indivisibility of 
infinity of extension. Verily if this be so, 'twould be 
hard to say what keeping by abstract necessity, and look- 
ing in another direction than to experiment, could be, 
when one would prove, that " Infinity of Extension is ne- 
" cessarily indivisible," or that " its parts are necessarily 
" indivisible from each other." 

§ 41. When Locke argued as follows : " To divide and 
" separate actually, is, * * by removing the parts one 
" from another, to make two superficies, where before 
i{ there was a continuity ; and to divide mentally, is to 
" make in the mind two superficies, where before there 
" was a continuity ; and consider them as removed one 
" from the other." * * * Therefore : " The parts 
" of pure space are inseparable one from the other : so 
" that the continuity cannot be separated, neither really 
" nor mentally."! When, I say, the author of the 
" Essay concerning Human Understanding," argued in 
that manner, did the idea ever enter his mind, (and we 
all know, how preciously fond he was of every sort of 
idea,) that he was looking " for something like experi- 
" ment as alone capable of satisfying him" as to the ne- 
cessary inseparableness of the parts of pure space 1 

§ 42. When our atheist said : " The author" (of the 
" Argument") " makes manifest the absurdity of sup- 
" posing space really divisible, SINCE that would be to 
" suppose the parts separated without having any space 
<£ between them." J (The force of the reason shall be 
examined afterwards. ||) That is, when our atheist em- 
ployed this enthymeme : to suppose space really divisible, 
is to suppose its parts separated, &c. ; therefore, to sup- 

t See above, § 29. J Chap. VII. par. 4. 

|| See Part IV. § 15. 



§§ 41-45. 



IRREFRAGABLE. 



53 



pose space really divisible is absurd : The suppressed pre- 
miss of which expression of reasoning, being, To suppose 
the parts of space separated, &c. is absurd : — Did it really 
enter his brain, to fancy he was looking " for something 
" like experiment as alone capable of satisfying him," 
that 'tis absurd to suppose space is really divisible ? 

§ 43. If, in Proposition II., there is any appeal made 
to experience, is the appeal made for the purpose of 
proving, that infinity of extension is necessarily indivisi- 
ble ? Nonsense this would be. If to experience any ap- 
peal be directed, it is only for the sake of getting an ex- 
planation of divisibility, divided, division. And to what 
other quarter than experience, or use, one could go for an 
explanation of what is understood by certain English 
words, it would be difficult to say. It would be impossi- 
ble to say, with any sense. 

§ 45. We have considered the antecedent of the hypo- 
thetical proposition : " If Mr Gillespie pleads not guilty 
" to this charge." We now pass on to the consequent . 
;< (If Mr Gillespie pleads not guilty to this charge,) I 
" would ask him how mathematicians have always re- 
" garded the smallest particle of matter divisible to in- 
" finity?"t Here he asks me to account to him for a 
thing alleged to be a fact. But the fact itself deserves 
to be looked into. Mathematicians very rarely conde- 
scend to treat of matter. It is not the pure Mathemati- 
cian, but the Natural Philosopher, who considers the 
question, Is matter divisible infinitely ? The question 
which the mathematician undertakes to decide is this, 
Are the parts of bare extension infinitely divisible ? The 
two questions are commonly confounded. Very unfor- 
tunately. For thence no small portion of the confusion 
into which the subject has been thrown. The questions 
differ in most material respects. 

t Chap. VI. par. 4. 

O 



54 



ARGUMENT, A PRIORI, 



Part 11. 



§ 45. The great majority of natural philosophers have 
determined that matter is divisible infinitely. And all 
mathematicians are of opinion, that bare extension must 
be divisible infinitely. We take upon us, to make mani- 
fest, in opposition to both, that matter is not, and that 
mere extension cannot be, infinitely divisible — A bold 
undertaking, considering the overwhelming majority in 
the one case, and the entire unanimity in the other. To 
run counter to a thing which has, again and again, been 
demonstrated, and is received almost as an axiom, by 
mathematicians, needs some courage. To boast that 
they shall be utterly overthrown by our opposition, seems 
to be the height of towering temerity. But patience : — 
the task will be easy and successful in proportion to the 
apparent difficulty of the enterprise. 



55 



PART III. 

THE NON-INFINITE DIVISIBILITY OF EXTENSION 
AND OF MATTER. 

§ 1. The propositions, then, which we have undertaken 
to establish are these : — That matter is not divisible to 
infinity : And, That extension cannot be divisible to in- 
finity. In the one case we have to do with the men of 
experiments. In relation to the other, we have to en- 
gage with those who confine themselves to the properties 
of bare extension. We shall take the second proposition 
first in hand. 

§ 2. — I. " No priestly dogmas, invented on purpose to 
" tame and subdue the rebellious reason of mankind, ever 
" shocked common sense more than the doctrine of the 
" infinite divisibility of extension, with its consequences ; 
•'* as they are pompously displayed by all geometricians 
" * *, with a kind of triumph and exultation. A * 
" quantity, infinitely less than any finite quantity, con- 
" taining quantities infinitely less than itself, and so on 
? in infinitum; this is an edifice so bold and prodigious, 
" that it is too weighty for any pretended demonstration 
" to support, because it shocks the clearest and most na- 
" tural principles of human reason." Inquiry concerning 
Human Understanding. Sect. XII. part ii. So says Mr 
Hume, and who can refuse his assent to every word \ 
" But," continues he, and at this point the sceptic and 
we diverge into different routes, ' ; what renders the mat- 
" ter more extraordinary is, that these seemingly absurd 
" opinions are supported by a chain of reasoning the 



56 



NON-INFINITE 



Pakt III. 



" clearest and most natural ; nor is it possible for us to 
" allowthe premises without admitting the consequences." 
Ibid. What ! absurd opinions supported by the clearest 
and most natural reasoning ! the clearest and most natu- 
ral premises leading to the most absurd conclusion ! Well 
might the sceptic when contemplating a matter so extra- 
ordinary (the epithet how appropriate !) as that which 
here filled his view, proceed to infer : " Reason here seems 
" to be thrown into a kind of amazement and suspense, 
" which, without the suggestions of any sceptic, gives her 
" a diffidence of herself, and of the ground on which she 
" treads. She sees a full light, which illuminates certain 
" places ; but that light borders upon the most profound 
" darkness. And between these she is so dazzled and 
" confounded, that she scarcely can pronounce with cer- 
;i tainty and assurance concerning anyone object." Ibid. 

§ 3. It admirably suited the sceptic to speak thus ; to 
involve, and to lose, the whole subject in the most pro- 
found darkness. " His aim," as says a much admired 
writer, " was," at all times was, "not to interrogate Na- 
" ture, with a view to the discovery of truth, but by a 
" cross-examination of Nature, to involve her in such 
" contradictions, as might set aside the whole of her evi- 
" dence as good for nothing." Philosophical Essays by 
Bugald Stewart. Essay II. chap. i. And therefore, it 
was quite in accordance with Hume's object, to make one 
part of our nature jar with the other, and, by way of il- 
lustrating the contradictiousness of the decisions to which 
our faculties come, to make a proposition shocking and 
prodigious, follow, by necessary consequence, from propo- 
sitions most clear and natural. This, we say, was in per- 
fect harmony with Hume's grand purpose, and excites no 
surprise : but to find those who profess no scepticism, 
staid and sober mathematicians, rule-and-compasses-men, 
to find them backing the strongest effort of the sceptic, 



§§ 3-7. 



DIVISIBILITY. 



57 



assisting him to lay the foundation for universal doubt ; 
this, this is the matter for marvel. And it is matter for 
great marvel. 

§ 4. But what can we do ? However absurd the opi- 
nion be, that extension is infinitely divisible, still Mr 
Hume contends, it is supported by a clear and natural 
chain of reasoning, and the Mathematicians make their 
appearance to assure us, that it is even as he maintains. 
It is fortunate for us, that they bring their demonstra- 
tions along with them. For this circumstance puts it in 
our power to see whether or not common sense and our 
powers of reasoning are here to be set by the ears, as the 
Sceptic would have it, and as his supporters the Mathe- 
maticians seek not to hinder him from having. 

§ 5. Now sundry demonstrations have been offered by 
geometricians in proof of the divisibility of extension to 
infinity. We shall select the demonstration propounded 
by the celebrated Eider. This demonstration requires 
no previous mathematical knowledge. It is simple and 
plain. And it is easy to see, that if it be not a good de- 
monstration of the problem, how to divide extension 
infinitely, there cannot be a good demonstration any 
where else. In fine, 'tis the best that could be had for 
our purpose. 

§ 6. "In geometry," said that eminent mathematician, 
" it is always possible to divide a line, however small, 
" into two equal parts. We are likewise, by that science, 
" instructed in the method of dividing a small line, as a ?,| 
" into any number of equal parts at pleasure, and the 
" construction of this division is there demonstrated be- 
" yond the possibdity of doubting its accuracy. 

§ 7. " You have only to draw a line A I parallel to a i 
" of any length, and at any distance you please, and 
" to divide it into as many equal parts AB, BC, CD, 
t See diagram, next page. 



58 



NON-INFINITE 



Part III. 




DE, &c. as the small line given is to have divisions, 
say eight. Draw afterwards, through the extremities 

A, a, and I, i, the 
straight lines A a 0, 
I i 0, till they meet 
in the point : and 
from draw toward 
the points of division 

B, C, D, E, &c, the 
straight lines OB, 
OC, OD, OE, &c, 
which shall likewise 
cut the small line a i 
into eight equal parts. 
§ 8. " This operation may be performed, however small 
the given line a i, and however great the number of 
parts into which you propose to divide it. True it is, 
that in execution we are not permitted to go too far ; 
the lines which we draw always have some breadth, 
whereby they are at length confounded, as may be seen 
in the figure near the point ; but the question is not 
what may be possible for us to execute, but what is 
possible in itself. Now in geometry lines have no 
breadth, and consequently can never be confounded. 
Hence it follows that such division is illimitable. 

§ 9. " If it is once admitted that a line may be divided 
into a thousand parts, by dividing each part into two 
it will be divisible into two thousand parts, and for the 
same reason into four thousand, and into eight thousand, 
without ever arriving at parts indivisible. However 
small a line may be supposed, it is still divisible into 
halves, and each half again into two, and each of these 
again in like manner, and so on to infinity. 
§ 10. " What I have said of a line is easily applicable 
1 to a surface, and, with greater strength of reasoning, to 



§§ 8-12. 



DIVISIBILITY. 



59 



' : a solid endowed with three dimensions, length, breadth, 
" and thickness. Hence it is affirmed that all extension 
" is divisible to infinity, and this property is denominated 
" divisibility in infinitum.'" Letters to a German Princess . 
Dr H. Hunter's translation. Vol. II. Letter yiii. 

§. 11. So we have had a demonstration of the infinite 
divisibility of extension, a demonstration referring to a 
diagram, according to wont. But whatever Euler may 
have imagined, there is a possibility of doubting the ac- 
curacy, not of the construction of the figure indeed, but of 
the statement of connection between the construction and 
the thing to be shewn thereby. 

§ 12. " You have only," says the demonstrator, " to 
" draw a line A I parallel to ai" (A I being) " of any 
" length, and at any distance" (from a i) " you please. 
" and to divide it into as many equal parts AB, BC, CD, 
" DE, &c, as the small line given is to have divisions, 
" say eight." To divide a line into eight parts, is to make 
eight lines of one line, each of the eight being removed or 
separated from the rest, be it by ever so small a distance^ 
Without removal or separation of parts, there can be no 
division of one line into eight lines : there can be nothing 
but the partial consideration of so much of the line to the 
exclusion of the rest, eight times. Euler, for all mathe- 
maticians, has said: " In geometry lines have no breadth. 1 ' 
How then can geometrical lines divide any thing ? since 
division implies some breadth or interval between the 
things divided. Where there is no breadth or distance 
between things, there is no division of the things. They 
are one and the same thing : That is, we were mistaken 
when we said, there were more things than one. In short, 
a i " the small line given" has no divisions at all. How 
then can it have eight ? The demonstration of infinite 
divisibility, has never touched one instance of division, 

t See Part II. § 26, and § 29. 



60 



NON-INFINITE 



Part III. 



and, to speak plainly, is no demonstration at all of the 
proposition with which it is connected. 

§ 13. But mathematicians are to be held as busying 
themselves not with real, but with mental divisions. But 
still the same sort of objection falls to be made to a de- 
monstration of the infinite divisibility of extension, when 
a mental divisibility only is concerned, as falls to be made 
to a demonstration of such divisibility, when a real divi- 
sibility is spoken of. To divide a line mentally into eight 
parts, is to conceive eight lines made out of one line, each 
of the eight being considered as separated from the rest. 
And as geometrical lines have no breadth, they cannot 
be conceived as dividing any thing. And since they can- 
not be conceived as dividing any thing, they cannot be 
conceived as dividing " the small line" a i. 

§ 14. So much for Enter's demonstration. We shall 
now demonstrate, in our turn, that the extension with 
which mathematicians have to do, is not divisible to in- 
finity, and that for this plain reason, that it is not divi- 
sible at all. Our demonstration must have one quality 
which Eulers has not. 

§ 15. Were the lines and figures of which the geome- 
trician treats, some more some less elastic and compres- 
sible, no dependence could be placed on his science. Take 
an example for illustration. If in any right-angled tri- 
angle, the side subtending the right angle were compres- 
sible, then a square described on that side might or might 
not be equal to squares described upon the sides which 
contain the right angle : For it has not been proved that 
if the hypotenuse of the triangle be compressible, the base 
and perpendicular are, in proportion to the respective 
length of each, equally so, that is, it has not been proved, 
that equal spaces in the base and perpendicular are com- 
pressible in the same degree as equal spaces in the hy- 
potenuse are. The lines and figures of geometry, then, 



§§ 13-16. 



DIVISIBILITY. 



61 



are not elastic or compressible. But all matter is com- 
pressible. The extension, therefore, on which mathema- 
ticians superstruct their science is not such extension as 
matter has. What extension can it be then % 

§ 16. In answering this question, we shall be under the 
necessity of forestalling, in some degree, what we have to 
say in another place ; but there appears to be no help for 
it, and a good thing will bear to be told oftener than 
once. The reader has had it shewn, that there is neces- 
sarily infinity of extension, f and has had it proved, that 
thepartsof infinity of extension are necessarily indivisible. % 
Now the parts of matter, or the material universe, are 
divisible from each other. Then, the parts of infinity of 
extension being necessarily indivisible from each other ; 
and it being intuitively evident, that the substratum of 
infinity of extension, if it have a substratum, can be no 
more divisible than infinity of extension itself ; and the 
parts of matter being, on the contrary, divisible from 
each other ; and it, therefore, following that the mate- 
rial universe is not the substratum of infinity of exten- 
sion, but is finite in extension : — (For were it truly of 
infinity of extension, it would, unquestionably, be the 
substratum thereof: || But it being not that substratum, 
therefore it is not of infinity of extension : — ) Here are 
two sorts of extension. The one sort that which matter 
has : And the other, the extension of infinity of exten- 
sion. And as infinity of extension is necessarily existing, 
and as the material universe exists in the extension of 
infinity of extension ; a part of this {part, but in the 
sense of partial consideration, for otherwise infinity of 

t See Part II. § 13, and following sections. 
\ See Part II. § 23, and following sections. 

|| " Upon the hypothesis of substance being infinitely extended, we 
" may regard it as ' the substratum of infinity of extension.' " — Refuta- 
tion. Chap. VIII. par. 3. 

P 



62 



NON-INFINITE 



Pakt III, 



extension can have no parts,t) must penetrate the mate- 
rial universe, and every atom, even the minutest atom, 
of it. 

§ 17. It will be proper, therefore, to distinguish be- 
tween those two kinds of extension. And accordingly, 
confining to matter, namely, to the distance of the extre- 
mities of matter from each other, the name extension ; 
let us apply to the extension of infinity of extension, the 
name expansion, or space.\ 

§ 18. In answer then to the question, What is the ex- 
tension on which geometry is superstructed % the reply is, 
it is the extension of space, the extension which is of in- 
finity. For we know of no other sort of extension but 
that of matter, and that of space ; or at least if we know 
of any other, it is altogether beside the purpose. Space, 
then, is the extension on which Geometry is superstruct- 
ed. But the parts of space are indivisible. || Therefore, 
mathematical extension is indivisible. 

§ 19. Thus have we accomplished what we took in 
hand, and proved, in opposition to the Mathematicians, 
that mere extension, or space, cannot be infinitely divi- 
sible. There is no " strength of reasoning," greater or 
less, in their demonstrations. And, in the next place, we 
have positively, rigidly, irrefragably, made manifest the 
contrary. 

§ 20. Should it be argued, that when our mathemati- 
cian speaks of divisions, in demonstrating the infinite di- 

t See Part II. § 27. 

\ " To avoid confusion * * , it were possibly to be wished, that the 
" name extension were applied only to matter, or the distance of the ex- 
" tremities of particular bodies ; and the term expansion to space in 
" general, with or without solid matter possessing it, so as to say space 
" is expanded, and body extended. But in this every one lias liberty ; I 
"propose it only for the more clear and distinct way of speaking." 
Locke's Essay, B. II. ch. xiii. § 27- See also Ch. xv. § 1. 

|J See Part II. § 27, and above, § 17, comparing the places. 



§§ 17-22. 



DIVISIBILITY. 



63 



visibility of extension, he does not mean divisions at all, 
but only partial apprehensions or considerations, which 
are not so much as mental divisions : as if he had said, 
it is demonstrable that extension is capable of being par- 
tially considered, in the way of consideration of so much 
extension, and then of consideration of so much of that 
extension, and so on, in infinitum, or rather, without ever 
coming to any stage where the process of diminishing the 
extension by considerations must stop : Should this be 
argued, the reply is two-fold. 

§ 21. — 1. If our mathematician thought, that the di- 
visibility of extension in infinitum, is an empty chimera, 
and never intended to demonstrate any such divisibility, 
his words are exceedingly bad indices to his thoughts, 
but his thoughts are good, as we have made manifest. If 
he, as standing for all mathematicians, take the divisi- 
bility of extension in infinitum to be a vain fancy, the 
point is given up in our favour, and we are entirely 
agreed with him. 

§ 22. — 2. If Eulers demonstration is to be viewed as a 
demonstration, that we can consider partially, by consi- 
dering and again considering, so much extension, without 
ever being under a necessity of arriving at any termina- 
tion to the process ; in this case, his demonstration must 
stand good, for any thing we have to advance against it. 
We never engaged to do aught requiring that we should 
find a flaw in any demonstration of such a kind. What 
we took upon us to do was, to make manifest, that ex- 
tension cannot be divisible to infinity."!* It ma 7 be, or it 
may not be, that Euler has strictly demonstrated the 
possibility of partial considerations of so much extension. 
in infinitum : But as we did not undertake to throw our 
authority, such as it is, or our arguments, upon either 



t See Part II. § 45, and above, § 1. 



NON-INFINITE 



Part III. 



side of that topic, so we shall not now do what we never 
promised to do.f 

§ 23. One thing, however, we shall permit ourselves to 
say upon that subject. Whether or not we can consider 
partially, by considering and again considering, so much 
extension, without being obliged to terminate the process 
somewhere : this very plainly seems to be capable of a 
test at least as good as any to be had in virtue of a mere 
geometrical demonstration. The test referred to is the 
testimony of our powers of conception, applied imme- 
diately to the subject ; applied in asking an immediate an- 
swer to the question, Can we, or can we not, consider a 
certain extension without coming to any point where we 
must halt in the business of considering, and again con- 
sidering, and considering yet again, and again, and 
again ? We either can, or we can not, have considera- 
tions and sub-considerations without end, and to appeal, 
for the decision of the affair, somewhere else than to a 
diagram, and a relative demonstration, seems at least as 
natural a course as any other. As natural, did we say ? 
Nay, (since we are upon the subject,) may we not, with 
all safety, affirm, that it is a very unnatural, and a very 
unexpected, mode of going to work, to set out to demon- 

t Perhaps, had it been our business to try to discover flaws in Euler's 
demonstration, considered as a demonstration of the possibility of partial 
considerations of a certain extension infinitely, we could have stumbled 
against enow. We shall drop only this one hint. No number of mathe- 
matical lines, laid alongside each other, can compose what has any breadth. 
Take the smallest line we can draw (for it would be taking too much for 
granted, here, to say, the smallest line we can conceive). Conceive that 
line crossed by only a million of mathematical lines — for we shall be mo- 
derate with our number. Does that enable us to consider, in the smallest 
Ime we can draw, a million of different, distinct parts ? If not, does the 
interposition of any number of mathematical lines go any way to help us 
to consider partially, in infinitum, the least extension we can draw ? We 
might prosecute, with some advantage too, the hint, which we have thus 
dropt, but having opened up the road, we refrain from following it out. 



§§ 23-27. 



DIVISIBILITY. 



65 



strate, by the interposition of a geometrical construction, 
that our minds can have considerations and sub-consider- 
ations of a certain extension, without limit 1 And it may 
be "worth while for one who is presented with a geometri- 
cal demonstration, that we can consider so much exten- 
sion partially, without ever halting with the diminutions, 
to ask this question, Is the pertinency of a geometrical 
demonstration in the case to be admitted, without proof ? 

§ 24. To him who should happen to be presented with 
a demonstration of that nature, (we cannot help saying 
it,) we would suggest, that there is another question 
which he might advantageously ask himself; which is 
this, Admitting the pertinency of a demonstration of such 
a character, does not the thing demonstrated run counter 
to the testimony which my mind bears as to what it can 
do ? And if consciousness gives the lie to the conclusion to 
which the demonstrator reaches, what can his demon- 
stration be good for ? — But these are matters that lie 
entirely out of our way here. — 

§ 25. — Much of what has here been urged in relation 
to a mathematical demonstration of the possibility of 
partial considerations, infinitely, of so much extension, 
might be advanced concerning a mathematical demon- 
stration of the possibility of mental divisions, and indeed 
of divisions simply, of extension, in infinitum. — 

§ 26. — II. We come now to the consideration, and the 
proof, of the first of the two propositions, the proposition 
which asserts that matter, is not divisible to infinity. 

§ 27. There are two great arguments which are con- 
tantly employed, when the opinion of those who deny the 
infinite divisibility of matter, is attempted to be reduced 
to an absurdity, or a contradiction. And as those argu- 
ments may rightly be pronounced the chief causes of the 
prevalence of the doctrine maintaining the infinite divi- 
sibility of matter ; if we can succeed in entirely breaking 



66 



NON-INFINITE 



Part III. 



their force, or rather in exposing their want of all force, 
we shall be paving the way for a cordial reception to a 
doctrine of an opposite description. To bring into com- 
plete discredit what has been mainly relied on as giving 
support to the sentiment we dissent from, is by no means 
to attain to the position we would reach, but it is to re- 
move an obstruction lying in the way. 

§ 28. We shall make the distinguished author of the 
Letters to a German Princess furnish us with that exhi- 
bition of the arguments referred to on which we shall 
comment. The mode of stating those arguments may be 
a little different when it is another than Euler who brings 
them forward, but we may always recognise the pith of 
the arguments under any covering. 

§ 29. But ere we encounter the two arguments as ex- 
hibited by Euler, it is necessary to admit, there are suf- 
ficient grounds for thinking, that this writer, when he 
uses the words which shall all before long be quoted, sup- 
poses that he is treating concerning that extension the 
divisibility of which to infinity he had demonstrated (in 
such a way as we have seen). For those words imme- 
diately succeed to the demonstration, in which he was 
busied about geometrical extension ; and in the letter 
which follows the one containing the demonstration, he 
expressly considers " whether this divisibility in infinitum" 
(such divisibility as geometrical extension was demon- 
strated to have) " takes place in existing todies ; existing, 
for Euler held the strange, the monstrous opinion, " that 
" simple extension, as considered in geometry, can have 
" no real existence," it being " merely a chimerical object, 
' ; formed by abstraction.''^ True, when we compare this 
with what is subsequently advanced, that " as geometry is, 
" beyond contradiction, one of the most useful of sciences, 
" its object cannot possibly be a mere chimera ;" that 
t Letter IX. 



§§ 28-29. 



DIVISIBILITY. 



67 



there is a necessity, then, of admitting, that the object 
" of geometry is at least the same apparent extension 
" which those philosophers allow to body."t He is allud- 
ing to the monadists ; who, it seems, gave to body no 
no more than a quasi, or as-it-were extension, affirming 
that bodies are not extended, but have only an appearance 
of extension. When, I say, we compare the assertions to- 
gether, we find ourselves at a loss what to make of Euler. 
The one declaration seems to contradict the other. First, 
that extension which is the object of geometry has no 
real existence ; it is a mere chimera. Next, the object 
of geometry eannot possibly be a mere chimera ; the ob- 
ject being at least the same extension which the mona- 
dists allowed to body. It is a pity that the author of the 
Letters should have left us under the necessity of grop- 
ing, in so much darkness, for his real opinion : his words 
(we say not his sentiments) contradicting each other. 
But when we have pondered the matter a good while, and 
considered the thing on all sides, we begin to perceive 
that probably Euler s opinion at bottom was this : — The 
object of geometry can have no real existence as a sepa- 
rate entity : The notion of it is gotten by abstraction, 
and in this sense it is a chimerical, or a shadowy object ; 
But tho' the object of geometry exists not separately, it 
has a true existence, as true an existence as the extension 
of body, which undoubtedly exists, tho' it exists not by 
itself. This statement concerning what Euler s senti- 
ments at bottom were, derives strength, or perhaps it 
becomes certain, when we consider other passages which 
are to be found in the Letters. " All general notions are 
"as much abstract beings as geometrical extension." 
" Extension is undoubtedly a general idea, formed in the 
" same manner as that of man, or of tree in general, by 
" abstraction ; and as man or tree in general exists not, no 
t Letter X. 



68 



NON-INFINITE 



Part III. 



" more does extension in general exist. You are perfectly 
" sensible, that individual beings alone exist, and that ge- 
" neral notions are to be found only in the mind."t Gene- 
ral notions, if we would speak with modern propriety, 
should not be designated abstract beings, nor beings of 
any kind. They have being, but they are not beings. 
To have being, and to be a being, are by no means iden- 
tical. All states or operations, all modes or qualities, 
have being, but notwithstanding, none of them constitutes 
a being. J — Extension is not undoubtedly a general idea, 
nor is it an idea at all. Of extension undoubtedly, we 
have an idea ; whether the idea be a general idea, or not. 
But the idea, and that about which the idea is employed, 
the extension to-wit, are very different. — I cannot be even 
so much as positive that we have the idea of man, or of 
tree, in general. How then can I be positive how the 
idea is formed ? — Though extension in general exists not 
externally, still extension exists externally. — I am certain 
not only that " general notions" are only in the mind, 
but that what Euler\\ and others call "individual notions" 
are to be found nowhere else. — These remarks, in con- 
nection with the citations last made, appeared to be ne- 
cessary, before saying, as we now say, that to Elder s sen- 
timents as we have explained them, his own words en- 
forcing the explanation, we can give our most cordial as- 

t Letters VII. & IX. 

X It must be conceded, that some of the older authors were accustomed 
to apply, on certain occasions, the term being to a mode or property, as 
well as to a substance. Dr Watts and Br Berkeley may be given as in- 
stances. See Part XI. §§ 33, 35, & note to § 39. Yet " few writers," 
the first (not in importance) of these Doctors is constrained to admit, 
" allow mode to be called a being in the same perfect sense as a substance 
" is." Logic, Part I. ch. ii. sect. 1. A substance is a being: But to say 
that a mode is a being, is about all one with saying that a mode is a— 
substance, or a — something more than a mode. 

|| See his seventh Letter. 



§ 29. 



DIVISIBILITY. 



69 



sent. The object of geometry is an object having a real 
existence. The object is extension. But mere extension 
cannot exist separately^ The object of geometry is, then, 
only a mode. These are exactly our sentiments. — To re- 
turn from this digression, which will not be without its 
use : Though it is supposed by Euler, that in the words 
about to be quoted, he is treating of the extension the 
divisibility of which to infinity he had demonstrated, 
still he is to be held as speaking rather of the extension 
of bodies, i. e. of matter. The words in which he expresses 
himself in the passages to be cited, refer far more naturally 
and properly to the extension of bodies than to that of 
space. For instance : To speak of "particles" , attained 
by dividing a thing, and of the " division of an inch", 
surely savours much more of what relates to matter than 
of what relates to pure expansion. And true it is that 
Euler's passing continuously from the extension of space 
to the extension of matter, without remarking any tran- 
sition, will not appear at all so wonderful when we con- 
sider, that at times he expressly confounds the two kinds 
of extension. For example, he says : " The object of geo- 
" metry is at least the same apparent extension which 
" those philosophers," the monadists, " allow to body. "J 
— We said, he confounds the two species of extension at 
times. For on other occasions he speaks thus : " The 
" object of geometry, therefore, is a notion,|| much more 
" general than that of tody, as it comprehends not only 

| " To me nothing seems more absurd, than that there should be ex- 
" tension without anything extended." Dr JReioVs Essays, Essay II. 
ch. xix. The Doctor is speaking of extension, having matter in his eye. But 
it may be demanded : Out of matter, as well as in it, can bare extension 
exist without anything extended ? 

\ As above. 

|| The object of geometry is not a notion. The object of geometry is 
space. See above, § 18. We have a notion of the object of geometry, but 
space is not a notion. 



70 



NON-INFINITE 



Part III. 



" bodies, but all beings simply extended without impe- 
" netrability, if any such there be."t — The author of the 
Letters, we repeat, sometimes quite confounds the two 
species of extension. And therefore when, on an occasion, 
he is dealing with the one species, he may well think he 
is also dealing with the other. But tho' Euler has con- 
founded the extension of matter with that of space, there 
is no good reason why we should imitate his example. 

§ 30. But even though Euler s words be held as being 
properly applicable to the simple extension of geometry ; 
what matters it ? 'Tis not of the least consequence to 
us on what principle they ought, as they stand in the 
Letters, to be construed. If they apply to the extension 
of space more naturally than to that of matter, all that 
our readers have to do, is to consider them in the light 
in which we have represented them. When set in that 
light, they contain the marrow of the two arguments 
which are so much relied on by Natural Philosophers, on 
behalf of their favourite dogma of the infinite divisibi- 
lity of matter. And it is with these arguments that our 
business lies. 

§ 31. First argument. " Whoever is disposed to deny 
" this property of extension," (matter,) — the property 
denominated, divisibility in infinitum — " is under the ne- 
" cessity of maintaining, that it is possible to arrive at 
" last at parts so minute as to be unsusceptible of any 
" farther division, because they ceased to haveany extension. 
" Nevertheless all these particles taken together must re- 
" produce the whole, by the division of which you ac- 
i; quired them ; and as the quantity of each would be a 
" nothing or cypher 0, a combination of cyphers would 
" produce quantity, which is manifestly absurd. For you 
" know perfectly well, that in arithmetic, two or more 
" cyphers joined never produce any thing. 

t Letter VII. 



§§ 31-35. 



DIVISIBILITY. 



71 



§ 32. " This opinion that in the division of extension, 
" or of any quantity whatever, we may come at last to 
" particles so minute as to be no longer divisible, because 
" they are so small, or" (which is far from being the same 
thing) " because quantity no longer exists, is, therefore, a 
" position absolutely untenable." Letter VIII. 

§ 33. I am " disposed to deny" the infinite divisibility 
of matter, and am " under the necessity of maintaining, 
" that it is possible to arrive at last at parts so minute 
" as to be unsusceptible of any farther division ;" " that 
" * * we may come at last to particles so minute as 
tf to be no longer divisible ;" but I do not allow this is, 
" because they ceased to have any extension," " or because 
- quantity no longer exists." Those who deny the in- 
finite divisibility of matter, are under no necessity of 
assigning any such reason for their doctrine. Euler, for 
those whose sentiments he would represent, and does mis- 
represent, covertly assumes, that what is not extended is 
not divisible. For the causal proposition, Certain par- 
ticles are unsusceptible of division, because they have not 
any extension ; involves the principle, that what has no 
extension is not divisible. Which principle is indeed to 
be admitted. But though we admit the principle, we 
cannot allow that it is at all applicable in this case : We 
cannot grant, that the reason why the minute particles 
are no longer divisible is because they have no quantity. 
In other words, we admit the truth of the major, we deny 
the truth of the minor premiss, of the syllogism : We 
deny, that certain particles have not any extension. 

§ 34. It is to be granted, we repeat, that what has no 
extension is not divisible. And for this simple reason ; 
what has no extension is nothing. 

§ 35. On this subject we shall cite a passage from the 
' ; Introduction" to the " Argument." We have nothing 
better to say now. " Can there be conceived a greater 



72 



NON-INFINITE 



Part III. 



" absurdity than the assertion, that a substance, cogita- 

tive or inco^igitative, * * * may be without any ex- 
;i tension whatsoever? To believe this indeed defies hu- 
" man nature. If reason can, with certainty, pronounce 
" any thing, it may pronounce this decision, that exten- 
" sion and existence are so necessary to each other, that 
" there can be no existence without extension. Talk of 
<; a substance which has no extension : you present us 
" with words of amusement. 

§ 36. " If there be a subject on which authority should 
" be of weight, such a subject, 'tis plain, is the debate, 
" whether we must conceive, that to deny extension is to 
" deny existence. And, 'tis well, that, in behalf of the 
" position, that existence cannot be without extension, 
" there are two as great authorities, in speculations of 
<; this nature, as can any where be found. 

§ 37. " ' Perhaps, * * *' (says Mr Locke,) ' it is 
<; ' near as hard to conceive any existence, or to have an 
" ' idea of any real being, with a perfect negation of all 
" ' manner of expansion ; as it is to have the idea of any 
" ' real existence, with a perfect negation of all manner 
" ; of duration.' Essay concerning Human Understand- 
" ing, B. II. ch. xv. § 11. And to have the idea of any 
" real existence with a perfect negation of all manner of 
" duration is, surely, impossible. 

§ 38. " The Cartesians make mind and matter to be 
" different in their essence ; and make extension (the 
" correction of Des Cartes' 8 opinion is, solid extension,"]") 
" to be the essence of matter : Consequently, with them, 
" a thinking substance cannot be extended. Mr Locke 
" wrote at a time when these Cartesian opinions were 
" generally received. But yet, (we see,) he held, that, 

t " This correction is by Dr Isaac Watts. See Philosophical Essays." 
Note in " Introduction." 



§§ 36-41. 



DIVISIBILITY, 



73 



" without extension, it is impossible to conceive exist- 
" ence." 

§ 39. We shall here introduce a sentence from a dif- 
ferent part of Mr Locke 's work. " He that considers 
" how hardly sensation is in our thoughts, reconcil/able 
" to extended matter ; or existence to any thing that hath 
" no extension at all, will confess, that he is very far 
" from certainly knowing what his soul is. * * * On 
" which side soever he views it, either as an unextended 
" substance, or as a thinking extended matter; the diffl- 
" culty to conceive either, will, whilst either alone is in his 
" thoughts, still drive him to the contrary side." B. IV. 
ch. iii. § 6. 

§ 40. (Ought not the difficulties attending the hypo- 
thesis of unextended substance, or of thinking matter, 
have driven Mr Locke, not from the one side to the other, 
from Scylla to Charibdis, alternately, but to a third hy- 
pothesis attended with no apparent inconvenience ? The 
difficulties attending either of those hypotheses — difficul- 
ties, do we call them ? the utter absurdities rather. Sure, 
there is no proper difficulty at all accompanying the 
opinion of unextended substance ; for no man can possi- 
bly conceive such a thing. And if the thing cannot be, 
it cannot have any consequences. Ought not the impos- 
sibility of believing either of those hypotheses, have made 
the author of the Essay concerning Human Understand- 
ing to renounce both, and come over to the doctrine, 
that the soul, being really a substance, is extended, and, 
being a thinking substance, is immaterial ?) We return 
to our " Introduction." 

§ 41. " £ Extension does not belong to thought,' (these 
" are the words of Dr Samuel Clarke,) 6 because thought 
" ' is not a Being ; But there is need of extension to the 
" ' existence of every Being, to a Being which has or has 
" c not thought, or any other quality whatsoever.' Se- 



74 



NON-INFINITE 



Part III. 



" cond letter to Joseph Butler, afterwards Bishop of 
" Durham. 

§ 42. " 'Tis true, that in these words, Br Clarice does 
" not say, that he cannot conceive the existence of a Being 
" without extension, but that, 'tis certain, is what he 
" means." Division III. 

§ 43. To these authorities, but for one reason, I might 
add another ; the authority of Eider himself. In the 
passage last quoted from the " Letters," he assumes that 
to be unextended is to be nothing. His words are : 
" The quantity of each," to-wit, of the " particles," 
<: would be a nothing." Why 1 " They ceased to have 
" any extension." With Eider, then, to cease to have 
any extension, is to cease to be any thing, is to become 
nothing. 

§ 44. The reason why we cannot safely add Euler to 
those authorities is this : Though in that passage, as well 
as in many other passages, he reasons as if to be unex- 
tended were to be nothing, or have no existence, still in 
other places, he speaks of real existencies on which he 
bestows not the attribute of extension. To give just one 
instance : " Monads," says he, " having no extension, must 
" be considered as points in geometry, or as we represent 
' ; to ourselves spirits and souls. "t In spite of all that 
the panegyrists of Euler have ever said, he is, on many 
occasions, any thing but a consistent reasoner, he is, too 
often, guilty of consequentially contradicting his own 
positions. But there is an excuse for him in the present 
affair. When he reasons as if there can be no existence 
without extension, he is off his guard. But when he 
talks of substances which have no extension, he is in a 
situation which must prove dangerous to a weak reasoner. 
he is a partisan of a favourite hypothesis, the foolish, the 
absurd, hypothesis of unextended spirit. 

t Letter XIV. 



§§ 42-49, 



DIVISIBILITY. 



75 



§ 45. What has no extension, then, is nothing. And 
nothing cannot be divisible. So, what is unextended 
cannot be divisible. 

§ 46. When Eider gives as the reason why the minute 
particles are no longer divisible, the position, The parti- 
cles have no extension ; he may be giving what the fol- 
lowers of the famous Leibnitz, in particular his distin- 
guished disciple Wolff, the partizans of unextended 
monads, (things which made so much noise in their day.) 
gave as the reason why the minute parts of bodies are 
unsusceptible of division beyond a certain point ; but he 
is very far from giving the reason why any rational sup- 
porter of the doctrine of ultimate particles holds, that 
bodies are not divisible in infinitum. 

§ 47. To speak of dividing extension into two non-ex- 
tensions, that is, something into two nothings, is to mount 
to the highest pinnacle of absurdity. And it is precisely 
for this reason we deny, that the minute parts which we 
contend are no longer divisible, have ceased to have any 
extension. We cannot, then, by any process of division 
arrive at last at particles that have ceased to have any 
extension. And if we cannot arrive at them, if, in other 
words, they cannot exist, they cannot be unsusceptible, 
any more than they can be susceptible, of division. Upon 
the whole, the absence of extension can never be the 
reason why any particles are no longer divisible. 

§ 48. Agreeing with Eider, we grant it is " manifestly 
" absurd" to suppose, that a combination of nothings can 
produce something, or that a combination of non-exten- 
sion with non-extension can produce extension. And this 
is just the reason, only viewed from a station different 
from that which it was viewed from before, why the mi- 
nute particles which with us are unsusceptible of farther 
division are not altogether unextended. 

§ 49. In fine, to be indivisible and to be unextended. 



76 



NON-INFINITE 



Part III. 



are not admitted to be necessarily convertible. Every 
thing- unextended is, for that reason, indivisible. But 
every thing indivisible is not therefore unextended : At 
least this has not yet been shewn. And it has not been 
proved, that there is any other reason why every thing- 
indivisible is unextended. 

§ 50. No doubt, the advocates of the doctrine of the 
infinite divisibility of body, are in the habit of taking for 
granted, that what admits of no farther division has no 
extension. " Let us suppose," says Eider. " a line of an 
" inch long, divided into a thousand parts, and that these 
" parts are so small as to admit of no farther division ; 
" each part, then, would no longer have any length, /or" 
| the proof is just the thing to be proved, in a different 
expression,] " if it had any, it tuould be still divisible."^ 
What is indivisible is unextended. Why 1 Because, 
whatever is extended is divisible. But this is exactly 
equivalent to the point that was to be proved. And how 
is this, in its turn, to be proved 1 Because, what is indi- 
visible is unextended. And this is the convenient circle 
in which the advocates of that doctrine go round. They 
reduce indivisibility to unextendedness, and prove unex- 
tendedness by indivisibility. That, then, which they are 
in the habit of assuming, to-wit, that nothing can admit 
of no farther division but what has no extension, we 
must deny their right to assume, till they produce a bet- 
ter title to the right than they do when they take for 
granted a thing precisely equivalent to the point to be 
proved. 

§ 51. But in discussing the proof given of the assump- 
tion, that what is indivisible must be without extension, 
we have been betrayed into something like an anticipa- 
tion of the consideration of the second argument : which 
is the following. " Finally," says the author of the Let- 
t Letter VIII. 



S§ 50-53. 



DIVISIBILITY. 



77 



ters, " however far you may have already carried, in 
il imagination, the division of an inch, it is always possible 
" to carry it still farther ; and never will you be able to 
u carry on your subdivision so far, as that the last parts 
" shall be absolutely indivisible. These parts will un- 
" doubtedly always become smaller, and their magnitude 
4£ will approach nearer and nearer to 0, but can never 
" reach it." Letter VIII. 

§ 52. The former argument consisted of the assignation 
of a false ground for the doctrine of ultimate particles : 
(Non causa pro causa.) This is composed of an entire 
begging of the question : ( Petitio principii.) The thing 
in debate is, whether is the division always capable of 
being carried farther \ And this argument says : " It is 
" always possible to carry it still farther." The question 
under discussion is, whether do the parts always become 
smaller ? And this argument declares : " These parts 
" will undoubtedly always become smaller." This argu- 
ment, then, takes entirely for granted, the thing that was 
to be proved. 

§ 53. We shall indulge ourselves so far as to give, in 
addition to Enter's exhibition of this argument, the vulgar 
method of stating it. The man of Natural Science usually 
speaks after this manner : " Certainly every portion of 
" matter, however minute, must have two surfaces at least, 
" and then * * it follows of course that it is divisible ; 
" that is, the upper and lower surfaces may be separated." 
Rev. J. Joyce's Scientific Dialogues, p. 5. So convincing 
is this reasoning esteemed, it is all that is said on the 
subject ; so plain is it held, it is the pupil, and not the 
preceptor, who falls in with it. The question for resolu- 
tion is, has every portion of matter, surfaces that are di- 
visible ? The resolution is : To have surfaces does imply 
being divisible. The question is, has every particle an 
upper and an under surface separable from each other ? 



78 



NON-INFINITE 



Part III. 



The resolution says : To have an upper and an under 
surface does imply having separable surfaces. Why, the 
resolutions do no more than barefacedly assume the very 
positions which the opponent of the dogma of infinite di- 
visibility would ask proof for. The best that can be said 
on behalf of that sort of argument which begs the ques- 
tion is, that it is at hand in every case, and therefore 
can never be utterly overcome, as 

When a battle's won, 
The war's as far from being done.f 

§ 54. Having thus removed an obstruction that lay be- 
tween us and the position we would reach ; an obstruction 
which, indeed, we might have made a circuit round, or 
have stepped over, but still an obstruction; we shall 
evince, that as by the two arguments which have been 
considered, it has not been proved that in dividing a body 
we may proceed in infinitum, so it will never be proved 
that we can go on to infinity, a satisfactory proof of the 
contrary being to be had. 

§ 55. The question, 7s matter, to-wit, any particular 
piece of matter our thoughts may be occupied about, di- 
visible to infinity ? may be more conveniently, not to say 
more properly, stated in another way : Can we divide any 
particular particle without coming to any point in our 
divisions and subdivisions where we must stop \ Which 
question may be divided into two branches. The question 
which the first of the two composes is this : In dividing 
any particle by a real process, is it true that we can carry 
on the process without ever arriving at any^point beyond 
which it is impossible for us to go ? The second question 
is the following : If there be indeed a limit past which 
we cannot perceive any division of a body, cannot we con- 
ceive, at any rate, the divisions and subdivisions to go on, 
without our coming to any termination in the business ? 

t Hudibras. 



§§ 54-60, 



DIVISIBILITY. 



79 



§ 56. The answers which are to be given to those ques- 
tions will determine the controversy, whether matter is 
infinitely divisible. We have seen that philosophers have 
made the attempt to determine it otherwise than by ap- 
pealing to what may be really perceived, or at most ima- 
gined, — in other words, otherwise than by appealing to 
facts and experience. But such an attempt is vain in 
the extreme. If it be not competent to the senses, or at 
least to the imagination, to decide the controversy, then 
the decision of it falls under the cognizance of no tribunal 
that we know of. The topic, without doubt, is to be dis- 
cussed on no very abstract grounds, if we are to discuss 
it with any properly founded hopes of bringing it to a de- 
terminate conclusion. 

§ 57. Now as far as the topic is to be decided on by 
an appeal to observation, there will be very little difficulty 
in the case. We may boldly pronounce, without fear of 
any contradiction, that no one ever perceived the division 
of any piece of matter carried beyond a certain point. 
Our senses conduct us to fixed limits in our divisions and 
subdivisions. Observation, then, so far as it goes, does 
the very contrary to establishing the doctrine of the in- 
finite divisibility of matter. 

§ 58. For the sake of those who are disposed to be 
more moved by authorities, than by any appeal to facts, 
we adduce the following testimonies. 

§ 59. ' ; There is a limit beyond which we cannot per- 
" ceive any division of a body. The parts become too 
" small to be perceived by our senses." ReicCs Essays. 
Essay II. ch. xix. 

§ 60. " We must allow that there are physical points, 
" that is, parts of extension, which cannot be divided or 
" lessened, either by the eye or" — &c. Hume's Inquiry 
concerning Human Understanding. Sect. XII. Partii. 
Note. 



80 



NON-INFINITE 



Part III. 



§ 61. " In speaking of the divisibility of body, we must 
" carefully distinguish what is in our power, from what 
" is possible in itself. In the first sense, it cannot be de- 
" nied, that such a division of body as we are capable of, 
" must be very limited." — " After having, for example, 
" divided an inch into a thousand parts, these parts are 
" so small as to escape our senses, and a farther division 
" would to us, no doubt, be impossible." Eulers Letters. 
Vol. II. Let. xi. & viii. 

§ 62. The first question, thus, falls to be answered in 
the negative. In really dividing any particle of matter, 
we are unable to go on with the process past a certain 
stage. 

§ 63. But though there is a limit beyond which we can- 
not perceive any division, can we not, at all events, con- 
ceive of divisions and subdivisions without end ? We 
shall make Mr Hume's words answer this interrogatory 
for us. 

§ 64. " The imagination * * may raise up to itself 
" an idea, of which it cannot conceive any subdivision, 
" and which cannot be diminished without a total anni- 
" hilation. When you tell me of the thousandth and ten 
" thousandth part of a grain of sand, I have a distinct 
" idea of these numbers and of their different proportions ; 
" but the images which I form in my mind to represent 
" the things themselves, are nothing different from each 
" other, nor inferior to that image, by which I represent 
" the grain of sand itself, which is supposed so vastly to 
" exceed them.f * * * Whatever we may imagine 

t We may have distinct enough, or it may be confused enough, ideas 
of any two or more numbers, or sets of numbers, and of their relative 
proportions ; say, of ten, as standing for the parts of an inch, and of the 
1,000,000th, and 1,000,000,000,000th parts of the 10th of an inch. And 
is not the mistaking these ideas for the ideas of something pertaining to 
an actual inch, a wide cause of the vain supposition, that we can frame 
images of real things as minute as the millionth and billionth part of the 
tenth of an inch? 



§§ 61-65. 



DIVISIBILITY. 



81 



" of the thing, the idea of a grain of sand is not distin- 
" guishable * * into twenty, much less into a thou- 
" sand, ten thousand, or an infinite number of different 
" ideas." — " 'Tis therefore certain, that the imagination 
44 reaches a minimum" Treatise of Human Nature. B. I. 
Part ii. Sect. l.\ 

§ 65. 'Tis true, that there are equally strong assertions 
on the other side of the question. And were the asser- 
tions simply given, were a direct appeal made to con- 
sciousness for the truth, we should be obliged to admit, 
there were no alternative for it but to let each one declare 
himself for that side of the question he beforehand was 
inclined to adopt. Even, however, in the case contem- 
plated, one view only of the matter (be this remembered) 
could be just. But there is this difference between the 
opposing assertions. Whatever Mr Hume may have 

t In quoting from the " Treatise of Human Nature," a few remarks 
are necessary. That work was the first of Hume's publications. In the 
Advertisement prefixed to the " Inquiry concerning Human Understand- 
" ing," the Sceptic says : " Most of the principles and reasonings contained 
" in this volume were published in a work in three volumes, called A 
" Treatise of Human Nature. * * * * He (the author) cast the 
" whole anew in the following pieces ; where some negligences in his 
"former reasoning, and more in the expression, are, he hopes, corrected. 

% % % % Henceforth the Author desires, that the following 
" Pieces may alone be regarded as containing his philosophical sentiments 
£C and principles." Hume himself, thus, disowned the reasonings of the 
" Treatise." No one need condemn what is repudiated by its author. 
To do so, were to challenge an enemy who confesses himself already van- 
quished. But should I be pleased with a particular passage in the 
" Treatise," what harm can there be in citing it, to convey my sentiments ? 
Sometimes there's no great necessity for speaking for ourselves when words 
that are at our hand express exactly what we have to say. What a cer- 
tain writer says of volumes, is much truer with regard to sentences. " A 
" writer often does more good by shewing the use of some of those many 
" volumes which we have already, than by offering new ones ; though 
" this be of much less advantage to his own character." Law's Preface 
to King's Origin of Evil. 



82 



NON-INFINITE 



Part III. 



done in other places, whatever inconsistency he may be 
guilty of in the affair ; the words we have but now cited 
from the " Treatise," and we, in making them the vehi- 
cles of what we had to convey, do simply appeal to what 
consciousness testifies on the subject ; and we are content 
to leave the matter there, without seeking to go any far- 
ther : While those who range themselves on the opposite 
side do not lay down their position as any thing like self- 
evident. They do not say, we can conceive divisions and 
subdivisions without end, and this fact is decisive of the 
point at issue. But they offer proof why we must be able 
to conceive the thing : Which is a very different matter. 
Could they think, that their position needed no evidence 
to support it, when they set out in search of proof? And 
if their position needed proof, it cannot altogether be a 
fact testified immediately by consciousness. The plain 
testimony of consciousness, as to what falls luithin its pro- 
per province, is the strongest and the most direct, as well 
as the most easily reached evidence we can have. 

§ 66. To refer to Euler. When he said : " However 
" far you may have already carried, in imagination, the 
" division of an inch, it is always possible to carry it still 
" farther ; and never will you be able to carry on your 
" subdivision so far, as that the last parts shall be abso- 
' ; lutely indivisible," &c."f When he said that, was he 
contented with the evidence to be had intuitively of the 
proposition which he brought forward \ Not to insist on 
this, that he gives elsewhere, as we have seen, \ a detailed 
argument to prove, that it must be always possible for us 
to carry the division forward, or on any consideration of 
that nature ; the author of the Letters produces you an 
especial reason, when he thinks the proper time is come, 
to show that by the imagination " the division of an inch" 



t See above, § 51. 



% See above, § 31, & 32. 



§§ 66-68. 



DIVISIBILITY. 



83 



may always be carried still farther. " After having, for 
" example, divided an inch into a thousand parts, * ■ * *< * 
" you have only," says he, " to look at this thousandth 
" part of an inch through a good microscope, which mag- 
" nifies, for example, a thousand times, and each particle 
" will appear as large as an inch" [does] " to the naked 
" eye; and you will be convinced of the possibility of 
" dividing each of these particles again into a thousand 
" parts : the same reasoning may always be carried for- 
" without limit and without end." Letter VIII. 

§ 67. We have little or nothing to do with Eulers 
proof, that the imagination shall never be able to carry 
on its subdivisions so far, as that the last parts shall be 
absolutely indivisible. Our attention just now is engaged 
with something else. It is only with the fact of there 
being a proof that our present business lies. Neverthe- 
less, we shall say one word upon the proof, in passing. 

§ 68. The reason why the imagination can always carry 
still farther than it has yet done, the division of an inch, 
is that a microscope which magnifies a thousand times 
will make the thousandth part of an inch appear as large 
as an inch does to the naked eye. The microscope, with 
Euler, enlarges our imaginative powers. But, in reality, 
the microscope only enlarges the rays of light that flow 
from each particle. It is not the rays, it is the rays di- 
lated, that we see by the aid of the microscope. Does 
the microscope make the thousandth part of an inch to 
be an inch ? As the microscope is, beyond contradiction, 
one of the most useful of curious instruments, it is not 
the cause of so amazing an absurdity, as the making of 
an inch out of the thousandth part of one. That instru- 
ment by no means enables us to perceive a less extension 
than we can see by the naked eye. It does not destroy, 
it does not at all affect, the minuteness of any particular 
extension. To spread a ray of light out to a greater ex- 



84 



NON-INFINITE 



Part III. 



tent than the ray filled according to our unassisted powers 
of vision ; to make a thousandth part of an inch look as 
if it were an inch ; is very far from making the least 
perceivable extension to be more extended than it was 
perceived to be : The possibility of so spreading out a 
ray of light, is the farthest thing possible from being a 
datum by help of which any natural philosopher can make 
out, that we can conceive the divisibility of matter in 
infinitum. In conceiving the division of the rays of light 
flowing from the thousandth part of an inch, as seen 
tli rough a microscope the magnifying power of which is 
a thousand times, we are, after all, only conceiving the 
division of an inch of extension. 

§ 69. We shall next refer to the procedure of another 
author who declares himself an advocate for the doctrine 
of infinite divisibility. " The parts," these are Dr ReicTs 
words, " become too small to be perceived by our senses ; 
" but we cannot believe that it [the body] becomes then 
" incapable of being farther divided, or that such division 
" would make it not to be a body. 

§ 70. " We carry on the division and subdivision in 
" our thought far beyond the reach of our senses, and we 
" can find no end to it : Nay, I think we plainly discern, 

that there can be no limit beyond which the division 
" cannot be carried. 

§ 71. " For if there be any limit to this division, one 
" of two things must necessarily happen : Either we have 
" come by division to a body which is extended, but has 
■ ; no parts, and is absolutely indivisible: or this body is 
" divisible, but as soon as it is divided, it becomes no 
64 body. Both these positions seem to me absurd, and 
" one or the other is the necessary consequence of sup- 
" posing a limit to the divisibility of matter." Dr ReicTs 
Essays. Essay II. ch. xix. 

§ 72. We may just notice, in our way, that the first of 



§§ 69-73. 



DIVISIBILITY. 



85 



the two alternatives, namely, that we come to a body 
extended but indivisible, is no consequence whatever of 
the doctrine, that in dividing any body we may come to 
bodies extended but indivisible. This alternative is the 
doctrine itself : And he who puts it does little else than 
say, If there be any limit to the division of a body, there 
is a limit to the division of a body. As for the other al- 
ternative, namely, that by dividing a certain body, the 
body becomes no body, whether or not it be any conse- 
quence of the doctrine, that in dividing a body we may 
arrive at indivisible bodies, it must be granted to be quite 
as absurd as it appeared in Dr ReioVs eyes. ReioVs se- 
cond alternative is just tantamount to Eider s first argu- 
ment. \ 

§ 73. " We carry on," says the Doctor, " the division 
" and subdivision in our thought far beyond the reach of 
" our senses, and we can find no end to it." Well, if con- 
sciousness say so, should not the matter be allowed to 
rest there % Certainly : otherwise there would be a ne- 
cessity for a proof, that the thing which consciousness 
testifies is, must be. But is the matter allowed to rest 
there, in token of consciousness saying so 1 By no means. 
" Nay," continues the Doctor, " I think we plainly dis- 
" cern, there can be no limit beyond which the division 
" cannot be carried." And then follows the proof. From 
all which, you see how ill satisfied the Doctor was with 
the unsupported testimony of consciousness, if conscious- 
ness said, we can find no end to the division and subdivi- 
tion : Although Consciousness was, as all know, a great 
favourite with him, it being exalted in his system of 
mental philosophy to the rank and dignity of a separate 
and original power of the mind. So, he did not intend, 
any more than Euler did, to appeal to Consciousness for 
a favourable answer to the question, Can we divide and 

t See above, § 31. 

R 



86 



NON-INFINITE DIVISIBILITY. Part III. 



subdivide in our thoughts, without finding any end, " in 
" wandering mazes lost." 

§ 74. There was, indeed, this reason for giving a proof 
why it is necessary that in our thoughts we find NO end 
to the division and subdivision, — that, in point of fact, in 
our thoughts we can find, can shortly find, AN end to the 
division and subdivision. 

§ 75. And, of a truth, if it had not been for the reason 
of the absence of an end to the divisions, we should never 
have heard of the absence itself of an end. (On this ac- 
count it was that we entered on the two arguments com- 
monly employed in behalf of the dogma we have opposed.) 
Had it not been, we say, for the must be, the is had never 
reached our ears. For every one has it in his power to 
satisfy himself, that in conceiving the division of a par- 
ticle of matter, the imagination will ultimately reach an 
image which cannot be lessened, which to lessen would 
be to annihilate, 



87 



PART IV. 

THE "ARGUMENT, A PRIORI, FOR THE BEING AND 
" ATTRIBUTES OF GOD," AN IRREFRAGABLE DE- 
MONSTRATION. 

§ 1. After so extensive an incursion into the territory 
of the Mathematician, and that of the Natural Philoso- 
pher ; to which we were invited by having had the dogma 
of infinity divisibility cast in our teeth ; we return with 
good will to the words of the " Refutation." We intro- 
duced, and have most fully answered, Antitheoss ques- 
tion : " I would ask * how mathematicians " (natural 
philosophers) " have always regarded the smallest par- 
" tide of matter divisible to infinity ?"f It is thus Anti- 
theos follows up the question : " Do they ever contem- 
i£ plate actual separation of parts in such cases ?"J Most 
assuredly they do. In such a case as where Natural 
Philosophers are considering the division, or even but the 
divisibility — whether to infinity, or to finity, is of no con- 
sequence — of any piece of matter; to a certainty, they 

t As our author seems to favour the doctrine affirming the infinite di- 
visibility of matter, he should have stood aloof from the smallest particle 
of " matter," which, unfortunately for him, he has fallen in with. For 
what is the smallest particle of matter ? That which cannot be diminished, 
that which cannot be divided into smaller particles. But if, with such a 
one as Antitheos, any particle of matter is so small as that it cannot be 
diminished, or divided into smaller particles, if, in other words, there is a 
smallest particle ; is the divisibility of matter in infinitum, in no danger 
of disgrace ? Yea, it runs imminent risk of being maltreated, past remedy, 
by its friends, and should cry out lustily, Murder ! my advocates are for 
putting me beyond the pale of existence. 

% Chap- VI. par. 4. 



38 



ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," 



Part IV. 



<'ast an eye on actual separation, or at all events capacity 
of actual separation, of parts. But how does our author 
reply to the question, Do mathematicians, or at least 
natural philosophers, contemplate actual separation, or 
rather capability of actual separation, of parts, when they 
are discussing- the topic whether matter be divisible in 
infinitum I " No ;" says he boldly, " but parts * * * 
" in the sense of partial consideration only." Now were 
a geometrician, or a man of natural science, who was in- 
structing a pupil in the sublime, as well as curious, doc- 
trine of the infinite divisibility of matter, proceeding to 
illustrate the first approaches to the infinity!" by directing 
the pupil's attention to the divisibility of a New-York 
pippin into two ; where is the necessity of there being 
halves "in the sense of partial consideration ONLY V 
What if the philosopher, to cut the knot for our atheist, 
(for he would have us believe it is a real Gordian one,) 
were to slice the apple through the middle, and present 
one-half to his pupil in order to being divided again, and 
eat the other himself ? As Antitheos himself has said 
elsewhere, (whether with entire propriety or not, is an- 
other question, J) " If it be of any specific body we 
" speak," a New-York pippin for instance, " we can, in 
" reality, separate one part from another." || What good 
reason, nay what specious reason, can be assigned why 
philosophers should not ever contemplate parts in any 
sense but the sense of partial consideration only, even 
parts in the sense of capability of actual separation, when 
they are regarding the divisibility, the infinite, or the 
finite, divisibility, of any piece of matter 1 Is the piece 
of matter not capable of having its parts actually sepa- 
rated from each other ? Or are the philosophers obliged 
to choose to confine themselves to partial considerations 
which are not so much as mental divisions? If this be 
t See Appendix. J See below, § 7. || Chap. VII. par. 4. 



§§ 2-3. 



IRREFRAGABLE. 



89 



so, whence the obligation ? Let us know its source, that 
we may be put into a condition to see a little farther into 
so strange a thing. 

§ 2. In giving our author's reply to his question, se- 
veral words were omitted, as the asterisks denoted. 
" Parts — ," the passage runs in this way, " as Mr Git- 
" lespie himself has it — in the sense of partial con- 
" sideration only." When Mr Gillespie speaks of parts 
in the sense of partial consideration only, he has some- 
thing in his view very different from the parts of matter, 
which all, so far as not already divided, are divisible, or 
may be conceived as divisible, from each other, which, 
therefore, are parts in another sense than by partial con- 
sideration only ; he has in his view the parts of the ex- 
tension which is of infinity, which parts, both really and 
mentally, are necessarily indivisible, and, so, are parts 
only in the sense of partial considerations or apprehen- 
sions. Of this no one who has perused the " Argument" 
can be presumed ignorant, and therefore our antitheist 
must be supposed to have known of it well when he pen- 
ned the words upon which we are animadverting. What 
judgment, then, are we to pass on Antitlieoss mode of 
speaking % Is it calculated to convey a correct representa- 
tion of matters ? In giving a misrepresentation of the 
case, can our atheist be reckoned perfectly honest ? 

§ 3. After replying to his own question, in his own 
way, Antitheospxits another interrogatory. " When they," 
the antecedent is, mathematicians, "When they," asks he, 
- speak of the hemispheres of the earth, divided either bv 
" the plane of the equator, or that passing from the me- 
4< ridian of Greenwich to the 180th. degree of longitude, — 
" are they necessarily guilty of speaking unintelligibly V 1 
By no means, answer we. But nevertheless, if mathe- 
maticians, geographers rather, speak of hemispheres of 
the earth, of hemispheres divided by an imaginary plane 



90 



« ARGUMENT, .4 PRIORI;' 



Part IV. 



which they denominate the equator, or by a plane passing 
through the first meridian and the 180th degree of lon- 
gitude, a plane every square foot of which is as ideal as 
any foot in the plane of the equator ; if, in other words, 
geographers employ the term divided in one, and that 
perhaps not the best, of its second intentions ;t they can 
as readily, and quite as rationally, speak of their being 
able to conceive the earth as divided into two by a real 
process, of the earth as being divisible in the sense of ac- 
tual separability of parts. Geographers speak, we grant, 
of halves and divisions of the earth when they mean no 
more than considerations of so much of it to the exclu- 
sion of the rest, for the time. And geographers have 
a sufficient right to use, when they please, any word in 
a technical sense, in a sense of their own, if they but 
use the same word always in the same sense. This qua- 
lification is necessary for a good reason : To be consist- 
ent with regard to the language we employ, as it is a 
great, so it is an indispensable step towards being com- 
pletely intelligible. Geographers, we repeat, talk of di- 
visions, when they do not mean divisions strictly speak- 
ing ; but then they can also talk, to good purpose it may 
be, of divisions in the proper sense of the term. 

§ 4. To render the distinction between geographical 
divisions and true and real divisions yet plainer, by a fa- 
miliar illustration. Let a plane, called, if you choose, a 
geographical plane, about six feet long and some two feet 
deep, and of no breadth, be passed through the middle of 
a living human body. And indeed — if this consideration 

t We -would recommend to Afititheos 's attention, first and last, (and 
our recommendation he may turn, if he likes, to some advantage, for the 
future,) a caution given by a very eminent Logician. " The utmost care 
" is requisite," in these words the present Archbishop of Dublin warns us, 
" to avoid confounding together, either the first and second intentions, or 
" the different second intentions with each other." See Wliately's Elements 
of Logic. Book III. § 10. (Ed. 6th.) 



4-5. 



IRREFRAGABLE. 



91 



will enable one to transmit the plane more easily — ana- 
tomists and physiologists are accustomed to treat of the 
halves of the human frame, when they tell us that as a 
whole it is symmetrical, the one-half forming in the main 
a counterpart to the other. What if we were to desig- 
nate the transmission a dividing 1 Would he who was 
subjected to the act eat his next meal at all the worse 
for it ? Would he breathe less, or walk less, or sleep less ? 
Would any function be destroyed, or impaired in the 
smallest ? That gives us as an idea of the geographical 
mode of dividing. But were one to turn to division of 
the right sort, and threaten in good earnest to divide in 
a real manner a living man into halves ; the well-founded 
and salutary laws of the land would be apt to interfere, 
and shew how wide they regard the difference to be be- 
tween a merely geographical method of dividing any ob- 
long solid, and a mode of dividing, at least somewhat 
similar to that which, so far down, was practised by num- 
bers of our heavy-handed dragoons when they were last 
in the Netherlands. 

§ 5. Proper divisions, in short, are toto ccelo different 
from geographical ones. Geographical divisions are in- 
deed partial considerations. But the grand distinction 
(let us not by any means lose sight of it) between geo- 
graphical partial considerations and our partial consider- 
ations of infinite extension, lies in this, that whereas we 
can make the ordinary subjects of the former kind of con- 
siderations undergo divisions in our thoughts after ano- 
ther sort than that effected by bare partial apprehension ; 
it is quite out of our power to subject the parts of that 
extension which is of infinity to any other divisions by the 
mind than such as we denote by partial apprehensions or 
considerations. It is with no propriety, as I have fre- 
quently observed, that we bestow the name of division 
upon a mere partial apprehension. 



92 



« ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," 



Part IV. 



§ 6. If geographers are not guilty of speaking unin- 
telligibly when they say, that the equator divides the 
globe into the northern and southern hemispheres, &c, 
" How is it," demands our atheist, " that extension is ne- 
" cessarily indivisible 1 ?" I really do not know. I never 
pretended to be able to tell why extension is necessarily 
indivisible. I never said even so much as that it was so. 
The " Argument" says no more than that " Infinity of 
" Extension is necessarily indivisible." And really one 
would think, that any extension, unless it compose part 
of the extension which is infinite, is divisible to all intents 
and purposes, so far from being necessarily indivisible. 
If the author of the " Refutation" should incline to urge, 
that by " extension" he meant infinity of extension, when 
he asked how it is that extension is necessarily indivisi- 
ble, then we would refer him, for an answer to his ques- 
tion, to Part II. § 27., and to his own comment on the 
proof there occurring, as the said comment is to be met 
in the 37th section of the same Part.t Nay, demon- 
stration apart, is it not a truth immediately self-evident, 
that infinity of extension, or space, is necessarily indivisi- 
ble? Let Antitheos answer this question. "I grant," 
admits he, " that we may conceive of an absolute sepa- 
" ration," and therefore separability, " of substance gene- 
" rally, which ive cannot do in the case of extension. "J 
Here by " extension" he means infinity of extension, or 
space. Else, where the sense of the antithesis between 
"substance" and "extension?" Not to say that the 
context binds " extension" to that meaning. We might 
have allowed Mr Locke to reply to that question ; who, 
whenever he has informed us what division implies, lays 
it down as a truth intuitively perceivable, not by deduc- 
tion necessary, that pure space is indivisible even so much 
as in thought. Pure space, with him, is the extension 



t Gonsider, also, § 15, &c. below. 



| Chap. VII. par. 4. 



§§ 6-8. 



IRREFRAGABLE. 



93 



distinct from the extension of matter, is the extension 
which is of infinity.t 

§ 7. Antitheos proceeds: "It may be said, perhaps, 
" that although matter is, mentally, easy enough to di- 
vide" Doubtless one would think it is easy enough to 

divide matter mentally. But by the bye, we must not 
forget, that 'tis easy enough to divide much that falls 
under the description of matter otherwise than only by 
the mind. Our atheist has observed (as we noticed be- 
fore :) 6 ' If it be of any specific body we speak, we can, in 
" reality, separate" or divide ;; one part from another." 
Now this is going even farther than we feel disposed to 
go. Is the Dog-star a specific body ? It will probably 
be allowed by Antitheos that it is so, as no present ob- 
ject is to be attained by a denial, — at least, no object 
at all worth the cost of a shamefully obvious falsehood. 
Can we separate or divide one part of the Dog-star from 
another, in reality ? Ah, no. Sirius is too distant, and 
too big, for us to split it into pieces. To sum up what 
we have advanced : If it be of any specific body we 
speak, we can in reality, or, if not in reality, at least in 
imagination, divide the parts from each other. — But 
possibly, or probably, Antitheos, by " any specific body," 
meant any specific body upon this earth? If so, — let 
him take out a patent for his discovery, that men ;£ can, 
in reality," or by manual instrumentality, " separate one 
" part from another." 

§ 8. Our author has often reasons for his forms of ex- 
pressions. And he happens to have an excellent reason 
for declaring, that it is easy enough to divide matter 
mentally. The reason makes its appearance in a subse- 
quent chapter. We may gather what it is from the 
following assertion. " That matter is divisible, (on a 
" certain and special construction of terms,) no one will 

f See Part II. § 29, & 41. 



94 



« ARGUMENT, A PRIORI, 



Part IV. 



" deny ; but that it is absolutely so, is not true."| What 
that certain and special construction of the term divisible 
is, when we say with truth, matter is divisible, we may 
learn from words occurring in the same paragraph. "We 
"can divide substance," Antitheos informs us, "by ab- 
straction;" that is, I humbly apprehend, by a partial 
consideration, which happens to be no true division at 
all. But we can do more than divide substance by ab- 
straction. For again : " We may conceive of an absolute 
i; separation," and, a fortiori, separability or divisibility, 
" of substance generally. "if Words which richly deserve 
to be weighed most attentively. With our antitheist, 
substance and matter mutually exhaust each other, that 
not being admitted, by him, into the rank of substance 
which is not material. What that certain and spe- 
cial construction is, we may learn also, may we not? 
from the words which, in our regular progress, we are 
examining — " Matter is, mentally, easy enough to divide." 
According to our atheist, then, the reason why it is easy 
enough to divide matter mentally is, that it is difficult 
enough, indeed altogether impossible — not for us only, 
but — for any power, or (if Antitheos would prefer another 
word) for any chance or accident, absolutely to divide 
matter, at least matter " generally." And, in truth, it 
must be confessed, that the position, Matter " generally" 
is divisible only mentally, is a good consequence from 
the position, Matter "generally" is divisible, but is not 
divisible absolutely : a good consequence, at all events, 
on the supposition, (the only one possible, if we would 
preserve Antitheos's character for never being without 
a meaning,) that " absolutely" as contradistinguished 
from " mentally," means not mentally. If matter gene- 
rally is divisible at all, and be not divisible out of the 
mind, it is wonderfully probable, that it is divisible in 



t Chap. VII. par 4. 



| Above, § 6. 



§§ 3-9. 



IRREFRAGABLE. 



05 



the mind. Our atheist's reason, in fine, may be admitted, 
with considerable safety, to be a good reason, if it con- 
stitute a good and a true position in itself. But is it 
true, that matter generally, or, as a whole — for this, I 
conceive, is what Antiiheos means when he says, " We 
" may conceive of an absolute separation of substance" or 
matter "generally" — Is it true, that matter as a whole 
is not divisible absolutely, or out of the mind ? 

§ 9. What if absolute divisibility (we say not absolute 
division — far from it — ) follows from the admission, for- 
tunately so liberally furnished by our author, of mental 
divisibility? If we can divide all that is matter by a 
mental process, how can any one make it appear, it is 
impossible in the nature of things that all matter should 
be divided by a real process ? Can we, in this case, infer 
the existence of an impossibility outwardly, from the 
existence of a possibility inwardly? an impossibility in 
things, from a possibility in our conceptions regarding 
the things ? Nay, what criterion of possibility, and im- 
possibility too, can we have but that which arises from 
our conceptions ?t What we conceive to be possible, is 
possible. Which, indeed, is virtually saying nothing 
more than this, What we conceive to be possible, is 
possible to us. And this proposition, in its turn, may be 
transmuted into another, even into this most undeniable, 
yet important proposition, Whatever we conceive to be 
possible, we really do conceive to be possible. We con- 
ceive a thing to be possible in reality : We judge a thing 
to be possible in reality : The thing is possible in reality : 
What are these but different ways of setting forth the 
same position? The grand element in the affair, in each 
of the three expressions, is, the conception of real pos- 
sibility. Whatever, then, we clearly conceive to be pos- 

t " We can judge," says Archbishop King, " of things no otherwise 
" than from onr conceptions." Origin of Evil. Chap. I. Sect. ii. & 2. 



96 



" ARGUMENT, A PRIORI;' 



Part IV. 



sible in reality, is possible in reality. | And therefore, 
as we do (having Antitheos's leave) clearly conceive 
matter as a whole to be susceptible of division absolutely, 
or in reality, we cannot be wrong in affirming, that mat- 
ter as a whole is capable of being divided absolutely, in 
reality, as in itself. 

§ 10. So much as to that divisibility which matter is 
subject to. A topic upon which our author (in his 
seventh chapter, as well as in his sixth,) has gone wrong 
altogether, confounding as he does, in grand style, divi- 
sibility with division (things usually the same with Anti- 
theos,\) separability with separation, the conception of a 
vacuum with the existence of a vacuum externally, and 
drawing inferences from these indifferently, sometimes to 
his own inexpressible comfort and satisfaction, and some- 
times, and as frequently, at the expense of landing him- 
self, and us, were we not sufficiently reluctant to let him 
be our conductor whithersoever he would, amidst the 
turnings and windings of a worse than Cretan labyrinth. 

t Perhaps Hume never wrote a better passage than the following, 
whether we regard the acuteness or the cogency of the reasoning. 
" Whatever can be conceived by a clear and distinct idea, necessarily im- 
" plies the possibility of existence ; and he who pretends to prove the 
" impossibility of its existence by any arguments derived from the clear 
if idea, in reality asserts that we have no clear idea of it, because we have 
" a clear idea. 'Tis in vain to search for a contradiction in any thing 
" that is distinctly conceived by the mind. Did it imply any contradic- 
" tion, 'tis impossible it could ever be conceived." Treatise of Human 
Nature. B. 1. Part ii.,Sect. 4. See the second note to § 64, Part III. 
It will be observed, that the author of the Treatise goes further than we 
have gone. We aver, Whatever we conceive to be possible, is possible : 
He avers, Whatever we conceive, is possible. But perhaps the latter 
maxim differs very slightly at bottom from the other. The learned Cud- 
worth says: " Whatsoever is possible, that is, whatsoever is conceivable 
« ■* * j the very essence of possibility being no other than concep- 
tibility. ; ' True Intellectual System of the Universe. Book I. ch. v. 
Birch's Edit. Page 647. — As Hume's is the greater, ours the less, if his 
maxim be true, ours must therefore be so too. 

% See Part II. § 32. 



§§ 10-11. 



IRREFRAGABLE. 



97 



§11. At length we shall permit our atheist to termi- 
nate the sentence in the middle of which we broke in, 
hoping as we do that for what of rudeness there may 
have been in the interruption, the weightiness of that 
which we had to deliver will be accepted as an apology. 
" It may be said, perhaps, that although matter is, men- 
44 tally, easy enough to divide, it is impossible to apply 
"the same process to extension"^ For my part, I see 
no impossibility in the case ; unless by " extension" be 
meant the extension, or part of the extension, which is 
infinite. And indeed we may opine with much proba- 
bility, that such extension was that which was in Anii- 
theos's view ; for the very next sentence uses " space' 
to stand for the " extension" of its predecessor. " But is 
" not the space occupied by the earth, — or say, its useful 
44 little representative, a twelve or a twenty-inch globe, — 
44 as easily conceived to be divisible" or perhaps divided 
44 by a mathematical plane, as the globe itself, which is 
"not really but only mentally divided?" In answer to 
which question : — 1. Why is the globe, the little globe, or 

The great globe itself, 
44 not really * divided ?" Not because it is not really divi- 
sible. For that it is really or in the nature of things divisi- 
ble, is sufficiently proved by our being able to conceive the 
thing possible. J — 2. As to whether the space occupied by 

The great globe itself, 
Yea all which it inherit, 

or by a representative of it twelve inches, or it may be 
twenty inches, in diameter, (it is right to be exact with 
an admeasurement ;) I say, as to whether that space can 
be conceived divided, or even, if you please, but divisible, 
by a mathematical plane : let us ask, What is a mathe- 
matical plane \ Our author informs us correctly ; though 
he has encumbered his information with a good deal of 

t Parag. 5. \ See above, § 9. 



98 



" ARGUMENT, A PRIORI;' 



Part IV. 



inanity. "A mathematical point," he advances to the 
information thus, " has no dimensions,! because whatever 
" possesses dimensions must possess figure, and that which 
" has figure cannot be a point." That which has figure 
cannot be a point. But why I The " Refutation" sup- 
plies not the reason. So that, as to why a point has no 
figure or dimensions, we are left within a little of where 
we began. Our author had spoken better, if he had 
simply said, A mathematical point has no dimensions, 
because that which has no dimensions is the definition 
given by mathematicians of a point. " In like manner." 
he goes on, " a plane cannot have thickness, since what- 
" ever is of the smallest thickness is not a plane but a 
• ; solid. "J Could he not just have said, A plane is de- 
fined to be a surface having length and breadth but no 
thickness : as that which has the three dimensions is 
defined to be a solid 1 — " A plane," then, " cannot have 
thickness :" " whatever is of the smallest" or of any 
- thickness is not a plane." How, then, can we con- 
ceive the space Antitheos speaks of, or indeed any space 
whatever, divided, or divisible, by a mathematical plane I 
A division by a mathematical plane is no division at all. 
That which divides matter, or space, or any thing our 
atheist likes, must have some thickness, tho' the thick- 
ness should be " of the smallest." But as touching this, 
an ample sufficiency has been already set before the 
reader. |] — In fine, the space filled by the earth, or its 
" little representative," is not as easily conceived to be 
divided, or divisible, as the great globe, or any small 
one, can be conceived to be divided, or divisible. For 
that space cannot be conceived to be divided or divisible 
at all. 



t Why discard magnitude, the usual word ? 
I Parag. 5. 

|] See Part II. § 26, and note— § 29— Part III. § 12, &c. 



§§ H-13. 



IRREFRAGABLE. 



99 



§ 12. " In dividing space by abstraction," or by a par- 
tial consideration, " therefore, there is no necessity, as 
" our author would have us believe, of falling into the 
" absurdity of space divided by actual separation of the 
"parts, leaving no space between them."t As our 
author would have us believe, says Antiiheos. Now the 
author alluded to would have no one believe any thing 
by the sixtieth part of a degree so absurd. How could, 
and where did, the author of the " Argument," in treat- 
ing of partial considerations of infinite extension, expan- 
sion, space, which he, after the example of Mr Locke, 
allows to be quite possible ; how could he, and where 
did he, in granting that we may for a time consider so 
much space to the exclusion, as it were, of the rest, fall 
into the "absurdity" (word well chosen) of supposing 
space divided by actual separation of parts, luhen the very 
thing which, with all his might, he demonstrates to be 
impossible, is this very thing, to-wit, that the parts of 
infinite extension, or space, are susceptible of actual 
separation ? 

§ 13. Our atheist concludes what he has to urge in op- 
position to Proposition II. in this way. " If Mr Gillespie's 
"indivisibility be understood in an abstract sense, his 
" proposition is not true ; if, in reference to actual expe- 
" riment, he may be applauded for having recourse to 
"inductive instead of a priori reasoning, but he need 
"not so soon have neglected the principles upon which 
"he started, without intimating some ground for the 
" change." % After what has been so fully advanced in 
Part II. the reader needs no guide to lead him through 
this maze. Mr Gillespie recognises but one kind of 
proper divisibility, (and who ever heard of any other ?) 
and has demonstrated, that infinity of extension is not 
divisible, in the proper sense of the word. Therefore, 
" his proposition is * true." 

t Parag. 5. % Parag. 6. 



100 



« ARGUMENT, A PRIORI;' 



Part IV. 



§ 14. And that we have great authority to vouch for 
the validity of Mr Gillespie s demonstration, even the 

AUTHORITY OF OUR ATHEIST HIMSELF, shall now be 

evinced past the possibility of room for doubt. 

§ 15. " In the discussion of his second proposition," 
says Antitheos, as before we heard,t " the author makes 
" manifest the absurdity of supposing space really divisi- 
" ble, since that would be to suppose the parts separated 
" without having any space between them." We agree 
with Antitheos, that the author of the "Argument" 
makes manifest the absurdity of supposing space, or 
rather " infinity of extension," which is all one with in- 
finity of space, I to be really divisible ; but we can never 
grant, that it is absurd to suppose space is really divisible 
for the reason which Antitheos assigns. The reason given 
by this gentleman why there is absurdity in supposing 
space really divisible is this, to suppose space really di- 
visible would be to suppose the parts separated without 
having any space between them. Now, to say that to 
suppose space really divisible is to suppose the parts 
thereof separated, or divided, is to confound two things 
wnich are entirely different, divisibility and division. 
We have seen that our atheist charges Mr Gillespie with 
confounding these two distinct things, || and here Anti- 
theos exposes why he was so ready to charge such a pro- 
cedure on another : Antitheos confounds the two things 
himself. The cloven foot has made its appearance. 

§ 16. Our author has quite reversed matters. He who 
supposes, if any one can suppose, (as it is certain no one 
can,) that the parts of space are separated, or divided, 
presupposes the separability, or divisibility, of the parts. 
But he who supposes (and the person who supposes must 
just be nobody at all) the divisibility of space, by no 

t See Part II. § 37, and § 42. 

X See Part III. § 17. |] See Part II. § 32, and § 34. 



§§ 14-18. 



IRREFRAGABLE. 



101 



means thereby supposes, either first or last, the division 
of space. 

§ 17. In a word, we agree with our atheist as to the 
fact, we differ from him as to the reason of the fact, that 
under the second Proposition of the " Argument" is made 
manifest the absurdity of supposing f infinite extension, 
or space, to be divisible. Had Antitheos said that Pro- 
position II. manifests the absurdity of supposing space 
really divisible, since to suppose it really divisible is to 
suppose its parts separable, we should haA r e agreed with 
him as to the reason of the fact too : so far at least as 
the absurdity of the supposition, that the parts of space 
are separable, is a reason of the absurdity of the supposi- 
tion, that space is really divisible : for, in truth, the sup- 
positions look as if they were no more than barely tanta- 
mount to each other. 

§ 18. We shall turn our antitheist's admission on all 
sides, and make every conceivable supposition, to shew 
that viewing the admission in what light one pleases, it 
is all that our hearts could wish. Should the author of 
the " Refutation" be inclined to allege, that by " divisible" 
he meant divided, never intending to admit more than 
that the " Argument" had manifested the absurdity of 
supposing that space is really divided ; then, as we shall 
leave him no door to creep out by, away from us, we have 
these two considerations to urge. They will be found 

t We use the words supposing or suppose, here and elsewhere, in the 
same sense as that in which Mathematicians speak, when, in a proper 
reductio per impossibile ad absurdum, they ask us to draw an absurd 
consequence from a supposition which is to be set aside. The suppo- 
sition in one sense, and that one the best of senses, is really impossible. 
We cannot clearly conceive the truth of it to be a possible thing, and 
this even before the contrary to it is established in due geometrical style. 
But the case is argued as if the impossible supposition were conceived 
to be true. We may deduce an inference from a supposition which we 
can make only relatively, as we may say. 

S 



102 



« ARGUMENT, A PRIORI, 



Part IV. 



adamantine impediments to an escape. 1. The first con- 
sideration will have respect to the good faith in which an 
allegation of that description could be offered. Antitheos 
is speaking in relation to the " second proposition," and 
the second Proposition, as it occurs in the " Argument" 
runs thus: " Infinity of Extension" (which is the same 
as Space) " is necessarily indivisible." It does not run 
this way : Infinity of Extension is really undivided. But 
to pass over the faith in which such an allegation would 
need to be made, as a circumstance of trifling moment, we 
have to say, that the thing alleged, were it alleged, to be 
meant by our antitheist, would be altogether as accept- 
able as the sign of his meaning. For 2. If Mr Gillespie 
manifested no more than, or rather so much as, the absur- 
dity of supposing that space is really divided, if, in other 
words, he demonstrated that space is really not divided, how 
could he have done so but by demonstrating that space 
cannot be really divided ? We demonstrate that a thing is 
not, only by proving that it cannot be. And if Mr Gil- 
lespie demonstrated that space cannot be really divided, 
he must have demonstrated that space is really indivi- 
sible. For to say, that space cannot be divided, and to 
say, that it is indivisible, are one and the same. So that 
if Mr Gillespie demonstrated that space is really not di- 
vided, he has demonstrated that space is really indivisible. 
And therefore even if " divisible" in the passage in 
question, be to stand for divided, and our atheist be to 
be held as admitting nothing more than that Proposi- 
tion II. manifests the absurdity of supposing that space is 
really divided ; we have, contained virtually in an admis- 
sion to that effect, his authority for it that Mr Gillespie 
has demonstrated the real indivisibility of space. 

§ 19. To conclude this part of the subject, let the ad- 
mission of our antitheist be regarded in any sense one 
likes, to a certainty we have, as we affirmed, his autho- 



S§ 19-21. 



IRREFRAGABLE. 



103 



rity to vouch for the validity of the demonstration, that 
infinity of extension, or space, is indivisible. 

§ 20. And since the author of the " Refutation" has 
passed his word in sincerity for the truth of Proposition 
II., let us rest contented, without bearing him any grudge 
for what besides may have fallen from his pen. What 
matters it, though he cried out, at the first glimpse of the 
affair, " unqualified assent * cannot be accorded to 
" proposition the second," if, on second thoughts, (second 
thoughts are better than first,) he saw a sufficient reason 
for declaring, that his opponent " makes manifest the ab- 
surdity "of supposing space really divisible," his opponent's 
highest aim being to demonstrate that space, infinite space, 
is really indivisible ? Whatever difficulties Antitheos as- 
serted to be in the way ; — if ultimately he proclaims that 
the road is thoroughly clear, we may know he was only 
making as if he would cause us a little, a very unneces- 
sary, affrightment. However it comes about that the 
second Proposition is true, it suffices that it is so. 

§ 21. We can now proceed to judge in a certain affair, 
with capital authority at our elbow for the decision we 
shall pronounce. At the beginning of Chapter VII. An- 
titheos says : " The fourth proposition * * is found- 
" ed upon the baseless fabric of extension" (he should 
have said, " infinity of extension") " being indivisible," 
&c. ; and in the fifth paragraph of Chapter VI. he had 
more than merely hinted, that Proposition II. consti- 
tutes a gratuitous fallacy. Whether the necessary in- 
divisibility of infinite extension be a baseless fabric, 
whether the declaration that " infinity of extension is 
" necessarily indivisible," be a gratuitous fallacy, admits 
not now of the possibility of a doubt. We have had our 
atheist's word for it, that the "Argument" has demon- 
strated, infinity of extension is really indivisible, and what 
more could be necessary to show that the indivisibility of 



104 « ARGUMENT, A PIlIORi; 1 Part IV. 

infinite extension is no " baseless fabric" ? that the posi- 
tion which affirms infinity of extension to be necessarily 
indivisible, is never to be reckoned in the number of 
" gratuitous fallacies?" 

§ 22. So far, then, as we have gone yet, all is well. " It 
; ' would be absurd in the extreme to deny" Proposition I. 
And, in spite of himself, Antitheos has accorded " the 
" same unqualified assent" to Proposition II. 

§ 23. The words which next occur in the " Refutation" 
bring us to a new subject. " A corollary is here intro- 
" duced, asserting the immoveability of extension" \ 
There happens to be no corollary of the kind in the 
" Argument." A Corollary there is indeed. Eut it is in 
the following terms. {; Corollary from Proposition II. 
' ; Infinity of Extension is necessarily immoveable.'" A 
matter this, widely different from what Antitheos repre- 
sents it to be. " It is true," proceeds he, " that either 
" finity or infinity of extension can never be supposed 
" capable of motion." Bare finity of extension is not 
capable of motion ; but then every thing of finity, of finity 
only, in extension, is so. " Space cannot," continues our 
atheist, " be carried out of itself." Very true. That is 
equivalent, so far as it goes, to what the Corollary de- 
clares. " Nor," adds he, by way of illustration, " can those 
" parts of it occupied by Mont Blanc, for example, and 
" the Peak of Teneriffe, ever be imagined to change 
" places." Precisely so. But the Mountain and the Peak, 
themselves, may be imagined to change places. And the 
distinction well deserves observation. " To the truth of 
" what is here maintained, therefore," concludes he, " we 
" must give unreserved assent, independent of its nominal 
" connection with false doctrine immediately going be- 
u fore."f The " false doctrine" is that which sets forth 
that " Infinity of Extension is necessarily indivisible." 
t Chap. VI. par, 7. 



22-25. 



IRREFRAGABLE. 



105 



That false doctrine we have witnessed the author of the 
" Refutation" transforming into a perfectly true one.t 
The £J connection," which is called a " nominal" connec- 
tion, (for what reason it is easier to search than to find.) 
is established, under the " Corollary," in the following- 
manner. " Infinity of Extension is necessarily immove- 
" able. That is, its parts are necessarily immoveable 
" among themselves. For, motion of parts supposes, of 
" necessity, separation of the parts. He who does not 
" see that motion of parts supposes, of necessity, separa- 
" tion of the parts, need never be expected to see that 
" because every A is equal to B, therefore some B is equal 

to A. And Infinity of Extension being necessarily in- 
M capable of separation, is, therefore, necessarily immove- 
" able, that is, its parts are necessarily immoveable among 
ft themselves." 

§ 24. The connection we speak of is set forth by Mr 
Locke in these words. " The parts of pure space are 
" immoveable, which folloius from their inseparability ; 
" motion being nothing but change of distance between 
" any two things : but this cannot be between parts 
- that are inseparable; which, therefore, must needs be at 
" perpetual rest one amongst another." Essay B. II. ch. 
xiii. § 14. 

§ 25. We were finding some fault in our author's con- 
clusion, but since, according to it, " unreserved assent" 
" must" be given to the truth maintained in the Corol- 
lary, we need, after all, have no quarrel with any thing 
that accompanies the unconditional admission. 



f See above, § 15, &c. 



106 



PART V. 

THE " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI, FOR THE BEING AND 
"ATTRIBUTES OF GOD/' AN IRREFRAGABLE DE- 
MONSTRATION. 

§ 1. " But we now come," such are the words which 
follow those last quoted from the e< Refutation," " But we 
" now come to a proposition which may be said to carry 
■• with it all the strength, if it has any, as well as the 
" weakness, of Mr Gillespie's 6 Argument. '"f 'Tis well 
that Antitheos attaches some importance to the Propo- 
sition he has now in his eye ; for the preceding one wa< 
treated as if it were " of no great consequence." The 
Proposition which, as our author will have it, has all 
the strength, or the weakness, of the " Argument," " is," 
that gentleman correctly remarks, " the third in number, 
" and announces that ' There is necessarily A Being of 
" Infinity of Extension.'" t 

§ 2. " If we had not already seen" continues Antitheos, 
" that the author's reasoning leads us to conclude that 
" his Being is to be regarded as something substantial" — 
Where did we see what, in his own sense of it, Antitheos 
says we have seen ? Nowhere else but in the fourth para- 
graph of Chapter V., where we saw it stated (the state- 
ment being according to truth) that Mr Gillespie's ' sub- 
' sequent reasoning' ' makes intelligence, &c. part of his 
argument ; ' and where we saw our atheist lay down a de- 
termination to hold Mr Gillespie as making intelligence. 
&c. part of his argument ab ovo usque ad mala — ' uni- 
formly.'! We promised to run to the rescue whenever 
t Chap. VI. par. 8. J See Part II. § 4. 



S§ 3-5. " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI;' IRREFRAGABLE. 107 



Antitheos was detected turning matters upside down, and 
this is the first opportunity we haye had of making good 
our promise. We should not regret if we never had a 
second. But things do not always fall out according to 
one's wishes. And our wishes in this respect, run a 
great chance of being disappointed : Antitheos threatened 
us with uniformity as touching the affair of putting tilings 
topsy-turvy. 

§ 3. So much as to where Antitheos and his reader had 
seen that Mr Gillespie's reasoning leads to the conclusion, 
that his Being is substantial, in our antitheist's sense of 
" substantial," as it occurs in the passage we are criti- 
cising. As it occurs in that passage, we say ; For our 
author is not always consistent in his procedure, he be- 
ing accustomed to use substantial, and its cognate, sub*- 
stance, in more senses than one. For example, at one 
time, " substance," with him, is that only which " pos- 
" sesses attraction," which " is observed under a thousand 
iJ varieties of figure, density, colour, motion, taste, odour. 

combustion, crystallization, &c." which is capable of 
being " weighed," and " analyzed," and of having " its 
" elements reduced to gas."t While, in the case before 
us, " something substantial," with our atheist, stands for 
nothing more than " an agent of any kind — something 
" possessing power — something that acts" — something 
that has " intelligence, and power, and freedom of 
" agency."; J Nothing more: For there is no mention of 
attraction, figure, density, colour, motion, taste, odour, 
combustion, crystallization, &c. weight, gaseousness, &c. 
as among the essential acts, properties, or capacities, of 
that which is substantial. 

§ 4. No doubt, Antitheos would say, were the question 
put to him, that every thing which has " intelligence, and 

t See Part XII. § 1, 4. 

X Compare Chap. VI. par. 9 ; with Chap. V. par. 4. 



108 



« ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," 



Part V. 



" power, and freedom of agency," can attract and be at- 
tracted, has figure, density, would have colour if exposed 
to the rays of the sun, moves, may be supposed to have 
a certain taste, and a certain smell, may be set on fire, 
may be crystallized, and weighed, and analyzed, and re- 
duced to elementary gases. Such, however, is not the 
matter for consideration here. That composes the ques- 
tion respecting local conjunction, the question as to what 
qualities are inseparably associated in the same subject. 
It may be, or it may not be true, that intelligence, and 
power, and freeness, are never to be found but in a sub- 
ject having figure, and density, and colour, and motion, 
and ta>te. and odour, &c. &c. ; but whether that be true, 
or whether it be false, concerns us not at present. On 
the contrary, the following are the questions which arise 
out of our atheist's procedure, as we have noticed it. I> 
that which possesses attraction, &c. &c. a substance ; a 
Substance because it has the capacity of attracting, and of 
being attracted ? And again : Is that which has intelli- 
gence, &c. to be pronounced a substance ; to be pro- 
nounced a substance just because it has the property of 
intelligence ? Is that which is of intelligence, therefore to 
be denominated a substance ; without our waiting to de- 
termine the point as to how many properties or qualities 
must keep company with intelligence as mutual occupiers 
of the subject of inhesion ? Which Antitheos decides in 
the affirmative. t 

§ 5. When I observed, our author would hold, that 
everything having intelligence, &c, can attract, and has 
figure, density, &c. &c. &c, I bore in mind what he in one 
place says : "It (extension) is also conceivable as one of 
■'the properties, if not the only indispensable property 
- of matter."J By which if the unwary reader should 



t See preceding section. 



t Chap. VIII. par. 3. 



IRREFRAGABLE. 



109 



understand that Antitheos means to make even " a very 
" clever approach" (to employ our authors racy Ian- 
guagef) to the s Cartesian doctrine, that extension is the 
essence, itself, of matter, J the reader would be much mis- 
taken indeed. What our atheist means, in spite of his 
own words, amounts only to this : that whereas a parti- 
cular piece of matter may be without some one quality 
which some other piece has ; for instance, the book called 
" Refutation" may well be supposed to be without that 
weight which even one solid Argument would impart to 
it ; that whereas, in fine, each of the other properties ever 
found in matter may be absent, one after another, from a 
thing, and matter yet remain behind : we cannot take 
away all extension, without taking away all matter too. 
The sentence itself from which those words are taken, 
commences thus : " Although extension may be conceived 
" of as a pure abstraction ;" that is, I fancy, as existing 
separately, or by itself ; as in the case of pure space. From 
which clause we see how very far Antitheos was from go- 
ing into the doctrine of Des Cartes. — After all, it must 
perhaps be granted, that it is no easy task to reconcile the 
beginning and end of this sentence : " Although extension 
" may be conceived of as a pure abstraction, it is also 
" conceivable as one of the properties, if not the only in- 
" dispensable property of matter." If extension can, and 
our antitheist says it can, exist by itself, without thereby 
being matter, how can extension make any approach, un- 
less a stupid one, to being the only indispensable property 
of matter? In short, there is " a very clever approach" 
to a contradiction. The end of the sentence and the be- 
ginning can never exist together in perfect harmony ; the 
sooner, therefore, they separate for ever, the better. — 
We have only farther to remark, that tho' in this pas- 

t Last Chapter, ninth paragraph. 
\ See Part III. § 38. 

* T 



110 



« ARGUMENT, A PRIORI;' 



Part V. 



sage Antitheos speaks of extension as perhaps being the 
only indispensable property of matter, yet the whole scope 
of his book, where it at all bears on the topic of what mat- 
ter is, runs counter to that sentiment. The exception to 
the general strain is a solitary one. 

§ 6. But not only have we " already seen" in the " Re- 
" futation," that Mr Gillespie's reasoning leads to the 
conclusion that his Being is " something substantial" but, 
the author of that production throws out, we may see the 
same thing in a different quarter altogether. " If," says 
he, " we refer to the third Division of his Introduction, 
" we find him contending that the necessary Being must 
4 ' be of the character now ascribed to that subject. At 
" the twenty-third section" — &c. &c.f Now what is this 
that we have here ? The " Argument, a priori, for the 
; ' Being and Attributes of God," "professes to demonstrate 
" that matter by the most rigid ratiocination. "J To be 
complete in itself, is one of the necessary prerequisites of 
a demonstration. The work alluded to, accordingly, 
never refers to the " Introduction" — Which is so dis- 
tinct from the " Argument" that this might have received 
— and may yet receive, (for the special benefit of refuta- 
tion-makers, now that Antitheos has put into my head 
the propriety of letting it receive, — ) publication sepa- 
rately, and be, notwithstanding, a finished treatise, want- 
ing nothing necessary in order to the presence of the most 
perfect unity of execution. || The " Introduction," in a 
word, is in no respect any part of that which the Society 
of Atheists which fixed on our author as its champion, 
was challenged to answer and refute. Doubtless, I might 

t Chap. VI. par. 9. % See Preface hereto. 

j] The " Argument" has actually received " publication separately :" 
It has gone forth without an Introduction. The pieces which, in the for- 
mer edition, went under the name of " Introduction," appear, in this 
volume, as so many distinct treatises. See § 7 of the text. 



§§ 6-7. 



IRREFRAGABLE. 



Ill 



have challenged that Society, had I liked, to overturn the 
reasonings which compose the three Divisions of the " In- 
" troduction." And it may be noticed, that no proof has 
been adduced to evidence that, if it had been so chal- 
lenged, it could, by means of this champion, or of any 
champion, have successfully overturned any of those rea- 
sonings. But as the case is, the Society was challenged 
to do no more — and no less — than answer and refute the 
reasonings contained in the " Argument a priori" &c.f 
§ 7. To enable our readers, the more perfectly to un- 
derstand with what grace Antitheos in his " Refutation" 
of the " Argument, a priori" &c, brings in quotations 
from the " Introduction," to find of what character the 
" Argument " makes the necessary Being it discourses of 
to be ; we shall enumerate the topics of which the " In- 
" troduction" consists. " Division I. An Inquiry into 
" the Defects of mere a posteriori Arguments, for the be- 
" ing of A Deity. Chapter I. Of the Argument from 
" Experience. Chapter II. Of the Argument from Mi- 
" racles." " Division II. A Review of Dr Samuel 
" Clarice's Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of 
4i God." " Division III. Necessary existence implies in- 
" finite extension." The first section of which Division 
commences thus : " SUPPOSING, that there is a necessarily 
" existing substance, the intelligent cause of all things." 
Division III., so far from being taken up in an attempt 
to do aught towards proving a necessarily existing sub- 
stance, the intelligent cause of all things, sets out with 
the express supposition that there is such ; and is 
wholly employed in endeavouring to deduce a certain con- 
sequence from that supposition. In fine, the contents of 
the Division we speak of, are truly summed up in what 
may be drawn from its title : If necessary existence be 
supposed, then that is supposed, which implies infinite ex- 
t See Letter and Challenge in Preface hereto. 



112 



" ARGUMENT, A PRIORI, 



Part V. 



tension. Marvellously good indeed is the grace with 
which our atheist, at the place where he stands, and for 
the purpose which he has to serve, quotes from " the third 

Division" of the " Introduction." 

§ 8. Well then ; here we have our antitheist going " out 
" of the record," to use a legal phrase which he has adopt- 
ed, t We referred lately to his determination to turn 
matters upside down, or rather, to turn the end round up- 
on the beginning. J With regard to the case before us, 
we can acquit him of any charge of placing the tail where 
the head only should be. His conduct now is of a diffe- 
rent character from what it was in the former instance : 
At present, he is seeking to introduce into the beginning, 
neither end nor middle, but only something entirely dis- 
tinct, alike from beginning, and from middle, and from 
end. But we shall not copy the bad example, nor follow 
our atheist through those sentences, vicious as at the pre- 
sent stage they must be, which respect something avowed 
in the third " Division." Not that there is any thing 
contained in those sentences, nor any thing about them, 
except the confusion which follows in their train, that we 
need to fear : As might easily be shewn, were this a fit 
opportunity. But anxiously do we desire, we acknowledge, 
to keep clear of the confusion which very naturally would 
result from a present consideration of the sentences under 
notice. In short, Antitheos had his reasons for what he 
has done. And we have ours for reprobating his exceed- 
ingly unwarrantable procedure. 

§ 9. " If we had not already seen that the author's 
reasoning leads us to conclude that his Being is to be 
" regarded as something substantial" — -Well, what follows 
from such a supposition ? " We should have been at a 
M loss what to make of the subject of the above predicate. 



t See :c Preface" to " Refutation." 



J See above, § 2. 



§ 8-9. 



IRREFRAGABLE. 



113 



" As a logician would say, it is not distributed. "f The 
non-distribution of a subject can never be any reason why 
one should be at a loss what to make of it. A non-dis- 
tributed subject is, " as a logician would say," a subject 
made to stand for a part only of its significate. And did 
ever any logician worthy of the name, assert that we 
should be at a loss what to make of a subject because it 
is taken in a part only of its extent ? Logicians are quite 
as fond of undistributed, as of distributed subjects. And 
as an evidence, there are in the field of logic as many 
particular propositions as there are universal ones : The 
non-distribution of the subject being that which fixes the 
particularity of the proposition. But our aim is not to 
rectify Antitheos's logic, except where the badness of his 
logic is made a prop to the goodness of his cause ; and to 
pass over a matter which, after all, is of little moment 
in the present business : Antitheos's logic in the preced- 
ing portion of the passage, finds me totally at fault. 
What does he make the subject to be, to-wit, in the Pro- 
position, " There is necessarily a Being of Infinity of 
" Extension ?" The word Being. But how " Being" can 
be regarded as the subject, our atheist has not conde- 
scended to declare, neither is he at all able to declare. 
To me indeed it appears, that " Being" in that Proposi- 
tion is syncategorematic, i. e. constitutes a part only of the 
complex term composing the subject : which I take to be, 

"A Being of Infinity of Extension : " — " th ere is necessarily, ' ' 
being the predicate, or, if you will, the copula and the 
predicate together. But to settle what is the right sub- 
ject, and, by consequence possibly, what is the right pre- 
dicate, of the Proposition, is, as well as the other thing, 
but a mere trifle, not worth vexing ourselves about ; as 
shall be perceived in the eleventh section. Though An- 



t Parag. 9. 



114 « ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," Part V. 

titheos has called things by their wrong names, it may turn 
out that the slip in logic will not afford him even a sem- 
blance of support. 

§•10. " Relative," says the author of the " Refutation," 
after presenting us with the sentences which respect some- 
thing avowed in " Division III." of the " Introduction;" 

Relative to a Being of this sort, then" — that is, relative 
to a Being of the character spoken of in that " Division," 
to-wit, " a necessarily existing substance, the intelligent 

cause of all things."! But here we can have nothing 
to do with the assumed Being which " Division III." 
treats of. Our atheist himself seems to have had his mis- 
givings as to the propriety of the " then" for he imme- 
diately goes on to say : " At all events, relative to a sub- 
stantial being" — A substantial being ! Why not a being 
{i.e. an existing) substance 1 Is not a substance identical 
with a being ? Why distinguish them ? What is an un- 
substantial being ? A shadow that proceeds not from any 
substance is not more a non-entity than an unsubstantial 
being. A substantial being is a substantial — substance ; 
or a being that has — being. What nothingness has a 
non-being substance which an unsubstantial being has not ? 

§ 11. " Relative to a (substantial) being, the truth of 

the predicate" Antitheos proceeds, " is what we have 
" now to try. "J As he made " Being" to be the subject, 
so now he takes " Infinity of Extension" to be the pre- 
dicate, in Proposition III. Our atheist would repre- 
sent Being as something already got at. and the aim of 
that Proposition to be, to invest the Being with infinite 
extension. Quite contrary to the truth : A Being is not 
something which the " Argument," as yet, holds us in 
possession of. The object of the Proposition, in fact, is 
neither more nor less than to arrive at a Being ; a Being, 
indeed of infinity of extension : but the Proposition by 

t See above, § 7. X Parag. 11. 



§§ 10-16. 



IRREFRAGABLE. 



115 



no means considers" Being" and " Infinity of Extension," 
first separately, afterwards proceeding to work out a con- 
junction of them. In a word, " Infinity of Extension" is 
not the predicate. " The truth of the predicate is what 
" we have now to try," says Antitheos. The truth of 
Proposition III., at any rate, he is going to try. And 
that is sufficient comfort for us. 

§ 12. We shall make it our business to examine every 
item and iota of the ordeal ; Because, the Proposition, if 
successfully established, goes near to be decisive, in our 
favour, of the whole controversy ; and if objected to, on 
sufficient grounds, the whole demonstration, the whole of 
the merely pretended demonstration, must go for nothing. 
Our atheist rightly holds the Proposition in question to 
be of very high importance in the affair ; whether or not 
it carries with it ALL the strength of the " Argument." 

§ 13. " The evidence in support of the third proposi- 
" tion is stated," our author remarks, " in the form of a 
" dilemma."] And then he quotes § 1, and part of § 2, J 
and § 4. The words he has quoted are as follows. 

§ 14. " Either, Infinity of Extension subsists, or, (which 
" is the same thing,) we conceive it to subsist, without a 
u support or substratum ; or, it subsists not, or we con- 
" ceive it not to subsist, without a support or substratum. 

§ 15. " First, if Infinity of Extension subsist without 
" a substratum," [or, if it have not a substratum,] " then, 

" it is a substance" * * * * * 

********** 

§ 16. " Secondly, If Infinity of Extension subsist not 
" without a Substratum," [that is, if it have a Substra- 
tum,] " then, it being a contradiction to deny there is 
44 Infinity of Extension,! it is a contradiction to deny 
" there is a Substratum to it." 

t Parag. 11. 

X Antitheos does not signify, he has omitted any thing. 
j| " Prop. L Note in " Argument" See Part II. § 15. 



116 



" ARGUMENT, A PRIORI; 



Part V, 



§ 17. " The conclusion deduced from the latter alter- 
" native," says Antitheos, " besides appearing fcme and 
" impotent, is somewhat laughable.^ But allowing its 
" logic to pass, it may be worth while, if only for amuse- 
" ment, to try the force of this, the negative horn of the 
" dilemma, by ascertaining what it is made of.'^J Why 
is this pronounced to be the negative horn ? 'T would 
require more than an Aristotle to tell how it could pro- 
perly be pronounced to be so. But though Aristotle 
could not, yet possibly Antitheos can inform us, why 
■• this" is pronounced to be the negative horn. 'Tis per- 
haps probable, that Antitheos calls the alternative spoken 
of, " the negative horn of the dilemma," because that 
alternative contains the word "not." At least, I can- 
not think of any better reason he could have. With 
regard, then, to the question, whether the word " not" 
causes the member in which it occurs to be truly nega- 
tive : the word " without," in the alternative, appears to 
be a negative one, to all intents and purposes. And if 
so, the alternative will be affirmative, so long as two ne- 
gative words (" not," and " without") — which affect the 
same thing — are equal to a positive. — Be " this" horn 
of what sort it may, it is a horn which Antitheos would 
get quit of, if he but could. || But however negative the 
horn may be, 'tis a positive truth that Antitheos has 
been fairly stuck upon it, and can by no struggling take 
himself off. We shall observe, in good time, how he 
winces. 

§ 18. But whether " this" be the negative horn, or not, 
let us witness in what manner the foree of it is tried, 
;; The primary signification of the word substratum is, a 
4i thing lying under something else. Supposing, for in- 
" stance, a bed of gravel to lie under the soil, gravel is 

t See Part XII. § 8. t Parag. 12, 

|] See Part XI. § 21. 



§§ 17-19. 



IRREFRAGABLE. 



117 



'•' the substratum of that soil ; if there be sandstone be- 
" low that, the sandstone is the substratum of the gravel ; 
" if coal be found beneath the rock, coal is the substra- 
" turn of it, and so on as far as we can penetrate. To say, 
" therefore, that space must have a substratum, is nothing 
" less than saying that it must have something to rest 
" upon ; something to hold it up. That is, — Space must 
" have limits ; and there must be something in existence 
" beyond its limits to keep it from falling— out of itself! 
" If this be not the acme of absurdity, a ship falling over- 
" board, as our sailors' jest goes, is no longer a joke ; and 
" the clown who boasted that he could swallow himself 
" boasted of nothing that he might not be\ reasonably 
" be\ expected to perform. "J These are capital jests. 
And had they but come in at a proper place, we should 
have " laughed consumedly." The misfortune is, they 
are not in season. 

§ 19. " The primary signification of the word substra- 
" turn is," our philologist informs us, " a thing lying under 
'•' something else." So it is. Substratum is a participle 
from the verb substernor,Anglice, to be strowed or strewed 
under. But, alas ! the primaiy signification of the word 
substance is very similar to that of the word substratum. 
The primary signification of substance, is, standing under : 
It being nothing but a derivation from the participle 
substans.\\ But Antiilieos is remarkably enamoured of the 

f One of these is an error of the press. But to say which, would be 
to interfere with the style. % Parag. 12. 

|| From the neuter plural, Home Toohe says. — It is curious, or perhaps 
it is not curious, that the two words in our language corresponding to sub 
and stans, to-wit under and standing, should, when joined in one word, 
constitute a term denoting what is very usually reckoned the superior 
portion of the mind. Our materialist would busy us about substance as 
not reaching to aught beyond body. So that there is some necessity for 
our refusing to quit the English, for the Latin preposition. And accord- 
ingly, we are resolved to stick by the understanding. Surely, it, in good 
English, does not so naturally mean body, as substance may stand for 
mind. 



118 



ARGUMENT. A PRIORI," 



Part V. 



word substance, and therefore he has a respect for its 
primary signification, never bringing this in sight. But 
then he bears (with ample reason too) substratum a ter- 
rible grudge, and thinks nothing of exposing its primary 
signification to well-merited derision. 

§ 20. A fine affair truly here. Strange work, work 
• ; passing strange," might our atheist make of our Eng- 
lish tongue, were he to go on at this rate. At what 
point in its history could any language bear to pass 
through the primary-signification-alembic ? Because the 
meaning of a word, considered as to its etymon, is so, 
therefore it is just the same so now — clean contrary 
perhaps to the incontestable fact : Is not that a grand 
conclusion to come to ? 

§ 21. But Antitheos is not alone in the world, in the 
use of such reasoning. Before him, a very celebrated 
philologist and freethinker went very far in the primary- 
signification-track. 

§ 22. " True," says John Home Tooke, " is * a 
•• past participle of the verb * * To TrowT * * * 

§ 23. " True, as we now write it ; or Trew, as it was 
• ; formerly written ; means simply and merely — That 
" which is Trowed. And, instead of its being a rare 
" commodity upon earth ; except only in words, there is 
•• nothing but Truth in the ivorld. 

§ 24. ' ; That every man, in his communication with 
" others, should speak that which he troweth, is of so 
" great importance to mankind ; that it ought not to sur- 
;; prize us, if we find the most extravagant and exaggerated 
" praises bestowed upon Truth. But Truth supposes 
" mankind ; for whom and by ivhom alone the word is 
" formed, and to whom alone it is applicable. If no man, 
" no truth. There is therefore" [Save the mark ! 
Therefore !] " no such thing as eternal, immutable, 
- everlasting truth ; unless mankind, such as they are 



§§ 20-32. 



IRREFRAGABLE. 



119 



" at present" [and, of course, unless " Truth," " the 
" third person singular of the Indicative Trow,"] " be 
" also eternal, immutable, and everlasting. Two persons 
" may contradict each other, and yet both speak truth : 
" for the truth of one person may be opposite to the 
" truth of another. To speak truth may be a vice as 
" well as a virtue : for there are many occasions where it 
" ought not to be spoken." " Diversions of Purley." 
Part II. Chap. v. 

§ 25. " Right is no other than RECT-toi (Regitum J, 
" the past participle of the Latin verb Regere" 

§ 26. " In the same manner our English word Just is 
" the past participle of the verb jubere" 

§ 27. Law is merely the past tense and past parti- 
" ciple of the Gothic and Anglo-saxon verb 

" and it means (something or any thing, Chose, 

" Cosa, Aliquid) Laid down" 

§ 28. "A Right and Just action is, such a one as is 
" ordered and commanded." 

§ 29. " It appears to me highly improper to say, that 
" God has a Right : as it is also to say, that God is 
"Just. For" [Mark the — reason!^ "nothing is or- 
" dered, directed or commanded concerning God." 

§ 30. "I follow the Law of God (what is laid down by 
" him for the rule of my conduct) when I follow the Laws 
" of human nature; which, without any human testimony, 
" we know must proceed from God : and upon these are 
" founded the Rights of man, or what is ordered for 
" man." Part II. chap. i. 

§ 31. " Those sham Deities Fate and Destiny — ali- 
" quid Fatum,quelque chose Destinee — are merely the past 
" participles of Fari and Destiner." 

§ 32. " Chance * * and his twin-brother Acci- 
" DENT, are merely the participles of Escheoir, Cheoir, 
" and Cadere. * * To say — 1 It befell me by Chance, 



120 



« ARGUMENT, A PRIORI:' Part V. 



" 'or by Accident,' — is absurdly saying — ' It fell by fall- 
" 'ing.'" Ibid. Chap. ii. 

§ 33. But what need to multiply quotations? though 
" Home Tooke" as one not incorrectly says, " has fur- 
" nished a whole magazine of such weapons for any So- 
" phist" [wise man, etymologically,] 61 who may need 
" them." Whately's Logic, B. III. § 8. 

§ 34. Now hear the opinion of one who was no bad 
judge in an affair like that to which he is addressing him- 
self. " It is in this literal and primitive sense alone," 
we are citing the words of Dugald Stewart, " that, ac- 
" cording to him, (Mr Tooke,) a philosopher is entitled 
" to employ it, (any word,) even in the present advanced 
" state of science ; and whenever he annexes to it a mean- 
" ing at all different, he imposes equally on himself and 
" on others. To me, on the contrary, it appears, that to 
' ; appeal to etymology in a philosophical argument, (ex- 
" cepting, perhaps, in those cases where the word itself 
' : is of philosophical origin) is altogether nugatory ; and 
" can serve, at the best, to throw an amusing light on the 
" laws which regulate the operations of human fancy." 
Philosophical Essays. Essay V. ch. ii. 

§ 35. We might favour our readers with a good many 
passages from Stewart which have no tendency to with- 
draw from the literal-and-primitive-sense-method any 
portion of the respect which is due to it. But we decline 
to put this philosopher upon the task of further, and in 
detail, as it were, slaying the slain. It is only necessary 
to state some things, to render a fuller refutation than the 
statements themselves contain in gremio, wholly a work 
of supererogation. 

§ 36. The author of " The Diversions of Purley" at 
the end of his First Part, assures his readers : 44 1 know 

for what building I am laying the foundation : and am 
" myself well satisfied of its importance." It must on all 



S§ 33-38. 



IRREFRAGABLE, 



121 



hands be admitted, that to work in the dark as to the 
result of one's edification (to pay in coin that should pass 
here, if any where,) is not the most pleasant thing in the 
world, even though what we are building be castles in the 
air. 

§ 37. Thus much as to Home TookeJs extravagancies. 
And thus much indirectly, at the same time, as to Anti- 
theos's argument derived from the " primary signification 
M of the word substratum" The thing is verily nothing 
less than " the acme of absurdity." 

§ 38. But our atheist knew well enough what he was 
about. He understood assuredly that the "Argument," 
which maintains that " Infinity of extension," or space, 
" is necessarily existing" did not afford any premiss from 
which it could be inferred, by any stupidity, that " Space 
" must have limits /" and that " there must be some- 
" thing in existence beyond its limits" Antitkeos was dis- 
tinctly aware, that he could advance nothing stronger 
than a rush to beat down the reasoning under Proposi- 
tion III. : and therefore, (like many dishonest sophists, 
in circumstances so far analogous,) precisely because he 
could do nothing in the way of refuting, he raises a — a — 
primary signification — a — man of straw, that no one 
could have imagined was ready for the occasion, and 
laughs heartily, he pretends, at the effect this appearance 
has on him, calling on his readers to laugh too. 

Spectatum admissi risum teneatis amici ? 



122 



PART VI. 

THE « ARGUMENT, A PRIORI, FOR THE BEING AND 
"ATTRIBUTES OF GOD," AN IRREFRAGABLE DE- 
MONSTRATION. 

§ 1. We shall suppose that the merriment, whoever 
joined in it. has subsided. And truly with Antitheos it 
lasted not long. The words which we next come to in 
the •■ Refutation" are far from laughing themselves, what- 
ever the very gravity of some of them may force us to. 
The words alluded to, whenever we enter upon them, ex- 
pose the fact, that, so little satisfied was Antitheos with 
the argument from " the primary signification of the word 
" substratum " the ground he had taken is deserted as 
utterly untenable. 

§ 2. " Should it be contended that the term ought to 
" be understood in its secondary acceptation," — the only 
acceptation, we may mention once for all, the author of 
the " Argument" ever thought of putting upon it, An- 
titheos must have been thoroughly assured, — " and that 
" the substratum of the infinity of extension subsists with- 
" in itself, as any material body is said to be the substra- 
• ; turn of its own extension: — I would remark, that we 
" know of nothing possessing extension except matter, — 
- nothing else that can stand as an object to which ex- 
" tension may be ascribed as a property ; and that matter, 
:i not existing by mathematical,'''' [the word should be me- 
taphysical^] " but only by physical necessity, cannot be 

t See Part I. § 47, and following sections. 



§ 1-3. « ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," IRREFRAGABLE. 123 



' : the substratum referred to" t. Matter, says our atheist, 
exists by physical necessity, that is, it exists because it 
exists. But such necessity is no necessity at all, as might 
be evident even to the understandings of asses\ ; and 
therefore, there is no real necessity that we should dwell 
upon the point. It perfectly suffices us, that matter does 
not exist by metaphysical necessity, to-wit, in the sense 
of it being a contradiction to suppose it not to exist. 
" We know of nothing possessing extension except mat- 
" ter," — we were informed, — " nothing else that can 
" stand as an object to which extension may be ascribed 
; ' as a property." " Material bodies," as the next sen- 
tence has it, (there being many of Antitheos's sentences 
that serve as a chorus,) " material bodies, comprising all 
" that we do know, or can know of Being." All easily 
said. None of it so easily proved nevertheless. And 
whether easily proveable or not, the assertions assume the 
very thing to be proved. But has not Antitheos offered 
us evidence of his right to make the assumption, that we 
know of nothing but matter which has the property of 
extension, or tJiat we know of no Being but a material 
body ? Not a jot of evidence does he even pretend to af- 
ford. Then, the thing remains a barefaced assumption 
of the best part of the whole matter in debate, remains, 
to use an expression of his own, nowhere more appli- 
cable, " an unproved extravagance. "|| 

§ 3. " Hence it is evident," continues our atheist, " that, 
" in material bodies, comprising all that we do know, or 
" can know of Being, it is impossible to find any thing 
'* that will serve Mr Gillespie's purpose. "IF Mr Gilles- 
pie will cheerfully admit, that because " matter * * 
" cannot be the substratum referred to" by him, it is quite 
impossible to find any thing that will suit his purpose in 

t Chap. VI. par. 13. 

X A phrase employed by the Epicureans, on a certain occasion. 
|| Chap II. par. 15. *[ Parag. 13. 



124 



« ARGUMENT, A PRIORI;' Part VI. 



material bodies. And it is the business of a certain part 
of his work to demonstrate the impossibility. His first 
Scholium being partly taken up with proving, that " the 
" Material Universe cannot be the Substratum of Infinity 
" of Extension :" Supposing the material universe to 
exist, for the Scholium does not assume the thing, except 
in the case (a common — but not a universal — casef) 
where it is admitted ; the Scholium beginning thus, " //, 
" then, it should be maintained, that the Material Uni- 
" verse is the Substratum of Infinity of Extension" — 
And it cannot be maintained that the material universe 
is that substratum, or any substratum, or any thing, un- 
less it be first assumed that matter exists. 

§ 4. " Even this impossibility overlooked, however," 
Antitheos goes on, " what is it that next meets our view ? 
" — One substance occupying infinite extension, and ano- 

th or occupying part of this extension, if not also the 
•• whole of it ; in other words, two things at the same 
il time occupying the same space. Theology always en- 
" tangles its advocates in inextricable absurdities. "J To 
the same purpose our author writes, farther on. " The 
"real existence of matter brings along with it what he," 
Mr Gillespie, ' ; is so much afraid of" [when there is a 
good reason] " — namely, the absurdity of two beings at 
;i the same time occupying the same space. On this 
" ground let it be remembered that it is not requisite we 
" should demonstrate the infinite extension of the mate- 
" rial universe. In so far as it does extend, it occupies 
• ; space; and, the infinitely extended substance occupy- 
" ing of course, the whole of space, must occupy that of 
" the material universe as well as any other, — if any 
" other there be." 

t Few, indeed, and those few atheists, or, at best, bnt half-theists, con- 
tend for the existence of matter, in the sense which Antitheos puts upon 
matter : who, by matter, means something which is in no sense dependent 
for its existence on mind. X Parag. 13. 



§i 4-7. 



IRREFRAGABLE. 



125 



§ 5. " Let us suppose for a moment." our antitheist 
continues in the chapter from which we are now quoting-, 
" the being of a substance of infinite expansion, the in- 
" telligent agent in the production of all things — and all 
" this is contended for in the ' Argument' " [at the pro- 
per time and place] " — what was it to do when perform- 
:( ing the * * feat of creating the universe out of 
" nothing ? Was it to annihilate so much of its own sub- 
" stance as would be necessary to make room for matter, 
" in order to give it verge and scope enough ?f If no ^> 
" either matter could not be brought into being, or we 
" must suffer ourselves to be driven to the conclusion 
" already shown to be necessary in admitting the very 
" palpable doctrine of the actual existence of matter. 1 ' 
Chapter IX. paragraphs 10, 11. 

§ 6. From the work of a very celebrated atheist, cited 
as it is on one occasion, and borrowed from on many 
more, by Antitheos, we shall extract a sentence or two 
which exactly chime with the passages which we have 
just set before the reader. " I shall inquire," says the 
author of the famous Systeme de la Nature, ' : if matter 
" exists ; if it does not at least occupy a portion of space % 
" In this case, matter, or the universe, must exclude every 
" other being who is not matter, from that place which 
" the material beings occupy in space." Vol. II. ch. ii. 
Again : " Matter certainly occupies a part of space, and 
" from that part, at least, the Divinity must be excluded." 

Appendix" to the " System of Nature." Chap. xx.J 

§ 7. In all these passages, whether those of Mirabaud 
or rather D'Holhach, or those of Antitheos, it is coolly 
taken for granted, that it is absurd to have (in the words 
of the first of the passages from the " Refutation") " two 

t Give ample room and verge enough. 

Gray's Bard. 

% See Appendix. 

U 



126 



« ARGUMENT, A PRIORI; 1 Part VI. 



iC things at the same time occupying the same space." 
But this which is so conveniently assumed, happens to be 
the very thing which lay — yea, and still lies — at our 
atheist's door to be proved. To evince it by arguments 
which would place it beyond the reach of rational ques- 
tion, is absolutely necessary if atheism be to stand. 

§ 8. We shall at once admit " the absurdity" (we quote 
again from Antiiheos) " of two beings at the same time 
" occupying the same space," in the same respect. For 
this would be all one with two beings which were but one 
being : the duality and unity being confounded. A great 
enough absurdity truly. 

§ 9. But that two things may occupy the same space 
at the same time, in different respects, is, I hope, very far 
from being absurd to suppose. But be it what it may. 
it is nothing less than what the " Argument" has under- 
taken to demonstrate. 

§ 10. But the " Argument" does not set about demon- 
strating that, till it has gotten the length of the second 
Scholium under Proposition IV. And Antiilieos himself, 
as we have seen,"f gives the ;t Argument" credit for 
" precision of purpose and exactness of arrangement." 
And therefore, if we, who are standing over against 
nothing farther on than Proposition III., now let our 
readers know how the work in question demonstrates 
that two substances may fill the same space, at the same 
time, but in different respects, it is not because we are 
under any strong necessity of doing so, but only because 
there is nothing to hinder us from following out a thing 
which our atheist has started, out of season as it happens, 
and in an evil hour for himself. 

§ 11. The secret, indeed, has already been divulged : 
and of a truth it will never be easy to make a secret of 
that which must stare one in the face if he but opens his 
t See Part II. § 4. 



§§ 8-14. 



IRREFRAGABLE. 



127 



eyes and turns them in the proper direction. But in place 
of repeating the words which our reader has been pre- 
sented with in Part III. § 16, we shall here cite the 
ipsissima verba of the Scholium to which reference has 
just been made. 

§ 12. " Scholium II. The parts of Infinity of Exten- 
" sion, or of its Substratum, if it have a Substratum, be- 
" ing necessarily indivisible from each other")" * * * : 
" and the parts of the Material Universe being divisible 
44 from each other * * * : and it, therefore, following 
" that the Material Universe is not the Substratum of 
" Infinity of Extension * * * : Here are two sorts of 
" extension. The one sort, that which the Material Uni- 
" verse has : And the other, the extension of Infinity of 
" Extension. And AS Infinity of extension is necessarily 
i: existing, | AND AS the extension of the Material Universe 
c ' must exist, if it exist, in the extension of Infinity of 
" Extension ; a part of this, or of its Substratum, if it 
w have a Substratum, (part, but in the sense of partial 
" consideration;) must PENETRATE the Material Uni- 
" verse, and every atom, even the minutest atom, of it." 

§ 13. So, we see how it is easily and very palpably de- 
monstrable, that two things must fill the same space at 
the same time, if matter exist. The two things fill the 
same space in different, in very different respects. They 
fill the same space, the one by penetrating, the other by 
being penetrated : this, (to discriminate nicely, and not too 
nicely,) by filling or occupying the space, that, by consti- 
tuting it. 

§ 14. When Antitheos lays down, that it is absurd to 
have in our view " two things at the same time occupy - 
" ing the same space," he makes no mention of the doc- 
trine of penetration. If he took care to make no mention 

t See Part II. § 27, and Part III. § 16. 
X See Part II. § 14; also. § 9. 



128 



" ARGUMENT, A PRIORI; 1 



Part VI. 



of it, he may justify his silence by pointing to an excel- 
lent reason which was in existence : all the absurdity, if 
there was any, disappears whenever penetration is intro- 
duced. There cannot be complete penetration without 
two things filling the same space at one and the same 
time. 

§ 15. Antitheos, we repeat, takes no notice of the doc- 
trine of penetration. He did this, either advisedly, or be- 
cause he could not help it. 

§ 16. If he could not help what he has done, or rather 
what he has not done ; in this particular matter, he was 
not so clear-sighted as was an author whose ideas are not 
seldom turned to good account in the " Refutation." 
" They (the theologians) will * insist," remarks DUIol- 
bach, " that their God, who is not matter, penetrates that 
which is matter." System of Nature. Vol. II. ch. ii. 

§ 17. [Our readers may naturally, and very laudably, 
be desirous of being informed what objections the French 
atheist has to urge against the doctrine of the Deity's 
penetrating matter. It is all the more proper to supply 
the information, that our British atheist, so far from ob- 
jecting to the doctrine, does not so much as think it right 
to notice it. In fine, we may with some advantage be- 
stow a little consideration on what the foreigner has ad- 
vanced in opposition to our tenet. 

§ 18. Objection. " It must be obvious, that to pene- 
" trate matter, it is necessary to have some correspon- 
" dence with matter, consequently to have extent ; now 
" to have extent, is to have one of the properties of mat- 
" ter."— 

§ 19. Reply. But is it proved anywhere in the " Sys- 
' ; tern of Nature," that because extension is one of the pro- 
perties of matter, therefore whatever has extension — ex- 
tension, which is a true sine qua non of every substance 
—attributed to it, is material \ No indeed. Has a va- 



§§ 15-27. 



IRREFRAGABLE. 



129 



cuum (and UHolbach speaks of a vacuum as quite a pos- 
sible, if not also a really existing tiling ;) lias a vacuum 
extent % Then, according to the leaning of the objection, 
a vacuum is a plenum. 

§ 20. Objection. " If the Divinity penetrates matter, 
" then He is material." — 

§ 21. Reply. Any reason given % None. Then there 
is none to be examined. The assertion itself may very 
correctly be designated, in AntitJieos's nervous language, 
" an unproved extravagance." Why, if matter is per- 
fectly penetrated by a distinct substance, the presump- 
tion, till something to the contrary be established, seems 
all to be in favour of the penetrating substance being im - 
material. 

§ 22. Objection. " By a necessary deduction He is in- 
" separable from matter." — 

§ 23. Reply. He is not separated from matter, of 
course, so long as HE penetrates it, that is, so long as it 
continues in existence. But no longer. Matter has not 
been proved to have necessary existence. 

§ 24. Objection. " Then if HE is omnipresent, HE will 
" be in every thing. This the theologian will not allow." 
" System of Nature." Vol. II. ch. ii. 

§ 25. Reply. The theologians of UHolbaclis book 
may not allow it ; but, for ail that, every consistent theo- 
logian, and, what is more, every rational man, will allow 
the necessity of the consequent. 

§ 26. And thus we have gone over, and, on his own 
ground, replied to all that the French atheist has object- 
ed to the Deity's penetration of matter. No mighty 
things verily those objections. But since they are all that 
so ingenious and so zealous an objector could bring for- 
ward, we may depend on't they constitute the full strength 
of his bad cause. 

§ 27. I am led to make a reflection, which seems to 



130 



« ARGUMENT, A PRIORI, 



Part VI. 



arise, not altogether so unnaturally, out of the considera- 
tion with which we have just been occupied. What indeed, 
but a passion for atheism, should incite certain to inveigh 
so mightily against the doctrine of penetration in general ! 
And as we are upon the subject, it may not be amiss to 
observe, that it can but ill become modern natural philo- 
sophers to incline determinately to look with an unfa- 
vourable eye on the doctrine of the penetration of one 
substance by another, even though this latter should be, 
if any thing, immaterial : Modern Natural Philosophers, 
none of whom has yet proved, while many of them are 
confident, it is not proveable, that light itself is material : 
Modern Natural Philosophers, whose experiments and 
investigations have led them to a full belief, that the elec- 
tric fluid is a substance most intimately pervading every 
material substance. Let Antitheos, in the character of a 
natural philosopher, represent the whole body of the phi- 
losophers spoken of. Hear him discourse of the electric 
fluid. 

§ 28. " Should it be demanded — as it is always com- 
mendable to do on such occasions — what the substance 
" is which we deem to be present in what is usually de- 
; ' nominated a vacuum, — we may reply — the electric fluid. 
" No substance is capable of excluding it. As water seeks 
" its level, the fluid in question presses every where, that 
" it may be every where present ; and with this ten- 
" dency, IT penetrates, in a manner the most irre- 
" sistible, every thing that can be opposed to its course." 
Chap. VI. par. 6. 

§ 29. The substance recognised by the name of the 
electric fluid penetrates every material substance. Does 
not this lead the way to help us somewhat to conceive how, 
as it were, it may be that a part of the infinite extension, 
OR of its immaterial substratum, penetrates every sub- 



28-33. 



IRREFRAGABLE. 



131 



stance, light and the electric fluid with the rest, which can 
in any manner fall under the cognizance of sense ?] 

§ 30. Whether or not Antitheos saw, 'tis nothing very 
wonderful that he speaks — he does speak — as if he saw 
not, how it is that two things may, without any absurdity, 
be held to occupy the same space at the same time. The 
demonstration of the penetration of matter, where matter 
exists, is the very Hercules of his Lernsean Hydra. Not 
to see that demonstration in the " Argument," or alto- 
gether to forget its being there, though the demonstra- 
tion figures in a scholium of its own ; either of these is 
bad enough. 

§ 31. And there is something else which is as bad ; very 
likely, worse : The doctrine of the penetration of matter, 
is deducible, by undeniable consequence, from our 
atheist's tenets, as they are given by himself. Unfor- 
tunate Antitheos ! though one door was somehow shut, 
(at least Antitheos does not say, he saw it open,) to have 
the enemy enter by another, which is not to be closed so 
easily. 

§ 32. We shall produce our antitheist's tenets, and 
afterwards address ourselves to the necessary consequence 
of them as associated. 

§ 33. In the first place, then, as specimens of one class 
of tenets, take the following. " Infinity of extension is 
" NECESSARILY existing, — it would be absurd in the ex- 
" treme to deny." Etc. &fc.\ Again : " Take away mat- 
" ter, and you effect the taking off of every thing of which 
" we can form the slightest idea. All is annihilated, 
" except space and duration." J Ch. II. par. 26. Again : 

t See Part I. § 34. 

X This passage leads me to quote a sentence from a Review of the 
" Argument, a priori," &c. which made its appearance in a Number of 
" The United Secession Magazine." " Were our minds," says the Re- 
viewer, " to make the most extravagant of all possible suppositions, and 



132 



"ARGUMENT, A PRIORI, 



Part VI. 



" Matter may be regarded as eternal and space infinite. 
" We must, it is true, award both attributes to the lat- 
" ter." Ch. III. par. 8. To the like effect : " We have 
" * a something * * * * WHOSE non-existence, 
" * * * and so forth, cannot be conceived : a some- 
" thing, in short, that answers to our notions of space." 
Ibid. par. 12. To the same purpose: " It is not neces- 
•• sary — not absolutely necessary — that even extension, or 
" space, should have any substratum or support to its 
" existence whatever." Ch. IX. par. 2. Also : " To make 
' : sure of the necessity so much desired, Mr Gillespie lays 
" hold of the only two things to which it can at all be 
4 - made applicable — duration and .space." Ch. XIII. par. 4. 

u compass the idea of all the material universe, and even (let it he said 
'■ irith deep reverence) God himself being annihilated; 1 still we know it 
" is certain that ' infinity of extension and infinity of duration' would con- 
" tinue to exist." " Both these are, in their very nature, independent 
"of all being, even of God himself." The author of which may write 
" Atheist" on his forehead, as soon as he can, without running any risk 
of writing a logical lie. If we can conceive God Himself— to speak with 
sense, for reverence, in present circumstances, is altogether out of the 
question — to be annihilated ; if, in other words, it infer no contradiction 
to say, He exists not ; and if there be any one thing which exists quite 
independently of God ; what is there in Theology worth caring about ? 
Theology itself becomes a phantasm. 

As another suitable opportunity of noticing that criticism may never 
fall in my way, and as assuredly 'tis worth nobody's while to search for 
one, I shall not quit this disagreeable subject till I deliver something of my 
mind concerning the performance generally. 

Two remarks could not miss occurring to every sensible reader of that 
deplorable Article. The first is, that the Reviewer sticks at no dishonesty, 
however gross. The most shameful misquotations are never boggled at ; 
even though the want of all good faith should shine clearly through. The 
other is, that the writer has no head (any more than a heart) equal to such 
discussions. Every one who has a capacity for topics of that nature, will 
make the discovery, ere any two sentences be read, that, whoever has, ib«f 
wretched critic has not. 

i Behold another Reviewer harping on the same string in Part I. % 14. 



§§ 33-34. 



IRREFRAGABLE. 



133 



Finally, take this : " The necessary existence of infinite 
" space and duration : none of which propositions were" 
[or was] "ever disputed." See Part I. § 35. f Thus, in- 
finity of extension, infinite space, is plenarily admitted by 
our author to have necessary existence. 

§ 34. We shall, in the second place, bring forward a 
set of passages that speak a very different language. Ac- 
cept first : "A being existing by necessity is sought for ; 
" that is * * * one whose non-existence it is not in 
" the power of man to imagine ***** To seek 
" in nature for such a being ; to ransack the whole uni- 
" verse for it were vain. Among real and known exist- 
" ences it was no where TO be found." I Next take : 
" If such a condition as necessary or self-existence really 
" exists, * * Why can it not be made applicable to 
" the material universe" ?|| To a similar effect : " Matter 
" does not exist by that necessity which alone is admitted 
" in the argument a priori^ And this : " We may as 
" well go into the hypothesis of a vacuum at once * 
" * * What, then, is a vacuum ? It is space, I presume, 
" without any matter being present at all."f t Once more : 
" It is as easy to conceive of the non-existence of the 
" thing supposed," (to-wit by Br Clarke,) " as to conceive 
" of the non-existence of that of which we are ourselves 
" made up, together with the world we inhabit, and the 
" countless suns and systems occupying space in all direc- 
" tions."JJ Again: " Gods and devils, angels and spirits, 
" heaven and hell, — supposing them all to exist — could 
" have no claim to necessary existence, since it implies no 
" contradiction to imagine them not to exist. "\\ And in 

t See, also, " Refutation," Chap. X. par. 7- 
X Chap I. par. 6. || Chap. II. par 21. 

f Chap. V. par. 5. ft Chap. VII. par. 5. 

XX Chap. XIII. par. 3. || || Chap. II. par. 20. 

X 



134 



« ARGUMENT, A PRIORI;' 



Part VI. 



fine : " We can conceive matter not to exist."! 
Thus, matter is by our atheist completely deprived of true 
necessary existence. 

§ 35. To collect into a focus the very dissimilar, yet 
congruous rays, emitted by that body of light, the " Re- 
" futation," -which sends forth no clearer beams than are 
here : In the one set of positions, we have an extension 
which is necessary ; in the other set, an extension not ne- 
cessary. 

§ 36. We hasten to the consequence resulting from the 
conjunction of the two kinds of positions. We have an 
extension which is necessary, and we have an extension 
which is not necessary. We have, therefore, two 
extensions which cannot be the same. Two ex- 
tensions the one whereof cannot be any part of 
the OTHER. But a non-necessary extension cannot by 
it- presence annihilate any portion of a necessary exten- 
sion. And, THEREFORE ; matter — which has the non- 
necessary extension — existing along with, if not contained 
in, the extension which is of infinity — the necessary ex- 
tension ; the infinite extension, or space, must pene- 
trate ; matter must be penetrated, tota, et totaliter. 

§ 37. Such, then, is the conclusion to which we are 
compelled to come by Antitlieoss express tenets. And 
wherein does that conclusion differ from the conclusion 
of " Scholium II. ?" Not in any point at all. 

§ 38. Let the reader give his utmost attention to what 
we have here been urging. For, the doctrine of penetra- 
tion demonstrated, atheism falls down, dead as a stone. 
And Antitheos knows this, else he knows but little of any 
moment in the affair. And the best of all, is — never let 
us forget it — the doctrine of penetration necessarily fol- 
lows from his own principles. 

t Chap. II. par. 20. Consider, likewise, Chap. II. par. 24, and 
Chap. IX. p. 10. 



§§ 35-40. 



IRREFRAGABLE. 



135 



§ 39. So that, to speak in allusion to our atheist's 
words, as they occur in the first of the passages on which 
we have been animadverting, Theology has not entangled 
its advocate in an inextricable absurdity. There is no 
absurdity in the case, but one ; which is this, that our 
author should stand up for the atheistical hypothesis, and 
hold principles from which the first grand principle which 
conducts to Theism, and to nothing else, follows by com- 
plete necessity. 

§ 40. After the words referred to in the preceding 
section, Antitheos goes on thus : "A religious friend who 
" has corresponded with me upon this point, alleges that 
" the substance of the substratum of infinite extension is 
" not material." \ To be religious according to our 
atheist's mode of reckoning, nothing more is requisite than 
to be a theist. On this understanding, I can easily help 
him to another religious friend (a friend in the very best 
sense) who alleges the same thing, namely, that the sub- 
stance of the substratum of infinite extension is immate- 
rial. And this friend is no other than the Author of the 
"Argument" himself, who, though, to speak truth, he has 
not alleged that the substance of the substratum of infi- 
nite extension is not material, has, if he be not sadly mis- 
taken, done much more than merely allege that which im- 
plies the immateriality of the substance of the substratum 
in question ; and who will persist in thinking he has done 
so, till some one shall evince, by truly valid arguments, 
that the thought is erroneous. As for the " Refutation," 
of arguments, except those which are " a very clever ap- 
" proach" to shockingly bad ones, it contains none. The 
Author of this production, himself, shall witness for us, 
that the " Argument" has undertaken to demonstrate 
what involves the immateriality of the substratum of in- 
finity of extension, or expansion. '•' Admitting his (Mr 
t Chap. VI. par. 14. 



136 



" ARGUMENT, A PRIORI, 



Part VI . 



" Gillespie s) substratum of space * * * No reason 
" can be assigned why infinity of expansion * * * * 
" should have an. immaterial something to keep it in 
" existence, that would not prove" — &c. &c.| Here it is 
tacitly assumed, that the " Argument" seeks to reach an 
immaterial substratum of infinity of expansion. So that 
the t; religious friend" introduces Antitheos to the front of 
what may be held, in a certain and a good sense, and to 
his opprobrium, alas ! as the very asses' bridge of the de- 
monstration. Observe, then, Antitheos^ s " footing" and 
bearing, as he prepares to make the leap, and pass the 
bridge. Get clear of it he must ; or else it will roll over 
on him, and crush his atheism into powder. Observe, I 
repeat, how the passage is to be effected. Behold, he 
springs aloft — " But this is mere babble." Immediately 
I hear all my readers loudly accuse me of having omitted 
something. But I assure you, not one word has been missed. 
Then surely something follows. True ; but what is to 
come you will not think mends the matter. — " This is 
4i mere babble ; something he has been taught to repeat, 
" — not the dictate of his sounder judgment." — And why 
so? — " Substance and matter are the same. The words 
" are synonymous and convertible" — in the sense of the 
words mutually exhausting each other, Antitheos means. 
Yes, the words are convertible in that sense, IF the barely 
assuming the thing our atheist had to prove, the mere 
uttering of an " unproved extravagance," be all that is 
necessary to be done in the affair. J " When," our anti- 
theist proceeds, " used otherwise" (than, to-wit, as merely 
convertible words) " they become unintelligible ; inasmuch 
"as we might then talk of an unsubstantial substance 
" and immaterial matter." j| C7w-substantial substance ; 
namely, substance that is not substance ! Jm-material mat- 
ter ; to-wit, matter which is not matter ! Unintelligible 



t Chap. VII. par. 13. 



| See above, § 2. 



|| Parag. 14. 



i§ 40-41. 



IRREFRAGABLE. 



137 



indeed. And as such we hand them over to our material- 
ist's tender mercies. 

§ 41. (One word in relation to the latter unintelligibi- 
lity. There is no opinion, however extravagant, but has 
had its advocates in the world, no assertion so wild as 
not to have been made by some philosopher. \ Antitheos 
holds, and who is he who will think, Antitheos does not 
rightly hold ? that to talk of im-material matter is to talk 
unintelligibly. But attend. A very celebrated main- 
tainor of the materiality of mind, had also been an 
advocate for the immateriality of matter. Dr Priestley , 
in his " History of Discoveries relating to Vision, Light, 
" and Colours," declares for the " scheme of THE imma- 
" teriality OF matter, as it may he called.'" And we 
shall not take upon us to say, that he so declares himself 
with less reason on his side than he has when he appears, 
and he appears throughout his " Disquisitions on Matter 
" and Spirit,'''' as a sworn friend to the materiality of 
mind. From matter, this Doctor says, in the latter work, 
(vol. i. p. 144, 2d edit.) he has " wiped off the reproach" 
[a long standing one] " of being * * absolutely inca- 
: ' pable of intelligence." Which perhaps he had accom- 
plished all the more easily, if matter be immaterial.) 

t Nihil est tarn ahsurdum quod non uliquis d Philosophis asserat. — 

TULLY. 



138 



PART VII. 

THE « ARGUMENT, A PRIORI, FOR THE BEING AND 
" ATTRIBUTES OF GOD," AN IRREFRAGABLE DE- 
MONSTRATION. 

§ 1. The next paragraph in the " Refutation" com- 
mences thus : " But, to refer to the first Proposition, — 
" has it not been demonstrated that infinity of extension 
" exists necessarily'? — that it exists, per se, by the most 
" abstract and metaphysical necessity?"! By the way, 
here we have the right word, 6. " metaphysical" : Though 
no farther back than the thirteenth paragraph, we had 
" mathematical," the wrong one.J Antitheos in a certain 
place speaks of a " magic rod" possessed by " the rea- 
" soners for the being of a God according to the argu- 
;£ ment a priori ;" who are said to " work miracles with" 
" necessity" which is the name of the rod.|| A magic 
rod it must be : and no mistake. But I am of opinion, 
that our author's magical powers, whether they are cen- 
tred in a rod or no, should be presumed, notwithstanding 
his confirmed distaste to the supernatural, to be nowise 
inferior to those resident in the rod of the a priori rea- 
soners noticed. To turn, when one likes, what is meta- 
physical necessity into " mathematical," and the mathe- 
matical back again into " metaphysical necessity" ; im- 
plies, methinks, a stretch of power equal, and indeed su- 
perior, to the virtue ascribed by him to our magic rod. 



t Chap. VI. par. 15. J See Part VI. § 2. 

|| See last Chapter, sixth paragraph. 



§§ 1-3. « ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," IRREFRAGABLE. 139 



We, he says, " work miracles." Whereas, he works an 
impossibility, and that's more than a miracle. 

§ 2. It has been demonstrated, that infinity of exten- 
sion exists necessarily. So the first question is answered. 
It has not been, and what is more, it never will be, de- 
monstrated that infinity of extension exists per se. So 
Antitheos has his second question replied to, but not affir- 
matively. " The first Proposition" maintains the neces- 
sary existence of infinite extension ; but determines no- 
thing concerning the topic whether that extension exists 
by itself or not. In the language of the note upon Pro- 
position I. : " The proposition affirms that there is Infi- 

* ■ nity of Extension, but affirms nothing more.' 1 '' See " Ap- 

* pendix" to the " Argument. "t 

§ 3. After putting the two interrogatories which we 
have answered in so satisfactory a manner, our atheist 
asks : " In what sort of predicament, then, must that 
" reasoring appear, which gives up a leading and univer- 
" sally admitted truth by placing it in a questionable 
" position V The reasoning that does so must appear, 
and, which is more, must really be, in an ill predicament 
indeed. This much may be held as settled. But the 
" then;" the significant particle which insinuates that 
" that reasoning" is Mr Gillespie's ; — " there's the rub." 
But -we come to the proof of the justness of the insinua- 
tion. " Mr Gillespie's dilemma recognises, at least, the 
" possibility of infinite extension requiring a substra- 
" turn to support it — infinite extension, which is itself 
" necessary !" Yea : Mr Gillespie's dilemma, or dis- 
junctive proposition, does recognise such a possibility ; 
and, what is a longer journey in the same direction, the 
first Proposition of Part III. is, inter alia, taken up in 
demonstrating that " Infinity of Expansion" or Extension 
i% cannot exist by itself," that, on the contrary, " Infinity 
t Weigh the note to § 88, Part X. 



140 



« ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," Part VII. 



" of Expansion subsists not without a Substratum or 
" Being." Mr Gillespie, then, in his dilemma, and out 
of it too, fully " recognises, at least, the possibility of in- 
" finite extension," " which is itself necessary," " requir- 
" ing a substratum" — We shall not say a " substratum 
" to support it," that is, a substratum to be a substratum. 
Infinite extension is itself necessary. But then, it is not 
necessary that infinite extension exist per se : At least, 
this has not been shewn to follow from the other posi- 
tion ; or, moreover, from any thing else. The positions, 
Infinity of extension exists necessarily, and, Innnity of 
extension exists per se ; though it has pleased Antitheos 
to treat them as if they expressed much about the same 
thing, are positions of a widely different character. The 
latter one is no more necessarily true because the former 
is so, than it is necessary, that because there are such 
things as vain assertions cemented together so as to form 
weak arguing, therefore the vain assertions should exist 
per se. Only conceive vain assertions that never pro- 
ceeded from any idle tongue, or unfortunate pen ! that 
never existed, consequently, but by themselves ! hanging 
in the pure per se state — wherever you please ! without 
even a Refutation to reside in ! The 

Words congeal'd in northern air,f 

are not so badly off, though they must submit to be heard 
at the thaw, as those assertions must be. Words frozen 
in the atmosphere must first have been uttered. And 
vet, though there cannot be vain assertions that never 
were made, it is perfectly true there is an abundance of 
the commodity in the world — to try our patience. Some 
very vain assertions are not so far to seek either ; al- 
though we mention no place. 

§ 4. " Mr Gillespie's dilemma recognises, at least, the 
t Hudibras. 



§§ 4-6. 



IRREFRAGABLE. 



141 



" possibility of infinite extension requiring a substratum 
" to support it — infinite extension, which is itself neces- 
" sary ! How is this?" I think, we have told him. 
And, for his comfort, he shall be told yet farther. 

§ 5. " Was it found," demands our antitheist in con- 
tinuation, " that although space possessed a few of the 
" Divine attributes, it did not possess all, nor any thing 
" like all that were deemed needful to constitute a re- 
" spectable deity? Notwithstanding appearances, I should 
" hope not. But, at any rate, we are again landed in a 
" quagmire of absurdity — the absurdity of supposing a 
" thing to be dependent and independent at the same 
" time. If space must be conceived a priori necessary, to 
" talk of a substratum being necessary in the same sense 
" of the word is nonsense."t What does Antitheos here 
understand by the word " space V Without an accom- 
panying word, or phrase, to determine the exact sense it 
is to bear, space always is rather an ambiguous term. 
Different schools of philosophy have employed it to stand 
for very different things. 

§ 6. And it will be of singular use in clearing matters, 
if we present an enumeration of the different things un- 
derstood by philosophers when they are treating oi space. 
— In explaining the various ideas which have been enter- 
tained, one thing shall be carefully attended to : We 
shall take pains not to represent those opinions from 
which we dissent through the medium of our own belief 
on the subject. The inquiry is to be, What do philoso- 
phers mean by space ? And should we presuppose, at 
least should our exposition assume, that space stands for 
some particular thing exclusively, the representation of 
the sentiments of certain could hardly be given with fair- 
ness. In fine, though we have a fixed bias in this mat- 
ter, we shall endeavour, while we deliver what others 
t Parag. 15. 



142 « ARGUMENT, A PRIORI;' &c. Part VII. 



think, to proceed as if we had no preconceived notions 
at all. 

§ 7. A few remarks, also, shall be thrown out, intended 
to show that of the various opinions some approach 
nearer to the truth than do others. Where notions are 
most completely opposed, the object viewed by the minds 
in possession of them cannot possibly be the same, or if 
there be not more objects than one, the sentiments can- 
not possibly all be correct. 'Tis certain enough, that 
the reports brought us, as to what space is, disagree in 
the most fundamental points. — With regard to the expo- 
sition, we shall not take space to stand for any one thing 
more than for any other. But when we pass to the ani- 
madversions, we shall, on the contrary, by all means as- 
sume that space is nothing more than space ; that space 
is nothing more than space, and nothing less. An as- 
sumption which, doubtless, we are well entitled to make : 
And one that will be found to carry a great deal with it 
— A thing you may naturally incline to consider as re- 
markable. But true it is, that so simple an act as hold- 
ing so many of the conceits concerning space up to the 
light of the axiom, space is space, is to lay bare their 
extreme emptiness. — The digression as a whole, in short, 
will be useful, inasmuch as it will go to determine whe- 
ther there be in nature space without matter, and, if 
there be, what space without respect to body is. And 
besides the general purpose it is designed to serve, parts 
of the digression (we seek not to conceal it) will be at- 
tended with no inconsiderable collateral advantage to our 
cause. 



143 



OF THE SENTIMENTS OF PHILOSOPHERS CONCERNING 
SPACE.—M. DES CARTES, MRS COCKBURN, AND 
OTHERS. 

§ 8.-^1. Some philosophers have considered Space to 
be a substance. These may be divided into two classes. 
First ; those who hold Matter and Space to be the same. 
Second; those who contend that Space is a substance, 
and is distinct from matter. 

§ 9. — 1. Des Cartes having defined extension to be the 
essence of matter, and thus made extension and matter 
to be the same, could admit of no space void of body, 
could not admit, in other words, of there being space 
which is not material. A consequence of the definition 
is, that the material universe is infinitely extended : The 
idea of the infinity of extension no man who reflects on 
the subject can get quit of ; and, therefore, if extension 
be matter, matter is without bounds. " Puto" says Car- 
tesius, " implicare contradictionem, ut mundus sit Jinitus." 
[" I take it to involve a contradiction to say, the material 
" universe is finite," i. e. in extent.] JEpist. 69. Partis 
primal. And to reduce the position, Matter is finitely 
extended, to a contradiction, this ingenious theist had 
nothing but his own vain definition, namely, Matter is 
extension, and extension is matter. What else under 
the sun, or above, could he have ? 

§ 10. We shall introduce a passage from a rather in- 
genious author. " Some (I mean Des Cartes and his fol- 
" lowers) confounding the ideas of extension and bodyb&ve 
" by this * * been led to assert the absolute infinity 
" even of the material universe : tho' they could not but 



144 



SENTIMENTS 



Part VII. 



14 at the same time be sensible that their hypothesis in 
" some sense rendered matter or body a necessary being, 
" by depriving the Deity both of the power of creating 
" a finite whole at the first, and of afterwards annihilating 
" any part." " An Impartial Enquiry into the Existence 
" and Nature of God," &c. By S. C. (S. Colliber.J 
B. II. Part ii. ch. 2. — I add, that if extension, or space, 
and matter are to be confounded, matter must have been, 
as well as must be, eternal, and is also necessary in the 
sense of it inferring a contradiction to say, it does not 
exist ; unless we will have it, that all extension began 
sometime to be, and can be imagined not to be at all. 
There can be space without matter, or body : else, body 
is eternal, nay necessarily existing, that is, cannot be sup- 
posed non-existent. 

§ 11. — 2. The opinion has been entertained by some, 
that there is space apart from matter, and that Space 
without matter is, itself, a substance. " Suhstantice sunt,'" 
says Gravesande, " aut cogitantes, aut non cogitantes ; 
<: cogitantes duas novimus, Deum et mentem nostram. 
tt * * * Dum etiam suhstantice, quce, non cogitant, 
" nobis notes sunt, Spatium et Corpus." [" Substances 
" are either cogitative, or incogitative ; the cogitative 
" are two-fold, God and human minds. * * * In- 
44 cogitative substances are likewise two-fold, Space and 
" Body."] Introd. ad Philosophiam, § 19. Under this 
head, we may next notice, in the first place, their notion 
who tell us, that Space void of body is a kind of inter- 
mediate substance ; neither body nor mind, but a some- 
thing between the two. And, in the next place, the sen- 
timent of those who are willing to be held as maintaining, 
that Space is God. 

§ 12. — (1.) The notion that Space is a peculiar sort of 
being, a substance between body and spirit, has been 
adopted by divers writers of no very remote period. A 



§§ 11-13. 



CONCERNING SPACE, 



145 



distinguished female metaphysician expresses herself in 
the following manner. " I see no absurdity in supposing, 
" that there may be other substances, than either spirits 
" or bodies. ******** There should 
" be in nature some being to fill up the vast chasm be- 
" twixt body and spirit. * * * ■ * What a gap be- 
" twixt senseless material and intelligent immaterial sub- 
" stance, unless there is some being, which, by partaking 
" of the nature of both, may serve as a link to unite them, 
" and make the transition less violent? And why may 
44 not Space be such a being ? Might we not venture to 
" define it, an immaterial unintelligent substance, the place 
" of bodies, and of spirits, having some of the properties 
" of both ?" Mrs Cockburn's Works. Birch's Edit. vol. i. 
p. 390-l.t 

§ 13. This lady writes as if body and spirit were two 
distinctly different kinds of substance, and as if intelligence 
was the peculiar attribute of Spirit. Senseless material 
substance, and intelligent immaterial substance ; thus she 
distinguishes : And alluding as she does to the violence 
of that transition which passes from the one substance to 
the other, she represents the substances as being sepa- 
rated by a mighty and irremoveable gulf. She, good 
woman, had not learned the secret (it was yet — possibly 
it still is — undivulged) how to wipe off from matter the 

t Mrs Catherine CocJcbum was the author of " A Defence of Mr 
" Locke's Essay/' and other acute and excellent performances. The De- 
fence was much prized by the incomparable author defended. She was 
also in high favour, on account of her writings, with Br Thomas Burnet, 
Bishop of Salisbury, and the giant-minded Warburton : — Each of these 
Prelates supplied a preface to a production of her pen. Br Thomas Sharp, 
Archdeacon of Northumberland, carried on a controversy with Mrs Cock- 
burn, as to the true foundation of morality. She surely was an honour to 
her sex. — The words quoted in the text, occur in her " Remarks upon 
" some writers in the Controversy concerning the Foundation of Moral 
" Virtue and Moral Obligation." 



146 



SENTIMENTS 



Part VII, 



reproach of being miserably ill qualified for sustaining 
the heavy burden of thought, t Her distinction and re- 
presentation we are disposed to commend. And as for 
her ignorance of the secret ; — probably she was wiser 
without the knowledge. 

§ 14. But now to what is to us the important part in 
the quotation, the statement, to-wit, of her opinion, that 
space is a substance, an unintelligent substance, yea an im- 
material substance. (Of a truth that space void of matter 
— which is what she means by space — is ^m-material, 
none can deny.) By what arguments does Mrs Cockburn 
pretend to evince, that her opinion has foundation in the 
nature of things? I find only one argument in that pas- 
sage, and no more than one other in all her writings. 

§ 15. The argument occurring in the passage quoted, 
infers the truth of the hypothesis embraced, from the ad- 
vantage attending it. Space, argues Mrs Cockburn, " by 
" partaking of the nature of both" "senseless (or unin- 
" telligent) material, and intelligent immaterial sub- 
" stance" 

§ 16. But we must break in, to remark how it comes 
about that Space is invested with " some of the proper- 
" ties of both" spirit and body. Why is Space thus in- 
vested ? Because it is immaterial and unintelligent. Had 
it been said, that, seeing Space is not matter, and is des- 
titute of intelligence, an attribute this of spirit, Space is 
not body and lacks a property of spirit ; there had been 
nothing very objectionable. But as the lady's words 
stand, the only £ property' bestowed on spirit is zm-mate- 
riality — a cold negation ; and the only 6 property' thrown 
over to body is un -intelligence — a mere privation too. 
To return from this interruption, which, we may say, was 
forced upon us, and for which we humbly beg pardon of 
Mrs Cockburn : — 

t See Part VI. § 41. 



%% 14-19. 



CONCERNING SPACE, 



147 



§ 17. She argues, we repeat, that Space, by partaking 
of the nature of both unintelligent material, and intelli- 
gent immaterial substance, is useful in the realm of na- 
ture, inasmuch as it serves as a connecting link, and takes 
off all that can be taken from the violence of the transi- 
tion, between substances separated by such a " vast 
" chasm." — Space, in short, connects intelligence and non- 
intelligence, matter and not-matter. But if there be a 
connecting link between matter and no matter, intelli- 
gence and no intelligence ; why might we not extend the 
principle, and introduce a connecting link beween exist- 
ence in general, itself, and non-existence ; by way of ren- 
dering the transition from the one to the other less vio- 
lent ? But shall we indeed be ever able to say, without 
violence to truth, that the great gulf betwixt non-exist- 
ence and existence 

Tamely endured a bridge of wondrous length ? 

§ 18. The other argument to which allusion was made, 
is not, indeed, intended to evidence, that Space is an un- 
intelligent substance : and as for immateriality, space 
without matter is immaterial all the world over. This 
second argument is intended to evidence no more than 
that Space is a substance. But then, if it really render 
this much apparent, it will do a great deal. The argu- 
ment in question is contained in these words : " The idea 
" of space is not the idea of extension, but of something 
" extended."^ Remarks. 

§ 19. Now if this argument be to go for any thing at 
all, it will obviously go for something very weighty. Thus 
it deserves our serious consideration. 

t Who shall decide, when doctors disagree ? 
And who shall decide, when Doctors differ from ladies ? " If Space 
u and Duration * * * be not ( as His plain they are not ) themselves 
" substances.''' — Dr SI. Clarke's Ans. to 5th Letter. 



148 



SENTIMENTS 



Part VII. 



§ 20. Space, the argument implies, is not extension, but 
something, that is, a substance extended. 

§ 21. But if Space be an extended substance, Duration 
may be, on the same ground, an enduring substance. The 
two things are in the same predicament. Space and 
Time are each a sine qua non of every thing else. The 
non-existence of either cannot be conceived. They are 
both limitless. They are, in fine, on a footing of equality 
in every essential respect. And if bare space be a sub- 
stance, it will be necessary to assign a sufficient reason 
why bare duration is not. It will be consequentially ne- 
cessary, and absolutely impossible. 

§ 22. This is an argument from the consequence. The 
next shall be an argument from the state of the fact. 

§ 23. Space is a substance having extension : This the 
lady's argument involves. Now the hypothesis, that ex- 
tension is an attribute of space, takes, of necessity, cog- 
nizance of two things, — the substance extended, and the 
extension thereof. But though the hypothesis does so, 
do we ? This is an appeal to consciousness, and as the 
court applied to is competent to take the case in hand, 
so, it need scarcely be said, no other tribunal is qualified. 
Do we (I say) in conceiving space, — as we conceive a thing 
heing, do we conceive, in addition, a thing liaving, exten- 
sion? How, and wherein is space, the substratum ex- 
tended, distinguishable from extension, the property of 
space? The plain and simple truth is, space, the sub- 
stratum, and extension, the property, are not distinguish- 
able at all. We conceive only one extension, only one 
space. 

§ 24. So much for the argument from the fact. Now 
for an argument from the word. 

§ 25. Space just means extension or expansion. " The 
" words Space, Extension, Amplitude, and Expansion 
" are," says the author of the Impartial Enquiry, " no- 



20-27. 



CONCERNING SPACE. 



149 



6 * thing different, neither in their genuine signification 
" nor in their original use" — " whatever distinction is 
" wont to be assigned is merely arbitrary." See his Dis- 
course concerning the Nature of Space. 

§ 25. Space, then, is merely another term for extension. 
And therefore, to say, Space is something which is extend- 
ed, or which is extension, is all one with saying, Exten- 
sion is something which is space. Which propositions 
are indeed nothing more than the truth, in one view of 
matters, viz. that in which the propositions are beheld as 
truisms : But, according to our lady's mode of reckoning 
what are equivalents, are tantamount to these proposi- 
tions : — Space is something (in the former equivalent pro- 
position it ran, which is — but now it becomes) ivhich has, 
or possesses, extension ; and, Extension is something (for- 
merly, which is — at present) which has, or is invested with, 
space. But if simple space (in short) be not only exten- 
sion, or space, but likewise a something or a substance 
possessing space ; then, assuredly, simple space is some- 
thing more than simple space. And we have already ar- 
ranged, that we are not to permit any person to depart 
from us with the impression, that space is any thing more 
than space. "j" 

§ 26. It may be remarked, in approaching the termi- 
nation of this department of the subject, that space or ex- 
tension without any matter filling it, may by all means 
be connected with a substance. But if it be, the circum- 
stance will not make out, that mere space is, of itself, a 
substance. The very reverse, indeed. Space supposing a 
substance, is another thing, truly, from space being one. 

§ 27. Space, then, so far forth as it is space only, can- 
not be a substance. To elevate it to the rank of sub- 
stance, is to change its identity. Before the dignity at- 
taching to the nature of substance will sit easy upon space, 
t See above, § 7. 

Y 



150 



SENTIMENTS 



Part VII. 



we must metamorphose that which is space into that 
which space resides in. 

§ 28. We have, in all this, confined ourselves to one 
line of arguing. But the reader may consider, at this 
point, something which occurs in the third section, above. 

§ 29. — (2.) As the notion which we have just consi- 
dered regards Space as unintelligent, so the opinion next 
to be noticed views it as an intelligent substance. 

§ 30. Br Samuel Clarke has an observation on " the 
" weakness of such, as have presumed to imagine Infinite 
•' Space to be a just representation or adequate idea of 
" the Essence of the Supreme Cause. "f The observation 
occurs under his 4th Proposition : Which runs thus : — 
" What the Substance OR Essence\ of that Being," [or 

t Is there no confounding here of the objective and subjective ? of 
space and our idea of it? To fail in preserving the distinction between 
object and subject, was no uncommon tiling in the Doctor's age. The 
full consequences of the failure were rendered very apparent in the age 
which preceded ours. But though the Doctor sometimes unfortunately- 
lost his ideas in things, and changed, in spite of nature, things into ideas, 
yet, set him upon it, he could condemn all confusion in regard to the 
external and internal. The following passage may be admired, consist- 
ently, by the most finical stickler for the metaphysics which proceed " on 
" the principles'of Common Sense." — " The principal occasion or reason of 
u the confusion and inconsistencies, which appear in what most writers 
" have advanced concerning the nature of Space, seems to be this : that 
" (unless they attend carefully,) men are very apt to neglect that ne- 
" cessary distinction, (without which there can be no clear reasoning,) 
" which ought always to be made between Abstracts and Concretes, such 
" as are Immensitas and Immensum ; and also between Ideas and 
" Things, such as are the notion (which is within our own mind) 
" of Immensity, and the real Immensity actually existing without us." 
Correspondence with Leibnitz. Note in 5th Reply. 

\ The Doctor employs these two words as perfectly synonymous, and 
entirely convertible. This will be very plain to him who reads what is 
under this 4th Proposition. In which, the Doctor, when speaking in 
relation to God — the Self-Existent, Necessarily -Existing — Supreme 
Being — Substance — Cause, — uses, no less than five times, (as we have 
denoted,) substance and essence as expressing exactly the same thing : 



§ 28—32 



CONCERNING SPACE. 



151 



Substance,"t] " which is Self-Existent, or Necessarily 
" Existing, is ; we have no idea, neither is it at all possi- 
'* ble for us to comprehend it." The proposition lays 
down, that of the substance of God we have no idea : The 
observation sets an eye on those who, contrariwise, ima- 
gined that we have an idea of such substance ; — that our 
idea of infinite space — -not infinite space itself, as Clarke 
has it — is the idea of the substance of God. The great 
Hector of St James's, then, knew of persons who laboured 
in trying to represent space to be the substance of the 
Divine Being. 

§ 31. " Some," says Leibnitz, " have believed it (real 
" absolute space) to be God himself." Third Paper to 
Clarke, 3. 

§ 32. And Bishop Berkeley, good Bishop Berkeley, J no 
bad judge he of the sentiments of others, and no lover of 
language deficient in precision, speaks of " that danger- 

ous dilemma, to which several, who have employed their 
il thoughts on this subject, imagine themselves reduced ; 
" to-wit, of thinking either that real space is God, or else 
f that there is something beside God which is eternal, 
" uncreated, infinite, indivisible, immutable." — " It is cer- 
" tain," continues the Bishop, " that not a few divines, 
" as well as philosophers of great note, have, from the 
" difficulty they found in conceiving either limits or an- 

nihilation of space, concluded it must be Divine," viz. 

To say nothing of his employing, more than once, the two words indif- 
ferently, when treating concerning other things or beings. So that we 
may cite, as completely applicable to the present case, a marginal note in 
his Preface to " The Evidences of Natural and Revealed Religion." — 
" In this whole question, the word Essence is not to be taken in the 
" proper metaphysical sense of the word, as signifying that by which a 
" thing is what it is. * * * * But Essence, is all along to be understood, 
" as signifying here the same with Substance.' 1 '' 
t See Part V. § 10. 

X To Berkeley, every virtue under heaven. 

Pope. 



152 



SENTIMENTS 



[Part VII. 



a Divine Substance : for, observe, his view here is directed 
to those who put forth, " that real space is God." " And 
" some of late have set themselves particularly to shew, 
" that the incommunicable attributes of God agree to it." 
Principles of Human Knowledge, Sect. CXVII. Thus 
far Bishop Berkeley. 

§ 33. We shall seize this favourable opportunity, to 
vindicate the memory of a writer not so much known now 
as once he was. Against the respectable author whom 
we have in our eye, has a serious accusation been brought 
by Dr Isaac Watts. A great lover of truth was the 
Doctor : And if he be detected making a wrong state- 
ment, we can have no difficulty in ascribing the false re- 
presentation to the true source, and may rest most tho- 
roughly contented that he knew no better himself. 

§ 34. The charge which the Doctor's pen was trusted 
to drop flows in this manner : — " Mr Raphson, a great 
" mathematician, has written a book on this theme, Be 
" Spatio Reali,\ wherein he labours to prove that this 
;c space is God Himself, going all along upon this suppo- 
" sition, that space is and must be something real ; and 
" then his reason cannot find an idea for it below God- 
" head." Philosophical Essays. Essay I. Sect. iv. 

§ 35. But this testimony is not borne out by the fact ; 
Mr Raphson s book neither labours to prove, nor so much 
as simply affirms, a thing so very absurd as the assertion, 
that space is God. The 13th proposition in Mr Raph- 
sons demonstration concerning space is : " Spatiwn est 
" attributum (viz. immensitas) Primm Causoe." [" Space 
" is an attribute (or it is theimmensity) of the First Cause."] 
See Cap. V. And it is not in one place only of his book, 
this great mathematician maintains, that 1 space, infinite 
space or immensity, is nothing more than an attribute of 



f Published at London, in mdcxcvii. 



§§ 33-36. 



CONCERNING SPACE. 



153 



the Supreme Being. t So very far was he from giving 
any countenance to the monstrous position with which 
Dr Watts has connected his name.J 

§ 36. Before losing sight of our mathematician, and of 
our metaphysician, we shall note, by way of setting mat- 
ters farther right, that the Reverend accuser (at least 
during one stage of his life,||) went nearer than Joseph 
Raphson did, to making space tobeGoD. In the very same 
paragraph wherein the mathematician's sentiment is mis- 
represented, the metaphysician hath these words : " Indeed, 

f The following words occur in the Dedication :— " Be Spatio Reali 
" * * subsequens tractatus agit * * * * quatenus * Supremi 
" Entis infinitum sit et eeternum Attributum." [" The following work 
" treats * * of Real Space * * * * as it is an infinite and eternal 
" Attribute of the Supreme Being."] In Cap. vi. these passages are to be 
found : " Spatium reale et infinitum, seu invisibilem Warn et incorpoream 
" rS Infiniti extensionem, ipsam immensitatem esse Primos Causae," &c. 
[" That the immensity of the First Cause is constituted by real and infinite 
" space, which are just other words to express the invisible and incorpo- 
" real extension of the Infinite One," &c] " Amplitudo extensionis infi- 
" nita, immensam in Prima Causa essendi difusionem, seu infinitam 
" illius, vereq; interminatam, essentiam, exprimit." [" In relation to the 
" First Cause, infinity of extension is but another expression for diffusion 
" to immensity, or infinite and truly interminable essence."] 

\ Watts has fallen into another mistake : and as we are in the way of 
rectifying blunders at any rate, we shall not leave his readers on a wrong 
scent as to a second notorious misconception in relation to Raphson's 
book. Wherein, affirms the Doctor, the author goes " all along upon this 
" supposition, that space," to-wit, space distinct from matter, " is and 
" must be something real." But what is the truth ? Hear Mr Raphson 
speak for himself. The title of " Cap. IV." is as follows : " Spatium reale 
" d materia distinctum in rerum naturd dari, rationibus e naturd mundi 
" materialis, &c.petitis, demonstratur." [" That there is real space distinct 
" from matter, is demonstrated, by reasons deduced from the nature of 
" the material world, &c."] And the chapter commences in this manner : 
" Hisce prwmissis, ad rem ipsam (scil. spatium reale a materia distinc- 
" turn) evincendam tandem venimus." <$ec. &c. [" Having premised this 
" much, we come at length to evince the thing itself (to-wit, that there 
" is real space distinct from matter") &c. &c] 
|| See Part X. § 57. 



154 



SENTIMENTS 



Part VII. 



" if space be a real thing existent without us, it appears 
" to bid fair for Deity." See also the title to the Es- 
say.t 

§ 37. All this trouble, a desire to do justice, and a 

regard to truth, compelled us to take. 

§ 38. We have shown that Space cannot be a Substance. { 
If Space cannot be a Substance, it cannot be a substance 
in possession of intelligence. All that we shall now do, 
is, to add something additional, upon the topic of the im- 
possibility of Space having intelligence, or being God. 

§ 39. By God, — at the very least we must mean, if we 
mean any thing, an intelligent, moral Being, or a Being 
with the attributes of intelligence, wisdom, goodness, ho- 
liness, &c. &c. How, then, can Space be God ? how can 
Extension without matter, be wise and good ? Space, for 
aught that has been proved, or that appears, to the con- 
trary, may^ coexist with those attributes: It may be 
the mode of a Substance, of which they are modes too. 
But how can space, extension void of body, vacuum, be 
intelligent, and wise, and good, and holy \ To say, that 
space is intelligent, wise, good, holy, is to say what vir- 
tually implies, that space, and intelligence, and wisdom, 
and goodness, and holiness, are coexisting things, but it 
is not to say what implies any thing more — if the asser- 
tion is to be supposed to have really any proper meaning. 
Space is nothing but space. But intelligence is some- 
thing which is not Space. Therefore, if space itself 
were intelligence, space would not be space. Though 
Space and Intelligence may well be allowed to be coexist- 
ences, you cannot sink and lose the one in the other, 
without absurdity. But you sink and lose them in each 
other, whenever you make them more than coexistences. 
And they are more than coexistences, if space is intelli- 

t See Part X. § 10. See, also, § 24 and § 34 of the same Part. 
X See above, § 21, and following sections, to § 28 inclusive. 



§§ 37-41. 



CONCERNING SPACE. 



155 



gence. And Space is Intelligence, if it be true that space 
is intelligent, true, in any other sense than that involved 
in the position, They are coexistences. 

§ 40. " Space," observes Clarke, " is not a Being, an 
" eternal and infinite Being, but a property, or a conse- 
" quence of the existence of a Being infinite and eternal. 
" Infinite Space, is Immensity : But Immensity is not 
" God : And therefore Infinite Space, is not God." Third 
Reply to Leibnitz, 3. Again. " Infinite Space, is nothing 
" else but abstract Immensity or Infinity ; even as Infinite 
" Duration is abstract Eternity. And it would be just 
" as proper, to say that Eternity is the essence," [or sub- 
stance^] " of the Supreme Cause ; as to say, that Immen- 
" sity is so." Demonstration : under Prop. IV. — These 
observations are deserving of being pondered, and with 
the reflections to which such observations should give 
birth, we cannot be too familiar. 

§ 41. In connection with what we have said, that, for 
aught which has been shown, or appears, to the contrary, 
space — we shall here say, infinite space — may co-exist 
with intelligence, wisdom, &c. ; we are desirous of answer- 
ing a question put forth by Antitheos, whom, in the mean 
time, we would not forget altogether. " How infinite ex- 
" tension," these are Antitheos' 1 s words, " or infinite dura- 
tion, or a compound of both — if a compound of this 
" nature can be imagined — " (I am sure it cannot) — " or 
; ' how even a substratum of these abstractions^ — supposing 
" such substratum — can afford a medium for the exist- 
" ence of intelligence, power, and freedom of agency, 
" passes all understanding." — " Can we describe," de- 
mands our atheist, " how it is possible for intelligence to 

t See above, the second note to § 30. 

I The word in the " Refutation" is " attractions obviously a mis- 
print. The sense (perhaps the nonsense — see Part I. § 8) requires ab- 
stractions. 



156 



SENTIMENTS 



Part VII. 



44 pervade all space — ? * * * * * 

" Mr Gillespie talks of a substance, it is true, a being of 
" infinity of expansion, &c." f To Antitheos's ques- 
tion, How can intelligence pervade all space ? I shall 
respond by a counter interrogation. But first, I must 
set down two or three words of his own, by way of a sort 
of fulcrum, whereby and where from to loosen the foun- 
dations of his materialism, or, should these remain un- 
shaken, it will be because his atheism totters to its base. 
;< Intelligence *, speaking generally, is," asserts Antitheos, 
" nothing more than an accidental property of matter." % 
Now my question is this : Does matter possess extension? 
No doubt, — Antitheos has already informed us.|| Where- 
fore, intelligence being a property of what has extension, 
intelligence pervades what has extension. For how can 
intelligence be a property of matter, but by pervading 
matter ? The thing is clear enough. But what is meant 
by pervading matter, is, co-existing with matter. 

§ 42. Then — (I see Antitheos tremble for his atheism, 
as well he may — ) if intelligence can co-exist with matter, 
or solid extension, why, why can intelligence not pervade, 
or co-exist with, extension without solidity, with pure 
space ? Certain it is, the solidity does indeed seem to be 
no furtherance, but an impediment rather, to thought. 

§ 43. Will Antitheos be disposed to allege, that it is the 
infiniteness of space which presents the barrier in the way 
of the co-existence of Space and Intelligence \ If he will, 
then we shall let Leibnitz furnish the ground-work for an 
unanswerable reply. " Supposing the sensorium (of the 
" soul) to be extended, * * * the question returns, 
" Whether the soul be diffused through the whole exten- 
" sion, be it great or small. For, more or less in bigness, 



t Chap. XII. par. 1 & 2. 
1| See Part VI. § 2. 



X Chap. XI. par. 4. 



§§ 42-44. CONCERNING SPACE. 



157 



" is nothing TO the purpose here." Fifth Paper, 98. 
— In fine, why may not intelligence pervade all space, as 
well as all a brain, or all of any portion of a brain ? 

§ 44. We shall finish what we have to urge in relation 
to the opinion, that pure space is a substance, as well as, 
indeed, in relation to our first head generally, by putting 
before our readers two passages in Mr Locke.] And had 
these passages, or such passages as these, been sufficiently 
digested (and Bacon himself could not point to much that 
was worthier of undergoing the whole process), we should 
never have heard of such a fantastic hypothesis as that 
which maintains that space is a substance — an unintelli- 
gent substance, or an intelligent one — For neither branch 
of the hypothesis is one whit more ridiculous than the 
other. " Space, considered barely in length between any 
" two beings, without considering any thing else between 
" them, is called distance ; if considered in length, breadth, 
" and thickness, I think it may be called capacity ; the 
" term extension is usually applied to it in what manner 
" soever considered." Essay. B. II. ch. xiii. § 3. :< Whe- 
" ther we consider, in matter itself, the distance of its 
" coherent solid parts, and call it, in respect of these solid 
" parts, extension ; or, whether considering it as lying 
" between the extremities of any body in its several di- 
" mensions, we call it length, breadth, and thickness ; or 
" else considering it as lying between any two bodies, or 
" positive beings, without any consideration whether 
" there be any matter or no between, we call it distance. 
" However named or considered, it is always the same 

t The passages referred to (for that matter) might be quoted, and not 
to bad purpose either, in relation to any of our great heads, — nay, in re- 
lation to almost any part of this digression. So that, if the reader will 
carry the contents of the passages about in his mind, till he get to the end 
of what we have to say regarding space, he will do what will oblige us, 
and be useful to himself. 

Z 



158 



SENTIMENTS 



Part VIII 



" UNIFORM SIMPLE idea of SPACE whereof having 

" settled ideas in our minds, we can revive, repeat, and 
" add them one to another, as often as we will, and con- 
" sider the space or distance so imagined, either as filled 
" with solid parts, so that another body cannot come there 
" without displacing and thrusting out the body that was 
•• there before ; or else as void of solidity, so that a body 
" of equal dimensions to that empty or pure space, may 
" be placed in it without the removing or expulsion oi 
" any thing that was there." Ibid. § 27. 



PART VIII. 

OF THE SENTIMENTS OF PHILOSOPHERS CONCERNING 
SPACE. — NEWTON, CLARKE, BUTLER, PRICE, LOCKE 
ADDISON, TILLOTSON, MILTON, AND OTHERS. 

§ 1. — II. Other philosophers mean by Space nothing- 
more than a mode, property, quality, affection, of a sub- 
stratum or substance. The philosophers we now speak of 
may be ranged into two divisions. The first division may 
consist of those who allow of no vacuum in nature, who,, 
in other words, hold matter to be infinitely extended. 
The second will be composed of those who maintain the 
existence of vacuum, or space without matter. 

§ 2. — 1. As to those philosophers who fall to be ranked 
under the first division : These, in affirming matter to be 
limitless, not having it to say, (they being no Cartesians,) 
that matter, because the same with extension, cannot be 
conceived to be finite ; have one only decent pretext for 
their conduct, Their pretext is this, — they please arbi- 



§§ 1-5. 



CONCERNING SPACE. 



159 



trarily to make the affirmation. Now, because they have 
no better reason to give, we are inclined to believe, their 
assertion agrees not with the nature of things. That, in 
point of fact, matter is infinitely extended, — that, in point 
of fact, there is no such thing as vacuum any where amidst 
bodies,t or beyond all matter, (there being no beyond in 
relation to all matter,) as to so gratuitous an assertion, 
it is nowise necessary that we give it a farther considera- 
tion. Our readers shall have dwelt upon the subject long- 
enough, by the time they have fully comprehended the 
elements constituting the assertion. 

§ 3. — 2. We, therefore, pass on to the philosophers of 
the second class, the philosophers who admit that there 
is Space distinct from matter, considering this Space to 
be no more than a mode or property of a substance or 
substratum. 

§ 4. " Deus * * *." says the great Newton in his 
celebrated Scholium, " Nonest wternitas velinfinitas, sed 
" ceternus et infinitus ; non est duratio vel spatium, sed 
" durat et adest. Durat semper, et adest ubique ; et ex- 
" istendo semper et ubique, durationem et spatium, ceterni- 
" tatem et infinitatem constituit." [" The Deity * * 
" * is not eternity nor infinity, but HE is eternal and 
" infinite ; HE is not duration nor space, but HE endures, 
" and is expanded. X He endures always, and is present 
" every where ; and by existing at all times and in all 
" places, he makes duration and space, eternity and in- 
" finity, to be."J] Princip. Mathematic. Schol. general, 
sub fmem. 

§ 5. Those who are acquainted with Clarices Demon- 
t See ArPENDix A. 

% " Sir Isaac Newton, in his famous Scholium, * * supposes God to 
" be extended" or expanded. Br Watts' Inquiry concerning Space. 
Sect. v. — " Sir Isaac Newton thought, that the Deity * * * con- 
" stitutes * space." Br Reid. See Part IX. § 17. 



160 



SENTIMENTS 



Part VIH 



stration, and his Letters to Butler, are well aware what 
his sentiment is.*f We shall select a passage from a dif- 
ferent quarter of his writings. " Space void of body, is 
" the property of an incorporeal Substance." Again : 
; ' By void Space, we never mean Space void of every thing. 
" * * In all void Space, God is certainly present," &c. 
&c. Papers which passed between Leibnitz and Clarke : 
t 'inrkes 4th Reply, § 8 & 9. A hundred quotations to 
the same effect might be made. 

§ 6. " We seem," these are the words of Butler, " to 

• discern intuitively, that there must and cannot but 

• be somewhat, external to ourselves, answering this idea," 
the idea of infinity, i. e. immensity and eternity," "or 

" the archetype of it. And from hence (for this abstract, 
" as much as any other, implies a concrete) we conclude. 
" that there is and cannot but be, an infinite, an immense 
" eternal Being existing." Analogy of Religion Natural 
and Revealed. Part I. chap. vi. 

§ 7. " It is," says Br Price, " a maxim which cannot 

t § 1. " They" (" Eternity" and " Immensity") " seem both to be but 
" modes of an Essence or Substance." Demonstration, under Prop. IV. 
— " Space, is a property, or mode, of the self-existent Substance." "The 
" self -existent Substance * * is itself (if I may so speak) the Substra- 
■ turn of Space" Ans. to the 3d Letter. 

§ 2. " Though his" [Dr Clarke's] " adversaries (see Chev. Ramsay, 
' book i. prop. 8. Schol.) charged him with adopting the Diffusive Ubi- 
•• quity, he is," says Henry Lord Brougham, or Sir Charles Bell, or say 
both, " plainly not subject to this observation." Illustrative Note on the 
9th paragraph of Chapter xxiv. of Brougham and BelVs Paleyh Natural 
Theology. 

§ 3. Amazing assertion ! How can Clarice make immensity, or bound- 
less space, 1 to be a mode of God's Substance : How can Clarice maintain 
the Deity to be the Substratum of Space : Unless Clarice do adopt 
diffusive ubiquity, 2 and be, very plainly too, subject to the charge brought 
against him by the Chevalier ? 

1 " To say that immensity does not signify boundless space, * * * v is (I think) 
" affirming' that words have no meaning." Clarke's 5th Reply to Leibnitz. 

2 What is ubiquity which is not diffusive ? The same thing that unextended exten- 
sion is. See Appendix B. § 10. 11. &e. 



§§ 6-9. 



CONCERNING SPACE. 



161 



" be disputed, that time and place are necessary to the 
" existence of all things. Br Clarke" continues Br Price, 
" has made use of this maxim to prove that infinite space 
" and duration are the essential properties of the Deity, 
and I think he was right." 

§ 8. If I dared to introduce the author of the " Argu- 
" ment" among such illustrious company, I should notice 
that his sentiment is the same as theirs, and that he has 
attempted to demonstrate (what, by the bye, none of the 
others ever thought of doing) that space, infinity or im- 
mensity, or what you will, is only an attribute or mode. 
See Part VII. § 3. 

§ 9. After these references to the opinion of Clarke 
and Butler, &c, we shall be able duly to appreciate the 
justness of something put forth by Antitheos, almost at 
his outset. " It could not," this gentleman declares, 
u escape observation among minds of an abstract and re- 
" flective turn, that space possesses some of the attributes 
u commonly ascribed to Deity, such as infinity, and, of 
" course, omnipresence ;t immateriality, and so forth : 
" that duration cannot be supposed to have had a begin- 
" ning, or to be within the possibility of ever coming to 
££ an end. It must thus have appeared to the metaphy- 
■ ii sical theist, exceedingly desirable to bring these idle 
££ and unappropriated attributes into more useful play, 
" and in a manner the most advantageous to the common 
" faith. Clarke and Butler, and all their followers, have 

t § 1. If we would speak -with strict correctness; to be infinitely extend- 
ed and to be omnipresent, — to have infinity, viz. of extension, and to have 
omnipresence, — are the same. Omnipresence is no consequence, (Antitheos 
would have it a consequence) of infinity, or infinite extension. Omnipre- 
sence is just infinite extension, and infinite extension is just omnipresence. 

§ 2. "It is not very correct to say (though Antitheos says) that infinity, 
to-wit, of extension, or space, is an attribute of space : Unless a thing may 
be an attribute of itself. Space is infinite : and infinite space is no attri- 
bute of infinite space. 



162 



SENTIMENTS 



Part VIII. 



" accordingly talked much of these matters, and evinced 
" a strong predilection for them in selecting examples 
" wherewithal to illustrate the absolute and infinite per- 
" fections of the Divine nature. These metaphysicians, in 
" short," [observe, it is c; metaphysicians,"] " have made 
" space and duration usurp the station and dignity of a 
" Divine Being. They have taken this empty and inani- 
• mate fabrication, and set it up in a newly-erected shrine 
" of curiously mathematical construction, and fallen down 
" to it as the God of their idolatry. "t (The " mathema- 
; ' tical" shrine, — not the " metaphysicians, "J but — our 
magician must have constructed. Newly erected is the 
shrine : and if suddenly erected, no wonder, since it arose 
by magic. ||) With Clarice and Butler, and their followers 
as to this affair, infinite space and infinite duration are no 
more than modes or properties of the existence of God. 
With Antitheos — Clarke and Butler, and their followers, 
make space and duration to be God Himself. As arrant 
a piece of nonsense as could be put into their mouths, 
And we know how honestly put. 

§ 10. The same sort of thing is set forth in other places 
too. For instance : — In Chapter VI. paragraph 15, our 
atheist speaks, as we have heard, as if Mr Gillespie had 
represented space to be Deity.^F And in Chapter XII. 
paragraph 2, Antitheos hints broadly enough, (and falsely 
enough,) that the same gentleman " m&kes space into a 
" God altogether." Read, also, the 12th paragraph of 
Chapter III. 

§ 11. We shall in this place take notice of Mr Locke, 
who seems undetermined — not so much what to think, as — 
what to say, as to whether space be a substance or a mode. 

t Chap. I. par. 7. 

J Law notices " the great confusion caused by a jumble of Mathematics 
" and Metaphysics together." — Notes to King. Note (6.) 
|| See Part VII. § 1. «[ See Part VII, § 5. 



%§ 10-12. 



CONCERNING SPACE. 



163 



This solid thinker believed the material universe to be 
finite. " If," he says, " body be not supposed infinite, 
" which, I think, no one will affirm," §fc. Essay, B. II. 
ch. xiii. § 21. And the like in numerous places. And 
as he believed matter to be finite, so he believed, and 
could not but believe, space to be infinite : " This," he 
declares, " is certain, that whoever pursues his own 
" thoughts, will find them sometimes launch out beyond 
the extent of body, into the infinity of space or expan- 
u sion." Ibid. Ch. xv. § 4. To the same effect he speaks 
in many passages. Locke believed, we say, that body is 
finite, and space infinite : Consequently, that there is space 
without matter. And though he determines not, at least 
does not determine explicitly, whether space void of body 
be a substance, or only the property of one ; — ( space void 
of body, or beyond body, can be no third thing ; it cannot 
be a relation of bodies to each other ;) — he shews a de- 
cided leaning to the sentiment, that such space is no more 
than a mode. 

§ 12. This most judicious philosopher gives no obscure 
intimation of what was his opinion, in the following pas- 
sages. " Whatever men shall think concerning the exist- 
" ence of vacuum, this is plain to me, that we have as 
" clear an idea of space, distinct from solidity, as we have 
<■ of solidity, distinct from motion, or motion from space. 
" We have not any two more distinct ideas ; and we can 
" as easily conceive space without solidity, as we can con- 
' ceive body or space without motion, though it be never 
" so certain, that neither body nor motion can exist with- 

4£ out space. But whether" after all he had said to 

evince, that motion proves a vacuum to be in the neigh- 
bourhood of bodies,t and that there is a vacuum, infinite 
vacuum, beyond the utmost bounds of body ; after all he had 
said,J in a word, (and before all he had to say||) to make 

t See Appendix A. J See B. II. ch. xiii. § 21. Etc. 

|| See B. II. ch. xvii. § 4, Etc, Etc. 



164 



SENTIMENTS 



Part VIII. 



clear, that there is extension independent of matter 

:c Whether any one will take space to be only a relation 
;£ resulting from the existence of other beings at a dis- 
;£ tance, or whether they will think the words of the most 
" knowing King Solomon, ' The heaven, and the heaven of 
" ' heavens, cannot contain Thee ;' or those more empha- 
" tical ones of the inspired philosopher, St Paid, 6 In him 
c< ; we live, and move, and have our being,' are to beun- 
• : derstood in a literal sense, I leave every one to consi- 
; ' der ;t only our idea of space is, I think, such as I have 
• ; mentioned, and distinct from that of body." B. II. ch. 
xiii. § 27. Again: "It is true, we can easily, in our 
" thoughts, come to the end of solid extension ; the extre- 
" mity and bounds of all body, we have no difficulty to ar- 
4; rive at ; but when the mind is there, it finds nothing 
•' to hinder its progress into this endless expansion : of 
" that it can neither find nor conceive any end. Nor 

let any one say, that beyond the bounds of body there is 
" nothing at all, UNLESS he will confine God within the 
" limits of matter. Solomon, whose understanding was 
i; filled and enlarged with wisdom, seems to have other 
" thoughts, when he says, ' Heaven, and the heaven of 
• ; ' heavens, cannot contain THEE f and he, I think, very 
" much magnifies to himself the capacity of his own 
" understanding, who persuades himself, that he can ex- 
; ' tend his thoughts farther than God exists, or imagine 
" any expansion where HE is NOT." Ibid. ch. xv. § 2. 
Again : " God * * fills eternity ; and it is hard to 
" find a reason, why any one should doubt that HE like- 

wise fills immensity. His infinite BEING is certainly 
- l as boundless one way as another ; and methinks it 
" ascribes a little too much to matter, to say, where there 

is no body, there is nothing." Ib. § 3. Again : 
" — The boundless invariable oceans of duration and ex- 
t See Appendix B. 



§§ 12-15. 



CONCERNING SPACE. 



165 



" pansion ; which comprehend in them all finite beings, 
" and in their full extent, belong only to THE DEITY." 
Ib. § 8. Again : " Motion cannot be attributed to God, 
" not because he is an immaterial, but because HE is an 
" infinite, spirit." B. II. ch. xxiii. § 21. Again : " God 
" is * * everywhere." Ib. ch. xxvii. § 2. 

§ 13. See also, to the same purpose, B. II. ch. xvii. 
§ 20. B. II. ch. xxiii. §§ 33. 34. 35. 36. Etc. etc. 

§ 14. Why this great philosopher did not speak out 
still more unequivocally in this case, reasons might be as- 
signed. That he had something in his mind as to which 
he did not, for certain causes, speak fully out, we may 
see (as from the two first citations in the twelfth section 
above, so) from certain rather mysterious words in the 
passages to be presently cited from the Essay : Words 
which do hint, not too darkly either, that this wonderful 
man had the solid foundations of the a priori argument 
from Space and Time — or Immensity and Eternity — to 
the existence of God, settled and firmly fixed in the deep 
recesses of his mind. To which conclusion we shall be 
the more led, when we reflect, that Locke, in his corres- 
pondence with his friend Limborch, distinctly states his 
belief, that the Unity of Deity is completely proveable 
a priori. 

§ 15. " Je crois" so writes Locke to that correspondent, 

" que quiconque reflechira sur soi-meme, connoitra evi- 
" demment sans en pouvoir douter le ?noins du monde, 
" quHl y a eude toute eternite un Eire intelligent. Je 
" crois encore quHl est evident a tout homme qui pense, 
" qu'il y a aussi un Etre infini. Or je dis qu'il nepeut 
" y avoir QU'un Etre infini, §f que cet Etre infini doit etre 
" aussi VEtre eternel ; parce que, ce qui est infini doit 
il avoir et£ infini de toute eternite, car aucuns additions 
" faites dans le terns, ne sauroient rendre une chose infinie, 
" si elle ne Vest pas en elle-meme, df par elle-meme, de 



366 



SENTIMENTS 



Part VI II. 



" toute etemite,. Telle etant la nature de Vinfini gu'' on 
" n'en pent rien oter, Sf qu'on n'ypeut rien ajouter. D'ou 
" il s'ensuit que Vinfini ne sauroit etre separe en plus d'un, 
" ni etre qiCun." 

§ 16. " (Test-Id, scion moi, une preuve A PRIORI 

" QUE lZeTRE ETERNEL INDEPENDENT N'EST QU'UN : 
" si nous y joignons Videe de toutes les perfections possi- 
" bles, nous avons alors Videe d J un DiEU eternel, infini, 
" omniscient, tout-puissant, &c."| From Locke's let- 
ter to Limborcli of 21st May, 1698. Consult also Locke 
to Limborch of 29th Oct. 1697, and of 2d April 1698. 

§ 17. The very important passages to which we re- 
ferred so recently J are the following. " To conclude : 
" expansion and duration do mutually embrace and com- 
" prehend each other ; every part of space being in every 
" part of duration ; and every part of duration in every 
• : part of expansion. || Such a combination of two distinct 
:< ideas is, I suppose, scarce to be found in all that great 
" variety we do or can conceive, and may AFFORD mat- 

t " I believe that whoever makes use of his reflection, will know it to be 
" a most evident and unquestionable truth, that there has been from all 
" eternity an intelligent Being. I believe also that it is evident to 
" every thinking man, that there is likewise an infinite Being. Now 
" I say that there can be but one Infinite Being, and that the Infinite 
" Being must be also the eternal Being ; because what is infinite must 
" have been infinite from all eternity, since no additions made in time, 
" could render that infinite, which was not so in itself, and by itself, from 
" all eternity. The nature of infinity involving that nothing can be taken 
" from it, nothing added to it. Whence it follows that infinity cannot be 
" divided, nor be more than one thing. 

" This is, as I think, a proof A PRIORI that the Eternal In- 
" dependent Being is but one : and if we join the idea of all possi- 
" ble perfections, we have the idea of one God, Eternal, Infinite, All- 
" knowing, and All-powerful, &c." X ^ ee above, § 14. 

J| " Cum unaquceq; Spatii par ticula sit semper, & unumquodq; Dura- 
" tionis indivisibile momentum ubique" — [" Since each particle (or point) 
" of Space is always, and each indivisible moment of Duration is every- 
" where — "] Sir Isaac Newton, Schol. Generate. 



§§ 16-21. 



CONCERNING SPACE. 



167 



" TER TO FARTHER SPECULATION." B. II. ch. XV. § 12. 
And again : " The idea whereof," viz. " infinity of space 
" or expansion," " is distinct and separate from body, 
" and all other things : WHICH MAY (to those WHO 
" please) be a subject of farther meditation." 
Ib. §4. 

§ 18. However, we shall not get leave to keep Locke 
of our party, without a struggle. But as the very name 
of the author of the " Essay concerning Human Under- 
" standing" will frighten many of the timid and weak 
philosophers over to the side he espouses ; will enable 
not a few among the irresolute philosophers to make up 
their minds with whom to range themselves ; and will be 
sure to throw a damp over any ardour which opposing 
philosophers may possess : we shall make good our right 
to retain Locke among our numbers, by the irresistible 
force of fair means. 

§ 19. Reid it is who disputes our claim to Mr Locke's 
authority in the present case. " Locke" remarks the 
Doctor, " has reduced all things to three catagories, viz. 
" substances, modes, and relations. In this division, 
" time, space, and number, three great objects of human 
" thought, are," the Doctor declares, " omitted." Ana- 
lysis of Aristotle's Logic. Chap. II. sect. ii. 

§ 20. Does Br Reid put forward any thing to support 
the declaration ? No. Then that is so far well : We 
have not to set out to overturn aught given as proof of 
his assertion ; consequently, there's nothing to prevent 
our proceeding straightway to the proof of our own, viz. 
that Mr Locke took pure space to be a mode of existence. 

§ 21. Reid is quite correct in saying, that the profound 
reason er he mentions reduces all things, all the objects 
of thought, to the three categories, substances, modes, and 
relations. The subject of Modes is taken up by Mr Locke 



168 



SENTIMENTS 



Part VIII. 



first of all. The Chapter (it is Chapter XIII. of Book II.) 
in which he begins to treat of modes, is occupied with 
" the simple modes of space." A great portion of the 
Chapter is occupied in proving : " Extension and body 
" not the same''' — (§ 11 — ) " A vacuum" or, as he else- 
where calls it. "pure space," " beyond the utmost bounds 
" of body"—{% 21.) Etc. etc. etc.] So that if the au- 
thor of the Essay omitted to place among modes pure 
space, that great object of human thought at sundry 
times, and of Br Reid's when he set space betwixt time 
and number (as above ;) it was not because Locke had 
not brought modes and pure space into the closest juxta- 
position. Further, if it had been omitted to class pure 
space, and duration, (or time, as Held has it,) with modes, 
Locke could hardly fail to observe the omission, consi- 
dering that 4 chapters are mostly taken up in treating of 
those two things ; 4 chapters, not one of which is one of 
Locke's short ones; 4 chapters, which together consti- 
tute no inconsiderable part of the whole Essay. And if 
he had noticed any omission of the kind, he would cer- 
tainly (for Locke was an honest man) have done some- 
thing to remedy the mighty defect in the principle or 
the application of his classification. But if so very pal- 
pable an omission as the omission must have been, if it 
existed at all. were made and were not observed, it is far, 
far indeed, from being what one would have reasonably 
expected from so capacious and observing a mind. 

§ 22. But not to insist solely on these considerations, 
convincing though they are, we shall hear Mr Locke 
speak for himself, directly on the subject of wlmt Spjace 
is : for with Space only we have here to do. — Remem- 
ber, that our controversy at this time is with Dr Reid I 
who has asserted, that Mr Locke neglected to put space 

t See above, §§11, 12— also, Part II. § 29, & 30. 



22-23, 



CONCERNING SPACE. 



169 



under any of his three predicaments,— say, under either 
of the two predicaments, Substance and Mode.\ 

§ 23. After having (in the 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 
15th, & 16th sections of the thirteenth chapter of Book 
Second) distinguished 'pure or simple space from body, 
by and bye (§ 17) he puts this question into the mouth 
of an objector : — " If it be demanded (as usually it is) 
" whether this space, void of body, be substance or acci- 
" dent?" Here is a question which, of itself, furnishes 
an experimentum crucis for the determination of the 
point whether or not Locke inclined to take space for an 
accident, that is a mode. When that acute philosopher 
made space to have an existence distinct from matter, he 
saw, he must have seen, that the question would be raised, 
What is pure space ? How then does the author of the 
Essay answer the very natural interrogatory ? By say- 
ing that space is not a substance, and not a mode \ By 
no MEANS. But here was an opportunity of the fairest 
kind he could ever have, to declare that space was not a 
mode or accident, and not a substance, if he took it to be 
neither. How answers he, then, the question, Is space, 
void of body, substance or mode ? " I shall readily an- 
" swer," he replies, " I know not" — I know not which. 
For he does not say : I know not whether pure space be 
any thing at all — And indeed how could he ? since he 
expressly declares that space void of body is NOT nothing 
at all. " Nor let any one say," is his caveat, " that be- 
" yond the bounds of body there is nothing at all," fyc. 

To the same purpose is the following : " When 
" men pursue their thoughts of space, they are apt to stop 
" at the confines of body, as if space were there at an 
" end too, and reached no farther. Or if their ideas, 
" upon consideration, carry them farther, yet they term 
" what is beyond the limits of the universe, imaginary 

t See above, § 19. J As above, § 12. 



170 



SENTIMENTS 



Part VIII. 



" space ; as if it were nothing, because there is no body 
" existing in it"\ B. II. ch. xv. § 4. Etc. etc. — But the 
reply has not yet been all given, and what is to come is 
the better portion : "I know not : nor shall be ashamed 
" to own my ignorance, till they that ask, shew me a 
" clear distinct idea of substance" Then I shall tell 
them, whether space void of body be a substance : Sub- 
stance or mode pure space must be, as it is certainly a 
something. 

§ 24. I know that an exception will be taken to what 
has just been urged, and that the two sections of the 
Essay which do all but immediately succeed the words 
Last quoted, will be especially appealed to by those who 
may be anxious to tear Mr Locke from the company of 
those with whom pure space is a mode, or accident, of a 
substance. In those sections it is said : — " Substance and 
" accidents of little use in philosophy. — " (§ 19.) " Were 
" the Latin words inJwerentia and substantia, put into the 
" plain English ones that answer them, and were called 
" sticking on, and under-propping, they would better dis- 
" cover to us the very great clearness there is in the doc- 
" trine of substance and accidents, and shew of what 
" use they are in deciding of questions in philosophy." 
(§ 20.) Etc. 

§ 25. Mr Locke is ridiculing something here. It is 
granted. But what is that which he ridicules ? Not 
substances.^ Not modes, or accidents, if this word be 
preferable. For he makes all things, " as they are in 
" themselves" (b. ii. ch. xxv. § 1.) to be either substances 

f " The Ancients did not call all Space which is void of bodies, but 
" only extramundane Space, by the name of imaginary Space. The 
" meaning of which, is not, that such Space is not real ; but only that we 
" are wholly ignorant what kinds of things are in that Space" Clarke's 
3d Reply, 2. 

I This is declared by Mr Locke himself, in his second Reply (or third 

Letter) to the Bishop of Worcester. 



%% 24-27. 



CONCERNING SPACE. 



171 



or modes, i. e. accidents.f A good jest indeed it would 

I be, to behold Locke ridiculing 1 , here or there, substances 
and modes ! or the ideas (for Locke was particularly fond 
of the ideas) of substances and modes ! Locke divides 
all things, as in themselves, into modes and substances — 
and ridicules modes and substances ! Incredible. Im- 
possible. 

§ 26. But of a certainty, Mr Locke is ridiculing some- 
( thing. What he ridicules, there are words within the 
boundaries of those two sections which will shew us. 
And it is well we are not left to mere inference, but have 
evidence of the express sort. " They who first ran into 
4i the notion of accidents, as a sort of real beings, that 
" needed something to inhere in, were forced to find out 
u . the word substance, to support them. Had the poor 
" Indian philosopher (who imagined that the earth also 
" wanted something to bear it up) but thought of this 
" word substance, he needed not to have been at the trou- 
" ble to find an elephant to support it, and a tortoise to 
" support his elephant ; the word substance would have 
; < done it effectually." (§ 19.) Etc. 

§ 27. Here you have the key to expose what Mr Locke 
laughs at : which is, The notion of accidents as beings 
having a real existence, distinct from substances. The 
illustration shews this clearly : Locke secretly (yet mani- 
festly) compares the Indian philosopher's earth to an 

t See above, § 19, and 21. " The adequate division of being compre- 
" hends but these two members" i. e. " substance' 1 '' and " modeP — Bayle, 
\ Crit. Diet. P. 3083. " Unquestionably, whatsoever is, or hath any kind 
" of entity, doth either subsist by itself, or else is an attribute, affection^ 
" or mode of something, that doth subsist by itself." Cudworth , s Intel- 
lectual System. Chap. v. Birch's Edit. P. 769. Again : " What is 
" neither Substance nor Modification of a Substance, is a pure non-entity." 
Cudworth , s Eternal and Immutable Morality. B. IV. ch. iv. 9, Sec 
Part X. § 16, and the relative note. 



172 



SENTIMENTS 



Part VIII. 



accident^ and his elephant to a substance ; while, again, 
the elephant and the tortoise being viewed in relation to 
each other, elephant is transformed into accident, tortoise, 
at the same time, stepping into the elephant's shoes, and 
becoming substance. But the earth is notoriously a dis- 
tinct thing from the elephant 

With Atlantean shoulders fit to bear 
The weight of mightiest monarchies ; 

and the elephant is different from the tortoise. There- 
fore accident, — set forth by the earth and the metamor- 
phosed elephant, — is an entity separable from substance, 
— represented by the first elephant and the tortoise. But 
this is absurd. And also very ridiculous. So Mr Locke 
a tolerably grave (he was a very vivacious) gentleman in 
general, takes a hearty laugh at it. And we may well 
join him in his merriment, for the " notion of accidents, 
• as a sort of real beings," having the same relation to 
substances that the earth has to the Indian philosopher's 
elephant, or the elephant to the tortoise, may provoke a 
-mile from the severest countenance. 

§ 28. In accordance with what we have now said, 
Watts writes : — " Mr Locke has happily refuted that un- 
" reasonable notion of substance in general, which makes 
;£ it to be some real thing in nature, different from all the 
" united qualities, the supposed properties and powersf 
** of body or spirit, and he has exposed it to a just ridi- 
" cule, as in Book II. chap. xiii. sect. * 19, 20." Once 
more : " Mr Locke would seem to exclude and abandon 
" any general notion of substance, as another real physi- 
" cal distinct being, provided to support all its real or sup- 
" posed accidents or qualities, and seems to banter it by 
" the Indian's * * tortoise — which supports the elephant 

t Why supposed? are they only supposed? are they not true and real 
properties and powers ? 



S§ 28-31. 



CONCERNING SPACE. 



173 



" — which supports the world."— Philosophical Essays. 
Essay II. sect, i.f 

§ 29. Finally, I would just ask any one to lay his hand 
upon his head, and, for Dr Reid, to reconcile the words 
of Mr Locke, as quoted in the twelfth section, above, with 
any other hypothesis than that which makes endless ex- 
pansion, or space, to be a mode of the existence of God. 

§ 30. But indeed the thing is very clear. And what 
could have induced the author of the u Analysis of Aris- 
" totles Logic" to trust to the world so unguarded and 
groundless an assertion as that which we have been weigh- 
ing, it would not be easy to discover : unless it were that 
he really thought as he wrote, and could not help it. 

§ 31. Before quitting the philosophers who consider pure 

t Prudence dictates that I should use the precaution of begging it to 
be borne in mind, that I am not to be held as doing more than agreeing 
with W atts upon the point as to which he is cited. Watts thinks that : 
" As solid extension" — (" solidity and extension considered in body, are 
" but as one thing" — Essay II. sect, iv. — ) "and a power of thinking 
" have this one character of substance, that they are sufficient supports 
" for qualities, modes or accidents ; so they have the other property of 
K substance also, viz. that they subsist of themselves, independent of any 
* created being." — (Essay II. sect. ii. And see that Essay throughout.) 
Now all this seems to me to be very absurd ; especially the latter part. 
Is power not a relative thing ? can a power of thinking really subsist of 
itself ? Ability, capacity, — power, — seem unavoidably to imply a subject 
of them. 

" I have never," says Watts, " seen sufficient ground to abandon all 
" his ( Des Cartes" s ) scheme of sentiments of the nature of mind or spi- 
" rit."— &c. Essay V. sect i. See Preface to his Essays : especially the 
5th paragraph. 

" Nidlo * " writes Locke, with his eye directed towards Des Cartes's 
scheme as to mind, " Nullo * modo mihi in animum inducere possum 
" cogitationcm per se existere, sedremvel substantiam, cogitantem" — &c. 
[" I cannot conceive cogitation existing by itself, but I can conceive a 
'■'substance cogitating," — &c] Letter to Limborch, of 4th and 18th 
Oct. 1G98. 

In the same strain Reid declares : " We take it * as a first principle 
"* * * * that thinking supposes a being that thinks." — Essay I. ch. ii. 

2 A 



174 



SENTIMENTS 



Part VIII. 



space to be the property of a substance, we shall gratify 
our readers with a paragraph from the pages of our wor- 
thily admired Addison. 

§ 32. " If," says this sensible and elegant writer, in one 
of his Essays on the nature of the Supreme Being, " If 
" we consider HIM (our maker) in his omnipresence, his 
" being passes through, actuates, and supports the whole 
" frame of nature. His creation, and every part of it, is 
t; full of him. There is nothing HE has made that is 
'• either so distant, so little, or so inconsiderable, which 
"he does not essentially inhabit. His substance is within 
; ' the substance of every being, whether material or im- 
" material, and as intimately present to it as that being 
" is to itself. It would be an imperfection in HIM, were 
' : HE able to remove out of one place into another, or to 
" withdraw himself from any thing he has created, or 
''' from any part of that space which is diffused and spread 
" abroad to infinity." Spectator, No. 565. See the re- 
mainder of that most beautiful paper. f 

§ 33. Tillotson, as a Divine, was held in warm admira- 
tion by Addison. But that is not the only reason why we 
shall bring forward a sentence from the Archbishop : who 
was, according to the opinion of Dr Samuel Clarke, — 
himself no mean judge in such matters, — " of far better 
" understanding and judgment" than the generality of the 
Schoolmen. 

§ 34. " By the immensity of God, I mean," Archbishop 
Tillotsontells us, " that His being hath no bounds or limits, 
" but doth EVERY WAY SPREAD AND DIFFUSE ITSELF be- 

' ; yond what we can imagine The presence of another 

' ; being, even of a body, which is the grossest substance, 
" doth not exclude HIM ; the whole world doth not con- 
" fine HIM ; but HE fills all the space which we can 



t See. likewise, No. 571. 



S§ 32-35. 



CONCERNING SPACE. 



175 



;; imagine beyond this visible world, and infinitely more 
" than we can imagine.'' — Sermon CLIY. : on the im- 
mensity of God. 

§ 35. I shall finish this head with thewords of England's 
immortal Epic Bard : who 

Rode sublime 
Upon the seraph-wings of Extasy, 
The secrets of th' Abyss to spy. 
He passed the flaming bounds of Place and Time.t 

The esoteric philosophical theology of the following pas- 
sage in the Paradise Lost is not a whit behind the best in 
all the world. 

— Thou, my "Word, begotten Son, by thee 
This I perform ; speak thou, and be it done 
My overshadowing Spirit and might with thee 
I send along ; ride forth, and bid the deep 
Within appointed bounds be heaven and earth • 
Boundless the deep, because I AM, who fill 
Infinitude ; nor vacuous the space, 
Though I, uncircumscribed myself, retire, 
And put not forth my goodness, 

Book VII. 

t Gray's Progress of Poesy. 



176 



• PART IX. 

OF THE SENTIMENTS OF PHILOSOPHERS CONCERNING 
SPACE.— ANTITHEOS, REID, STEWART, GLEIG, GAS- 
SENDI, EPISCOPIUS, LEIBNITZ, AND OTHERS. 

§ 1. — III. Thus far as to those who will have Space to 
be a Substance, and those who take it to be only a Mode. 
The third grand hypothesis is that of such as lay down, 
that space is space, or what is tantamount to such propo- 
sition. The philosophers we are now come to, are in- 
clined to allow, that there is Space, without matter, in 
the universe : And while they do not allege that Space is 
aught less than Space, they will not suffer more to be 
affirmed concerning it, than that it exists where body ex- 
ists not. As a matter of course, therefore, — maintaining, 
its they do, that Space is neither a substance nor the pro- 
perty of one, but is, notwithstanding, a somewhat really 
existing, — they are for making it out to be some third 
thing. Though indeed, to speak truth, these philosophers 
do not so much assert that space belongs to some third 
class of entity, (viz. something distinct from substance, 
and from property,) as virtually refuse to proclaim what 
Space is. In short, the fair amount of their notion, so 
far, at least, as they let it come before the world, is con- 
tractible to this, Space is Space. 

§ 2. — 1. The philosopher of this class whom we shall 
advert to first, is Antitheos himself. 

§ 3. This gentleman admits, in the most distinct man- 
ner, and to the fullest extent, that there may be space 



§§1-5. SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. 177 



without matter. Of this our readers are perfectly aware. 
According to Antitheos, we can conceive the non-existence 
of the whole material universe.t But though we con- 
ceive matter away, we cannot, our atheist largely, and sa- 
tisfactorily, insists, conceive the non-existence of Space. J 
Pure space, or vacuum, then, is, with our antitheist, a pos- 
sible thing. 

§ 4. To advance to a second admission: — "I grant," 
says Antitheos, — and the admission has already been refer- 
red to as being of the utmost importance, — 1| " I grant 
" that we may conceive of an absolute separation of sub- 
' : stance" [by substance he means matter] " generally," or 
as a whole. || Now, as often as we conceive an abso- 
lute separation of matter, as a whole, so often do we con- 
ceive, that matter is finite ; — separability, and, a fortiori, 
separation, implying finiteness;^! — and that, consequently, 
there is pure space in nature. Whenever, in fine, we 
conceive a separation of matter absolutely, we conceive 
what involves the existence of pure space. But we can 
easily conceive a separation of matter absolutely. We can 
easily, therefore, conceive that vacuum exists. 

§ 5. But not only does Antitheos contend that we may 
conceive — and that we may easily conceive what involves 
— the co-existence of the absence of body and the pre- 
sence of space : he is of opinion that perhaps there has 
always been a vacuum in nature. " We cannot prove," 
he correctly observes, " that it" (" matter") " is infinite- 
" ly extended. The fact is, we cannot say whether mat- 
" ter be infinitely extended or not. "ft And therefore, 
we cannot be sure but that there now is, in point of fact, 
extramundane space. If the world is finitely extended, 



t See Part VI. § 34. 
|| See Part IV. § 8. 
tt Chap V. par. 7. 



X See Part VI. § 33. 
% See Part II. § 39. 



178 



SENTIMENTS 



Part IX. 



(and Antitheos grants, we cannot be certain that it is not,) 
there is empty space beyond its limits. " If the material 
" universe is * * finite ; there cannot but be actual 
" * * extramundane space. "f For our atheist, like a 
reasonable man, admits it is absurd, to suppose, all ex- 
tension itself to be bounded. J According to our atheist's 
doctrine, then, it may be that vacuum is a really existing 
thing. 

§ 6. But what need to speak of our antitheist's making 
vacuum to be possible, or conceivable, — nay easily con- 
ceivable, or very possible — perhaps a real existence ? For 
do not his explicit principles imply all these things, and 
amount, besides, to a great deal more ? " Infinite space," 
(the reader will find in Part VI. § 33.) " is plenarily ad- 
" mitted by our author to have necessary existence." 
• Matter is," (as we have seen in § 34. of the same Part,) 

by our atheist completely deprived of true necessary 
" existence." Thus according to Antitheos 's principles, 
" we have an extension" [which is, and] " which is NE- 
" CESSARY, and we have an extension" [which is, but] 
" which is NOT NECESSARY." || But that necessary exten- 
sion is composed of vacuum, or pure space. Therefore, 
pure or simple space has real existence, yea necessary ex- 
istence, in our atheist's universe : An existence which by 
this time must have given, and which (irreversible Fate 
has decreed it) will continue to give, our atheist, the sorest, 
and a quite unbearable, annoyance. 

§ 7. " All Atheists," said one who was well acquainted 
with antiquity, and who knew right well how to turn his 
skill in the false, as well as in the true, philosophy of the 
ancients, to good account against the enemy : " All Athe- 
" ists are mere Corporealists, that is, acknowledge no 
" other substance besides body or matter. For as there 

t Clarke's 5th Reply : Note. J See Part I. § 34, 35, 0c. 

|| See Part VI. § 36. 



6-10. 



CONCERNING SPACE. 



179 



t; was never any yet known, who, asserting incorporeal 
" substance," [or what implies incorporeal substance,] 
" did deny a Deity ; so neither can there be any reason, 
" why he that admits the former should exclude the lat- 
" ter. Again, the same dull and earthly disbelief or con- 
" founded sottishness of mind, which makes men deny a 
" God, must needs incline them to deny all incorporeal 
" substance " [and all that implies incorporeal substance] 
" also. Wherefore as the physicians speak of a certain 
" disease or madness, called hydrophobia, the symptom of 
<J those that have been bitten by a mad dog, which makes 
" them have a monstrous antipathy to water ; so all 
" Atheists are possessed with a certain kind of madness, 
" that may be called Pnewnatophobia, that makes them 
" have an irrational but desperate abhorrence from spi- 
" rits or incorporeal substances," [or whatever implies as 
much,] " they being acted also, at the same time, with 
" an Hylomania, whereby they madly doat upon matter, 
" and devoutly worship it as the only Numen. 17 Cud- 
worth's Intellectual System. Chap. III. and xxx. (Birch's 
Edit. P. 135.) 

§ 8. True, the Democritic and Epicurean atheists did 
indeed admit the existence of space or vacuum, as a na- 
ture really distinct from body. But not very consistently 
with the general spirit of — we do not say, their philoso- 
phy, but — their atheism. Accordingly, " other Atheists 
" there were," observes Cudworth, " who * * * 
" were sensible of the inconvenience of making space thus 
" to be a thing really distinct from body, (from whence 
" it would follow unavoidably, that it was an affection of 
" incorporeal substance.") Chap. V. (P. 770.) 

§ 9. And thus much as to the annoyance, or the in- 
convenience, which space hath caused, and will yet cause, 
our antitheist to experience. 

§ 10. To repeat something we have said : In Antitheos's 



180 



SENTIMENTS 



Part IX. 



universe, pure or simple space has real existence. Our 
next business must lie with the question, What does An- 
titheos make simple space to be ? And we shall find, that, 
with him, simple space is simple space : neither more nor 
less. 

§ 11. " We know," as we have heard our atheist de- 
claring-^ " of nothing possessing extension except matter, 
" — nothing else than can stand as an object to which 
" extension may be ascribed as a property" With An- 
titheos, then, simple or pure space does not possess ex- 
tension : in other words, extension is not a mode of Space. 

§ 12. And as extension is not a mode of Space, so 
Space (i. e. Extension) is made by Antitheos to be itself 
no mode of a substance. Why? "Material bodies," J 
Antitheos is ready to answer, " comprising all that we do 
' : know, or can know of Being," that is, Substance. \ If 
bodies be the only substances possessing the attribute of 
extension, it is very plain that pure space cannot be the 
attribute of any substance. 

§ 13. In fine : Our Atheist's decision being this, That 
simple space is not a substance, and not a mode, — and 
not a relation of bodies to each other, (because, with our 
atheist, simple space is necessary, whereas bodies are not:||) 
Simple space remains, then, simple space. ^[ And that, 
let me tell Antitheos, is saying, contrary to what one 
might beforehand fancy, not a little but a great deal, "ft 
§ 14. — 2. With no impropriety, but perhaps for one rea- 
son, may we bring Dr ReioVs opinion under this head. The 
Doctor says : " We call it (space) immense, eternal, im- 
" moveable, and indestructible. But it is only an immense, 
" eternal, immoveable, and indestructible void or empAi- 

t See Part VI. § 2. 

% Are there are anywhere immaterial bodies ? || See above. § G. 

^[ Read the 9th par. of the concluding chap, of the " Refutation." 

tt See above, § 6, 7. 



§§ H-17. 



CONCERNING SPACE. 



181 



iC ness." Essays. Essay II. ch. xix. To say, Space is void 
or emptiness, that is, void or empty of every thing — but 
space, or what space or extension supposes, if it supposes 
aught : to say, we repeat, that space is void or empty of 
every thing — but space; what is this essentially more 
than saying, Space is Space ?t 

§ 15. With which agrees, sufficiently, the passage in 
the "Analysis" already made use of by us. \ If Space 
be not a substance, and be not a mode, and be not a 
relation, (as that passage implies,) pray, what can Space 
be — but Space \ 

§ 16. The reason why perhaps we cannot properly re- 
duce Reid's opinion to this class, shall be perceived when- 
ever we recite a paragraph occurring in the Chapter " Of 
" Duration." 

§ 17. " Sir Isaac Newton thought, that the Deity, by 
" existing everywhere, and at all times, constitutes time 
" and space, immensity and eternity. This probably sug- 
" gested to his great friend Dr Clarke what he calls the 
" argument a priori for the existence of an immense and 
" eternal Being. Space and time, he thought, are only 
" abstract or partial conceptions of an immensity and 
" eternity, which forces itself upon our belief. And as 
" immensity and eternity are not substances, they must 
" be the attributes of a Being who is necessarily immense 
" and eternal. These are the speculations of men of su- 
" perior genius. But whether they be as solid as they 
" are sublime, or whether they be the wanderings of ima- 
" gination in a region beyond the limits of human under- 
" standing,! I am unable to determine" Essay III. ch. iii. 

t See Tart X., §§ 41, 47. % See Part VIII., § 19. 

|| Queer itur : When my imagination, or that within me which con- 
ceives, does wander in a region whither my understanding, with the aid 
of that which conceives, whither, in other words, my imagination cannot 
wander ; whither has imagination gone ? by what instrumentality was 

2 B 



182 



SENTIMENTS 



Part IX 



§ 18. Of course, as Reid is unable to determine whether 
or no the sentiment of Sir Isaac Newton and Dr Clarke, 
that immensity, or boundless space, is the attribute of an 
immense Being, be a solid one ; he must be supposed un- 
able to determine, that space is not an attribute, or mode, 
of a substance. And space cannot be, in every sense, 
void or empty, if it is full of a substance. 

§ 19. Upon the whole, with regard to the sentiments 
of the Professor of Moral Philosophy, concerning space, 
we may safely take the following words (they are his own) 
as a satisfactory compendium. "We are at a loss to 
" what category or class of things we ought to refer 
• them," i. e. time and space. (Chapter " Of Duration.") 
Well might Reid say so. 

§ 19 + 1- The declarations of another Professor of 
Moral Philosophy deserve our attention in this place : 
The Professor about to be introduced was, from first to 
Last, an admiring disciple in the school of Dr Reid. Even 
with regard to the present affair, Dugald Stewart's philo - 
sophy coincides pretty closely with that of the Glasgoiv 
Professor. At one particular point, indeed, there seems 
a too slavish concurrence. After the " candid acknow- 

ihe journey accomplished ? how does imagination employ itself in its new 
quarters ? how long will imagination stay away ? and will it communicate, 
on its return, what it has seen in its travels ? and, if it does, will not 
such conduct amount to a betrayal of secrets ? 

What lies beyond the sphere of human understanding is that which is 
Lestitute of a foundation in intelligibility. No subject that we can think 
of, properly lies beyond the sphere of our understandings ; but to utter 
unintelligibilities, we may easily do. There are some philosophers who 
do solemnly caution us to beware of going beyond the reach of our 
faculties: to beware of exceeding our faculties, by our faculties. The 
caution is to be wondered at, and neglected. There is no great danger in 
the matter • there's only an impossibility. In the same hour in which 
m receive power to sink below themselves, they will (I prophesy) re- 
ceive power to soar above or beyond themselves. At least there is a high 
probability. 



S§ 18-19. 



CONCERNING SPACE, 



183 



" ledgment from Dr Reid,\ I need not be ashamed." 
says Mr Stewart, " to confess my own doubts and diffi- 
" culties on the same question." Now, the truth is, there 
is no want of dogmatism : The want is, consistency in 
the dogmatism. Mr Stewart's assertions run in the teeth 
of each other. 

§19 + 2. " That Space is neither a substance, nor an 
" accident, nor a relation, may be safely granted." Dis- 
sertation on the Progress of Metaphysical Philosophy. 
Note Y Y. In accordance with which : " Is it not evi- 
" dent, that of things which are unique (such as matter, 
" mind, space, time ) no classification is practicable?" 
Ibid. Note I. 

§19 + 3. Space, then, is not a substance, not an acci- 
dent, or mode, not a relation. Indeed, it cannot be clas- 
sified : it is unique. In fine, all that can be safely said of 
Space is, that it is — Space. 

§19+4. But the matter stops not here. We must 
attend to Dugald Stewart while he flatly contradicts him- 
self, in the course of one and the same work. 

§ 19 + 5. " I think it must be granted that there is 
" something peculiarly wonderful and overwhelming in 
" those conceptions of immensity and eternity, which it 
" is not less impossible to banish from our thoughts, than 
" the consciousness of our own existence. Nay, further, 
" I think that these conceptions are very intimately con - 
" nected with the fundamental principles of Natural 
" Religion. For when once we have established, from 
" the evidences of design everywhere manifested around 
" us, the existence of an intelligent and powerful cause, 
" lue are unavoidably led to apply to this cause our 
" conceptions of immensity and eternity, and to conceive 
" Him as filling the infinite extent of both with his pre- 
" sence and with his power. Hence we associate with the 
t See above, § 17- 



184 



SENTIMENTS 



Part IX 



•• idea of God, those awful impressions which are natu- 
' rally produced by the idea of infinite Space." — Disser- 
tation. Part Second. Section 3. 

§ 19 + 6*. If we unavoidably apply, to that cause, 
immensity, conceiving " Him" as filling the infinite ex- 
tent of immensity,t or infinite space ; do we not una- 
voidably make infinite space to be an " accident," a pro- 
perty, a mode, of " Him ?" 

§ 19 -f 7. Thus, with Ditgald Stewart, Space is not 
a mode, and yet Space is a mode. Allowing that the 
predications neutralize, the one the other; we have, as 
riduum, the subject itself. And if we take Space for 
predicate as well as subject, (which no Logic can hinder 
us from doing,) we obtain the fundamental position, 
Space is Space. 

§ 20. — 3. Under this head, we may notice, also the 
fjords of a Bishop of Stirling. 

§ 21. In the Chapter treating of " Space and its 
•• modes," in our Bishop's treatise, the following is the 
title which serves for the exponent of several paragraphs : 
" Space nothing but the possible existence of body." And 
in a succeeding paragraph, these words occur : " We 
• consider pure space as a mere notion relative to the 
^ existence of corporeal substance, as- in truth nothing 
" more than the absence of body, WHERE body is possi- 
; ' ble." Encyclopaedia Britannica, 7th Edit. Art. " Me- 

taphysics." Thus Bp. Gleig. 

§ 22. Pity, if the Bishop did not bear in mind, that 
" where" supposes, and perhaps presupposes, space. 

§ 23. Pure space is " a mere notion," says the Bishop. 
To which had he stuck, we should have been obliged to 
have set down his words elsewhere, even among the 
idealists of the affair. J But the second clause seems in* 

t The infinite extent of immensity, is much the same tautology as the 
immensity of infinite extent, or space. J See Part X t 



§§ 19-27. 



CONCERNING SPACE. 



185 



tended to be exegetical of the first, and the Bishop 
drowns (and that pretty successfully) his notion in the 
' boundless invariable ocean,' as Locke would call it. of 
absence of body. 

§ 24. Now though Space were reduced to nothing but 
the possibility of body, nothing more than the absence of 
body (in Space, observe you,) where body is possible — 
still, one may venture to hope, Space may turn out to be 
Space. 

§ 25. — 4. Gassendi s hypothesis, likewise, has a good 
claim to be ranged under this third great head. 

§ 26. Gassendi, who was the restorer of the Epicurean 
philosophy, or — if Epicureanism were too soundly asleep 
to be resuscitated — who at least strove to palliate the 
dogmas of Epicurus ; the celebrated Gassendi, we say, 
chose to maintain, that Space is not Spirit and not Body, 
is not Substance and not Accident. Here is a descrip- 
tion by negatives, with a vengeance. What Space is, 
seeing it is neither mind nor matter, neither substance 
nor property, I cannot tell. Only I fancy, Space still is 
Space. Shade of the learned Gassendi ! what less, what 
more, what else, can Space be than Space ? 

§ 27. A certain middle nature; something perfectly 
distinct from corporeal substance, and yet not an incor- 
poreal substance either — a somewhat between substance 
and accident : this is what space is, would the shade re- 
spond, were Gassendi 's shade to be faithful. Space a 
middle nature ! a real somewhat, neither spiritual nor 
material, neither a substance nor a mode ! Then, a — 
we know not ivhat.^ In short, a nothing. Nothing, to- 
wit, but space. In fine, Space would continue to be 

t " Some Accident without a Substance, * * or some other 
" 1 know not what." Leibnitz, 5th Paper, 119. But an accident with- 
out a substance is in rather better plight than a somewhat neither acci- 
dent nor substance, nor any thing else. 



186 



SENTIMENTS 



Part IX. 



Space, even though Space were ascertained to be nothing- 
more than the certain middle nature. 

§ 28. Bayle (in Grit Diet, p. 3083-4) characterized— 
and we cannot say, altogether without justice — Gassendts 
procedure in the following manner : " Gassendus * * * 
" chose * to plunge himself into the most hideous 
' J abyss of conjecturing, that," &c. &c. Whatever Gas- 
sendts conjecture is, of this we are confident, that Gas- 
sendts space seriously constitutes a most hideous abyss. 
One into which we are desirous not to be plunged, — now, 
or at any future time. To contemplate a flight into " the 
" vast immeasurable abyss" t of infinite space, is always 
dreadful enough. But a survey of the secrets of space, 
the middle nature, would be, methinks, more awful still. 
But only — honesty compels me to confess — upon one con- 
dition, viz. that space, the middle thing, be any thing at all. 

§ 29. To every follower of Gassendi we say, accom- 
modating certain words of Bishop Berkeley to our use : 
" You may, if so it shall seem good, use the word" [space] 

in the same sense that other men use nothing, and so 
" make those terms convertible in your style." Principles 
of Human Knowledge. Section LXXX. 

§ 30. — 5. We shall take notice of one other hypothesis, 
as falling to be classed with those assemblages of letters 
which are tantamount to the position, Space is space. 

§ 31. That space is an external nothing, we have, we 
can say, the authority of a Divine, and no less a one than 
Episcopius. " Totum atque omne illud spatium quod 
" EXTRA hunc mundum esse dicitur, nihil omnino reale 
" est, sed pure pute imaginarium, & prorsus nihilum." 
Instit. Theolog. Lib. IV. cap. odii. The space which is said 
— ay, and (under Episcopius *s leave) which is thought — J 
to be BEYOND the material universe, is ALTOGETHER 
NOTHING : this Episcopius has given out as his serious 

t Milton. X See Part VIII. § 11, 12, &c. 



§§ 28-33. 



CONCERNING SPACE. 



187 



decision. And the grounds of his judgment, we, of 
course, need not seek to impugn, provided we be per- 
mitted to write after it a mere iota, which must be sub- 
scribed to, though it is not adscribed. Having, then, 
added an element entirely inconsiderable, we would ex- 
hibit Episcopius's declaration. All and every part of 
that space which is said, and which is thought, to exist be- 
yond this world is * * * . * • * altogether nothing 
but space. The addition is, no doubt, quite harm- 
less, and, from the nature of the case, 'tis impossible you 
can take any exception to it, justly. So great a Divine, 
then, being judge, Space is nothing but Space. And so 
Space yet is Space. 



§ 32. — IV. Other opinions have been entertained, at 
least other forms of speech have been adopted, on the 
subject of Space. The opinions, or at any rate the ex- 
pressions, now lying in view, are only two in number : 
Though the smallness of the number is the least part of 
the evil. But it will be perceived, after a slight exami- 
nation, that each of those opinions (supposing each set of 
words to stand for an opinion,) falls to be resolved into 
one or other of the three hypotheses which we have gone 
over. 

§ 33. A fourth set, then, of words maintain that Space 
is nothing but the relation, or rather the relations, of the 
bodies in the universe to each other, considered as exist- 
ing together. The name of the learned Leibnitz is con- 
spicuous among those who hold this opinion. An opinion 
which has become pretty common with persons who speak 
the language, if they do not meditate the truths, of philo- 
sophy. The doctrine may perhaps be pronounced the 
fashionable one, regarding Space. For what reasons, and 
by what means, it has become so prevalent among modern 



188 



SENTIMENTS 



Part IX. 



theologers, and certain descriptions of philosophers, is by 
no means perhaps so very obvious a thing. 

§ 34. But at all events, common and fashionable the doc- 
trine is. And therefore, 'tis of consequence that it be 
well analyzed. Without any possibility of being mistaken, 
we shall witness it resolving itself (with, to be sure, a 
special bad grace,) into the magnificent declaration, Space 
is space : An axiom resting on the most indisputable basis 
— and as true as any other truism of them all. But this 
is rather forestalling matters. 

§ 35. We shall deliver the doctrine of the most distin- 
guished advocate, as well as in a manner the first setter 
forth, of the dogma, in the words of Dr Samuel Clarice's 
translation, a translation which was " made with great 
iC exactness, to prevent any misrepresentation of Mr 
• ; Leibnitz's sense." See " Advertisement" prefixed to 
the " Collection of Papers which passed between the late 

learned Mr Leibnitz and Dr Clarke." 

§ 36. £J As for my own opinion," Leibnitz writes, " I 
• ; have said more than once, that I hold Space to be 
" something merely relative, * that I hold it to be an 
il order of COEXISTENCES — * * For Space denotes, in 
" terms of possibility, an order of things which exist at 
;1 the same time, considered as existing together ; with- 

out enquiring into their manner of existing. And when 

many things are seen together, one perceives that 
' : order of things among themselves.'" Third Paper, 4, To 
the same effect, see Fifth Paper, 29. &e. &c. 

§ 37. Elsewhere, Leibnitz says : " Space is that order, 
;£ which renders bodies capable of being situated," &c. 
Fourth Paper, 41. And when Clarke, in his answer, ob- 
served : " What the meaning of these words is ; An order, 
" (or situation,) ivhicli makes bodies to be suitable ; I un- 
;£ derstand not," &c.t, Leibnitz rejoined : " I don't say 
t Fourth Reply. 41 . 



§§ 34-39. 



CONCERNING SPACE, 



189 



" that Space is an order or situation, which makes things 
" capable of being situated: This would be nonsense." 
And hard upon this announcement, there follows the me- 
thod by which the learned German chose to get quit of 
the nonsense. t; I don't say, * that Space is an order 
" or situation, but an order of situations" &c. Fifth 
Paper, 1044 

§ 38. Before analyzing the doctrine of those passages* 
in order to see what it is reducible unto, it may be well 
to take a look in the direction of residts. To these we 
shall pay a regard which hardly could be bestowed, were 
we, in the first instance, to lay bare what the Leibnitzian 
dogma exactly amounts to. On the other hand, if the 
consequences inspire with horror — or with delight — the 
analysis will be followed with the intensest attention. 

§ 39. Two things necessarily follow from the supposi- 
tion, that Space is " something merely relative," i. e. to 
bodies, " an order of coexistences," i. e. of coexisting 
bodies. Bodies, we say. For should we ask a follower of 
Leibnitz, Why may not Space be the order of spirits (as 
well as of bodies) " existing together V the Leibnitzian 

t Would the reader like to see how a modern Leibnitzian shall express 
himself ? 

" Is it perfectly certain," asks an able Reviewer of the " Argument. 
" a priori," in one of the numbers of " The Presbyterian Review," " Is 
" it perfectly certain that there is no other class of ideas to which our no- 
" tions of space and time could, by possibility, be supposed to belong, than 
" those of substances and the properties of substance ? Have we not ideas 
" of relation which are ideas neither of substance nor of any property 
" of a substance ? Is it intuitively evident, that the notions in question, 
" particularly the notion of time, cannot possibly be of this sort ? It is 
" well known, that some metaphysicians of distinguished eminence have 
" thought that they are, — especially the latter of the two." 

Such is a specimen of the manner in which a Leibnitzian of our age 
looks matters in the face. You perceive, by several tokens, that the Pres- 
byterian critic is not so sure about space, as he is about time, being no 
more than a beggarly relation. 



190 



SENTIMENTS 



Part IX. 



is ready with his reply, That spirits have no extension, 
and, by themselves, have therefore nothing at all to do 
with space. "f There are two things, we repeat, which 
follow necessarily from the supposition, that Space is 
merely relative to bodies, an order of coexisting bodies. 

§ 40. — 1st. It is thence deducible, that body or matter 
is infinitely extended. If matter is finite, there is extra- 
mundane or bodiless space, or extension ; inasmuch as 'tis 
absurd to suppose bounds set to all extension. And if 
there be no space but what is relative to bodies, body or 
matter must be infinite in extent. It must be granted 
that space, of some kind, is infinite. 

§ 41. It may be observed, that even though matter be 
made boundless, it would not be therefore completely in- 
finite : Complete infinity including fulness. Although 
matter have no general boundaries, it may have particular 
interstices. To give it in Clarke's language : " Though 

t " There is nothing simple, in my opinion, but true monads, which 
" have neither parts nor extension." Leibnitz's Fifth Paper, 24. And 
that a spirit or soul is a true monad : " Every simple substance, soul, 

or true monad." 76.91. Again: " Thought and extended substance 
" have no connection with each other, and are beings that differ ioto 
" genere" Theodiccea. P. 172. See also, Third Paper, 12, and Fifth 
Paper, 48. 

Spirits have no extension : nothing to do with space. Was this the 
chimera that led the way to another of the wonderful births in the 
Leibnitzian philosophy, namely, that there can be no spirits but what 
are associated with bodies, however subtile ; although a spirit is a simple 
substance ? " There are," so says our distinguished German, " there are 
" no created substances wholly destitute of matter. * * * Angels 
" or Intelligences, and souls separated from a gross body, have always 
'•' subtile bodies, though they themselves be incorporeal." Fifth Paper, 
CI. See also Third Paper, 9. And verily, if souls (to let angels alone) 
have no extension, they stand in some need of being attended with matter, 
in order that they may not hopelessly elude our minds' perceptions, and 
conceptions too. See Part III. § 34, and following sections. See, also, 
Appendix B. § 24. 



§§ 40-45. 



CONCERNING SPACE. 



191 



" matter had no limits, yet it might have within itself any 
" assignable vacuities." Dem. under Prop. VI. 

§ 42. But if Space be the relations of bodies, matter 
is infinite, and infiniteness flowing from such a source 
cannot be of the complete kind. How can matter be com- 
pletely infinite, if there is Space (and Leibnitz contends 
there is), and if Space is different from Matter ? " I don't 
" say that Matter and Space are the same thing. * * 
" However, these things, though different, are insepa- 
" rable." Fifth Paper, 62. 

§ 43. — 2d. The second consequence from the supposi- 
tion in question, is : that as it follows that matter is with- 
out bounds, so it follows that matter could have had no 
beginning, and can have no end ; in fine, that matter is 
necessarily existing.! For according to the supposition 
we go upon, the non-existence of matter would involve 
the non-existence of all space. And no man ever did con- 
ceive, no man shall ever be able to conceive, the non- 
existence of all space.J 

§ 44. — 3d. We may add, that there is a third conse- 
quence resulting from the supposition, that Space is merely 
the order of co-existing bodies. The consequence is this : 
Were there only one body in the universe, the body would 
be necessarily immoveable : And, The material universe as 
a whole is necessarily immoveable. If space be no more 
than a relation of bodies ; no bodies, no space — no space, 
if but one body. And if there were no space, how could 
the sole body be moved ? how could the material universe 
be moved \ 

§ 45. (The doctrine of absolute space infers that of the 
possibility of absolute motion. On the other hand, to deny 

t The reader may consider what will be found in Part VII. § 10, as 
being suitable to present circumstances. The two cases are so far on one 
footing. 

X See Part I. § 25, and following sections. 



192 



SENTIMENTS 



Part IX. 



the possibility of absolute motion, is to deny that there 
can be absolute space. And to deny the possibility of 
absolute motion, that is, to contend that all motion is 
merely relative, is to get (by another route) at the position 
that if there were but one body, it would be immoveable. 

§ 46. " It doth not appear to me," says the Bishop of 
Cloyne, " that there can be any motion other than rela- 
■■ tire : so that to conceive motion, there must be at least 
" conceived two bodies, whereof the distance or position 
" in regard to each other is varied. Hence, if there was 
" one only body in being, it could not possibly be moved." 
(Principles of Human Knowledge. § CXII.) 

§ 47. These consequences, it is not to be doubted, will 
stagger those theists who have embraced Leibnitz's no- 
tion, and have any consistency left. 

§ 48. But then, the positions characterized as conse- 
quences will be greedily hailed by 
the atheist crew.f 

From which we may perceive how wise it was in our theo- 
logers to embrace the dogma out of which they arise. 
And as for the atheists, it will be time enough for them 
to glory in the notion, when they shall have made out 
the correctness of it — Which is something more than the 
theists who have inconsistently gloried in it have ever 
done. Before the atheists can push the dogma in our 
way, as an obstacle, they must be able to refute (and that 
not in the way of a mere " Refutation") all — but, for their 
comfort, no more than all — the first Part of the first Book 
of the " Argument ;" especially the two Scholia therein ; 
as well as be in a capacity to turn aside the edge of 

But we were going to anticipate what we have 

to advance. 

§ 49. We are now arrived at the place where we must 

t Milton. 



§§ 46-51. 



CONCERNING SPACE. 



193 



put down our crucible, and set our face, right earnestly, 
towards an analytic process. Our design is, to try whether 
the Leibnitzian thing be precious metal or no : And shall 
not our friends have good reason to congratulate us, if, 
immediately upon its being dropt into the vessel, it melts, 
and evaporates, and escapes in an unknown gas ; or, at 
best, turns out to be one of those worthless trifles^ with 
which (as we must have observed certainly elderly 
children are, — to the discredit of their instructers and 
others, — but too fond of sporting themselves ? 

§ 50. When Leibnitz defines Space, " An order of co- 
" existences,'" or "of things ivJiich exist at the same time, 
" considered as existing together ;" what are we to un- 
derstand by CO-, and TOGETHER ? Nothing having re- 
spect to Time, for " time" is referred to in a clause of 
its own. What then ? We must by all means under- 
stand them as having regard to Space, which they sup- 
pose, or perhaps rather presuppose. And then, the defi- 
nition becomes equivalent to this, — Space is an order of 
things * * * considered as existing together 
IN SPACE. A description which certainly looks more like 
banter than something designed to instruct us. 

§ 51. But to pass from this element in the description. 
What is space ? I ask a Leibnitzian. A mere relation 
or order of bodies co-existing, he replies. But tell me, 
further, I insist, what you particularly mean by " relation" 
and "order?" Take them severally. — And first as to 
relation. When Space is said to be " something merely 
" relative" to bodies, that, will the genuine disciple of 
Leibnitz rejoin, is as much as to say, Space is nothing 
but the mere distance of bodies. And as to order : " Or- 

t Mr Locke has a Chapter on " Trifling Propositions." The " purely 
" identical propositions" receive the honour of being first noticed. The 
honour is not undeserved. 

X See above, § 21, and following sections, § 31, and others. 



194 



SENTIMENTS 



Part IX. 



" der," in like manner, just means distance. " Men ob- 
" serve in things a certain order of co-existence, according 
" to which the relation of one thing to another is more 
" or less simple. This order, is their situation or dis- 
" tance." Leibnitz's Fifth Paper, 47. Space, then, is the 
distance of bodies from each other. 

§ 52. Space is distance. But distance is space. And 
what more does either of these positions amount to than 
this, Space is space ? " Space" says Locke, " considered 
<; barely in length, between any two beings, without con- 
" sidering any thing else between them, is called dis- 
tance." B. II. ch. xiii. § 3. " But however NAMED or 
" considered, it is always the same uniform simple idea 
;< of space" lb. § 27. To maintain, then, that space is 
distance, is virtually just to hold that space is space. 
And therefore, the Leibnitzian dogma is reducible to the 
edifying proposition which composes our THIRD gr cathead. 

§ 53. We shall now sum up what we have to say in re- 
ference to the passage quoted in § 36, above. " When 
" many things are seen together, one perceives that OR- 
" DER of things among themselves:" this is the Cypher. 
When many bodies are seen together IN SPACE, one per- 
ceives that distance of bodies among themselves, which 
is SPACE : AND THIS IS THE KEY. 

§ 54. Before leaving this department of the subject, we 
had better notice, that the further explanation or emen- 
dation (or whatever it be) of Leibnitz's doctrine, con- 
sisting of these words, " Space is" "anorderof situations,"t 
makes things much worse, if worse be possible, than it 
found them. Order, we have seen, is tantamount to dis- 
tance, distance to space. And situations obviously suppose 
or presuppose space. So that the emendation amounts 
to this, Space is a space of spaces. 

§ 55. How long will it be ere the numerous followers 

f See above, § 37. 



§§ 52-59. 



CONCERNING SPACE. 



195 



of Leibnitz consent to learn, that they cannot deny the 
existence of real absolute space (as it has been called) 
without assuming in their denial the very thing they would 
deny ! Men cannot speak of aught which does not involve 
Space, even Absolute Space. Space is a sine qua non of 
all else. 

§ 56. In the observations which we have thus made in 
direct relation to the Leibnitzian doctrine, we have not 
(the reader is requested now to reflect) advanced one step 
beyond the words, or what is implied by the bare words, 
in which the doctrine is conveyed. But what if we were 
to advance beyond the words % 

§ 57. Space is the relation, the order, the distance, the 
space, of, or between, bodies. But does not the space 
constituted by the distance of any two bodies from each 
other, — the distance, let it be, of the Sun from the Moon, 
— appear to the human mind to be capable of existence 
though those bodies were away 1 That is, does it not 
seem to us to be a false assertion, That space is merely 
a relation or order of bodies, or the distance or space be- 
tween them ? As touching this, however, we have merely 
to refer the reader to many previous portions of this work ; 
to all those places which set forth the necessary exist- 
ence of Space, and the non-necessary existence of 
Matter or Body. 

§ 58. It is false, then, that Space is a mere relation of 
bodies. Space, unlike body, exists necessarily. What 
Space in itself is, — whether it be a substance, or a mode, 
or — space, — forms an inquiry which has received, we trust, 
a most satisfactory investigation in the course of this long- 
Digression. 

§ 59. There is perhaps no doctrine which has done 
more to embarrass a plain matter, than this doctrine, that 
Space is nothing but the relation of bodies to each other. 
And on this account, we must have cleared away a deal 



196 



SENTIMENTS 



Part IX. 



of cloudiness from affairs, by showing that Leibnitz's dog- 
ma naturally resolves itself into a proposition which is so 
very simple, and so very free from all ambiguity. 

§ 60. Before passing on to the last opinion concerning 
Space, we shall give a specimen of Lord Brougham's in- 
anities occurring in the Section " Of the argument a 
priori. 11 We have heard of Leibnitz's " distance," and 
submit to the temptation which seduces us to listen to a 
few particulars relating to Brougham's. The British dis- 
tance, to the disgrace of our country, will be found to be 
greater inferior to the German. 

§ 61, " Is distance, that is, the supposed movementf 
• of a point in a straight line ad infinitum, a quality \ It 
" must be so if infinite space is. Then of what is it a 
" quality ? If infinite space is the quality of an infinite 
" being, infinite distance must be the quality of an infinite 
being also. But can it be said to be the quality of the 
" same infinite being \ Observe that the mind can form 
" just as correct an idea of infinite distance as of infinite 
" space, or, rather, it can form a somewhat more distinct 
" idea. But the being to be inferred from this infinite 
" distance cannot be exactly the same in kind with that 
to be inferred from space infinite in all directions." 
§ 62. Observe, that throughout this passage his Lord- 
ship distinguishes, and with no little care either, between 
infinite space, and what he is pleased to call infinite dis- 
tance. He distinguishes, we say, between them : without 
hinting however at the ground for the distinction. Rea- 
sons are sometimes only difficultly got at — And in certain 
cases become dangerous to those who employ them (as 
elephants in an Indian army have been known to turn 
upon their own troops :) Wherefore a degree of caution 
may be necessary in producing them. But what infinite 
distance can be, if (so far as the question, Can infinite 
t Distance is not a supposed movement. 



:§ 60-63. CONCERNING SPACE. 



197 



distance be said to be the quality of the same infinite be- 
ing of whom infinite space is the quality ? is concerned,) 
if, I say, it be not the very same as infinite space, passes 
all comprehension. " Space infinite in ALL directions" 
swallows up every "infinite distance." Infinite distance 
stands in the same relation to space infinite in all direc- 
tions, that any other less does to the greater which con- 
tains the less. — Infinite distance " cannot be exactly the 
" same in kind," indeed, with space infinite in all direc- 
tions ; but then this is because the one is the part of a 
thing, of which the other is the whole. Postulate space 
infinite in all directions — and you cannot avoid postulat- 
ing, at the very same time, space (or distance, if you will), 
infinite in this, or in that direction. 

§ 63. The mind, says his Lordship, can form " a some- 
" what more distinct idea" of infinite distance than of in- 
finite space. This is bringing matters to the very top of 
their bent. For. in truth, infinite distance, after all that 
can be said about it, is a perfect contradiction. That to 
constitute distance, at least two fixed points, or (if you 
prefer it another way) two points considered as fixed, are 
necessary ; is a point which may be considered to be as 
fixed as either of the poles of the universal heaven. t In- 
finite distance is an infinity that is finite, and a distance 
in which there are no distant things. 

t " Considering space as lying between any two bodies, or positive 
" beings * * we call it distance" — LocTce, Essay, B. II. ch. xiii. § 27- 
See also ibid. § 3. See Part VII. § 44. 



198 



PART X. 

OF THE SENTIMENTS OF PHILOSOPHERS CONCERN- 
ING SPACE. — LA W, WATTS, BROUGHAM, KANT, 
BERKELEY. 

§ 1. — V. We hasten to the fifth and last opinion, or 
nither class of opinions : And shall make our notices with 
becoming brevity ; except some case requiring a longer 
consideration present itself. 

§ 2. We have seen, we have conquered, the foe in their 
outposts: the remainder resolve to defend themselves in 
the citadel. We have been upon the ground wherefrom 
Space, specially Space in the distance, appears an exter- 
nal nothing ; and it is our present misfortune that we ap- 
proach a territory, from which, if Space does not dis- 
agreeably resemble an internal nothing, 'twill be because 
it is covered by a conceit, perfect in its way. 

— Multo nebulae circum Deaf fudit amictu, 
Cernere ne quis 

The peculiarity of this case, is, that a concealment is ef- 
fected as entire as that of the ostrich, when it hides its 
head from its pursuers. Not to keep the reader too long 
in suspense (we can imagine, and do excuse, his anxious 

t The Goddess who must be understood here, is, without doubt, Dul- 
ness, " the mighty mother" whom the Dunciad sings. Under the influ- 
ence of whose yawn, — whether or not sometimes 

Metaphysic calls for aid on Sense, 1 — 
Metaphysics never call on Common-sense, but to say, How much we des- 
pise you ! and every thing as natural as you ! 

i Book IV. 1. 646. 



§§ 3-8. SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. 199 



uncertainty ;) The opinion which is now to be admitted 
to a hearing, modestly yet distinctly and firmly whispers, 
that space is a mere, idea of the mind. 

§ 3. An idea of the mind : Then, upon my word, I 
think Space will turn out to be a Mode ; for an idea, as it 
is not a substance, so is very usually taken to be a condi- 
tion or quality of one. 

§ 4. But to descend to particulars, and submit to the 
drudgery of eyeing Space as it appears in the shape of 
this or that man's idea : — 

§ 5. — (A.) Bishop Law. — The following passages are 
taken from the Notes to Archbishop King's " Origin of 
-'Evil." "There are * ideas, and simp le ones too, which 
" have nothing ad extra correspondent to them, no proper 

ideatum, archetype, or objective reality, and I don't see 
" why that of space may not be reckon'd one of them." 
Chap. I. sect. 1, Note (3.) " — Pure extension, which 
" is an abstract idea, form'd by the mind itself, and, as 
" such, has no foundation anywhere else." " — Absolute 
" Space, which exists only in the mind." Note (6.) Con- 
sult also Note (7.) etc. etc. And as to Law's opinions 
farther, regarding Space, we beg leave to refer the curi- 
ous reader to the " Inquiry into the Ideas of Space, 
" Time," &c. — 1734. A work this, not seldom named 
and quoted by writers of that period, and subsequently, 
but now scarcely to be met with. 

§ 6. According to our Annotator, then, space is never 
an external existence, never an objective reality : It ex- 
ists only in the mind : It is, in short, an abstract idea. 

§ 7. And what, according to Edmund Law, is an ab- 
stract idea % at least, what is that abstract idea which 
composes, or is composed by, Space ? 

§ 8. An idea ; an idea, even in the most unfavourable 
event. And Law agrees with Locke, in making idea stand 
for " every thing about which the mind is conversant, or 



200 



SENTIMENTS 



Part X. 



" which can be the object of perception, thought or un~ 
" derstanding." Note (2.) But we shall not pretend par- 
ticularly to declare here, what Locke took an idea to be. 
His " ideas,'' 1 'tis well known, are, upon the whole, the 
most perplexing words in his book ; Sometimes, signify- 
ing one thing ; at other times, another ; and frequently, 
a third. But thus much we may safely remark, — and it 
suffices, we do remark, — that, whatever Locke took idea 
to be, in revum naturd he knew but of Substances, Modes, 
and Relations. Idea, therefore, must be one of these 
three. t 

§ 9. — (B.) Br Watts. — We shall be a little particular 
with the Doctor, as it has been said, that he " has with 

great ingenuity discussed all the several opinions about 
M space." Mrs Cockburris Remarks. (Vol. I. p. 390.) 
This which has been said, is generally thought. 

§ 10. Watts' 1 Essay on Space is entitled, "A fair in- 
'• quiryand debate concerning space, whether it be some- 
" thing or nothing, God or a creature." Philosophical 
Essays — Essay I. 

§ 11. The Essay in question falls naturally to be di- 
vided into two well-defined parts : In the first of which 
the author shows that " space cannot be merely an exist- 
" ence in the mind," &c. (Sect. II.) In the other, he 
labours to make out " the nihility of space" (sect, xi.) ; 
Space being "nothing real, but a mere abstract idea." 
(Sect. XII.) 

§ 12. 'Tis altogether unnecessary that we should mi- 
nutely regard all that, in propriety, appertains to the 
former portion. We believe, most people may easily see, 
that in vain does Br Watts attempt, in the second por- 
tion, to invalidate what, in the first, he advances on the 
topic of the external existence of space. 

§ 13. But to detail. Section I. explains the subject in 

t See Part VIII. §§ 19, 21, 25. 



§§ 9-14. 



CONCERNING SPACE, 



201 



general. " Void space," says Watts, il is conceived by 
" us as scattered through, all the world between bodies. 
" as interspersed through all the pores of bodies, and as 
" reaching also beyond all the worlds that God has made, 
" and extended on all sides without bounds. * * * 

" The grand inquiry is, What is this space ?" " Space 

" is," concludes the Doctor," either something or no- 
" thing : if something, it is either a mere idea in the 
" mind, or something existing without. If it exist with- 
" out us, it is a substance or a mode ; if a substance, it is 
" created or increated."t 

§ 14. In Section II. the author makes plain, " that 

t § 1. With which agrees, so far, Dr Clarke's summary of conceptions, 
" All the conceptions (I think) that have ever been or can be framed con- 
" cerning Space, are these which follow. That it is either absolutely 
" nothing, or a mere idea, or only a relation of one thing to another, or 
" that it is body, or some other substance, or else a property of a sub- 
• l stance.'' Note in 5th Reply. Between the two Doctors, the agree- 
ment at bottom would seem to be complete as to fundamentals, but in one 
particular. The dissenting Doctor alludes not to the conception, in vir- 
tue of which space is only a relation, &c. But he had it in his power 
to assign a good reason for the omission. Elsewhere, he maintains that 
the fancy of space being only a relation, is unintelligible. " Some 
" philosophers, particularly Mr Leibnitz, have fancied Space," these are 
our Doctor's words, " to be a sort of relative mode, and call it the order 
" of co-existent beings or bodies, which order is their general situation or 

" distance Thus, after a manner which is unintelligible to me, they 

" go on to explain their idea of Space." Sect. III. (Dr Watts has been 
followed in his decision as to Mr Leibnitz 's fancy. " As for the point 
" here in dispute, I must own, that it does not seem to me a fit subject 
" for argument ; inasmuch as I cannot even form a conception of 'the 
" proposition contended for by Leibnitz" Dugald Steivart : Disserta- 
tion First.) 

§ 2. Our own general division, and minor divisions, include (as the 
reader is by this time aware) all the members in Watts' 1 divisions, and 
all the members in Clarke's division to boot. It may be to some pur- 
pose, to present, once for all, a table of our division, and subdivisions, of 
the opinions anent 1 Space. See Frontispiece. 

i This word is set among- David Hume's Scotticisms. 



202 



SENTIMENTS 



Part X. 



" Space cannot be a mere nothing," but, on the con- 
trary, is a " sort of something :" that it " cannot be a 
" mere idea," but is " something without us." 

§ 15. In Section III. he endeavours to make it appear, 
that space is a substance. 

§ 16. " If Space be something which has an existence 
" without us, it must be either a substance itself, or a 
" mode or property of some substance ; for it is most evi- 
" dent, that it must either subsist by itself, or it must 
" subsist in or by some other thing which does subsist 
" by itself. There can be no medium between subsis- 
" tence in and by itself, and subsistence in and by an- 
" other." In all this, we think the Doctor is perfectly 
right. See Part V. § 14.— And Part VIII. § 25.| 

§ 17. But in what follows, we think he is perfectly 
wrong. Space cannot, he maintains, be a mode of a sub- 
stance. " That space cannot be a mode or property," 
he seeks to prove, by such arguments as these : — 

§ 18. (1.) "If space be a mode, where is the substance 
" in which it is," fyc. ? — Answer. The substance is 
where the mode is, to be sure. 

§ 19. (2.) WJierein does the substance differ from the 
mode ? — Answer. In this : whereas the mode is merely 
space or extension, the substance has extension and dura- 
tion and many other modes. See Part VII. § 39. — 
Part VIII. § 17.— Etc. 

§ 20. (3.) That Space is not an absolute mode, the Doc- 

t " Is this vacuum, or immoveable, indivisible, and penetrable exten- 
f£ sion, a substance, or a mode ? It must be one of the two." — Bayle. 
Crit. Diet. p. 3083. Bayle means a vacuum, said by others to exist. He 
means, that vacuum must be either substance or mode, if it be at all. — 
If " Space is a nature distinct from body, and positively infinite, f * it fol- 
" lows undeniably, that there must be some incorporeal substance, whose 
*' affection its extension is." " True Intellectual System of the Uni- 
" verse," p. 769-70. In the second note to the twenty-fifth section o 
Part VIII. hereof, Cudworth gives one-half of the reason. 



15-27. CONCERNING SPACE. 203 

tor would fain prove, and would prove thus : — " Space 
" neither wants any subject to inhere in" $c. " it wants 
" no other being that we can conceive to make it exist." 
— Answer. Whether this be truly so, or no, depends on 
what lies under " Space" See Part VII. § 5. Also, 
Part XI. §§ 1. 2. 3. 5. 7. 

§ 21. Other arguments, as we may say, are spoken of. 
But they seem far too wretched for serious notice. What, 
for instance, need one reply to such an argument as that 
which the next section shall set forth 1 Remember, the 
thing to be proved is, that infinite space is a substance. 

§ 22. (4.) " Space wants no created being to support 
" its existence." — Answer. We dare say, not. 

§ 23. The Section closes with these words : " All the 
<£ arguments that ever I read to disprove space to be a 
" substance, carry no force at all with them, and seem 
"to be mere assertions, not only without reason, but 
" contrary to it." On which subject, see Part VII. § 21, 
and the following sections, to § 28, inclusive. 

§ 24. Section IV. It having been proved — in the 
manner which we have witnessed, but to the Doctor's 
satisfaction — that Space is a substance, he shews that 
" surely it cannot be a created substance." If so, no 
doubt " it appears to be God Himself." 

§ 25. Section V. evinces that " Space cannot be God." 
And in this we entirely concur with Isaac Watts. "\ But 
we're not sure, that he and we would agree, as to the 
arguments by which the mutually received proposition 
should be established. 

§ 26. The Doctor's arguments are such as the follow- 
ing :— 

§ 27. (a.) " If Space be God Himself, then all bodies 
" are situated in God, as in their proper place — " &c. 
One might answer : This cannot properly be an objection 
to the doctrine : 'tis the doctrine itself. 

t See Part VII. §§ 38, 39, 40, 44, &c. 



204 



SENTIMENTS 



Part X. 



§ 28. (b.) " If space were God, then the divine Being-, 
" though in its whole it be unmeasurable," — [Mark that — ] 
" yet hath millions of parts of itself, really distinct from 
" each other, measurable — " &c. If one bear in mind, 
that Space hath no separable parts (what Watts proceeds 
to glance at,) and that finite can bear no proportion to 
infinite, he might well admit the strength of the position 
in the objection. For this position, also, is the doctrine 
itself. 

§ 29. (c.) A third " consequence of supposing Space to 
" be God, is this : Then every part of this divine space 
' ; will contain Divine Perfections in it complete, or only 
; ' some part of each of them." — And so on. For a reply 
to which, we shall turn to a place in Br Samuel Clarke's 
Answer to a sixth Letter. " The individual Consciousness 
" of the One Immense Being, is as truly one; as the pre- 
" sent moment of time is individually one, in all places 
"at once. And the one can no more properly be said to 
•• be an ell or a mile of Consciousness, (which is the sum 
" of" [Br Watts''] "objection,) than the other can be said 
" to be an ell or Simile of Time. This suggestion seems to 
<; deserve particular consideration." We are confident 
that this constitutes a basis for a triumphant reply. 

§ 30. (d.) If infinite space were God, God is infinitely 
extended. But God " is the most perfect spirit." And 
" a spirit is not extended." In reference to the first of 
which propositions, consider Part VII. §§ 38, 39, 40, 44, 
etc. — And in reference to the third, consider Part III. 
§ 34. with the following sections— Also, of Part VIII. 
Appendix B. § 24.— And Part IX. Note to § 39. 

§ 31. The Section concludes thus : " The strongest 
arguments seem to evince this, that space must be God, 
or it must be nothing." The strongest arguments seem 
to evince, as you, good Doctor, saw yourself in your se- 
cond Section, that Space cannot be nothing. And if any 



§§ 31-34. 



CONCERNING SPACE. 



203 



arguments evince, or even seem to evince, that Space 
must be God, they are (we may depend on't) removed from 
the strongest arguments by the whole diameter of being. 

§ 32. One reason why we deemed it to be expedient to 
go over those four arguments intended to show, that Space 
cannot be God, the reader may gather, if he ponders the 
words instantly to be quoted. They occur in the same 
Section. The remark contained in them appears to be 
in all respects just. " Most of the inferences which I 
" drew from the supposition of Space being God, are just 
" and natural, if Space be God's immensity," &c. 

§ 33. In Section VI. the Doctor gives " a review and 
" recollection of the argument." 

§ 34. Well was he entitled to proclaim : f * We enter 
" into the abyss of space, infinite and eternal space, and 
" our thoughts are lost and drowned in it." What he thus 
declared, reviewing as he was the first half of the way, 
he might as truly have cried out at any subsequent stage 
of his journey. At the very beginning of this Essay, the 
author had said : " Would any one imagine, that so 
" familiar an idea as that which we have of space, should 
" be so abstruse and mysterious, so difficult and unac- 
f countable a thing, as that it should be doubtful and 
" undetermined to this day, among the philosophers even 
" of this knowing age, what space is ; whether it be a 
" substance or mode, God or a creature, something or 
" nothing." And in the Preface he had written to this 
effect : " It is strange that philosophers, even in this en- 
" lightened age, this age of juster reasoning, should run 
" into such wide extremes in their opinions concerning 
" space ; that while some depress it below all real being, 
" and suppose it to be mere nothing ; others exalt it to 
" the nature and dignity of Godhead." Dr Watts, we 
say, had so written ; and, of a truth, even by the time he 
had gotten the length of Section VI., well was he entitled 

2 D 



204 



SENTIMENTS 



Part X. 



to demand : " After all our philosophy''' [Something like 
half the word would have done.] " and toil of reasoning, " 
TSuch as it is, even with toil thrown into the scale, to 
make heavy iveight.] " shall it be said that we know not 

• whether space be a mere nothing, or whether it be the 
true and eternal God?" — " Are the eternal God and 

• a mere empty nothing, so near akin to one another. 
" that we cannot see the difference between them — that 

■ we are not able to tell whether space be God, or whe- 
" ther space be nothing Indeed, Reverend Doctor, 
appearances look threatening : And the very worst may 
be dreaded, unless some third road is before us (if we will 
but look for it,) by which we may escape from paths so 
fraught with deceit and danger. Meanwhile, we heartily 
join in your prayer, that the shadows of your thick dark- 
ness may be scattered, and that you may be led out of the 
labyrinth of gross ignorance and mistake, and helped to 
make your way through the abyss of night — and so on. 

§ 35. There appears to be, in the 7th Section, nothing 
worth our notice ; if one nothing be excepted. Space, 'tis 
now darkly surmised, may ultimately turn out to be " a 
" mere non-entity or nothing." The Proteus, after going 
through all his shapes, may " fix at last," and submit to 
exist without any shape at all, ay without even the 
shadow of a shape. And hereabouts lies the mystery. 

§ 36. The 8th Section compares Space to shadow or 
darkness. " Is not darkness extended beyond the utmost 

" bounds of the material creation ?" " We can no 

" more assign the limits of darkness, than we can the 
" limits of space. Again, as darkness hath a seeming im- 
" mensity belonging to it. has it not an eternity also V 
Suppose that darkness is extended, infinitely extended, 
and is eternal : What can be inferred ? That extension 
or space is mere non-entity or nothing ? Nay, nay. 

§ 37. But has darkness, in realitv. extension and dura- 



§§ 35-41, 



CONCERNING SPACE. 



205 



tion ? No : Darkness by itself is not long, nor broad, nor 
deep ; and as extent is not an attribute of darkness, so 
neither is time. The thing which is dark may have, or 
rather must have, these attributes or conditions. If you 
suppose darkness and absence of body to coexist, then 
you have dark spaced 

§ 38. In Section IX. the Doctor tries to take courage 
from the hint, that space — or bodiless extension — may be 
nothing but the absence of body — or bodiless extension, 
— that is, that extension without body may be extension 
without body ; as shade — or the absence of light — is the 
absence of light : and to raise some efforts of reasoning, " to 
" prove space to be nothing real." J Space is inactive and 
impassive: Therefore, argues this Logician, it cannot be 
God nor a creature. Space cannot be God nor a crea- 
ture : And therefore, Space must be " non-entity or 
" nothing." Such is Watts' 1 reasoning. We answer: We 
are not at all disposed to dispute either the premiss or 
the conclusion of the first enthymene. But with regard 
to the second, while we go in with the premiss, we must 
cast out the conclusion, as well as (therefore) that pre- 
miss which the conclusion subsumes, viz. That what is not 
God Himself, nor a creature, is non-entity or nothing. 

§ 39. Section X. is " a re-examination whether Space 
" has any real properties." 

§ 40. The first consideration advanced here may be 
said to be, that space is " emptiness, or absence of body 
" or matter" — &c. And as touching this, see Part IX. 
§ 14, and § 24. 

§ 41. The second consideration says, in reference to 
Space's supposed " capacity to receive bodies into it," 
" that space is no otherwise capable of receiving body into 

t See Part IX. § 24. 

% " Or no real being," adds the Doctor. But I hope, that there is a 
medium between no real Being, and nothing real ; as I would not wish 
my thoughts to be nothing real — which yet, are not real Beings. 



206 



SENTIMENTS 



Part X. 



: it than as the emptiness of a vessel makes it capable of 
" receiving liquor" — &c. Which is cordially granted, 
Emptiness is either space without matter, or space with 
thin and subtile matter. Verily, Space is no otherwise 
capable of receiving body into it than as the space with- 
in an empty vessel (vacuum, for all practical purposes,) 
makes the vessel capable of receiving any sort of substance 
which is no larger than the space. Space, in fine, is no 
otherwise capable of receiving body, than as space is ca- 
pable of receiving body. 

§ 42. The third consideration consists of this : " Space 
- can never penetrate matter * * wheresoever mat- 
ter is, there Space is not." — " Space is no more, and is 
entirely lost, when body is placed in the room of empti- 
c; ness." Relatively to the topic of penetration, consult 
Part VI. § 12. and down to the end of § 36. 

§ 43. The fourth consideration may be said to be : The 
infinity of space is not an infinity of fulness. As to which, 
weigh what occurs in Part IX. § 57. ; and other places. 

§ 44. Fifth consideration : Infinite space is really divi- 
sible, and indeed divided, by the bodies situated in it. 
This is the same sort of consideration as the preceding. 
Space is not full, because there are bodies in it: Space is 
divided, because there are bodies in it. The considera- 
tions resting on the lame bottom ; to remove the bottom 
from the one, is to remove the bottom from the other. 
§ 45. Sixth Consideration. " The true reason why 
space appears to want no cause, is not that it has such 
;c a real and substantial essence as is too big to be produced 
" by any cause, but that it is such a subtile, tenuious, unes- 
" sential, or imaginary thing, that has not essence, nor 
" existence, nor reality enough to want a cause, or to be 
produced, or caused." We are happy at leaving this 
exactly as we found it. 

§ 46. Seventh Consideration. Space has not necessary 



§§42-51. 



CONCERNING SPACE. 



207 



existence: it can be annihilated. The reader has had 
too much on this subject in the course of our work, to 
leave it anywise necessary to add aught in this place. 

§ 47. The rest of the Section is taken up in illustrating 
a parallel between space and emptiness. And as empti- 
ness involves space, we can have no objections to offer to 
the institution of the comparison. — There may also be as 
much analogy between space and shade, that is. dark 
space, as ever the Doctor likes. 

§ 48. In the 11th Section is answered an objection 
against the nihility of space. 

§49. The objection amounts to this: " 20 miles of 
" space between" any " two bodies" — or, if you please, 
20 nonillions of miles of space between any two points 
— " cannot be mere nothing." For if the miles of space 
be nothing, the bodies, — or points, — are " close toge- 
" ther, or touch one another." Rather a shrewd objec- 
tion indeed, and 'tis not so easy to see how it is to be got 
decently over. 

§ 50. The reply consists of " a round denial" of the 
truth of the consequence in the proposition, If there be 
nothing between the bodies, or points, then they are close 
together : Were the miles nothing, the bodies, or points, 
would not therefore touch. Emptiness would be between. 
Emptiness, that is Space. But Space is nothing. — No- 
thing would be between. But what would the between 
be ? Nothing. Therefore, between the bodies or points, 
there would be a nothing which was a nothing. 

§ 51. Alas! we have nothing to bring against the 
round denial, unless it were something not very unlike 
the square or the cube of the miles of space. But the ca- 
lamity to which we are subjected is, that space, or empti- 
ness, is of no use in such a case : Except to keep bodies 
from dashing against each other, when a better preven- 
tive of collision is not to be had. 



208 



SENTIMENTS 



Fart X. 



§ 52. The nihility of Space having been so satisfacto- 
rily established, the 12th and last Section evidences (in 
the best possible way,) that space is " nothing real." Well : 
This tallies with its nihility. But the rubric immediately 
goes on to do more than merely insinuate, that Space is 
" a mere abstract idea." Indeed ! And is a mere abstract 
idea, an abstract idea, an idea, nothing real? nihility? 

§ 53. But not to be in too great a hurry. " After all 

• these debates, wherein we," such are the first words of 
the Section, " have been endeavouring to prove space to 
" be nothing real without us, yet perhaps we may allow 

• it to be an abstracted idea of the mind."f Nothing 
real without us : This, then, was what we had to under- 
stand by non-entity, or nothing, or nihility. Space is a 
non-entity, or nothing, or nihility, as far as without us is 
concerned. But as far as within us is concerned, Space 
is " an abstracted idea of the mind." Well for us, if 
after so much tossing by winds from all the quarters of 
the compass, we are now wafted into secure anchorage. 

§ 54. Br Isaac Watts presently repeats and answers 
the arguments which, in the beginning of the Essay, he 
had used to disprove Space to be a mere idea. 

§ 55. The first argument as now noticed, is : Space is 
without bounds, and therefore is not a mere idea in our 
minds. A capital argument, in sooth ! And the answer ? 
Tis this : " We can form an idea of infinite space of the 

• ever-growing kind, and it may be a mere idea still. Our 
:i idea, indeed, is not actually infinite" — Good : very good. 
For an answer, it were capital ; were it not that, however 
true the matter of the answer is, it is (by ill-luck) nothing 
to the point. That we can form an idea of Space, does 
not — surely — prove, that Space is an idea, or that our 
idea is Space. Who but such dreamers as the worthy 

t See Essay II. Sect iv. par 9. Essay V. Sect i. par. 4. And other 
places. 



§§ 52-57- 



CONCERNING SPACE. 



209 



Doctor ever dreamt that our ideas of Space might run 
riot when they had lost and drowned themselves in the 
abyss, — enlarging and contracting themselves as Space 
grew from less to more, and shrank from more to less ? 

§ 56. The second argument now mentioned, as proving 
that Space cannot be a mere idea, is as follows : Space 
" seems to have a necessary and obstinate existence." \ 
The answer being to this effect : Space has hardly so much 
external existence as certain mathematical truths, which 
the Doctor, who has a worthy object in view, calls ex- 
ternal truths ; and, asks he in fine consistency, Have 
these external truths, which are nothing besides ideas, 
any real existence extraneous to the minds that conceive 
them ? After all that we have written, we may safely leave 
it to the reader, to place himself between the argument 
and the answer, and judge which of them has the better 
cause by the hand. 

§ 57. " To conclude," says Dr Isaac Watts, in the last 
paragraph of his Essay, " after the laborious searches of 
" thought, reasoning and reading in SEVERAL stages of 
" my life past, these are the best conceptions and senti- 
u ments that I can frame of space." — The conceptions and 
sentiments bear very evident marks of having been framed, 
not only in several stages of his life, but in several, and 
totally opposite, states of his mind. — He proceeds : " I 
iS grant there may be some difficulties yet remaining, and 
" some darknesses which yet may hang over the subject. 
" Learned men have laboured hard to scatter them in for- 
" mer ages, and in the present too, without full success ; 
" yet, perhaps, in future time there may be a way found 
" out for adjusting all these difficulties to the more com- 
" plete satisfaction of some following age." — I must, of 
course, leave it to my readers to decide, whether I have 
not adjusted all the difficulties touching space ; but certain, 
t See Appendix. 



210 



SENTIMENTS 



Part X. 



at all events, I am of this, that there must be a way, to 
those who can find it, whereby to set right every thing that 
is wrong. 

§ 58. If the Doctor, by " difficulties" and " darknesses," 
means in the most distant manner, difficulties and dark- 
nesses of an incomprehensible cast, we have unquestion- 
ably a remark to offer. Tis the height of absurdity to 
fancy, that the human mind can conjure up difficulties of 
the incomprehensible kind, which the human mind can- 
not solve. How could the mind know the incomprehen- 
sibilities to be incomprehensibilities, unless it had comfort- 
able glimpses of that higher region, wherefrom the in- 
comprehensible things appear indeed to be things incom- 
prehensible? To comprehend that certain things are of 
an incomprehensible character, is at least to comprehend 
the things which are afterwards found to be incompre- 
hensible. And comprehending the things — is not that 
incompatible with the things being not of a comprehensi- 
ble character \\ 

§ 59. With Dr Watts, thus, space is " an abstracted 
idea of the mind." 

§ 60. And that he counts all abstracted ideas of the 
mind, and all ideas whatever, to be modes of a substance., 
the reader of his second Essay will perceive, by abundance 
of evidence. Referring to each of the four sections of 
that Essay, in particular, and to passages scattered through 
his volume of Essays, in general — we shall content our- 
selves with citing these four words : " Abstracted ideas 
•• or modes." (Essay II. Sect, ii.) • 

§ 61. Space is an abstracted idea of the mind. An 
abstracted idea of the mind is the mode of a substance. 
Therefore Space is a Mode. Thus Dr Isaac Watts. And 
therefore we are under the painful necessity of sending 
him over to those who will have Space to be a Mode, and 

t Weigh § 7 of Appendix to Part IV,— also, note to § 17, Part IX. 



§§ 58-63. 



CONCERNING SPACE. 



211 



nothing more, and nothing less. The Doctor will agree 
with his company, so far as antimodists are concerned. 
But the moment an investigation takes place with regard 
to the nature of the modality, Br Watts, and those of his 
way of speaking, must retire within themselves, the rest 
of the company being all the while at liberty to expiate 
over the whole field of nature, and even to wander beyond 
the solar walk or milky way. 
§ 62. — (C). Lord Brougham. — In the " Preliminary 
" Discourse," and in the Section already referred to,t 
the following words are to be found. " To argue from 
"the existence of space and time to the existence of any 
" thing else, is assuming that those two things have a real 
" being independent of our conceptions of them : for the 
" existence of certain ideas in our minds cannot be the 
" foundation on which to build a conclusion that any 
4 ' thing external to our minds exists. To infer that space 
" and time are qualities of an infinite and eternal being is 
" surely assuming the very thing to be proved, if a propo- 
" sition can be said to have a distinct meaning at all 
" which predicates space and time as qualities of anything. 
" What, for example, is time but the succession of ideas, 
" and consciousness and the recollection which we have of 
" that succession" 1 — &c. 

§ 63. In this passage it is not obscurely hinted, that his 
Lordship takes Space and Time to be conceptions or ideas 
in our minds. And, of course. Space and Time cannot be 
" qualities of any thing," i. e. " any thing external to our 
: ' minds," if Space and Time be no more than conceptions 
or ideas — namely, conceptions or ideas of Space and Time. 
On Lord Brougham's hypothesis, which (forget not) makes 
Space and Time conceptions or ideas, that is, internal 
affections, — it is verily vain to speak of Space and Time 
as being qualities (or any thing else) of any object exter- 
t Sse Part IX. § 60. 



212 



SENTIMENTS 



Part X. 



nal to our minds. Our conceptions, in one word, cannot 
be external to us. 

§ 64. We have little to do with his Lordship's ima- 
ginings about Time, but as " time" is introduced, we shall 
throw out a hint, which may have some claim to a brief 
consideration. 

§ 65. Time, says his Lordship, is the succession of 
ideas. But is not Time {Dr Price led the way, long ago, 
to the remark) presupposed by, or in, Succession ?\ What 
were a succession that occupied no time, that had no du- 
ration ? A succession which will never succeed — in gain- 
ing any wise man's good opinion. The position, Time is 
a Succession, is, so far as this question is concerned, ex- 
actly the same as the position, Time is Time. And that, 
by the bye, is as true as the position, Space is Space. 

§ 56. But time not only is the succession of ideas, it is 
the consciousness and recollection of the succession. Time 
is Time, and not only so, for time is the recollection of 
Time. Perhaps our readers may be more able than we 
are, to help out his Lordship at a dead lift. 

§ 67- It may be noticed, in connection with what is 
stated in the words under our examination, that they are 
amazingly inconsistent with what is conveyed at the con- 
clusion of the Section wherein they occur. Remember 
that space and time, and, by consequence, infinite space 
and infinite time (or duration), that is immensity and 
eternity, are ideas and conceptions " in our minds," and 
therefore are not any things " independent of our concep- 

tions :" and " cannot be the foundation on which to 

build a conclusion that any thing external to our minds 

f "We may measure duration by the succession of thoughts in the 
•• mind, as we measure length by inches or feet ; but the notion or idea of 
duration must be antecedent to the mensuration of it, as the notion of 
length is antecedent to its being measured." Dr Rekl Essay III. ch. v. 
Writes he not well ? 



§§ 64-69. 



CONCERNING SPACE. 



213 



" exists :" And then weigh the following particular 
" eminent use" of " the argument a priori" : — " The fact 
• ; of those ideas of immensity and eternity, forcing them- 
" selves, as Mr Stewart expresses it, upon our belief, seems 
- to furnish an additional argument for the existence of" 

A mind in which " those ideas," or, as the other 

passage calls them, " conceptions," are ? That is not said. 

But (and pray mark it ) " an Immense and Eternal 

" Being." And so on. 

§ 68. Space with Lord Brougham is a conception or an 
idea. And gives he out aught as to what the conception 
or idea is \ The conception Space is not " independent of 
" our conceptions." The idea Space is an idea " in our 
" minds." So would his Lordship reply. And perhaps 
there might be good reasons why we should not press the 
subject farther. 

§ 69.— (D.) Kant.~The Father of Critical Philosophy 
(who, by the way, outlived all its genuine disciples) makes 
Space, pure Space, to be a form of our sensibility — the 
original use of understanding itself — one of the rules of 
the transcendental aesthetic — only the original synthesis 
of the homogeneal, §c.\ — That space, says the Professor 
of Konigsberg, in which all motion must be, (which itself 
is therefore absolutely immoveable,) is named pure or 
absolute space. Again : — We conceive an absolute im- 
moveable, intransposeable space, to which we in thought 
refer, at last, all motion. — The conception of an absolute 

t For the benefit of those among our readers who may not be familiar 
with the Kantean terminology — as well as with what it stands for (when 
it stands for any thing ;) and who, therefore, have never gone as far, or 

as high, 
As metaphysic wit can fly ; 

I have to say, that the Kantean terminology is all of a piece. As in 
Chinese paintings there is no shading, each object being highly coloured ; 
so, with regard to the Transcendental nomenclature, every phrase, nay 
every term, is swollen to the utmost possible dimensions. 



214 



SENTIMENTS 



Part X. 



immoveable space has itself no object : Pure space is an 
empty object-less intuition — an " ens imaginarium." Ab- 
solute or pure space, in fine, is but an iDEA.t And 
so on. 

§ 70. Yet we must not neglect to notice, that though 
Kant thus takes Space to be nought except an idea or a 
conception, he can turn a new leaf, and write in a quite 
different strain. 

§ 71. I ('tis Emmanuel 'Kant who speaks) by all means 
have a conception of Space and of Time. Space and 
Time themselves are however not conceptions, though I 
have conceptions of them. Again : — I have a conception 
of wood: so have I too conceptions of space and time. 
But as wood itself is no conception, Space and Time are 
likewise no conceptions. And so on. 

§ 72. In the first place, then, Space is a conception. 

t § 1. Does pure or absolute Space, in which, according to Kant, all 
motion must be, contain the material universe ? If matter be contained 
in an idea, is not matter too an idea ? — Could any of the disciples of the 
Professor of Konigsberg be so blind as not to see that broad way by 
which Critical Philosophy leads to Scepticism? 

§ 2. One of Kanfs own pupils observed, and endeavoured to meet, the 
difficulty. " It may be * objected," remarks Mr Nitsch, " that, if there 
" be no external space, there is also no external world. But this is," he as- 
serts, " concluding by far too much * * * If there be no exter- 
" nal space, it will follow, that we are not authorised to assign extension 
" to external things, but there will follow no more." 1 

§ 3. But has there not followed enough ? Divest external things of all 
extension, and what do you leave ? Solidity, we shall say. But solidity 
supposes extension. So, abstracting all extension, you leave nothing. 
External things without extension, without any existence in an external 
space, were, after all that could be said, extremely curious curiosities. 
Things are external with respect to me, by there being space between me 
and the things. Take away the space, they cease to be external. In one 
word : " External" supposes, or presupposes, Space. — Consider § 55, 
Part IX. 

i " A General and Introductory View of Professor Kant's Principles," &c. London. 
1796. 



§§ 70-77. 



CONCERNING SPACE. 



215 



But, in the second place, Space is not a conception — It is 
an external existence : wood exists externally. 

§ 73. After all this, it is almost a pity to be under the 
necessity of bringing a third philosopheme of Kant's be- 
fore the reader's eyes. A pity, I say — For the philoso- 
pheme next to be introduced, if it does not succeed in 
swallowing up the other two things,—' twill not be on 
account of any lack of good intentions — -The attempt at 
any rate will be made. 

§ 74. Our Professor has several kinds of nonentities or 
nothings. One of them is the Nonentity or Nothing — 
the " nihil privativum" — which has not the original use of 
understanding, reality, for a foundation. Such is the con- 
ception of empty or pure space. 

§ 75. How these three seeming contradictions are to 
be reconciled, we cannot stay to inquire. Perhaps, should 
the matter be taken pretty deep, they cannot be recon- 
ciled at all. 

§ 76. — (E.) Bishop Berkeley. — But we come, in the last 
place, to a writer who had fully as much reason as any of 
them to make Space to be an idea. 

§ 77. "All extension," says the good Bishop, "exists 
" only in the mind." Principles of Human Knowledge. 
Sect. LXVII. " The philosophic consideration of mo- 
" tion doth not imply the being of an absolute space, dis- 
" tinct from that which is perceived by sense, and related 
" to bodies : which that it cannot exist without the mind, 
" is clear upon the same principles, that demonstrate," 
&c. Ibid. Sect. CXVI. But to multiply quotations to 
the same purpose, would be, in all conscience, altogether 
a work of supererogation. "j" 

§ 78. Space exists in the mind. Space, extension, is 

t " It is tins circumstance that will be found, on examination, to be 
" the principal stumbling-block in the Berkeleian theory, and which dis- 
" tinguishes it from that of the Hindoos, and from all others commonly 
(< classed along with it by metaphysicians; that it involves the annihila- 



216 



SENTIMENTS 



Part X. 



in the mind " only by way of idea.' 1 '' Principles. Sect. 
XLIX. And elsewhere the same. Therefore Space, 
with Berkeley, is an idea. 

§ 79. And what does the Bishop of Cloyne take the 
idea to be ? A mode. But no ; not a mode, though cer- 
tainly something very like it. 

§ 80. The following passages might lead us to suppose 
ideas were modes or properties. '■' The former ( spirits ) 
4i are active indivisible, substances : the latter (ideas ) are 

inert, fleeting, dependent beings, which subsist not by 
<; themselves, but are supported by, or exist in, minds or 
; ' spiritual substances." Principles. Sect. LXXXIX. 
t; A spirit has been shewn to be the only substance or 

• support, wherein the unthinking beings or ideas can 
" exist." Ibid. Sect. CXXXV. " I know what I mean, 

• when I affirm that there is a spiritual substance or 
■ snjiport. of ideas, that is. that a spirit knows and per- 

<: ceives ideas." Third Dialogue. " That there is no 
<! substance wherein ideas can exist beside spirit, is to me 
" evident." Ibid. Many are the similar passages. 

§ 81. Now what is a support but a substratum or sub- 
stance ? And what is a thing supported but a property 
or mode ? 

§ 82. But yet though Space is made an idea, and an 
idea is seen to be a thing supported, and Space, thus, is 
represented as very similar to a property ; Space is ra- 
ther in danger of being taken for a property or mode, 
than of being in reality a mode or attribute. 

§ 83. " Those qualities (extension and figure) are in 
" the mind only as they are perceived by it ; that is, not 

" tiou of space as an external existence ; thereby unhinging completely the 
" natural conceptions of the mind with respect to a truth, about which, 
" of all within the reach of our faculties, we seem to be the 
" most completely ascertained ; and which, accordingly, was se- 
" lected by Newton and Clarke, as the ground-work of their argument 
" for the necessary existence of God." Dugald Stewart's Philosophical 
Essays. Essay II. chap. ii. sect. 2. 



§§ 78-88. 



CONCERNING SPACE. 



217 



" by way of mode or attribute" &c. Principles. Sect, 
XLIX. " Look you, Hylas, when I speak of objects as 
" existing in the mind * * * * My meaning is 
" only, that the mind comprehends or perceives them ; 
;: and that it is affected from WITHOUT, "f or by some being 

distinct! from itself." Third Dialogue. And the 
same sort of thing in other places. 

§ 84. Thus have we treated of every distinct opinion 
which can be entertained regarding Space. If any per- 
son can righteously add a member to our General Divi- 
sion, or can with the least propriety subdivide farther our 
subdivisions, he will cause it to be clearly understood, 
that we have not gone over all the various opinions. We 
have no objection to oppose, should anyone desire to put 
upon trial what we have written, and subject it. in every 
possible respect, to the severest examination. 

§ 85. Before losing sight of our very long Digression, 
and turning once more towards the " Refutation," we 
shall improve the present opportunity, and remark one 
or two things which could not perhaps be more con- 
veniently noticed elsewhere. 

§ 86. Space being made by philosophers to stand for so 
many different things, the word being, therefore, of so 
ambiguous a description, the " Argument" never employs 
it, — but in one place, which is the " Appendix." The 
passage is as follows. 

§ 87. " ' Infinity of Extension is necessarily existing.' 
" Proposition. 

§ 88. " Let the extension be of space merely, or of 
" matter merely, or of space and matter together." Etc. 
See Part VII. § 2.+ 

t No assumption of Space here ? Weigh § 3. of the second note to § 69. 
above. 

X § I. It did not suit our purpose, to take for granted (even so little. 



218 



SENTIMENTS 



Part X. 



§ 89. Then — I hear an inquirer demand — if the term 
be so very ambiguous, how comes it to be used, so freely 
used, in the first Part hereof? The brief, the sufficient, 
reply is, that space, in that Part, is employed in no tech- 
nical sense whatever — At least, if it ever occur in a truly 
technical sense, any other sense would, all things being- 
considered, answer to the full as well. Let a man affix 
what idea to space he pleases, the grand purport and ob- 
ject of what is advanced in the Part we speak of, will 
not. in truth and reality, be at all affected thereby. We 
challenge our inquirer to make the experiment. 

§ 90. Nay, substitute for " space," on every occasion, 
land the same observation applies to " magnitude," and 
" immensity,") the word extension — the sense may re- 
quire it to be, infinite extension — a word attended by no 
particular ambiguity ; and the meaning and force of the 
passage, properly understood, will remain untouched. 

§ 91. In fine, all that Part I. requires at bottom to be 
admitted is, that something is necessarily existing, be the 
something space, or magnitude, or immensity, or simply 
extension. 

§ 92. But I hear another inquirer address me. In the 

or — if you please — so much, as) the separate existence of pure space, i. e. 
space without matter. The " Argument" sets out from the tiling denoted 
by the unambiguous word extension, infinite extension ; not caring of 
what nature the extension is. That there is expansion, viz. pure space, 
infinite expansion, or pure space, distinct from the extension of matter ; 
it is the business of the second Scholium under Prop. IV. Part I. to de- 
monstrate. 

§ 2. In fact, had the first Proposition in the demonstration (in place of 
being, " Infinity of Extension is necessarily existing,") been in these 
terms — Infinity of Space is necessarily existing ; — it might have been 
objected : That it was — unwarrantably, for without proof — assumed, that 
in nature there is space where there is no matter — A position, without 
doubt, of vast consequence, as against atheism {see fart ix. § 6, 7, 8.) : 
and by no means to be laid hold of, before a right to possession be esta- 
blished. 



§§ 89-94. 



CONCERNING SPACE. 



219 



29th section of the same Part (so is the second inquiry 
prefaced) Br Isaac Watts is brought in, saying, that we 
cannot conceive Space non-existent, &c. But subse- 
quently, he denied the necessary existence of Space.t In 
these circumstances, was it fair and altogether right, to 
apply the Doctor to that use which we find him forced 
to be of in that 29th section ? — My answer is quite at 
hand. 'Tis two-fold. 

§ 93. I ran upon Br Watts the FIRST ; and with Br 
Walls the SECOND, we had there nothing whatever to do. % 
We have had indeed a good many things to say to Br 
Watts the Second, || but certainly the occasion had not 
arrived when we were no farther on than Part I. § 29. 
Perhaps a deal of remarkable attention has atoned for 
any delay which may have taken place in paying our 
respects to the last-mentioned Doctor, to-wit, the Doctor 
in his last-alluded-to character. 

§ 94. But, again, tho' it be true, Br Isaac Watts, at a 
later stage of his life, denied that space has necessary 
existence — meaning, by space, an external something, dis- 
tinct in every respect from matter ; — still he does not, so 
far as I remember, exactly deny any where the necessary 
existence of extension of some kind. He no where af- 
firms of all extension whatsoever, that we can conceive it 
to be entirely blotted out of existence. And in the 29th 
section of Part first, extension — all extension — would 
have done as well as " space. "V 



t See above, § 46, and § 56, &c. 
|| See above, § 35 to § 57. 



J See above, § 11, 12, 5'/. 
^[ As see above, § 90. 



220 



PART XI. 

THE ARGUMENT, A PRIORI, FOR THE BEING AND 
"ATTRIBUTES OF GOD," AN IRREFRAGABLE DE- 
MONSTRATION. 

§ 1 . We must now request our reader to retrace his 
steps, and consider a second time the words quoted from 
. J ntitheos in the fifth section of our seventh Part. Taking 
For granted that the reader has reverted to those words, 
we repeat our interrogation, What does Antitheos under- 
stand by the word space, as it occurs in that passage ? 

§ 2. We have seen, that Space is Space, and neither 
more nor less, with our atheist.! Is the t: space" with 
which at present we are concerned, to be held as denot- 
ing merely bare space or extension ? If so, ; ' to talk of a 
• substratum being necessary," even " a priori necessary," 
to space, is, I should hope, very far from being nonsense. 
Nay, that there is a Substratum to infinite space or ex- 
pansion, is, as we observed, demonstrated in ; ' Part III." 
of the ' ; Argument. "J 

§ 3. If, contrariwise, by " space" Antitheos means the 
>ubstanee which space supposes, if it supposes such ; it is 
indeed nonsense to talk of a substratum to space being 
necessary a priori, or in any other sense of the word 
necessary : For, in the case contemplated, it is nonsense 
to talk of a substratum at all. 'Tis assuredly nonsense 
to talk of the substance to the substance, or of the sub- 

t See Part IX. § 10, and following sections. 
| See Part VII. § 3. 



1-6. « ARGUMENT, A PRIORI" IRREFRAGABLE. 221 



stratum to the substratum, of Space. If space stands for 
substance, it stands for substratum. 

§ 4. Our atheist does not inform us, in so many words, 
in which sense he uses the term. But from the circum- 
stance of his making " space" take the place which " in- 
" finite extension" occupied, we are entitled to conclude, 
he employed the term in the former of the two senses. 
The connection, in short, may be held to determine, that 
" space" stands for bare space. 

§ 5. Besides, is not as much as this indicated by the 
words which follow in the "Refutation?" "On the 
" other hand," says our author, " if it (space) stands in 
" need of a substratum, the foundation-stone of this great 
" argument must crumble into dust, and be unfit to serve 
" as a substratum to any thing." As to which : If Space 
stands in need of a substratum, this must be because 
Space is a property. And if Space is a property — to 
give it a substratum (of which it will stand in need,) will 
indeed cause the foundation-stone of an argument to 
crumble into dust, but the argument will be, not the 
" Argument * * for the Being * * of God," 
but the argument for the being of a Refutation.^ A 
word in Antitheos's ear, as to the foundation-stone of the 
great argument (by whomsoever handled) from Space, to 
the existence of Deity; — The pillars of the world may 
shake, and fall too — (no contradiction is involved in sup- 
posing that — ) but, though the pillars of the world fail, 
and the universe of matter be as if it had never been, — 
the foundation-stone of that great argument standeth sure. 

§ 6. A remark of somewhat the same nature as the 
remarks which our antitheist has in the 15th paragraph 
of Chapter VI., (all of which paragraph we have now gone 
over,) we meet towards the end of his volume. In his 
" retrospective and concluding remarks," he concentrates 
t See Part XII. § 7, with note A, and § 8. 



a ARGUMENT, A PRIORI;' 



Part XL 



" into one view the chief features, the shortcomings, and 
" anomalies of" Mr Gillespie's " extraordinary attempt 
" to prop up, upon rational principles, what has nothing 

to do with such principles, but which must for ever 
" remain a mere matter of faith. "t — Ponder this ere 
proceeding farther, — 'tis our antitheist's assurance we 
have for it, that Mr Gillespie's attempt to call in rational 
principles to his aid, has failed. 

§ 7. In Mr Gillespie's case, "there is," says Antitheos. 
now about the work of concentration, " there is an odd 
" forgetfulness of first principles. "J — Wherein consists 
the oddnessl — "Infinite extension and infinite duration 
" are either necessary OF themselves — absolutely so. 
" or they are not. " — Hitherto the ground is firm. No- 
thing can be more solid. — " If necessary OF themselves, 
•• then is the introduction of Mr Gillespie's substance 
" or substratum gratuitous and absurd." — All firm foot- 
ing as yet. — Of themselves is pretty much the same, 
is it not ? as if we should say PER SE (in the plural.) If 
infinite extension and infinite duration necessarily exist 
per SE — that is, without substrata — then we cannot, with- 
out absurdity, introduce substrata, or even a substratum. 
All is well, then, up to this point. To go on with Anti- 
theoss words : — " If not necessary, — " — But where is the 
OF themselves noiv ? Oh ! it was not convenient to 
carry about the PER SE any longer. Not for you, Anti- 
theos! who have to conjure up short comings and anomalies 
in Mr Gillespie. But for me, who have to do nothing of 
the kind, who have to execute no greater a task than to 
exhibit such short comings and anomalies as the " Refu- 
•• tation" abounds with — of which the present anomaly 

t Chap. XIII. par. 1. — Lo ! the Atheist licks up the spittle of the 
Sceptic : — Antitkeos's sneer is couched under language which forbids our 
not remembering Hume's — " Our most holy religion is founded on Faith. 
" not on reason." — Essay on Miracles. Part ii. 

I Chap. XIII. par. 4. 



§§ 7-8. 



IRREFRAGABLE. 



223 



and short coming (of two small Latin words, or the cor- 
responding ones in English,) is a very fair specimen : — 
For me, I say, it is quite convenient to keep the of 
themselves in mind. I must have consistency in the 
matter of the PER SE. Well then : — " If not necessary. — 1 ' 
OF THEMSELVES — " the primary propositions in the argu- 
(i ment are false and groundless. "t What argument ? It 
cannot be the " Argument, a priori" &c, because, in it, 
the primary propositions do not concern themselves at all 
with the affair of PER SE.J But take the passage in the 
way Antitheos has it, (reading, simply, " If not neees- 
" sary,") and nothing can be more indisputable than that 
" the primary propositions in the" " Argument, a priori," 
" are false and groundless." But infinite extension or 
space, and infinite duration, are far from being NOT ne- 
cessary : They ARE necessary. And what settles the 
point is, that we have Antitheos 1 s authority for it.|| But 
let us ever bear in mind, that though infinite space and 
infinite duration are necessary, it is not necessary that 
they exist PER SE. The farthest from it imaginable. — 
And this finishes our business, at this time, with the 
Chapter entitled " Retrospective and Concluding Re- 
" marks." * 

§ 8. The 16th paragraph of Chapter VI. commences 
thus : — " But if we are dissatisfied with the author's sub- 
" stratum," — [And Antitheos, unless so dissatisfied, could 
be no atheist — ] " ^ve are not much better situated with 
" the alternative left us ; for according to the dilemma he 

has imposed upon us, we are obliged to conclude that 
:i infinity of extension is itself a substance." Yea : And 
a dilemma to Antitheos it will remain. If infinite exten- 
sion stand in need of no substratum, why then it can 

t Chap. XIII. par. 4. 

X See Part II. § 13, &c, Part VII. § 2, 3, and note to § 88, Part X. 
I] See Part I. § 35. 



224 



ARGUMENT, A PRIORI;' 



Part XI. 



stand by itself. And if it can stand by itself, why then 
— however horrified Antitheos may be — it is a substance. 
But in reference, further, to this, see below § 21. and the 
subsequent sections, to the end of the Part. 

§ 9. We shall at all times be ready to grant, that in- 
iinity of extension makes but an awkward substance — a 
very prodigy among monsters. But at ivhose door would 
the folly of creating such a substance lie, if it lay at any 
body's? Not at Mr Gillespie's, for the " Argument' 1 
only says, " IF Infinity of Extension subsist without a 
" substratum, THEN, it is a substance"] — never saying, 
that Infinity of Extension subsists without a substratum, 
saying as it does the very reverse.^ But the folly of 
making a substance out of infinity of extension, lies, (as 
is, indeed, evident enough, and as will be farther evinced 
belowj| — lies, we repeat, at his door with whom infinite ex- 
trusion subsists without any substratum, quite by itself 

in nature only nature repudiates such a subsistence 

And therefore, that piece of folly will likely be found 

near Antitheos 's threshold, since he is so " dissatisfied" 
with the substratum of infinite extension. 

§ 10. In reflecting on "the dilemma" which is " im- 

" posed," do notrforget how sad a one it is for antitheists. 

§ 11. "I had thought," continues our atheist, " infinity 
• a mere nominal adjunct allowed to space, from the cir- 
" cumstance of our being unable to conceive limits to its 
" extent — " Here he makes infinity an adjunct, a mere 
nominal adjunct, to space. Elsewhere, he says infinity is 
an attribute thereof. We noticed, how incorrect this latter 
-aying is.^f And probably the former one is still more 
objectionable. But it is not worth our while to write 
another syllable on the subject. I had thought so, quoth 

t See Part V. § 15 — and below, § 15. £ See above, § 2. 

|| See below, § 21, and following sections. 

f See § 2. of tbe first note to § 9, Part VIII. 



§§ 9-11. 



IRREFRAGABLE. 



225 



he, — " but the theist, it seems, thinks otherwise. Infi- 
" nity, with him, must be a substance." — Only, if infi- 
nity exist per se. — " On the same ground," — Antitheos 
goes on, — " we might contend that finity is a substance 
" too." — To be sure. If infinity can exist per se, why may 
not finity, likewise, exist per se ? If bare infinity be a 
substance, — on precisely the same ground, bare finity may 
be a substance too. In this, between the theist and the 
anti-theist there is, for once, a happy unanimity — and in- 
deed the thing seems quite incontrovertible. " Suppos- 
" ing, however," proceeds Antitheos, " that space infi- 
" nitely extended is what he means," — by what \ by in- 
finity, I take it — " all that we can say is, that if it" 
(" space infinitely extended") " be a substance it is no 
" longer space, or extension, or any thing else than, — just 
" a substance ; — unless it may be both extension and sub- 
" stance at the same moment. But these are profane 
" thoughts." — They are, at all events, very empty words. 
As for thought, — whatever of this commodity is in them, 
is hardly equal to the task of rising to the profane. " If 
" it," i. e. " space infinitely extended," " be a substance 
" it is no longer space" — Good. And, in like manner, if 
Antitheos, finitely extended, be a substance, he is no longer 
Antitheos. This every one at a glance sees to be — just 
nonsense. Again : " If it," i. e. " space infinitely ex- 
pended, "" be a substance it is no longer * * * * any 
" thing else than, — just a substance." — So, if the finite 
thing called a " Refutation'''' be a substance, it is no longer 
any thing else than — just a substance. This, however, is 
any thing but nonsense, for it is sense, and good sense, 
and — just a truism ; — " unless" (indeed) the "Refutation" 
" may" [not] "be both " a "Refutation'' " and substance at 

" the same moment." Certainly, Space cannot be "both 

" extension and substance at the same moment," if exten- 
sion means extension and nothing more, N and if substance 



22G 



« ARGUMENT, A PRIORI,'' 



Part XI. 



means something more than 'extension and nothing more.^ 
But, this can with difficulty be accounted a discovery. 

§ 12. " Perhaps" — our atheist prosecutes the matter 
thus — " according to the new school of theology, not only 
" may a book be a substance, but its extension may also 
iS be a substance, its weight another, its colour a third, 
" and so forth." Surely, — IF the extension can exist 
per se, IF the weight can exist per se, IF the colour can 
exist per se. And this, not only according to the new 
school of theology, but according to the old school of 
logic. 

§ 13. " Let us hear, however," (these are Antitheos 1 s 
next words " how the divine theory of infinity of exten- 
• sion being a substance is to be sustained. — Mark with 
•• what boldness of reasoning it is brought out. The in- 
" ridel must look well to his footing and points of defence. 
" lest he be laid prostrate by its overwhelming force." f 
Then Antitheos proceeds to quote from " Proposition 
" III." The quotation we shall give, but we shall give, 
at the same time, what immediately precedes in the " Ar- 

gument," that our reader may the better understand 
whereabout he is. Part of the passage he has had be- 
fore \ — but no matter. 

§ 14. " Either, Infinity of Extension subsists, or, (which 
• ; is the same thing,) we conceive it to subsist, without a 
•■ support or substratum: or, it subsists not, or we con- 
;; ceive it not to subsist, without a support or substratum. 

§ 15. " First, IF Infinity of Extension subsist without 
•• a substratum, THEN, it is a substance. And" [now 
comes the portion cited by Antitheos'] " ' IF any one 
" ' should deny, that it is a substance, it so subsisting;' 
" (that is, without a support or substratum, ||) ' to prove. 

t Parag. 1G. 

I Viz. in Part Y. § 14, 15,— also in § 9, above. 
|j Observe the parenthesis is Antitheos '§. 



§§ 12-17. 



IRREFRAGABLE, 



227 



" 1 beyond contradiction, the utter absurdity of such denial, 
" 4 we have but to defy him to shew, WHY Infinity of 
(i ' Extension is not a substance, so far forth as it can 

£< ' SUBSIST BY ITSELF, OR WITHOUT A SUBSTRATUM.' "f 
§ 16. This, then, is what our atheist points to as bold- 
ness of reasoning. It must chagrin him, that he cannot 
find the weak side of the reasoning ; — though certainly 
none can hinder him from being highly offended at its 
boldness. The boldness, and the reasoning to the bargain, 
he would sneer down. But the reasoning, whatever be- 
comes of its boldness, will never hang its head. 

§ 17. It is thus Antitheos follows at the heels of the 
passage cited by him : — " A new era has thus dawned up- 
" on logic. A grand discovery is on the eve of rendering 
" her power irresistible, and her reign everlasting and 
" glorious. It is to be henceforth no longer necessary for 
" us to prove an affirmative : assert what we may, no one 

t § 1 . The following paragraph is the one which follows, in the " Ar- 
■ ( gument." 

§ 2. " As, therefore, it is a contradiction to deny that Infinity of Ex- 
" tension exists, 1 so there is, on the supposition of its being able to subsist 
" without a substratum, a substance or Being of Infinity of Extension 
cc necessarily existing : Tho' Infinity of Extension and the being of Infin- 
" ity of Extension, are not different, as standing to each other in the rela- 
" tion of mode and subject of the mode, but are identical." 

§ 3. If now my readers will turn to Part II. and § 4. they shall find 
our antitheist insinuating, that his opponent never told what he meant by 
the word being. (Look, also, at the 2d paragraph of Chapter XII. of the 
" Refutation.") In the passage just cited, that opponent (this being the 
first occasion of the Argument's using being,) makes Being to be the 
same as substance, and a substance to be what subsists without a substra- 
tum. Is not this telling what is meant ? We have yet to learn that Anti- 
theos could tell any thing better on the subject. Be this as it may, he has 
done the very thing Mr Gillespie has done, — he has given existing by it- 
self a good enough explanation of substance. (See below, § 43.) But 
present ends, you see, must be answered. If an inconsistency turns out 
to have been committed — why, in the circumstances of the case, it could 
not very well have been avoided. 

i " Prop. I."— Note in " Argument." See Part II. § 15. 

2 F 



228 



" ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," Part XI. 



" dare deny our assertions. For to prove beyond contra- 
" diction the utter absurdity of such denial, we have 
" only to put a brave face on it, and throw a defiance in 
<c the teeth of our opponent to prove the negative.' 't And 
in the Chapter wherein arc concentrated " into one 
" view the chief features" of Mr Gillespie's " extraordi- 
" nary attempt, "+ our atheist, writing in a similar strain, 
hath this sentence : — " He (Mr Gillespie ) can only insist 
" dogmatically upon duration and extension being recog- 
- nised as substances, and in self-satisfied proof, chal- 
• lenges any one, in the most braggart and imperious tone, 
" to shew why they are not to be regarded as substances !" 
Pa rag. 5. 

§ 18. Mr Gillespie maintained, (and he yet maintains) 
that, to prove the utter absurdity of a certain denial, we 
have but to defy the denier to .point to any sufficient 
reason for his denial. What is there that has not been 
denied by some one % || Should the correctness of this 
algebraic expression be denied 7 (« +a) : 2a : : (2a — a) : a) 
what better could be done than cJiallenging the denier, 
(not in a braggart imperious tone, but in a gentlemanly 
manner,) to produce a valid reason for his assertion, and 
thereby go far to show us, that, like Hudibras, 

For every why he had a wherefore ? 
Mr Gillespie, of a truth, had thought, that if all men had 

t Parag. 18. % See above, § 6. 

|| We have atheistical authority for it. " Hobbes says, that if men 
" found their interest in it, they would doubt'' [no — but they would say 
they doubt] " the truth of Euclid's Elements." This composes one of 
Diderot's notes to D'Holbach : The note being commendatory. See % 1. 
of Appendix to Part VI. And if Hobbes ever spoke as Diderot makes 
him speak, we have two atheists testifying at onee. And we readily ad- 
mit the atheistical authority to be high, in the present instance. It's ex- 
tremely likely the pair have spoken the truth. None better fitted to know 
what lengths certain men will go to, when they think their interests are 
at stake — 

—Men may mistake their true interests. 



§§ 18-19. 



IRREFRAGABLE. 



229 



agreed on giving a certain name to each of the objects or 
things in which were fulfilled certain conditions ; no per- 
son could reasonally refuse to suffer the appellation to be 
bestowed on any one of the objects : and that if a man 
was found so exceedingly singular as to recede entirely 
from common language, and universally received notions, 
the onus probandi (to take a phrase from the law) lay on 
him, to make good the new and unheard of position. 
That all men were af one as to the propriety of calling 
that a substance which exists without a substratum, Mr 
Gillespie had verily esteemed a circumstance sufficiently 
entitling him to call upon him who should decline to per- 
mit the term to be applied to that which does so exist, 
to call upon him (I say) to assign some ground for his 
refusal. No ! exclaims our atheist, such a circumstance 
is not sufficient to entitle Mr Gillespie to " throw a de- 
" fiance," (" dogmatically," of course,) at the refuser, to 
shew why a thing existing without a substratum is not to 
be designated a substance. No, indeed ! exclaims our 
atheist, for that would be (here lies his mistake) to usher 
in the day of a grand discovery — the dawn of a new era 
— in logic. And there's no room for any grand discovery 
in logic : A new era would come too late. No ! no ! ex- 
claims our atheist. But why does he so ? After the 
chiding we have got, we dare never so much as think of 
defying him, but we politely ask him, Wliy ? He should 
be able, and willing too, on every occasion, to give a rea- 
son for the principle on which he acts. 

§ 19. Mr Gillespie contended, that we have only to 
defy any one (an atheist, for example, — and let the atheist 
be such a one as Antitheos, if this gentleman likes — ) to 
point to some good ground for denying the proposition, 
" If Infinity of Extension subsist without a substratum. 
" THEN, it is a substance" ; in order to make manifest the 
absurdity of a denial. And from this particular -case ? 



230 



« ARGUMENT, A PRIORI;' 



Part XI. 



. intitheos has drawn, as a specimen of Mr Gillespie 's logic, 
which is the unrighteous part of the affair,) the universal 
proposition, To prove any affirmation, we have no more 
to do than, with " a brave face", to " throw a defiance 
*• in the teeth" of all opponents to prove a negative : Hurl 
your defiance at a negative, and, lo ! the affirmative is 
proven. The author of the " Argument" speaks of a 
special instance, and the author of the " Refutation," by 
a skilful manoeuvre, forces his opponent to speak as if he 
inclined to hold the special instance as the representative 
of any case whatsoever : as if he inclined to employ that 
procedure on every occasion, which he used on one only 
occasion, because no better could be done. This is the 
height of disingenuousness. This is wretched sophistry. 
But it is fortunate, that the sophistry is as obvious as it 
Is miserable. There is no mistaking it. 

§ 20. But after all : To lay down a thing, and defy all 
and sundry to show a good cause for asserting the con- 
trary. — though it may not be a commendable method, 
must at least be granted to be an allowable method, of 
starting towards the determination of any controversy 
whatever. Every thing which begins to be must have a 
sufficient reason for its existence. Every affirmation, and 
very negation that ever was, began sometime to be. And 
if a person deny a position, without being able to assign 
a proper cause, we may be assured that the denial is im- 
proper, if not absurd. It must always be admitted, that 
the mere hurling of a defiance at an opponent, is not by 
itself sufficient to establish a doctrine : It is sufficient 
only when conjoined with the opponent's inability to fur- 
nish may just evidence for the truth of a contrary propo- 
sition. 

§ 21. But, all this while, we have been assuming, that 
men universally have consented to denominate that a 
substance which has been decreed to subsist by itself, 



§§ 20-26. 



IRREFRAGABLE. 



231 



without a substratum, or subject of inhesion : Men uni- 
versally, with the exception of certain of the " atheistick 
H gang,"| who perceive themselves to be under the ne- 
cessity of either contending that infinite extension, or 
space, exists barely by itself, without any substratum, or 
granting that infinite extension exists only by reason of 
the existence of something else quite irreconcilable with 
their atheism. And 'tis high time that we present our 
readers with the evidence of our title to make the as- 
sumption. 

§ 22. Our authorities shall be selected from the list of 
those who are, among us, the best known and received as 
writers on such topics. Our authors, in short, must be 
in common and good repute. 

§ 23. The first authority we shall adduce is Mr Locke, 
and as he is the first, so he will be the greatest.^ 

§ 24. " The ideas of substances are such combinations 
" of simple ideas, as are taken to represent distinct par- 
" ticular things subsisting by themselves." — B. II. ch. xii. 
§6. 

§ 25. Modes, on the other hand, he defines thus : 
" Modes * * * * contain not in them the 
u supposition of subsisting by themselves, but are consi- 
" dered as dependences on, or affections of, substances." 
— Ibid, § 4. 

§ 26. In the 23d Chapter (same Book,) which expressly 
treats of our " ideas of substances," he hath these words : 
" The idea then we have, to which we give the general 

name substance, being nothing but the supposed, but 
" unknown, support of those qualities we find existing, 

t Cudwortli's words. 

X An excellent judge of the amount of fame which authors have, decides, 
that " in intellectual philosophy, Locke's celebrated work," leaves " all 
" competitors behind by the common consent of mankind." So says Lord 
Brougham, — in one of his valuable and very splendid " Dissertations'." 
Vol. II. p. 113-4. Much in this 2nd vol. — how unlike much in the 1st ! 



232 



" ARGUMENT, A PRIORI, 



Part XI. 



• ; which, we imagine, cannot exist SINE RE SUBSTANTE, 
" without something to support them, we call that sup- 
" port substantial" — § 2. 

§ 27. And in his letter to the Bishop of Worcester, he 
owns that his account of substance is on the same footing 
with that of Burgersdicius, Sanderson, " and the whole 
" tribe of logicians," who, he informs us, define a sub- 
stance to be, " ens, or res per se subsistens" 

§ 28. But indeed we could accumulate so much from 
Locke on this subject, that we must be content with the 
specimen given, and with referring the reader to a great 
part of the Chapter on " Substances," and to his Letter 
and second Reply to Dr Stilling fleet. 

§ 29. We do not feel ourselves under any necessity of 
adducing a host of Aristotelians, in the shape of Peripa- 
tetics and Schoolmen,! of whose song the constant burden 
is, Substantia est ens per se subsistens, non inlmrens in 
alio, Substance is that which subsists by itself, and has 
itself no subject : Because we believe that Mr Locke was 
an honest man, and an able ; and because (luckily for our 
readers' patience) he has spoken for " the whole tribe of 
" logicians." 

§ 30. Our next authority in this matter shall be the 
celebrated author of the True Intellectual System of the 
Universe : of which Sir James Mackintosh declares, " It 
; * is a work of stupendous erudition, of much more acute- 
• ; ness than at first sight appears." — Dissertation on the 
Progress of Ethical Philosophy, section 5. — The words 
which we are about to adduce, we have made use of al- 
ready, but the occasion was different. J 

§ 31. " Unquestionably, whatsoever is, or hath any kind 
" of entity, doth either subsist by itself, or else is an at- 

f Antitheos cannot reject their testimony : At any rate, he speaks of 
u the truly estimable wisdom of the schools''' — Chap. IV. par, 9* 
% See the second note to § 25. Part VIII. 



§§ 27-34. 



IRREFRAGABLE. 



233 



" tribute, affection, or mode of something, that doth sub- 
" sist by itself." Here he opposes a Mode to that which 
subsists by itself, that is, to a Substance. From the whole 
context of the passage, it is indisputably evident that he 
uses 'to subsist by itself, N and ^to be a Substance,^ as com- 
pletely convertible. See also, of the same great work, 
Chapter II. & vii. viii. 

§ 31. + 1. Our third author shall be Archbishop King, 
whose " Essay on the Origin of Evil" has lost none of its 
fame. " By Substance I here understand," says the Arch- 
bishop, in the second page of Bishop Law's translation, 
" a thing which the Mind can conceive by itself distinct 
" and separate from all others : For that Thing, the Con- 
" ception of which does not depend upon another, nor in- 
" elude or suppose any other, is to us a Substance ; and 
" accordingly we distinguish it by that Name ; But that 
" which implies dependence in the conception of it we 
" call a Mode, or Accident." 

§ 32. Dr Isaac Watts is an author who. in one shape 
or other, has passed through most people's hands, and 
whose authority in matters of logical and ontological 
science used to be none of the most inconsiderable. Be 
his authority, in metaphysical subjects, exactly what it- 
may, now, we may very safely take his opinion upon the 
question before us. We need not require, and did we 
require, we might fail in obtaining, a better judge, as to 
the propriety of bestowing a certain name on a certain 
thing. 

§ 33. In his " Brief Scheme of Ontology" there are 
these words : " Every thing is considered, either as sub- 
" sisting of itself * * * and then it is called sub- 
" stance * * * or it is considered as subsisting by 
" virtue of some other being in which it is, or to which 
" it belongs, and then it is called a mode." — Chap. XVI. 

§ 34. In the second of his " Philosophical Essays," and 



234 



" ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," Part XI. 



in the third Section, the folio-wing- sentence is to be seen. 
" If we can lay aside all our prejudices in this point, I am 
M persuaded solid extension would appear substantial 
" enough to be called a substance, since even mere empty 
(i space, or extension without solidity, hath been by some 
" philosophers esteemed substantial enough to subsist by 
" itself, and to deserve the honour of this name ?" — To- 
wit, the name of substance. From this passage it appears, 
that the Doctor reckoned that thing which subsists by it- 
self to be deserving of the name of substance. To this 
extent at least, he agrees with the philosophers he al- 
ludes to. Whatever difference there might be between 
the Doctor and the philosophers, otherwise; he evident- 
ly doubts not for one moment, that " to subsist by itself"' 
is t" to be substantial enough."^ And by the bye, as he 
takes " mere empty space" into account, the quotation 
speaks to our point, to a hair. Read, likewise, of the first 
Section of the same Essay, the second paragraph, and it 
will be found to speak no ambiguous language about that 
which the subsisting by itself makes a thing to be. — Etc. 
Etc. 

§ 35. In his " Logic," he says : " Every being is con- 
<; sidered either as subsisting in and by itself, and then it is 

called a substance ; or it subsists in and by another, and 
" then it is called a mode" — Part I. ch. ii. sect. 1. See 
also, to the same effect, the first paragraph of the follow- 
ing section : — etc. etc. 

§ 36. See especially § 16. of Part X. 

§ 37. We shall next produce a philosopher whose spe- 
culations savoured strongly of common sense, and that in 
more than one respect. For which reason, possibly, he is 
none the worse for our purpose. 

§ 38. " Things which may exist by themselves, and do 
" not necessarily suppose the existence of any thing else. 



§§ 35-40. 



IRREFRAGABLE. 



235 



" are called substances ; and with relation to the quali- 
" ties or attributes that belong to them, they are called 
" the subjects of such qualities or attributes." Dr Thomas 
ReioVs Essays. Essay I. chap. ii. — The chapter, this, in 
which the author points out " some of those things" which 
he is to " take for granted, as first principles," princi- 
ples " common to Philosophers and to the vulgar," " com- 
" mon principles, which are the foundation of all reason- 
" ing, and of all science," principles which " are such as 
" all men of common understanding know ; or such, at 
" least, as they give a ready assent to, as soon as they are 
" proposed and understood." 

§ 39. But the truth is, there would be no end to the 
quoting of authorities, on this subject, were we not to cut 
the matter short : — which here we do, as far as authors 
of one species are concerned. f 

§ 40. But no farther. — For as we have had our the- 
istical kind of authorities, so we shall let the reader have 
a taste of a-theistical authority too, — in relation to the 
very important point which is before us — A point in the 
decision regarding which, so very much is involved. 

t Were it lawful to quote, in an affair of this kind, a writer who had 
the bad fortune to get, for all time to come, an ill name, one, there is no 
doubt, much worse, by far, than he deserved ; we might have added, to 
the authors in the text, — Berkeley : who says — " Thing or being is the 
" most general name of all ; it comprehends under it two kinds entirely 
" distinct and heterogeneous, and which have nothing common but the 
f£ name, to-wit, spirits and ideas. The former are * * substances : 
" the latter are * * dependent beings, which subsist not by themselves, 
" but are supported by, or exist in, minds or spiritual substances." Prin- 
ciples. Sect. LXXX1X. (See Part X. § 80.) And : " It is acknow- 
" ledged on the received principles, that extension, motion, and in a word 
" all sensible qualities, have need of a support, as not being able to subsist 
" by themselves. But the objects perceived by sense, are allowed to be 
" nothing but combinations of those qualities, and consequently cannot 
" subsist by themselves. Thus far it is agreed on all hands." 
Sect. XCI. See likewise, Section LXXIII., and other places of his 
works, for the same sort of thing. 



236 



« ARGUMENT, A PRIORI;' 



Part XI. 



§ 41. What says Spinoza on the subject ? for we natu- 
rally turn in his direction, he having* been the most cele- 
brated (most justly celebrated) atheist of Dr Samuel 
Clarke's timet, ana there not having arisen his equal in 
atheism since. " Per Substantiamintelligo " says Spinoza, 
" id, quod in se est, et per se concipitur ; hoc est, id cujus 
" concept e.s nonindiget conceptu alterius rex, a quo formari 
" debeat." [" By Substance I understand that which is 
•• in itself, and which we conceive by itself ; it is that the 
" conception of which docs not stand in need of thecon- 
ception of aught else, in order to its existence."] Ethic. 
Par. I. Def. 3. 

§ 42. To all these authorities, which, there is no deny- 
ing, are so entirely satisfactory, we shall add a single 
other one. The Author now to be ushered into notice is 
worth them all put together, for he sets the matter in 
debute quite "I rest. 'Tis ANTITHEOS HIMSELF, I speak 
of. To bring Mm in, when any matter of more moment 
than ordinary is to be decided on, is our wont. \ 

§ 43. "I would ask" — these are Antitheos's words — 
" what intelligence is? Is it a being — a substance — a 
" thing that exists BY itself % Or is it not, on the con- 
" trary, a characteristic property — "j| Here, substance is 
given as another word for being, and 'existence by itself" is 
the exegesis of substance. With Antitheos, then, a sub- 
stance is that which eocists by itself. 

§ 44. Should it be argued, (for we must provide against 
every thing which can possibly be objected,) that all, or — 
if not all — so many of my authorities, when they say, 
What subsists by itself is a substance, had (if they 

t " Spinoza, the most celebrated Patron of Atheism in our time." 
Demonstration. 

% See Part I. § 34 & 35. Part IV. § 14, & following Sections. 
Part VI. from § 31 to § 37- 

U Chap. XI. par. 4. See Part XII. § 14. 



§§ 41-46. 



IRREFRAGABLE. 



237 



had not, others when speaking to the same effect, have 
had ) finite things only in view ; and that it is im- 
possible in the nature of things, that there can be an in- 
finite substance : — Then, my reply is, that Spinoza, the 
head of atheists, shall be allowed to settle this particular 
department of the controversy, for us. As a matter of 
course, theistical evidence is to be had in abundance, but 
I shall be content to limit myself to the evidence of atheists 
themselves. 

§ 45. " Substantiam corpoream," these are Spinoza's 

words, " * non nisi infinita concipi potest " 

[" Corporeal substance * is necessarily conceived to be 
" infinite — "] Again : — " Omnis^ substantia est ne- 
" cessario infinita. 1 ' [" Substance is of necessity in- 
" finite."] Ethic. Par. I. Prop. 8. 

§ 46. Thus Spinoza. But I shall be more liberal than 
I promised to be — And to Spinoza's authority I shall again 
subjoin that of Antitheos himself. " Matter, indeed, 
" may," he alleges, " be infinite.''^ Again : he observes, 
" we cannot say whether matter be infinitely EX- 
" tended or not. In so far as our experience goes, 
" and our observation can carry us, we find substance 
" completely occupying every part of space."\\ With 
Antitheos, matter is substance, indeed all that we have 
for substance. And this gentleman has no difficulty to 
throw in the way of matter's infinity. That is, he has no 
difficulty to throw in the way of infinite substance. 

t The word " omnis" goes, here, for nothing — A position, I cheerfully 
submit to the judgment of those that are versed in such matters. And 
did I dare to defy gainsayers, I should accompany what I hand over, with 
something. 

X Chap. III. par. 8, || Chap. V. par. 7. 



238 



PART XII. ' 

THE "ARGUMENT, A PRIORI, FOR THE BEING AND 
« ATTRIBUTES OF GOD," AN IRREFRAGABLE DE- 
MONSTRATION. 

§ 1. " But waiving," — such are the words which 
succeed the passage quoted, from Chapter VI. of the 
" Refutation," in § 17. of the preceding Part — " But 

• waiving, in the meantime, our plea of want of evi- 
; ' dence for the affirmative, a simple man would say in 
" relation to the case before us, that substance possesses 
" attraction, which extension does not ; that it is observed 
' ; under a thousand varieties of figure, density, colour, 
• ; motion, taste, odour, combustion, crystallization, &c. 
" which neither extension nor infinity ever is, or can in 
" its nature be. He might, in his deplorable ignorance, 
:{ ask if ever infinity was weighed, or extension analyzed 
" and its elements reduced to gas ?f This would, I dare 
:i say, only evince in the eyes of the theologian, that such 
" a person had no idea of the very convenient art of ap- 
• : plying metaphysical language to things physical ; whejre- 
" by a mere abstraction, or at most a property of some- 
' ; thing else, can so easily be charmed into a reality. His 

' shewing why infinity of extension is not a substance, 
" therefore, would be set down as grovelling, and com- 
" mon-place, and, by consequence, useless," Par. 19. 

t The preceding passage was had in view, when we were in the 3d 
section of Part V. 



§§ 1-4. " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," IRREFRAGABLE, . 239 



§ 2. Antitheos speaks of an art whereby an abstraction, 
that is, a thought of the mind,t can be charmed into a 
reality. Now one would have imagined that no art — 
still less, an art backed by a charm — was necessary, or 
even admissible, for the purpose ; and this, simply be- 
cause thought had all along been held to compose one of 
the classes of realities. Perhaps the decision was erro- 
neous, and a discovery of Inductive Science, has, in the 
hands of some fortunate Modern, made it plain that our 
thoughts are to be dismissed, for the future, to the dis- 
mal region of un-reality : where, if un-reality has any 
where, we might expect with the brightest and certainly 
the best-founded hopes, to behold sights stranger 

Than fables yet have feigu'd, 
—in short, the very same place (at least according to 
some) 

Where entity and quiddity, 
The ghosts of defunct bodies, fly. 

§ 3. Antitheos speaks of an art, " whereby a mere ab- 
" straction, or at most a PROPERTY of something else, 
" can so easily be charmed into a reality." — " That it 
" should come to this !"J Is a property of something in 
•need of an art possessed of a charm which, being used, 
behold ! a property starts into a reality. The property, 
then, was no reality before. " That it should come to 
« this !"+ 

§ 4. Our atheist waives the plea of want of evidence 
for the affirmative side in regard to the proposition, If 
Infinity of Extension subsist without a substratum by it- 
self, THEN, it IS a substance ; only so far as is compatible 
with his bringing forward reasons for the negative. He 
insinuates, that it is essential^ to a substance to attract 
and be attracted, to have a certain figure, and density, 
and colour, and motion, and taste, and odour, to be sus- 

t See Part I. § 8, { Hamlet. || See Part V. § 3, 



240 



« ARGUMENT, A PRIORI;' 



Part XII. 



ceptible of combustion, crystallization, &c. and of a pro- 
cess whereby it should be reduced to some gas; and is 
not this to adduce a reason on the negative side 1 

§ 5. It is an attempt at it, at all events : likely, the 
best which could be made. It is to adduce something, 
however, — any way you take it. When our atheist, (pass- 
ing over in his hurry, by the bye, the exact nature of the 
defiance altogether,) insinuates to that effect, he is fla- 
grantly guilty of n'petitio pirincipii, of begging the ques- 
tion to be proved, he . is to be held as having uttered, 
once more, ' ; an unproved extravagance." — Observe the 
concluding words : " His," the simple man's, " shewing 

• why infinity of extension is not a substance, therefore, 
" would be set down as grovelling and common-place, and, 

• by consequence, useless." Antitheos had been insisting, 
tho' secretly, that, to be a substance, a thing must possess 
attraction, figure, density, &c. &c. And here he plea- 
santly concludes as if his simple man had actually proved 
that infinite extension is not a substance, BECAUSE he had 
found it could not be weighed, nor reduced to gas, &c. 
&c. Verily, verily, his simple man, if he had made any 
such thing follow from such a cause, is no such simpleton 
after all, but — unless we mistake the matter much — is 
more of a knave than a fool. 

§ 6. We advance to the next paragraph. " After all, 
" however, how does the notable proposition stand, that 

there is necessarily a Being of infinity of extension ? 

The principle of the argument brought up in support 
" of it — the dilemma, in short — gives way on every side. 
" It stands without a vestige of backing, except from the 
" vain and swelling words of a blustering defiance," — 
[elsewhere called " a ridiculous bravado"! — ] "the value 
" of which no one but a fool could be at a loss to esti- 
" mate. "J — " I thank thee for teaching me that 

t Last par. of " Refutation. " % Parag. 20. 



§§ 5-7. IRREFRAGABLE. 



241 



" word."f — By the bye, although the dilemma is said to 
have given way " on every side" never a word was said 
by Antitheos to show it gave way in the middle. Anti- 
theos has never breathed one syllable against the dilemma, 
as a dilemma, or disjunctive proposition. He has never 
questioned the connexion of the members composing the 
disjunction, — the propriety of proposing the one alterna- 
tive when the other is rejected. The dilemma, then, is 
in our atheist's eyes unobjectionable. But the members 
— look at them, says he. And so we shall. The one is : 
" It (Infinity of Extension) subsists not, or we conceive 
" it not to subsist, without a support or substratum." 
Well, what have you to say to that, Antitheos ? — I own 
myself to be "dissatisfied" with your substratum, Anti- 
theos replies. % — The other member is : " Infinity of Ex- 
" tension subsists, or, (which is the same thing,) we con- 
" ceive it to subsist, without a support or substratum." 
What say you, Antitheos, to that 1 — As I am entirely 
" dissatisfied" with any substratum, infinite extension is 
left to stand by itself : and this, says Antitheos, I tell you 
seriously. || Then, Antitheos, I tell you, (and the infor- 
mation — shall it increase your seriousness? — ) you, and 
all the antitheists in the world, that infinite extension is 
made to be a substance. % 

§ 7. Now come we to the concluding paragraph of the 
Chapter before us : which paragraph opens thus : " The 
" author himself, indeed, seems not half sure of having 
" made good the doctrine he has announced : for after 
" having done all he could do, by the foisting in of a sub- 
" stratum upon extension" — [he should have said, infinite 
extension — ] After having foisted in a substratum upon 
infinite extension: Who or what did that ? Not Prop. III., 



t Merchant of Venice. J See P ai *t § 

|| See, also, Part IX. §§ 10, 11, 12, 13. 
^[ See Part XI. § 21, & following sections. 



242 



" ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," Part XII. 



which foists in nothing but a dilemma, a disjunctive pro- 
position, and a conclusion deduced from either member 
or alternative thereof. But to see a little farther into 
Antitheos'* s views : — " The foisting in of a substratum 
" upon" [infinite] £; extension to the destruction of its 
" necessary existence" — He that foists in a substratum 
upon infinite extension, by no means destroys the neces- 
sity of this latter. Infinite extension has not been proved 
to be not a mode only, of existence, t and to give it a Sub- 
stratum or Substance in which it inheres, if it is a pro- 
perty only, is surely not to destroy, but, were that possi- 
ble, to make more indestructible, its necessary existence. J 
After the author of the " Argument" had, by Antitheos'' s 
way of it, foisted in the substratum, " — he," we are next 
assured, " comforts himself with the reflection, that it is 
of very little consequence whether men will or will not 
" consent TO call this substratum by the name of being 
- or substance, because" — And then Antitheos cites a 
passage from the " Argument." The passage we shall 
produce, but the context shall be cited likewise. The 
first portion whereof the reader has had before him, al- 
ready. || 

§ 8. " Secondly, If Infinity of Extension subsist not 
" without a Substratum, then, it being a contradiction 
" to deny there is Infinity of Extension,^ it is a contra- 
" diction to deny there is a Substratum to it." — [The 
conclusion here, is the conclusion which Antitheos de- 
clared to be lame and impotent, and, as if that were 
not enough, lauglvMe.\\ The ground for merriment, I 
confess I do not see. But Antitheos may have a keener 
perception of the ludicrous. Can it be, that he laughs 
when he should be rather weeping ?£{ At all events, he 



t See Part VII. § 3. &c. 
|| See Part V. § 16. 
tt See Part V. § 17 r 



% See Note A. 

«[ " Prop. I." Note in « Argument." 

XX See Note B. 



§§■8-10. 



IRREFRAGABLE. 



243' 



should not have been so close, and kept the source of the 
jest all to himself : Had he but revealed where the cause 
for the merriment lay, others might have participated in 
the amusement.] — 

§ 9. " Whether or not men will consent to call this 
" Substratum Substance or Being, is of very little conse- 
" quence. For," [The passage cited by Antitheos follows.] 
" ' 'tis certain that the word Substance or Being, has 
" £ never been employed, can never be employed, to stand 
" ' for any thing more, at least, than the Substratum of 
£C ' Infinity of Extension.' " — The next sentence, in the 
" Argument," Antitheos does not quote. 'Tis as follows : 
" But to refuse to give such Substratum that name, being 
" a thing obviously most unreasonable, let us call the Sub- 
" stratum of Infinity of Extension, by the name of Sub- 
" stance or Being." Prop. III. §§ 4, 5. 

§ 10. It is in this way that our atheist writes after 
giving the quotation from the " Argument : — " It is, of 
" course, of no manner of importance whether men con- 
" sent to do what they always have done and must con- 
iC tinue to do, or whether they will not." — Exactly so. 
Antitheos lays down a general rule, applicable to any case, 
and Mr Gillespie gave the particular instance.t — " But 
" how far" our atheist next proceeds to ask, " is the 
u because" [or the "for"] " and its certainty consistent 
" with the lurking, suspicion of the honoured name of 
" Being or substance being refused to his unsupported sub- 
" stratum V — How far ? Very far indeed. As far as any 
one can see. Men often both- say and do very perverse 
things, when they think it is for their interest. J May not 
one see it to be, somehow, necessary, that there should be 
a Substratum to infinite extension, who yet, for some 
whimsical, or for some atheistical reason, refuses to ac- 
cord to the Substratum the name Substance or Being ? 

t Above, § 9. I See Note C. 

2g 



244 



« ARGUMENT, A PRIORI, 11 Part XII. 



Much more wonderful phenomena may be witnessed every 
day. Mankind not unfrequently develope the possibility 
there is, that human passions, and even fancies, may suf- 
fice to bring the tongue over to their side, in opposition 
to all the sound dictates of the understanding. There 
are those who will not be hindered by so paltry a diffi- 
culty as the obvious unreasonableness of a thing, from 
doing the thing. To refuse to bestow a name, is as easy, 
in one respect, as to see the propriety of the bestowment. 
I tli ink, that by this time the most inattentive reader 
must have remarked, how very few the insuperable ob- 
structions are that lie in an atheist's path. 

§11. A nthheos goes on thus : " Yet, on the very heels 
'• of this misgiving, he concludes, — 1 There is, then, NE- 
• : ' CESSARILY, a Being of Infinity of Extension.' " — Yes : 
Hard upon the heels of the lurking suspicion and misgiving 
as to whether some men may not act very unreasonably, 
by refusing a name to a thing which deserves it, — or, to 
deliver it more after Antitheos's manner, hard upon the 
heels of the " lurking suspicion" and " misgiving" as to 
whether certain men, having a certain object in view, 
will " consent to do what they always have done, and 
' ; must continue to do," in other, and similar, circum- 
stances — when no present interest warps their perceptions 
all awry ; the Author of the "Argument" thinks that 
by Proposition III. it is made out, for ever, There is, ne- 
cessarily, a Being of Infinity of Extension. And I shall 
venture to say, I am persuaded my reader must think so 
too. 

§ 12. Our atheist concludes his Chapter, and what he 
has to say in relation to Mr Gillespie's third Proposition, 
with these words: — " The worthy old father of the church, 
" who declared his belief of a Christian dogma because it 
" was impossible, is not far from having a logician of the 
" mathematical school to keep him in countenance. Mr 



§§ 11-15- 



IRREFRAGABLE. 



245 



" Gillespie frames a most absolute conclusion with his 
" premises dubiously faltering on his lips." — Mr Gillespie 
does indeed frame a most absolute conclusion, but that 
he does so with his premises dubiously faltering on his 
lips, is one of those many untruths which the reader has 
seen dropping from Antitheos" 1 s pen. And his is no fal- 
tering pen, on an occasion. It executes no dubious cha- 
racters, when a handsome misrepresentation is necessary 
for the writer's cause. 

§ 13. A logician of the mathematical school may be, for 
aught known to the contrary, a very proper person to 
keep company with one who has arrived at a " second 
" childishness. "t But whether worthy or unworthy, old 
or young, fathers or sons, of the Church, are more prone 
than certain other descriptions of persons, to believe in 
proportion to the incredibility of the creed, to act as if 
their maxim were, Credimus, quia impossibilia sunt ; 
this is a matter which may admit of doubt, and is open 
for fair investigation. 

§ 14. " Is it (intelligence) a being — a substance — a 
" thing that exists by itself? Or is it not, on the con- 
" trary," demands Antitheos, " a characteristic property 
" of a certain order of beings, dependent upon the exer- 
" else of their external senses, and, by consequence, their 
" organization ? We cannot even conceive how it should 
" exist, independent of these circumstances. ' To have 
" ' intelligence, it is necessary to have ideas ; to have 
" ' ideas, it is necessary to have senses : and to have 
" £ senses, it is necessary to be material. '} Intelligence, 
" THEREFORE, speaking generally, is nothing more than 
" an accidental property of matter "\ Chapter XI. 
parag. 4. 

§ 15. Now this which Antitheos says, that intelligence, 
speaking either generally or particularly, is nothing more 
+ Shakspcre. X See Note D. |} See Note E, 



246 « ARGUMENT, /i PRIORI;' Part XII. 



£Aaw cm accidental property of matter : that is, that 
such a thought of our minds as is denoted by the word 
accident — or chance — (for is it not plain, that accident — 
or chance — can be no real, separate existence in the world 
of external, independent realities, and that " the honoured 
name of Being or substance" suits no such thing as the 
letters c-h-a-n-c-e — or a-c-c-i-d-e-n-t — can ever denote 
I say, that such a thought of ours should, some time or 
other, have added thinking ( ourselves thus adding our- 
selves]) to certain c collocations of matter' J — (or was the 
matter not brought together previously 1 — ) this, to a 
truly " simple man," is — surely — as wild and monstrous 
a creed as any " worthy old father of the church" ever 
Bel himself down to frame, in the height of his zeal to be, 
abom measure mysterious and " divinely dark."|| This, 
THIS is INCREDIBLE. 

§ 16. And because it is so, we would have our readers 
consider, and evermore bear in mind, that the point now 
before our view touches somehow on the borders of that 
question to which the whole atheistic controversy may 
well be reduced To-wit, Is it more credible that Mind 
caused Matter, than that Matter caused Mind ? — To be- 
lieve that Matter (necessarily, or accidentally,) caused 
Mind to come into existence, is LMPOSSiBLE.tt Then, 
Atheism IS incredible. 

§ 17. And as it is impossible to believe, that Matter 
was the sole cause of Mind, so, with Antitheos, it is a 

CREDIBLE THING, THAT MlND WAS THE SOLE CAUSE OF 

Matter. Which we shall prove. 

§ 18. Our medium of proof shall be this : With Anti- 
theos, the Creation of Matter was a possible thing. %% 

t Thought thus acting before thought existed. 

% A favourite phrase with the Rev. Dr Chalmers. 

|] Dunciad. B. iv. 1. 460. f See Note F. 

tt See Note GL XX See Note H - 



§§ 16-23. 



IRREFRAGABLE. 



247 



§ 19. Antitheos certainly jeers sufficiently at the doc- 
trine of the Creation of Matter. — " Like the dogma of 
" all things being created out of nothing," [or, being 
created at all,] " * * * * the thing seems impossible'' 
— Ch. I. par. 6. " The creation or annihilation of mat- 
« ter, — either of which is an impossibility." Ch. V. last 
p ar< — « The miraculous and incomprehensible feat of 
" creating the universe out of nothing," [or, creating the 
universe at all.] — Ch. IX. par. 11." — The gross and pro- 
" foundly irrational dogma of creation. This is not pre- 
" cisely the place to detect and lay bare all the absurdi- 
" ties of that dogma (which could easily be done to its 
" inmost core)" — Ch. XII. par. 5. " He (the theolo- 
" gian) takes for granted the astounding fact of the ma- 
" terial universe having been created out of nothing" — 
[or, created at all.] Last Chap. par. 9. 

§ 20. But notwithstanding all Antitheos 's jeers, on this 
fruitful subject, he says : " We can conceive mat- 
" TER NOT TO exist." See also, other passages, the 
same in effect, from our atheist, (no atheist in this,) in 
Part VI. § 34. 

§ 21. Now — assuredly — he that can conceive Matter 
not to be, or not to have been, can conceive Matter to 
have had a beginning. Lay together these two positions : 
To-wit, Matter is, and, Matter can be conceived not to have 
been : And you have the conception of the Creation of 
Matter ; the possibility that Matter may have begun to 
be. 

§ 22. And as with our atheist (no atheist here,) Matter 
may have begun to be, the Creation of Matter is, with him, 
a possible thing.t — So that now we have, in firm keep- 
ing, our medium of proof. 

§ 23. And I fancy, it will not be denied (at least with 
a grave face,) that if Matter, all Matter, began to be, 
f See Note I. 



"ARGUMENT, A PR1R0I," Part XII. 



Mind, or nothing, must have produced it : That is, If Mat- 
ter began to be, Mind must have been the cause. t 

§ 24. So that — putting one thing by the side of an- 
other — it appears, that, with Antitheos, at the bot- 
tom OF HIS HEART,^ WE CAN BELIEVE, THAT MlND 

caused Matter And this was the thing to be proved. || 

§ 25. Antitheos should call himself " Anti- 
theos" — no, not for another hour. 



§ 2G. And here must be terminated our present Exa- 
mination. To advance farther now, would be improper 
in a high degree. We have weighed what Antitheos has 
said in reference to ; ' Proposition I." : We have exa- 
mined every atom of an argument urged against " Pro- 
t; position II." : And we have gone over word oy vjord, 
and in order, each syllable written in opposition to the 
evidence of "Proposition III." — On these three, (and on 
the corresponding three,) hang all the rest. If those Pro- 
positions be granted, or are fully established (whether 
they be granted or no,) Antitheos may as soon cause the 
heavens to depart by a frown, as he can get quit of the 
proof for the Being of A GOD. If those three positions 
are necessarily true, there lies close to our hands the de- 
monstration of An Intelligent First Cause of all the phe- 
nomena, and of all the matter, in the universe. And that 
they are so, we have no doubt, each one of our readers is 
by this time most thoroughly convinced.^ — In short, all 
the remaining positions in the " Argument, a priori, for 
'• the Being and Attributes of God," are mere deductions 

t See Note J. J Or rather, at the top of his head. 

|j See above, § 17. 

Whatever certain readers may say.. 



§§ 24-30. 



IRREFRAGABLE. 



249 



— doctrines evolved from the doctrines laid down in those 
preliminary Propositions.f 

§ 27. And on the other hand, if the truth of these Pro- 
positions have not been made luminously to appear, 'tis 
quite needless to proceed beyond them. The Zetetics 
were challenged to point out some — some one — " specific 
" fallacy" in my Demonstration. Antitheos, in the cha- 
racter of their avowed champion, alleges, he has detected 
A specific fallacy in the third, that vital, Proposition. If 
he be right, — at that point he should have stopped — It 
was mere supererogation to go over an inch of more ground 
— One of the two foundation-stones of this great argument 
crumbles into dust — And the whole " fabric of the Argu- 
" ment a priori comes lumbering down along with it. "J 

§ 28. That Antitheos resolved on sinking deeper 

into the slough of his own objections, is evidence of any 
thing but his own contentment with the result of his pre- 
liminary operations. He enters upon new ground, and 
demeans himself as if the region he had passed over were 
not territory fully conquered. 

§ 29. We shall come to a halt then— to see whether 
or no ee Theology must be sorely distressed for standing 
" ground, if this be its strongest position — its fortress — 
" its rock — its high tower." — " Refutation''' : last par. 

§30. To go on, we should have to subsume the un- 
questionable truth of a proposition to which my antago- 
nist has fairly — I mean, openly — objected. To take for 
granted against atheists, the truth of the 3d Proposition : 
" this will we do, if God permit." || But not now ivill we. 
In the mean time Antitheos is afforded an opportunity of 

t Of the truth of which, a slight inspection of that work, may satisfy 
one. Weigh § 19. Part II. 

J " Refutation," Ch. X. last par. These words are used as accommo- 
dations. 

II I am not arguing with an antitheist, at present. 



2 50 « ARGUMENT, A PRIORI;' Part XII. 

acknowledging what, we are bold to say, all our readers 
must have perceived. — 

" I PAUSE FOR A REPLY." 

§ 31. — I conclude, in the words of the penetrating Br 
Samuel Clarke. — " Infinite Space, is Infinite Extension: 
k ' and Eternity, is infinite Duration. They are the two 

" FIRST AND MOST OBVIOUS AND SIMPLE IDEAS, THAT 
" EVERY MAN HAS IN HIS MIND." — Ans. to Sixth Letter. 



POSTSCRIPT TO THE THIRD EDITION. 

§ 1. Three years have now elapsed since this Exami- 
nation was first given to the public : and as Antitheos 
lias not brought out any reply, it may be presumed, 'tis 
intended that no reply shall appear. 

§ 2. Indeed, in a private communication to the author 
of the Examination, " Antitheos " in so many words, lets 
it be understood, that he does not purpose to publish any 
reply. 

§ 3. In the communication referred to, " Antitheos" 
writing in the contemplation of a second edition of his 
work, admits, in consequence of Mr Gillespie's labours, 
that he " would have to alter" his reasoning " with re- 
' ; spect to the indivisibility of extension." " No one, I 

presume," writes " Antitheos;' " ever thought of deny- 
<; ing the applicability of infinitude, either to space or 
i: duration, or of imagining the separability of 

" THEIR PARTS." 



IRREFRAGABLE. 



251 



§ 4. — On the contrary, no less a one than AntitJieos 
himself, did speak as if he imagined the separability of 
the parts of space, when he gave birth to his refutation 
of Mr Gillespie's demonstration of the inseparability of 
those parts.t It is perfectly trae, that Antitheos does 
not continue to imagine the separability of the parts of 
Space ; the reasonings of the " Examination" having 
forced the conviction upon him, that " the same unqua- 
" lined assent''^ which was accorded to Proposition the 
first, || must, after all, "be accorded to Proposition the 
" second. "J 

§ 5. And here we cannot help reminding our readers, 
that " a great part of the reasoning in the ' Argument 1 
" is built upon the second Proposition," and that " to go 
over all that it is founded on to prove, would be to in- 
" troduce no small portion of the work referred to. "If 
This being kept in mind, the admission in Antitheos' 1 s 
letter will appear very valuable, in reference to the " Argu- 
" ment, a priori " 'Tis, for us, a most happy admission. 

§ 6. In a subsequent letter, Antitheos unwittingly re- 
veals what he feels the " Examination" has effected, with 
regard to the attack, in the " Refutation," on the third 
Proposition of the " Argument." The third Proposition 
" is," writes he, " any thing but WELL established" Not 
a word, however, in support of the assertion. "ft 

§ 7. In short, the silence of Antitheos before the pub- 
lic is expressive ; it informs us, as well as any words could 
inform us, of his inability to controvert the reasonings of 
the " Examination." No question but that so keen a 

\ See Part II. § 16, and other places. Besides : "Antitheos" "would 
" have to alter" "with respect to the indivisibility of extension," or space. 

X Part II. § 16. || See Part II. § i). «j[ Part II. § 10. 

tt The letters which are alluded to, lie in the hands of the General 
Secretary of the Philalethean Society. 

2 H 



252 « ARGUMENT, A PRIORI;' IRREFRAGABLE. 



controvertist would have replied, liad a passable reply 
been reckoned at all practicable. 

§ 8. This controversy may, therefore, be viewed as 
closed. The champion of the Zetetics having retired 
disgraced from the lists may be proclaimed recreant. The 
itheists of Scotland have cried, through the medium of 
their representative's silence : 



Hold, enough " 



NOTES TO PART XII. 



Note A. 

" Space and Duration being evidently necessary, and yet 
" themselves not substances, hut properties or modes ; show evi- 
" dently that the Substance, without which these Modes could 
u not subsist, is itself much more (if that were possible) neces- 
" sary." Dr SI. Clarke's 3d Ans. " Which (Space) we evi- 
" dently see to be necessarily-existing ; and yet which (not being 
" itself a substance,) at the same time necessarily presupposes a 
" Substance, without which it could not exist ; Which substance 
" consequently, must be itself (much more, if possible,) neces- 
" sarily -existing " Fourth Ans. 

Note B. 

Antitheos may hold in admiration the ancient sect of Stoics, 
or perhaps he may be lineally descended from the Danes. — " On 
A receiving mortal wounds in battle, they were so far from utter- 
" ing groans and lamentations, or exhibiting any marks of fear 
" or sorrow, that they commonly began to laugh and sing." — ■ 
Henry's History of Great Britain, B. II. ch. 7. 

Note C. 

We have, as we noticed before, atheistical authority touching 
upon something hereabouts. (See note to § 18, Part XI.) And 
as we have atheistical authority, so we shall treat ourselves to 
theistical, too. " We believe that to be true, which some have 
" affirmed, that were there any interest of life, any concernment 

of appetite and passion, against the truth of geometrical theo- 
" rems themselves, as of a triangle's having three angles equal to 
" two right, whereby men's judgments might be clouded and 
" bribed, notwithstanding all the demonstrations of them, many 
" would remain, at least sceptical about them." Cudworth : 
in Preface to Intellectual System. 



254 



NOTES TO 



Note D. 

I do not know exactly whence Antitheos took this sentence. 
The same sentiments abound, of course, in the Systeme de hi 
Nature, — and every atheistical work. 

" This passage of a modern writer, ( Hobbcs,) We worms, can- 
't not conceive, how God can understand without brains, is vox 
" pecudis, the language and philosophy rather of worms or 
ft brute animals, than of men." Cudworth's System, P. 841. 

Note E. 

Antitheos, it thus appears, was the result of accident. The 
concourse of atheistical atoms mentioned in our Preface was pro- 
duced by necessity. Doctors differ, and so, we see, do atheists. 
Both hypotheses agree in one respect. Antitheos, as well as that 
concourse of atoms, sprung from a word, or, at most, a thought 

his own ? or a neighbour's ? (See § 15 of the text.) — Or do 

I see an explanation of the enigma ? Antitheos \s ultimate-par - 
t'\c\e-body was the product of necessity, " physical necessity/' 
but his intelligence, or mind, that is, his organized body, was the 
result of accident : Is this what Antitheos would deliver ? If 
so, half (and not the worse half) of him came by accident, but 
the other gentleman was, every inch of him, the result of u ne- 
" cessary causes." So still the pair differ. But is there any 
harm in that ? 

However, after all : " Blind fate and blind chance are 

" at bottom much the same thing, and one no more intelligible 
" than the other." Berkeley's " Siris." Section 273. 

Note F. 

It is not an ill observation which Clarke makes, that the main 
question between us and the atheist lies in the Proposition, (his 
8th,) " The Self-existent and Original Cause of all things, must 
i: be an Intelligent Being." 

Note G-. 

See § 24 of Appendix B., and the places therein cited. 

' ; I appeal" exclaims John Locke, et to every one's own 



PART XII. 



255 



" thoughts, whether he cannot as easily conceive matter pro- 
££ duced by nothing, as thought to be produced by pure matter, 
" when before there was no such thing as thought, or an intelli- 
" gent being existing ?" B. IV. ch. x. § 10. See the whole of 
the unanswerable passage in our Review of Mr Locke's demon- 
stration, § 29. 

I shall add a parallel passage from Cudworth. — " As no man 
<£ can be so sottish, as to conceive himself, or that which thinketli 
<£ in .him, his own soul or mind, and personality to be no real 
<£ entity, whilst every clod of earth is such ; so it is certain, that 
u mind can never be generated out of dead and senseless matter 
" or body, nor result, as a modification thereof, out of magni- 
££ tudes, figures, sites, and motions, and therefore must needs be 
" a thing really distinct from it, or substance incorporeal." — 
System. P. 749. 

Those passages are brought forward not as authorities, 

but as solemn appeals to the Court of Consciousness. 

Note H. 

The creation of Matter, but not out of nothing : For that, 
strictly, is absurd nonsense. The proper notion of Creation is 
— not the bringing something out of nothing, but — the making 
something begin to be which before was not. 

Let him who can, reduce this to a contradiction — i. e. render 
manifest that to conceive it is impossible. 

Colliber says : ££ I confess, if any man could be found so abso- 
££ lutely stupid and void of understanding as to affirm that the 
,£ Deity in Creating the Vforld had * produc't it out of no- 
££ thing as out of a preexistent subject * * •* * such a 
££ notion of it might have some right to the character of a Con- 
" tradiction. But since by Creation there can no more be 
" meant than the causing to be what was not before, or the pro- 
££ ducing something where once was nothing, this is evidently no 
" more a Contradiction than" — &c. ££ Impartial Enquiry." 
Book I. ch. ix. 

And Clarke : ££ To say that something which once was not, 
4£ may since have begun to exist ; is neither directly, nor by any 
" consequence whatsoever, to assert that That which is not, can 



256 



NOTES TO PART XII. 



" be, while it is not ; or that That which is, can not be, while it 
" k" Bern, under Prop. X. 

Note I. 

I am happy at being able to add Mr Locke's authority to that 
of Antitheos, on the topic of the possibility of the Creation of 
Matter. " Possibly, if we would emancipate ourselves from vul- 
" gar notions, and raise our thoughts as far as they would reach, 
" to a closer contemplation of things, we might be able to aim at 
" some dim and seeming conception how matter might at first 
" be made, and begin to exist." Essay, B. IV. eh. x. § 18. 
It will be observed, Locke goes farther than Antitheos, by one 
step. With Antitheos, the Creation of Matter is possible : 
While Locke conceives, not merely that Matter began to exist, 
but how. 

Note J. 

" Man knows by an intuitive certainty, that bare nothing can 
" no more produce any real being, than it can be equal to two 
c; right angles." " This being of all absurdities the greatest, 
" to imagine that pure nothing, the perfect negation and ab- 
• ; sence of all beings, should ever produce any real existence." 
Locke, B. IV. ch. x. §§ 3, 8. 

We hesitate not to adopt, as pertinent here, one of Epicurus 's 
maxims, as it was understood by the Sect. 

Nullam rem e nihilo gigni Divinitusf unquam. — Lucret. Lib. I. 
If there was no Divinity, as they supposed there was not, why 
then — nothing could not cause any thing. 

We shall even go so far as to adopt the theorem as stated by 
another Poet. 

De nihilo nihil, in nihilum nil posse reverti. — Persii Satir. III. 
Nothing cannot be the cause of anything, nor reduce anything 
to nothing. Nothing cannot be a cause at all. 

" It had long ago been received as an indisputable doc- 

" trine, if not an axiom in philosophy, that out of nothing, no 
' ; thing can come ; and it has never yet been shown to be essen- 
" tially incorrect." Refutation. Ch. II. par. 25. Antitheos 
is right : — The doctrine, or the axiom, is correct, essentially, — 
and substantially too. 

| See the third note to the second section of Appendix to Part VI. 



APPENDIX. 



APPENDIX TO PART I. 

§ 1. It is of importance that it should be distinctly known what 
in truth a priori argumentation for Deity is, as a serious misun- 
derstanding is abroad : a misunderstanding which, indeed, has 
operated as one of those causes which have sunk that species of 
argumentation in public opinion. It has been thought right, 
therefore, to add, to the citation from the Quarterly Review,! the 
following just and sensible observations. It may be proper to 
mention, that the writers we quote from are by no means to be 
regarded as authorities on every subject. One at least, (the se- 
cond) of them, is, on some occasions, as un-orthoclox as possible. 

§ 2. " Many pious and ingenious persons, though perfectly sa- 
" tisfied with the proofs for the existence and absolute perfection 
" of the supreme Being, drawn from the works of the creation, 
" have thought themselves well employed in devising arguments, 
" drawn from other topics and considerations, which might lead 
" to the same conclusion, and might prove it perhaps in a still 
" more forcible manner, and might obviate the metaphysical ob- 
" jections of atheistical writers. Hence arose another way of 
" reasoning on this subject, usually called the argument a priori. 
" The terms a posteriori and a priori were introduced by the 
" Schoolmen to distinguish the two methods of arguing, one from 
" the nature of effects to the nature of their cause, the other 
" from the nature of a cause to the nature of its effects. The ar- 
" gument a priori, taken in this sense, cannot be applied to the 
" present subject ; for we cannot argue from any thing considered 
" in the light of a cause, when we mean to prove the existence 



t See Part I. § 68. 



258 



APPENDIX TO 



" or the attributes of that Being who is the firstcause of all things. f 
" Therefore when we speak of proving the being and attributes 
" of God a priori, we must understand that term in its original 
" and more comprehensive sense, as it denotes the common si/?i- 
" thetic method of arguing, which is applicable to this as well as 
" to other subjects, particularly to the proof of mathematical 
" theorems. In this method we lay down some evident principles 
' ; or axioms, and from thence deduce other truths that are more 
" complex. And as the principles from whence we begin are 
" first known to us, and in the order of our thoughts are prior to 
" the truths deduced from them, we are said in this case also to 
" argue a priori. This way of reasoning has been used by several 
•■ authors, and it has been acknowledged that if demonstration can 
" be attained on this subject, it must be by pursuing this method 
" of reasoning." Bishop Hamilton : Introduction to the Essay 
on the Existence and Attributes of God. 

§ 3. " The reader should attend," says the Bishop, in a note, 
" to the distinction here made between the two ways of arguing 
" <( priori ; one from a cause to its effects, which is the philoso- 
" phical way, the other from axioms or first principles, which is 
" the * * demonstrative way of arguing." 

§ 4. What a pity, that the " two ways of arguing, a priori," are, 
where the reference is to a God, so often confounded, or rather, 
that the one way is mistaken for the other, the wrong way for 
the right ! 

§ 5. " There are two general ways of Reasoning, called Ar~ 
i; onments a Priori, and a Posteriori, or according to what Lo- 
' : gicians commonly style the Synthetical and AnalyticalMethod : 
" The former lays down some evident Principles, and then de~ 
" duces the several Consequences necessarily resulting from them : 
M The latter begins with the Phenomena themselves, and traces 
" 'em up to their Original, and from the known properties of 

f To " argue from any thing considered in the light of a cause, when we 
" mean to prove the existence or the attributes of that Being who is the first 
; - cause of all things ;" has been well called, by Br Waterland, " arguing a 
" priori in the GROSS SENSE of the word." 1 To demonstrate a priori, in thv 
gross sense, " is," as Cudworth says, " impossible and contradictious "2 

1 Dissertation annexed to Bishop Latv's Enquiry. 

3. Preface to Intellectual System-. 



PART I. 



259 



" these PIiEenomena arrives at the Nature of their Cause. Now 
" the former of these is evidently preferable, where it can be had, 
" since the latter must depend upon a large Induction of Parti- 
" culars, any of which, when failing, invalidates the whole 
" Argument, and spoils a Demonstration." Bishop Law : Pre- 
face to Archbishop King's " Origin of Evil," 



APPENDIX TO PART IV. 

§ 1. We are about to bid a final adieu to the infinite divisibi- 
lity of matter, and to infinite divisibility of every kind. But ere 
we take our flight from the Cimmerian darkness of that uncom- 
fortable region, we shall do what lies in our power to dis- 
play the doctrine of infinite divisibility in those colours in which 
it will be seen to most advantage. And in truth, it requires to 
be placed in the most favourable light, if we would fit it to be 
brooked at all, it being but a monster at best. Many of the par- 
tisans of that doctrine have represented it as a very Gorgon. A 
Gorgon indeed it is : But then these gentlemen, with true Gre- 
cian mendacity, "I" have bestowed upon it more snakes and tusks 
than it was obliged to carry on 

The very head and front of [its] offending. 

In short, our statement shall be much to the credit of the dogma, 
of infinite divisibility ; and if its patrons do not give us their thanks, 
it will be because there is no gratitude in their bosoms, not be- 
cause we have not done any of them a service. 

§ 2. Matter, that is, every part of matter, is divisible in infi- 
nitum ; What are we to understand by that ? 

§ 3. — 1. We shall, in the first place, lay down what that doc- 
trine does not mean. It cannot mean that any portion of matter 
contains an infinite number of parts. 

§ 4, It must, we confess, be admitted, that not a few of those 

t Quicquid Grcecia mendax 

Audet 



260 



APPENDIX TO 



who have treated of the subject, not a few friends as well as foes, 
have represented the position, Matter is divisible infinitely, as con- 
vertible with the position, Matter contains, or consists of, an infi- 
nite number of parts. There is no necessity for our producing 
the willing testimony of friends, and the invective of enemies, to 
bear out what we affirm. What we affirm we suppose to be no- 
Thing but what is well known. — I'm not sure, that Mr Hume, in 
a passage which has been quoted, (in § 2. Part III.) may not 
have intended to sot out the dogma we treat of under such a re- 
presentation. Certain it is, that in a note upon the place he speaks 
twice of cm infinite number. In order to finding absurdities in 
that dogma, there is no need first to misrepresent it, or even to 
state it at all unfavourably. 

§ 5. But from the infinite, or, if we would be rather more cor- 
rect with our word, the eternal, divisibility of any particle of mat- 
ter, (were the divisibility possible,) we can by no means ra- 
tionally infer the existence of an infinite number of parts therein. 
For an infinite number is a contradiction in terms. The thing is 
very, obvious. When one speaks of the possible infinity of num- 
bers, infinity in this case signifies merely the power of always 
adding units to the sum we before had, and when any one deter- 
minate number is pronounced to be infinite, the word ceases to 
possess any meaning. What is of infinity in any respect, cannot be 
made greater in that respect. And were any one absolutely de- 
terminate number infinite, we could make an infinite number 
greater, if we could conceive a unit added to it, as it is most cer- 
tain we could. To speak, then, of an infinite number is to utter 
a contradiction. And therefore, even were every particle of mat- 
ter eternally divisible, all the matter in the universe could not be 
supposed to constitute an infinite number of parts. 

§ 6, " The infinity of numbers," says Mr Locke, " to the end 
" of whose addition every one perceives there is no approach, 
" easily appears to any one that reflects on it ; but how clear so- 
; ' ever this idea of the infinity of numbers be, there is nothing yet 
" more evident, than the absurdity of the actual idea of an infinite 
" number." " Let a man frame in his mind an idea of any * 
" * number, as great as he will ; it is plain, the mind rests and 
" terminates in that idea, which is contrary to the idea of infinity. 



PART IV. 



261 



" which consists in a supposed endless progression.'" B. II. ch. xvii. 
§ 8. Again : " Though it be hard, I think, to find any one so 
" absurd as to say, he has the positive idea of an actual infinite 
" number ; the infinity whereof lies only in a power still of add- 
" ing any combination of units to any former number, and that. 
t: as long, and as much, as one will," &c. &c. Ibid. § 13. 

§ 7- With reference to those persons who have accustomed 
themselves to speaking of an infinite number of parts, as the cause, 
or the consequence, or the concomitant, of the infinite divisibility 
of matter, and whose speculations have ever been found to be 
shrouded in mists sufficiently opaque to stand in the way of clear 
views; besides what Mr Locke has here already conveyed, convey- 
ed to them if they like, we would recommend the study of the fol- 
lowing passage, provided we be allowed to make one alteration 
upon it. " The great and inextricable difficulties which perpetual- 
" ly involve all discourses concerning infinity, whether of space, 
" duration, or divisibility, have been the certain marks of a de- 
" feet in our ideas of infinity, and the disproportion the nature 
" thereof has to the comprehension of our narrow capacities." 
Ibid. § 21. We propose, by way of amendment, to say, that the 
difficulties which involve many, perhaps nearly all, discourses con- 
cerning infinity, in particular concerning infinity when divisibili- 
ty to infinity is spoken about, have been the certain marks of a 
defect in many men's ideas as to what the ivord infinity means, 
and of the disproportion between the true meaning thereof and 
the confused comprehensions of the meaning by certain narrow 
capacities. Were this amendment suffered, John Locke, himself, 
would deal in better sense. Pray, if we can rise so high as 

TO SEE THAT THERE ARE DEFECTS IN OUR IDEAS OF INFINITY. 
WHAT SHOULD HINDER US TO SOAR AWAY FROM THE DEFECTS AL- 
TOGETHER ? If WE CAN SPRING SO FAR ALOFT AS TO DESCRY 
THOSE DEFECTS AS UNDER OUR SUPERINCUMBENCY, IS NOT THIS 
A SURE SIGN THAT THE DEFECTS ARE, IN THE BEST OF SENSES, 
BENEATH OUR NOTICE ? 

Quandoque bonus dormitat Homerus. 

§ 8. — 2. In the next place, we shall mention distinctly what is 
to be understood by the dogma of the divisibility of matter to all 
eternity. As the capacity of every particle of matter to be di- 
vided everlastingly, (be such capacity an odd chimera, or be 



262 



APPENDIX TO 



IT not,) does not entitle us to infer that matter contains an in- 
finite number of parts, so, on the other hand, it forces us to draw 
this conclusion, that no portion of matter, viz. that no body, con- 
sists of any definite number of parts at all. He who alleges that 
matter is eternally divisible, must maintain, that there is no body 
which is made up of truly ultimate particles ; no body which, with 
any propriety, can be said to contain aliquot parts ; in fine, no 
body which consists of parts component in any other sense than 
prop wtional, as halves, quarters, &c. &c. What are those parts 
of a body which are not ultimate? which are not aliquot? but 
which arc only proportional ? But to sum up every question in 
one ; what are those parts of a body which are of no fixed, de- 
finite number ? 

§ 9. These consequences, or these concomitants, are admitted, 
or, at least, what involves them all is allowed, by those who ought 
to know something of the affair, and who would not, for the world, 
unnecessarily allow any thing to the prejudice of the doctrine of 
the infinite divisibility of every portion of every body. 

§ 10. " He who maintains divisibility in infinitum" says a 
stout defender of the divisibility he speaks of, " boldly denies, 
4i therefore, the existence of the ultimate particles of body ;" " it 
" is a manifest contradiction, to suppose at once ultimate parti- 
'• tides and divisibility in infinitum." — " With all your might, 
" then, resist this assertion : every compound being is made up 
" of simple beings ; and though you may not be able directly to 
" prove the fallacy," &c. Euler's Letters. Vol. II. Let. xii. & 
xvi. And the same in other places. 

§ 11. " If it is admitted, that the divisibility of matter has no 
" limit," thus speaks another warm advocate of the dogma of ne- 
ver-ending divisibility, " it will follow, that no" [one] " body" 
\however minute] " can be called one individual substance. You 
" may as well call it two, or twenty, or two hundred" substances, 
or twenty times two hundred substances, or two hundred times 
two hundred nonillions of substances. See Reid's Essays. Es- 
say II. ch. xix. We thus represent a nonillion in figures : — 

1,000000,000000,000000,000000,000000,000000,000000,000000,000000. 
§ 12. Think of the nonillionth part of a mote in a sunbeam be- 



PART VI. 



263 



ing as much a body as the huge luminary in whose rays the mote 
dances ! Yet such a part of such a thing is as much a body as the 
sun, according to Dr Beid's principles. And verily 'tis even so, 
if one small circumstance be true : If such a part oe such a 
thing be not a non-entity. And when you have cogitated up- 
on that, sufficiently : Think of an extension but the nonillionth 
part of the extension of a mote in a sunbeam as really existing in 
rerum naturd, and afterwards of the first of these extensions be- 
ing divisible to all eternity ! These are the high mysteries into 
which those plunge who will have it, that the divisibility of mat- 
ter has no limit, 

§ 13. To conclude ; When one says that matter is divisible in 
ceternum, he must be understood as saying neither more nor less 
than that any particle, however small, can be divided without the 
possibility of ever coming to an end with the divisions. And to 
render his assertion a proveable one, he must be held as main- 
taining further, that, in point of fact, when we divide and subdivide 
any portion of a body, we find, that at no time can we give a 
rio-hteous termination to the business. 



APPENDIX TO PART VI. 

§ 1. The words quoted in the passage to which this Ap- 
pendix has reference, are taken from the New-York " Free 
" Enquirers' Family Library Edition" of the System of Nature. 
(mdcccxxxvi.) There are notes, said to be by Diderot. The 
translation of the notes is said to be by one H. D. Robinson. 
In the Advertisement, we are informed, that " the Systeme de 
" la Nature was first attributed to Helvetius, and then to M'ira- 
" beau" (p. iv.) and that it may now be attributed, with truth, 
to the Baron D'Holbach. (Pp. v. vi. vii.) 



§ 2. Of the " System of Nature" Lord Brougham says, in 
" Note IV" : " It is the only work of any consideration wherein 



264 



APPENDIX TO 



" atheism is openly avowed and preached — avowed, indeed, and 
u preached in terms. (See, particularly, part ii., chap, ii.)'' 
Like many assertions of Brougham's, this one is deficient in a 
certain good quality. " As to Atheists," said one who knew 
what he was speaking about, " these so confident exploders of 
" them are both unskilled in the monuments of antiquity,! 
•• and" — &c. Will his Lordship take quietly this hint, for want 
of a reproof, from his favourite Cudworth ?\ — One of the atheist- 
ical monuments of antiquity is the " I)c Rerum Natura" of 
Lucretius, who sings : — 

Omnis, ut est, igitur, per se, Natura, duabus 
Consistit rebus ; nam Corpora sunt, et Inane 

Pneterea nihil est, quod possis dicere ab omni 
Corpore sejunctum, secretumque esse ab Inani 
Quod <juasi tertia sit reruin natura reperta. 

— Prater Inane, et Corpora, tertia per se 

Nulla potest rerum in numero natura relinqui Lib. I. 

Natura videtur 

Libera contmno Dominis privata superbis, 

Ipsa sua per se sponte omnia Diis agere expers.|| Lib. ii. 

Xaturam rerum haud Divina mente coortam.|| Lib. III. 

t Unskilled in the monuments of antiquity ! Read Brougham's Notes VI. 
VU/VITL and then deny, if you can, that 

This, this was the unkindest cut of all. 

J The hint occurs in the Preface to what Warburton, that colossal man, 
has so well called " one immortal volume." (" Preface" to the 1st Ed. of 
Books iv. v. vi. of the " Divine Legation of Moses") 

|| Epicurus, and therefore Lucretius, speak, it is true, of Gods or a Divinity. 
But what says Tally of the Epicureans ? VERBIS ponunt, RE tollunt Deos. — 
•■ As Epicurus, so other Atheists in like manner have commonly had their 

vizards and disguises * * * * Yet they, that are sagacious. 
" may EASILY look through these thin veils and disguises" — Cudworth'x 
System, Ch. II. & ii. 

Epicurus had these reasons for speaking of Gods. 1. Because the Greek s 
of his day. Heathens though they were, were not prepared to permit such 
a monster as an atheist to exist in peace. 2. He took no small delight in 
making fools of the more unthinking common-people. — One would be apt 
to think that even the common-people of those times might always have 
appreciated such notable irony as the following : 

Tenuis enim natura Deum, longeque remota 

Sensibus a nostris, animi vix mente videtur. Lucretii Lib. v. 

The majority of Atheists, in all ages, have seen it fit to delude the vulgar 
and afterwards to mock them. 



PART VL 



265 



And Lucretius sings not unfrequently to the same tunes. — But 
perhaps, my Lord, the atheists of ancient times were of no con- 
sideration ? Or perhaps, they did not avow and preach their 
atheism openly ? Or, if they did it openly, perhaps they did 
not do it in terms ? — Your Lordship may be ill to please with 
atheism. Ex. gr. To affirm, with Spinoza, " Substantiam 
" corpoream, qum non nisa infinita concipi potest, nulla ratione 
" Natura Divina indignam esse did posse." [I. e. " That 
" corporeal substance (or matter,) which is necessarily conceived 
" to be infinite, must be allowed to .be not unworthy of the 
" Divine Nature :" Which may, very properly, be reduced to 
this proposition, — Matter is infinite, and there cannot be any 
God besides matter.] To affirm that, may not altogether satisfy 
your Lordship that the writer is an open, and avowed atheist, in 
terms. Your Lordship — I shall repeat it — may be ill to please 
with atheism : So very ill to please, indeed, that if such an one 
as your Lordship will be at the trouble to read, of the " System 
" of Nature," and of the second Part, the 9th chapter, (the 
title of which asks, " Do there exist Atheists ?" — ) he may 
come to think — not that there has been peradventure one, but 
that — there never was a truly atheistical work at all. 

§ 3. " There is," says Brougham, " no book of an atheistical 
" description which has ever made a greater impression than the 
" famous Sy steme de la Nature." * * 

§ 4. " It is impossible to deny the merits of the Systeme de 
" la- Nature. The work of a great writer it unquestionably is." 
And accordingly, his Lordship has devoted a long Note (it is 
Note IV.) to the performance. 

§ 5. Of the merit of the " System of Nature," it is thus that 
Lord Brougham speaks : — " Its merit lies in the extraordinary 
u eloquence of the composition, and the skill with which words 
" substituted for ideas, and assumptions for proofs, are made to 
" pass current, not only for arguments against existing beliefs, 
" but for a new system planted in their stead. As a piece of 
" reasoning, it never rises above a set of plausible sophisms — 
" plausible only as long as the ear of the reader being filled 
" with sounds, his attention is directed away from the sense. 



266 



APPENDIX TO 



" The chief resource of the writer is to take for granted the 
" thing to be proved, and then to refer back to his assumption 
" as a step in the demonstration, while he builds various conclu- 
" sions upon it, as if it were complete. Then he declaims 
" against a doctrine seen from one point of view only, and erects 
" another for our assent, which, besides being liable to the very 
" same objections, has also no foundation whatever to rest upon. 
" The grand secret, indeed, of the author goes even further in 
•' petitione principii than this ; for we oftentimes find, that in 
'* the very substitute which he has provided for the notions of 
" belief he would destroy, there lurks the very idea which he is 
** combating, and that his idol is our own faith in a new form, 
" but masked under different words and phrases. 

§ 6. "The truth of these statements," continues his Lordship, 
" we are now to examine." But into the examination we cannot 
follow his Lordship. 

§ 7- His Lordship's volume having crossed the Atlantic, 
and fallen into the hands of the New- World atheists; the 
compliment to the author of the book called the System of 
Nature is repaid, with interest. " Henry Lord Brougham 
* * ," say the Transatlantic infidels, " in his recent 
" Discourse of Natural Theology, has mentioned this extra- 
" ordinary treatise, but with what care does he evade entering 
" the lists with this distinguished writer! He passes over 
(i the work with a haste and sophistry that indicates how fully 
" conscious he was of his own weakness and his opponent's 
u strength." — The western free-thinkers part from his Lord- 
ship in this manner: " It is with a few pages" [The pages are 
as near as being sixteen, of the closer printed ones, as need be.] 
"of * empty declamation that his Lordship attacks and con- 
" demns this eloquent and logical work." See " Advertisement :" 
mentioned in § 1. above. 

§ 3. " ALL Christian writers on Natural Theology," so write 
the American atheologists, " have studiously avoided even the 
u mention of this masterly production : t knowing" [Here is the 

t These gentlemen subsequently except Brougham. 



PART VI. 



267 



eause \ " their utter inability to cope with its powerful reasoning," 
[Then follows the effect] " they have wisely*]* passed it by in si- 
" lence." Advertisement. The whole assertion says (to employ 
the mild language of Honyhnhnm) the thing which is not. But 
whether it be an ethical lie, or merely a logical one,— a lie of ma- 
lice, or only of mistake, — I shall not take up time in endeavour- 
ing to determine. The assertion is false, whatever be the rea- 
son of the circumstance. And did I deem it at all necessary to 
do so, I should set down the names of several writers on Natural 
Theology, the writers being Christians, who not only have not 
avoided mentioning the System of Nature, but who have exa- 
mined it, rather fully. And as it is false, that the production has 
been passed by in silence by all Christian writers on Natural 
Theology ; so it is not true, that these writers were in the know- 
ledge of their utter inability to cope with the Anti- Christian 
writer on (what I hope is Un-Natural, as well as) A-Theology. 
The effect has no existence : Is it any wonder, that the cause has 
therefore none ? 

§ 9. I, for one, in place of studiously avoiding even the men" 
tion of the " System of Nature," have, as the reader of my sixth 
Part is well aware, done the very reverse, and mentioned the 
production, when I could have " avoided even the mention" of 
it, without being very studious as to the hoiv, and without sub- 
jecting myself to be righteously found fault with, on account of 
the avoidance. I have mentioned the production : Nay more, I 
have quoted from it, and have commented on the citations. It 
may be but right to notice, that the citations are made from the 
chapter which forms, as Brougham truly declares, ci by far the 
u most argumentative part" of the Frenchman's book. (Note IV.) 
With what success I have encountered the Goliath of Infidels, % 

t There were good reasons for tlie wisdom. See below, note to § 9. 

\ " We have commenced the library with a translation of Baron d'Hol- 
" bach's System of Nature, because it is estimated as one of the most able cx- 
" positions of theological absurdities which has ever been written." Again : 
" Let those read this work who seek to come at a ' knowledge of the truth.' " 
But farther : " If the most profound logic, the acutest discrimination, the 
H keenest and most caustic sarcasm, can reflect credit on an author, then we 
" may justly hail Baron oVHolbach as THE GREATEST AMONG PHILOSOPHERS, 
<! and an honour to infidels." In short : " We have no apologies to make for 

2 i 



2G8 



APPENDIX TO 



let the attentive reader determine. Whether or no I display an 
utter inability to cope with a man so mighty among atheists — 
so far as matters between us have gone — there has been at least 
no ivise passing him by in silence. But though I have not 
passed by that author, I must certainly have passed by his 
' : powerful reasoning," for to the best of my recollection, I met 
with none of it. But let us not despair. We may yet fall in 
with the powerful reasoning which is so rife (according to re- 
port) in " this masterly production/' In a word, we may have 
better fortune the next time. And the reader may take our 
word for it, that we shall not lose any opportunity at all suitable, 
should such offer, of attempting (at any rate) to cope with this 
paragon of Philosophers, and even — to make use of a fine figure 
in the genuine bathos] — of Infidels. 



APPENDIX TO PART VIII. 

APPENDIX A. 

' ; Motion proves a vacuum. — But not to go so far as beyond 
" the utmost bounds of body in the universe, * * * to find 
" a vacuum, the motion of bodies that are in our view and neigh- 
" bourhood, seem to me plainly to evince it. For I desire any 
" one so to divide a solid body of any dimension he pleases, as 
" to make it possible for the solid parts to move up and down 
freely every way within the bounds of that superficies, if 
" there be not left in it a void space, as big as the least part 
" into which he has divided the said solid body. And if, where 
" the least particle of the body divided is as big as a mustard- 
• : seed, a void space equal to the bulk of a mustard-seed be 

" republishing the System of Nature at this time ; the work will support it- 
" self, and needs no advocate; it has never been answered, because, in truth, 
" it is, indeed, unanswerable." Advertisement, already mentioned. 

t To-wit. the Anticlimax. 



PART VIII. 



269 



" requisite to make room for the free motion of the parts of the 
" divided body within the bounds of its superficies ; where the 
44 particles of matter are 100,000,000 less than a mustard-seed, 
" there must also be a space void of solid matter, as big as 
44 100,000,000 part of a mustard- seed : for if it holds good in one, 
" it will hold in the other, and so on in infinitum" [Not in in- 
finitum., or any thing like it : But for a good while, perhaps till 
our minds can minish the particles no longer. See Part III. 
§ 26. and following sections.] 44 And let this void space be as 
44 little as it will, it destroys the hypothesis of plentitude. For 
" if there can be a space void of body, equal to the smallest 
" separate particle of matter now existing in nature, it is still 
" space without body, and makes as great a difference between 
44 space and body, as if it were [Ltya yua^a, a distance as wide as 
" any in nature. And, therefore, if we suppose not the void space 
" necessary to motion, equal to the least parcel of the divided 
" solid matter, but to tV or ttxVo of it, the same consequence 
44 will always follow of space without matter." Locke's Essay. 
Book II. Chap. xiii. § 23. 

Mr Locke recurs to this topic in a subsequent chapter. 44 Of 
44 such a void space we have not only the idea, but I have proved, 
44 as I think, from the motion of body, its" [consequentially, or 
hypothetically\ 11 necessary to existence." 44 It is impossible for 
44 any particle of matter to move but into an empty space." 
B. II. Ch. xvii. § 4. 

This demonstration by Locke of the existence of vacuum, will 
suggest to the classical reader, Lucretius 's exhibition of the ar- 
gument for the impossibility of motion in a perfect plenum. 

locus est intactus, Inane, vacansque. 

Q,uod si non esset, nulla ratione moveri 
Res possent ; namque, obficium, quod Corporis extat, 
Obficere, atque obstare, id in omni tempore adesset 
Omnibus : haud igitur quidquam procedere posset, 
Principium quoniam cedendi nulla daret res. 
At nunc per maria, ac terras sublimaque cceli, 
Multa modis multis varia ratione moveri 
Cernimus ante oculos ; qua?, si non esset Inane, 
Non tarn sollicito motu privata carerent ; 
Quam genita omnino nulla ratione fuissent : 
Undique Materies quoniam stipata quiesset. — Lib. Prim. 



270 



APPENDIX Tu 



To the English reader — 

— Take it in the very words of Creech.f 

A Void is space intangible : Thus prov'd. 

For were there none, no Body could be mov'd ; 

Because where e'er the pressing motion goes, 

It still must meet with stops| * * * 

'Tis natural to bodies to oppose. 

So that to move would be in vain to try, 

But all would stubborn,|| fixt,|| and moveless lie ; 

Because no yielding Body could be found 

Which first should move and give the other ground. 

But every one now sees that things do move 

With various turns in Earth and Heaven above ; 

Which, were no Void, not only we'd not seen, 

But * Bodies too themselves had never been : 

Ne'er generated, for Matter aU sides prest 

With other matter would for ever rest. 

Or in those of Dr James Mason Good. 

And know this VOID IS SPACE UNTOUCHED AND PURE.^f 

Were space like this vouchsaf 'd not, nought could move : 
Corporeal forms would still resist, and strive 
With forms corporeal, nor consent to yield ; 
While the great progress of creation ceas'd. 
But what more clear in earth or heav'n sublime, 
Or the vast ocean, than, in various modes, 
That various matter moves ? which, but for SPACE,*[ 
'Twere vain t'expect : and vainer yet to look 
For procreative power, educing still 
Kinds from their kinds through all revolving time.ff 

Our readers will perhaps pardon us, if we now present them 
with a demonstration of the position, that the motion of any body 
proves there is an immoveable space. The demonstration shall 
be from an old author, — a modern, however, should you mention 
him in the same breath with the Latin Poet. 

The following axioms are laid down, at the outset. 

' : Primum est, Nullius corporis superficies, quiescente corpore, 
" moveri potest, nec, moto corpore, quiescere. 

f Pope — Imitations of Horace. 6th Ep. of B. I. 

J Four words here left out, — for sense's sake. 

ji These words here transposed, — for sound's sake. 

The capitals are the translator's, 
tf The last line in the quotation from Lucretius is not so evidently translated 
by Mason Good, as one could have wished. 



PART VIII. 



271 




" Secundum, Nullum corpus ad aliud corpus quiescens propriu* 
" accedere, nec ab eo recedere, potest sine motu locali. 

(t Tertium, Nullius corporis potest fieri motus localis, nisi tran- 
" seundo per aliquod Extensum. 

" Quartum & ultimum, Omne corpus, localiter motum, move- 
" tur adcequate per ilia loca, quae motu suo acquiritA 

" Esto jam pro Cylin- 
" dro, duas vel tres uncias 
" alto, & super terram im- 
" motdm, ut jam suppo- 
" nemus, posito, Cir cuius 
" H KM H, Polusq; il- 
" lius Axis (circa quam 
" movetur) superior & in- 
" ferior A A. manifestum 
" est, quod superficies Cy~ 
" lindri extima separat se 
" a superficie concava am- 
" bientis aeris, per partes, 
" puta H I, a concava parte H I, pergitq; ad I K, & sic de re- 
" liquis. Unde plane apparet totam superficiem convexam Cy- 
" lindri (& eadem ratio est de planis) moveri in orbem ; ac pro- 
" inde quod totus Cylindrus in orbem movetur, per Axioma pri- 
" mum : Sed nullum corpus movetur, nisi transeundo per aliquod 
" Extensum : Ergo Cylindrus transit per aliquod Extensum, per 
" Axioma tertium. Sed per nullum Extensum transit extra am- 
" bitum HRMH. Ergo per Extensum intra ileum ambi- 
" TUM transit. Sed per suam ipsius Extensionem non transit ; 
" circumfertur enim cum ea simul. Quid igitur reliquum est 
" prater internum suum Locum, sive Spatium, quod occu- 

" PAT, PER CUJUS PARTES TRANSIRE POSSIT, nempe ab H A I a J 

" I A K, &c. Quod opportebat demonstrate. 

" Eursus supponamus in eodem Cylindro majori II K M II 
" sex foramina Cylindracea, B, C, D, E, F, G, cequalia, toti- 
" demq; minores Cylindros eisdem foraminibus inscrtos, superfi- 
" ciebusq; concavis horum foraminum cequatos et contiguos, Pena- 

t This last axiom does not appear to be used in the demonstration. But 
surely its nature is such that it can do no harm, although it be left in. 



272 



APPENDIX TO 



* ; tusq; aliquod corpus quiescens extra majorem Cylindrum, sitq; 
" corpus P. Movent ur jam denuo major Cylindrus, H K M H 
" circa axem A A secundum ordinem literarum II I K, dec. Dico, 
" tametsi minores Cyl vm Wi su />erjicies suas non separent immediate 
" nec a swperficiebus foraminum suorum, nec a superficie aeris 
" majorem Cylindrum ambientis, quod nihilominus moventur lo- 
'■ caliter. Nam dum major Cylindrus movetur ab Had I, Cy- 
•• Undrus B need it a corpore P quiescente ; Cylindrus vero E pro- 
prius ad UVud accedit. Nullum autem corpus ad aliud cor- 
" pus quiescens proprius accedere potest, vel ab eo recedere, sine 
1 ' motu locally per Axioma secundum : nec omnino moveri locali- 
•■ ter, nisi tramseundo aliquod Extensum, per Axioma tertium. 
" Sed Cylindrus B per nullum Extensum extra Cylindrum ma- 
jnri in />rrtr<tn.<it, tier jKuttrat ijtsum corpus C, cum ad C per- 
venit. lit- to,- Cylindrus B succedit tantum in cylindraceum 
spatiwm C, <t* Cylindrus C in spatium cylindraceum D, et sin- 
" guli Cylindri successive spatia cylindracea, sive locos internos 
'• i>roxrd K Hthn,i (' : /liitd/-<>rnhi, occuj>o.nt. Quod erat demonstran- 
dum." Etc. Taken from the 6th Chap, of More 1 * Manual of 
Metaphysic. 



APPENDIX B. 



§ 1. " The * opinion * " that " God is present every 
* ; where by an infinite extension of his essence," " appears most 
•■ in harmony with the Scriptures ; though the term extension, 
" through the inadequacy of language, conveys too. material an 
" idea." Theological Institutes, by Richard Watson. Part 
Second. Chap. III. (Third Edition.) Such is the deliberate sen- 
timent of this Theologian : and it will not be easy to name many 
works, each of them containing much more talented sober theo- 
logical discussion. 

§ 2. " We conceive of him," the " intelligent, self-existent, 
' : First Cause," " as existing in all duration, and in all space. 
" This is precisely the idea which we form of the existence of 



PART VIII. 



273 



" God ; exactly the view which the Bible gives us of him." 
Rev. B. Godwin's Lectures on the Atheistic Controversy. 
Lect. II. (P. 53.) 

§ 3. " He who upholds all things by his power, may be 

" said to be every where present. 

§ 4. " This is called a virtual presence.^ There is also what 
" metaphysicians denominate an essential ubiquity : and which 
" idea the language of Scripture seems to favour."" So says Dr 
Paley, in Chapter XXIV. of his Natural Theology. 



§ 5. Lord Brougham has a note in reference to this passage 
of the Doctor's.^ In which his Lordship informs us : " The 
" three doctrines are — ubiquity by diffusion, virtual ubiquity, || 
" or that of power only, and ubiquity of essence." 

§ 6. The sensible and rather shrewd Paley gives us two sorts 
of presence, or omnipresence ;% without hinting there was a third. 
Paley' 's Annotator loses not a moment in presenting us with three 
doctrines (it is out of his power to present us with three spe- 
cies) of omnipresence : the third doctrine being that of ubiquity 
of essence as opposed to ubiquity by diffusion, or that of ubiquity 
by diffusion as opposed to ubiquity of essence ; whichever way his 
Lordship pleases. 

§ 7. His Lordship, in entering upon his Note, forewarns us 
that the subject he is to touch is " confessedly abstruse." Those 
that create the abstruseness (well, if not the obtuseness) of a sub- 
ject, ought by all means to confess what the thing grew to under 
proper management. But it is not so right to represent their 
own handiwork as something they found ready made. 

f It may be laid down as one of those truths which admit of no contradic- 
tion, that, with regard to the uncreated substance at least, virtue cannot be- 
without substance. Speaking of this substance, Sir Isaac Newton hath these 
words : " Omniprcesens est ncmper virtutem solam, sed etiamper substantiam : 
" nam virtus sine substantia subsistere non potest." Newton. Princip. Ma- 
themat. Schol. general, sub jinem. 

\ See § 2. of note to § 5, Part VIII. 

|| " 'Tis natural to ask, not so much how it is proved, that God can be vir- 
" tually present, though not substantially present, in every part of nature, as 
<; what can be meant by being every where present by mere energy ?" 

% Properly, it is of omnipresence he is treating. 



274 



APPENDIX TO 



§ 8. The Author of the " Natural Theology" presents us with 
two divisions, as not only exhausting the subject, but being in fair 
antithesis. In fair antithesis the members of the division could 
not be, if the " essential ubiquity" were two-fold : the one species 
of essential ubiquity being " ubiquity of essence," the other, 
" ubiquity by diffusion." This matter may perhaps be rendered 
plainer by the following Schema. 

at 

Virtual presence, g S 

" v ~l Essential ubiquity, or omnipresence. 

omnipresence, ; | -- , 



Species, Specie." 



Ubiquity of essence" " Ubiquity by diffusion.' 

(as in Brougham's words) Queer. Ubiquity of what? 

i. e. — surely — "essential diffusion of what? See 

" ubiquity" (as in Paley's below, § 10, compared with 



language). § 11, and following sections. 

Here one of the species is neither more nor less than the 
</. iias itself. And pray, what is the other species, in con- 
tradistinction to its fellow-member, and the genus of both ? 
Tell us, and then we shall see whether the genus — essen- 
tial omnipresence — can in its two-fold nature be fairly op- 
posed to the other great member of the division — virtual 
omnipresence. 

§ 9. The Author of the " Natural Theology," in short, recog- 
nises no distinction of the kind introduced by the Noble Annota- 
tor. The Archdeacon of Carlisle had too much of a " natural 
" predilection" for wdiat by due care may be " level to all com- 
" prehensions," to be smitten with the love of unadulterated 
nonsense. If our Archdeacon had no talent and no taste for 
metaphysical speculation even though of the genuine cast, as is 
noticed by his Illustrator ;f far less, had he any regard for vile 
bastard metaphysics. — "Which it would be well to remember. 



t "His," Paley's, "limited and unexercised powers of abstract discussion, 
u and the natural predilection for what he handled so well — a practical argu- 



PART VIII. 



275 



§ 10. Lord Brougham speaks of " the Diffusive Ubiquity."f 
What can wow-diffusive ubiquity be ? Verily, the distinction be- 
tween " ubiquity by diffusion" — namely, of essence, or substance, 
(or, else, diffusion of what ? — ) and " ubiquity of essence is a 
distinction without a difference. How can there be ubiquity of 
essence but by every- where-diffusion of essence ? What is ubi- 
quity, if not diffusion every where ? Something inexpressibly 
absurd. Ubiquity, then, is just ubiquity by limitless diffusion. 
What else can it be ? 

§ 11. What is ubiquity of essence which is not ubiquity of es- 
sence by diffusion without bounds ? Did we pretend not to know, 
'twould, after all, be a shame. The nonsense has been fully con- 
secrated : For no inconsiderable period has it been the fashion- 
able theology. Ubiquity of essence which is not ubiquity of essence 
by boundless diffusion, is, let the reader be prepared the 

UBIQUITY OF THE ABSENCE OF EXTENSION, Or INEXTENSION, 

as 'twas usually expressed. The ubiquity of universal extension, 
in question, is the universal extension which has no extension at 
all. The every -where-ness under notice, is, in plain and honest 
English, just no-where-ness. 

§ 12. We shall dwell a little upon the topic of the fashionable 
theological whimsey. 

§ 13. The Author of the " Argument" has the following pas- 
sage. " The common sentiment of Theologians, that the neces- 
•■ sary substance, is, at the same time, in every point of space, and 

every atom of matter, entire, is, so far as the opinion is in- 
" telligible at all, just this third hypothesis, that the neces- 
" sary substance is infinitely extended : Though, 'tis true, all ex- 
" tension is denied to that substance. For to say that the same 
u substance is in different parts of extension, at once, without 
" being extended, is no more absurd than to say, extension, itself, 
" is not extended." " Introduction." Division III. Note to § 28. 

§ 14. " Qui autem," says the (undeservedly) almost-forgotten 
Raphson, " prcesentia ilia, vere essentialis, cunctis, quce sunt, 

" ment level to all comprehensions — appear not to have given him any taste 
" for metaphysical speculations." Note in " Section III." of the " Prelimi- 
" nary Discourse." 

f See § 2 of note to § 5, Part VIII. 



276 



APPENDIX TO 



' ; intima, per inextensionis hypothesin sine manifesto, contra- 

• dicttene (qucecunq ; tandem fuerit verborum collusio) expli- 
" eari possit, nondum constitit, neq ; unquam eonstare potcrit : 
" Vere enim loeis, etiam diversis, £)' a se invieem distantibus, per 
" essentiam eidesse, exempli gratia, globi terrestri, lunari, 
; ' gpatiisf; omnibus intermcdiis, quid cdiud est, quam ipsissima 
" ratio formalis rx extendi r"' From " Cap. VI." 

§15. We shall next hear the sentiments of S. ColUber : A 
writer of some celebrity once, and of, undoubtedly, considerable 
parts, and great good sense, in not a few respects. 

f- 16. " This opinion," — " the opinion of [the Deity's] Inex- 
tension" — *' being once entertained, 'tis scarce conceivable 

• what a train of riddles and paradoxes it drew after it. For 
• : thence the Platonists and the rest of Anaximanders Com- 
•■ nicntators first began to infer what is usually called ins Fndis- 
Ci tance. For distance being only a relative conception of Space, 
" consequently it could not, as they rightly concluded, be con- 
" ceived in a being who was, as they imagined, absolutely with 
•• out amplitude and dimensions. 

§ 17- " Thus far they proceeded in absurdity, their next step 

was impiety. For since they found it impossible to conceive a 
" being without amplitude and dimensions any otherwise than 
" as a mere mathematical * point ; they began to speak of 
" the Deity in the like diminutive terms, and, in effect, im- 
" prisoned the Great Creator within the smallest dust of his 
; - creation." [Less, infinitely less, so to speak, than the small- 
est dust : The smallest dust is always something : but a ' ma- 
' thematical point' has NO magnitude.] " But * * * * 
a * * * * * * they quickly solved the difficulty with a 
' • mystery, and gravely concluded that it was no impossibility for 

* an Infinite Being to exist entire, tho' in a certain atomi- 
•• cal manner, not only in one but in every individual particle 
•• of the universe at once. For this worthy discovery we are 
" particularly indebted to Plotinus, one of Plato's disciples. 
" who obliged the world with two whole books to demonstrate 
4: that one and the same being may be all of it entirely in each 
" distinguishable part of the world. 

§ 18. " This Philosopher it seems had found the secret of pro- 



PART VIII. 



277 



u ducing more Deities out of one than the fruitful fancies of all 
" the Poets in their Theogonies could ever make. * * * * 

§ 19. " But fearing, good man ! lest this discovery of his 
" should be thought inconsistent with the unity of God, he made 
" bold to stretch the mystery a little farther by concluding not 
" only that it's the property and privilege of the absolutely In- 
" finite Being to exist whole in every particle of the world, but 
" that he has an undoubted prerogative of existing whole in the 
" whole of it too ; so as to be one individual innumerable uni- 
" versal Deity. All which Platonical mysteries were afterwards 
" received as articles of faith by the Schoolmen, and are com- 
" prised in that vulgar maxim of theirs, viz., Deus est totus in 
; ' toto et totus in qualibet parte mundi, God is ivhole in the 
" whole and whole in every part of the world, Mysteries that 
" require a degree of faith beyond that of miracles ; a faith which 
" can transform contradictions into arguments with a Credo quia, 
u impossibile est." 

§ 20. Listen, for a moment, by the way to the " Treatise of 
" Human Nature," speaking in reference to the Schoolmen's 
maxim : — " That scholastic principle which, when crudely pro- 
" posed, appears so shocking, of totum in toto, et totum in qua- 
" libet parte : which is much the same as if we should say, that 
" a thing is in a certain place, and yet is not there." Book I. 
Part iv. Sect. 5. — Consult second note to § 64, Part III. 

§ 21. We now go on with S. C. — " Though 'tis next to impos- 
" sible to speak of such extravagances as these, and, at the same 
" time, to preserve that gravity which is so necessary in dis- 
" courses of this nature ; yet I conceive it may not be amiss to 
" have observed thus much, to the end it may be seen how 
" strangely the name of Learning has been misapplied to whim- 
" sies of this kind, and how profanely the sacred name of God 
" has been abused to consecrate the most egregious non- 
" sense." Impartial Enquiry, &c. B. II. Part ii. ch. 4. 

§ 32. Permit, ye upon whom the mantle of the madmen 
amongst the Schoolmen hath fallen ! permit a word of reproof, 
for the past, and of warning as to the future. Has not the egre- 
gious nonsense alluded to by the author from whom we have this 
instant parted, been one, and a very fruitful cause of the birth, 



278 



APPENDIX TO 



and growth, of Atheism in modern times? has it not been one 
of the great nursing-mothers of the atheist-monster ? a nursing- 
mother actively at work, though in some respects 
remote from public view ? 

§ 23. Let us call in evidence on the point. — " The partisans 

• of spirituality believe they answer the difficulties they have 
•' themselves accumulated, by saying, ' The soul is entire, is 
w; ' whole under each point of its extent." If an absurd answer 
•• will solve difficulties, they have done it ; for after all it will be 

• found, that this point, which is called .soul, however insensible, 

• however minute, must yet remain something." Thus writes 
D'Holbach. System of Nature, Part I. ch. vii. And the following 
is Diderot's note on that passage. It is with what is set forth in 
the note that our present business most lies. — " According to 

• this answer an infinity of unextended substance, or the same 
•• unextended substance repeated an infinity of times, would con- 
•• stitute a Bubstance that has extent, which is absurd; for, 
•• according to this principle, the human soul would then be as 
• ; infinite as God, since it is assumed that God is a beino; with- 
•• out extent, who is an infinity of times whole in each part of 
•• the universe — and the same is stated of the human soul; from 
■• whence we must necessarily conclude that God and the soul 
" of man are equally infinite, unless we suppose unextended 

• substances of different extents, or a God -without extent more 
i ctended than the human soul. Such are, however, the 

•• rhapsodies which SOME of our theological metaphysicians 

• would have thinking beings believe !" &c.f 

§ 24. (A single word on a collateral topic, What has ren- 
dered the doctrine of the immateriality of the soul so much out 
i' vogue now-a-days, and another name with many for a monster 
of absurdity ? The saying that that soul which is immaterial, is 
altogether destitute of extension, occupying not even a point of 
space. That is just the reason : Because, what has no extension 
is nothing ; or to give it in Mr Hobbes' words, " Substance 
"without dimensions are words which flatly contradict each 
u other." De Homine.% — And because, it is repugnant to the 

t See § 1. of Appendix to Part VI. 

f See Part III. § 34, and following sections,— and other places. 



PART VIII. 



279 



•lictates of our unsophisticated faculties to consider gross matter 
ay, or subtile matter, if you go to that,) as the only cause of all 
thought.!) 

§ 25. And as the hypothesis of inextension is well 

calculated to foster atheism, so the hypothesis of infinite exten- 
sion is admirably adapted to extinguish atheism. 

§ 26. In the first place, this hypothesis distinguishes tivo dif- 
ferent sorts of extension. And this of itself destroys the most 
plausible of the atheistic hypotheses : to-wit, the hypothesis of an 
absolute material plenum, and but one substance in nature. 

§ 27- And in the second, if it be established that there is an 
incorporeal, or immaterial, or spiritual expansion which pervades 
the material universe, it is worth no atheist's while to contend 
against the position, that that expansion is a mode of an Intelli- 
gent Spirit. 

§ 28. We shall draw this Appendix to a conclusion with one 
other piece from the " Impartial Enquiry." 

§ 29. " The opinion of the Nullibists. 

" 'Tis well known that Weigelius was the reviver of this extra- 
" vagance among Christians. For one assertion of his (among 
" divers others relishing of the height of enthusiasm and distrac- 
u tion) was that spiritual beings (since conceived to be unextended 
" or without dimensions) are no where and yet every where. 
" But the chief patron of this profound mystery of Nullibism was 
" Des Cartes. A philosopher that has rendered himself remark - 
u able for these three confident assersions, viz., That whatever 
" thinks is immaterial ; That whatever is extended, or has di- 
" mensions, is material ; and That whatever is unextended, or 
" without dimensions, is nowhere.^ Which last assertion (per- 

f See Part III. § 39 and § 40, — and other places. 

% The author of the " Impartial Enquiry" betrays gross ignorance in mak- 
ing the able Philosophical Reformer he mentions a patron of the absurdity of 
Nullibism. What better known in the philosophic world than the fact, that 
Des Cartes was at surprising pains to discover the seat of the soul ? At length 
the point was determined, and, thenceforth, the soul was to be confined 
within the minute limits of the pineal gland. The immortal author of the 
" Meditations concerning the First Philosophy" was hugely wronged by 
& C, but wronged, sans doubt, unwittingly. To conjecture : S. C. was led 
astray by Dr Henry More, who, during a laugh — of which, not Rmatus 



280 



APPENDIX TO PART VIII. 



; - haps the truest) is no other in effect than a frank confession of 
" what the Schools laboured to conceal under an insignificant and 
•• arbitrary distinction between the Locus of a Body and the Ubi 
" of a Spirit ; which it seems the less metaphysical Cartesians 
" find themselves unable to comprehend." Ibidem. 

% 30. Unable to comprehend: no marvel. Would any amount 
of metaphysics — short of metaphysics run mad — enable Carte- 
sians (to say nothing of others) to comprehend, in all its latitude, 
the scholastic distinction between locus and ubi? Take, upon 
the point, tlu; witness of two famous men. " If it be said by any 
" one, that it (the soul) cannot change place, because it hath 
" none, for spirits are not in loco, but ubi ; I suppose" — witness- 
eth John Locke — " that way of talking will not now be of much 

• ireighl to many in an age that is not much disposed to admire, 
or suffer themselves to be deceived by, such unintelligible 

• ways of speaking.' 1 Essay, B. II. ch. xxiii. § 21. — "The 
■ S.-h.j.ilmen's distinctions about Spirits existing in Ubi, and not 

u in Loco ; are" — saith the second witness — " mere empty sounds, 
• ; without any manner of signification." Dr Samuel Clarke's 
Ans. to 6th Letter. 

§ 31. No less a man than Dr Watts, the Divine, and so re- 
spectable a one as Isaac Watts, the Metaphysician, harped 
mightily, in his own way, upon this string, the distinction, to-wit, 
between the locus and ubi of a Spirit. Well, if he had been 
helped to go back and destroy the empty distinction, by means 
of an observation of his own, which partly serves to bring up the 
rear, composing as it does one of his concluding (they are deeply 

pious) reflections on " Spirits being in a place and remov- 

" ing from it," fyc. — (Essay VI.) " The best thing we can do," 
observes he, " is, to guard against those ideas of spirits which 
; -' have any gross absurdities in them." (" Conclusion" to 
Sect. V.) Excellently said, Dr Isaac Watts ! I assure you — 
And completely disregarded by yourself. 

Descartes, but Henri/ More should have been the object — comes out Avith this,, 
that ' the chief author and leader of the Nullibists, seems to have been the 
' pleasant wit. Renatus Descartes,'' and more of the same sort of exceedingly 
ill-directed jocularity. 

But 'tis no matter to us who the chief patron of Nullibism was, Whoever 
be was. he must have been a profound one. 



281 



APPENDIX TO PART X. 

§ 1. " Space ' seems to have a necessary and obstinate exis- 
" ' tence :' " — These words are quoted, in the place whereto this 
Appendix relates, as constituting an argument (to prove that 
Space cannot be a mere idea) which Dr Isaac Watts is to answer. 

§ 2. The whole passage, in the Doctor's work, is as follows : 
" It is said, space cannot be a mere idea, because it seems to 
" have a necessary and obstinate existence, whether there w£re 
" any mind or no to form an idea of it." There is no ques- 
tioning that Watts, by " any mind," meant the mind of any 
man, or, at most, of any " created being." 

§ 3. That Space has necessary existence, we are firmly per- 
suaded. And therefore, that Space would continue to exist, al- 
though every mind, that ever began to be, ceased to exist, we 
can easily believe. These are points we hold as settled. 

§ 4. But there is a controversy which may be raised, Can 
any person be quite sure, that Space would be, were there no 
mind whatsoever to conceive Space ? Hoiv could one be sure 
of that? 

§ 5. To be plain in stating our own sentiment : — We are quite 
convinced, that if there were no Mind to form an idea of 
Space, there would be no Space. That is to say, the suicidal^ 
supposition^ of no Space, is not more self-destructive than the 
supposition of no Mind. 

§ 6. Space is not an idea ; not a mind : But is not Space that 
about which ideas are employed ? is not Space an object of con- 
ceptions ? And is not the object of a conception inseparably re- 
lated to a conception ? To think of any thing — is not that to 
have an object of thought ? Is object of thought not relative to 
mind ? In fine, Is not Space relative to a mind cognising it ? 

§ 7- If so, tis sufficiently evident, that there could be no Space, 
were no Mind in existence. 

§ 8. Does it any way follow from this, that seeing Space is 
necessary, Mind is necessary ? 

t Consider Part II. § 14, &c, along with § 1 of note to § 88, Part X. Con- 
sider, also, Part III. § 16, 17. J Weigh the note to § 17, Part IV. 



282 



GENERAL APPENDIX. 



EXTRACT FROM THE " REFUTATION." 

" CHAP. VI. 

" Fallacies o/Mr Gillespie — The 1 Argument.'' 

" This grand argument is laid out in two books. In the first, 
the metaphysico-theologian endeavours to prove that some be- 
ing exists which is the sine qua non of every other thing in 
existence. It consists of three parts, or series of propositions, 
maintaining, first, that Space is this being ; second, that Dura- 
tion is also a being of the same kind ; and, third, that these are 
not different, but identical. The second book ascribes to the 
subject of the forementioned proofs, the divine attributes of 
omniscience, unlimited power, and freedom of agency. 
" We cannot afford time — much less can it be expected that 
others should afford patience — both to make a general analysis 
of this argument, and examine the reasonings brought up in 
support of the different parts of it. As, therefore, authors are 
peculiarly jealous of their privileges, and tetchy and froward 
with regard to any freedom used in the treatment of their ex- 
pressions, we shall take the most laborious, and, at the same 
time, least advantageous way of combating Mr Gillespie's prin- 
ciples, — book by book, and proposition by proposition. This 
course is the more necessary, as the argument a priori, unlike 
that derived from experience, depends upon a chain of rea- 
soning, — not upon the pointed putting of a single case, or the 
tautological repetition of a thousand. 

" The first proposition, — ' Infinity of extension is necessarily 
' existing,' — it would be absurd in the extreme to deny. No 
more can we imagine any limit prescribable to extension, than 
we can imagine the outside of a house to be in the inside of it. 



GENERAL APPENDIX. 



283 



" The same unqualified assent, however, cannot be accorded to 
" proposition the second ; namely, that ' Infinity of extension is 
" ' necessarily indivisible.' 

" Here, the author has given up his abstract necessity, and 
" looks for something like experiment as alone capable of satisfy- 
" ing him : for, notwithstanding some unmeaning talk, intended 
" to explain away this desertion of his own principles, he evi- 
" dently insists upon a real division — an actual separation of parts, 
" with some distance, however little between them, as that which 
" he means by divisibility. If Mr Gillespie pleads not guilty to 
" this charge, I would ask him how mathematicians have always 
" regarded the smallest particle of matter divisible to infinity ? 
" Do they ever contemplate actual separation of parts in such 
" cases ? No ; but parts — as Mr Gillespie himself has it — in the 
" sense of partial consideration only. When they speak of the 
" hemispheres of the earth, divided either by the plane of the 
" equator, or that passing from the meridian of Greenwich to the 
" 180th degree of longitude, — are they necessarily guilty of speak- 
" ing unintelligibly ? If not, how is it that extension is necessa- 
" rily indivisible ? 

" It may be said, perhaps, that although matter is, mentally, 
" easy enough to divide, it is impossible to apply the same process 
" to extension. But is not the space occupied by the earth, — or 
" say, its useful little representative, a twelve or a twenty-inch 
" globe, — as easily conceived to be divisible by a mathematical 
" plane, as the globe itself, which is not really, but only mentally 
" divided? A mathematical point has no dimensions, because 
" whatever possesses dimensions must possess figure, and that 
" which has figure cannot be a point. In like manner, a plane 
" cannot have thickness, since whatever is of the smallest thick- 
" ness is not a plane but a solid. In dividing space by abstrac- 
" tion, therefore, there is no necessity, as our author would have 
" us believe, of falling into the absurdity of space divided by ac- 
" tual separation of the parts, leaving no space between them. 

" It would be of no great consequence although the second pro- 
" position were as irrefragable as the first ; for it bears upon no- 
" thing at all applicable to any being, whether real or imaginary. 
" But we need not always allow even gratuitous fallacies to es~ 



284 



GENERAL 



li cape. The exposure, at least, shows the badness of the cause 
" that renders the adoption of them necessary. If Mr Gillespie's 
" indivisibity be understood in an abstract sense, his proposition 
i : is not true ; if, in reference to actual experiment, he may be ap- 
• • plauded for having recourse to inductive instead of a priori reason - 
" ing, but he need not so soon have neglected the principles upon 
" which he started, without intimating some ground for the change. 

" A corollary is here introduced, asserting the immoveability 
" of extension. It is true, that either finity or infinity of exten- 
" sion can never be supposed capable of motion. Space cannot 
•• be canfied out of itself, nor can those parts of it occupied by 

Mont Blanc, for example, and the Peak of Teneriffe, ever be 
" imagined to change places. To the truth of what is here main- 
" tained, therefore, we must give unreserved assent, independent 
M of its nominal connection with the false doctrine immediately 
" going before. 

" But we now come to a proposition which may be said to carry 
• with it all the strength, if it has any, as well as the weakness, 
of Mr G " Argument.' It is the third in number, and 

" announces that ' There is necessarily a being of infinity of 
" 1 extension.'' 

" If we had not already seen that the author's reasoning leads 
" us to conclude that his Being is to be regarded as something 
" substantial, we should have been at a loss what to make of the 
" subject of the above predicate. As a logician would say, it is 
" not distributed. But if we refer to the third division of his 
" introduction, we find him contending that the necessary being 
•• must be of the character now ascribed to that subject. At the 

twenty- third section he avows that ' It may be laid down as 
" ' one of those truths which admit of no contradiction, that with 
" ' regard to the uncreated substance, at least, virtue (meaning 

' power, I presume,) cannot be without substance. Speaking 
" ; of this substance,' the author goes on to say, ' Sir Isaac New- 
" ' ton hath these words,' — which may be rendered — ' Omni- 
" '• presence is not by power alone, but also by substance ; for 
" ' without substance, power cannot possibly subsist.'' 

" Not only, however, is the necessary being of Mr Gillespie 
" said to be a substance, and therefore by his own and Sir Isaac 



APPENDIX. 



285 



" Newton 9 s showing, possessed of virtue or power, but it has al- 
" ready been designated, ' the intelligent cause of all things.' I 
" am quite aware, that neither intelligence nor power can be de- 
" monstrated of any thing a priori, which we shall see when this 
" author's reasoning upon those attributes falls in our way. We 
" may, nevertheless, in endeavouring to bear in mind the descrip- 
" tion of Being, of whom so great things are predicated, avail 
" ourselves of any expression of opinion respecting it, that may 
" be scattered throughout the work. It is only on this account 
" that I have at present alluded to these after-considerations at 
" all. 

" Relative to a Being of this sort, then, — at all events, relative 
" to a substantial being, the truth of the predicate is what we 
" have now to try. The evidence in support of the third propo- 
" sition is stated in the form of a dilemma. ' Either infinity of 
" ' extension subsists, or, (which is the same thing), we conceive 
" ' it to subsist, without a support or substratum ; or, it subsists 
" ' not, or we conceive it not to subsist, without a support or sub- 
" ' stratum. First, If infinity of extension subsist without a sub- 
" ' stratum, then it is a substance. — Secondly, If infinity of exten- 
" ' sion subsist not without a substratum, then, it being acontra- 
" ' diction to deny there is infinity of extension, it is a contradic« 
" ' tion to deny there is a substratum to it.' 

" The conclusion deduced from the latter alternative, besides 
" appearing lame and impotent, is somewhat laughable. But 
" allowing its logic to pass, it may be worth while, if only for 
" amusement, to try the force of this, the negative horn of the 
" dilemma, by ascertaining what it is made of. — The primary 
" signification of the word substratum is, a thing lying under 
" something else. Supposing, for instance, a bed of gravel to lie 
" under the soil, gravel is the substratum of that soil ; if there be 
" sandstone below that, the sandstone is the substratum of the 
" gravel; if coal be found beneath the rock, coal is the substra- 
" turn of it, and so on as far as we can penetrate. To say, there- 
" fore, that space must have a substratum, is nothing less than 
" saying that it must have something to rest upon ; something to 
" hold it up. That is, — Space must have limits ; and there must 
" be something in existence beyond its limits to keep it from 



286 



GENERAL 



" falling — out of itself! If this be not the acme of absurdity, a 
(i ship falling overboard, as our sailors' jest goes, is no longer a 
" joke ; and the clown who boasted that he could swallow himself, 
" boasted of nothing that he might not be reasonably be expected 
" to perform. 

" Should it be contended that the term ought to be understood 
w in its secondary acceptation, and that the substratum of the 

• infinity of extension subsists within itself, as any material body 

• is said to be the substratum of its own extension : — I would re- 
1 mark, that we know of nothing possessing extension except 

• matter, — nothing else that can stand as an object to which ex- 

• tension may be ascribed as a property ; and that matter, not 

• existing by mathematical, but only by physical necessity, can- 

• not be the substratum referred to. Hence it is evident that, 

• in material bodies, comprising all that we do know, or cemknow 

• of Being, it is impossible to find anything that will serve Mr 
■ Gill spie'a purpose. Even this impossibility overlooked, how- 

• ever, what is it that next meets our view ? — One substance 
' occupying infinite extension, and another occupying part of this 
' extension, if not also the whole of it ; in other words, two things 
' at the same time occupying the same space. Theology always 
' entangles its advocates in inextricable absurdities. 

•' A religious friend who has corresponded with me upon this 
' point, alleges that the substance of the substratum of infinite 
' extension is not material ; but this is mere babble ; something 
; he has been taught to repeat, — not the dictate of his sounder 
; judgment. Substance and matter are the same. The words 
' are synonymous and convertible. When used otherwise they 

• become unintelligible ; inasmuch as we might then talk of an 
unsubstantial substance and immaterial matter. 

" But, to refer to the first proposition, — has it not been de- 
monstrated that infinity of extension exists necessarily ? — that 
it exists, per se, by the most abstract and metaphysical neces- 
sity ? In what sort of predicament, then, must that reasoning 
appear, which gives up a leading and universally admitted 
truth by placing it in a questionable position ? Mr Gillespie's 
dilemma recognises, at least, the possibility of infinite exten- 
sion requiring a substratum to support it — infinite extension, 



APPENDIX, 



287 



" which is itself necessary ! How is this ? Was it found that 
" although Space possessed a few of the divine attributes, it did 
" not possess all, nor any thing like all that were deemed need- 
" ful to constitute a respectable deity ? Notwithstanding ap- 
" pearances, I should hope not. But, at any rate, we are again 
" landed in a quagmire of absurdity — the absurdity of supposing 
" a thing to be dependent and independent at the same time. 
" If space must be conceived a priori necessary, to talk of a sub- 
" stratum being necessary in the same sense of the word is non- 
" sense : on the other hand, if it stands in need of a substratum. 
" the foundation stone of this great argument must crumble into 
" dust, and be unfit to serve as a substratum to anything. 

" But if we are dissatisfied with the author's substratum, we 
" are not much better situated with the alternative left us ; for 
" according to the dilemma he has imposed upon us, we are 
" obliged to conclude that infinity of extension is itself a sub- 
" stance. I had thought infinity a mere nominal adjunct al- 
" lowed to space, from the circumstance of our being unable to 
" conceive limits to its extent ; but the theist, it seems, thinks 
" otherwise. Infinity, with him, must be a substance. On the 
" same ground, we might contend that finity is a substance too. 
" Supposing, however, that space infinitely extended is what he 
" means, all that we can say is, that if it be a substance it is no 
" longer space, or extension, or any thing else than, — just a sub- 
" stance ; — unless it may be both extension and substance at the 
u same moment. But these are profane thoughts. Perhaps ac- 
" cording to the new school of theology, not only may a book be a 
" substance, but its extension may also be a substance, its weight 
" another, its colour a third, and so forth. Let us hear, how- 
" ever, how the divine theory of infinity of extension being a 
" substance is to be sustained. — Mark with what boldness of 
" reasoning it is brought out. The infidel must look well to his 
" footing and points of defence, lest he be laid prostrate by its 
" overwhelming force. 

" ' If any one should deny that it is a substance, it so subsist - 
" ' ing ; ? (that is, without a support or substratum,) ' to prove 
" ' beyond contradiction the utter absurdity of such denial, we 
" ' have but to defy him to show why infinity of extension is not 



288 



GENERAL 



" 'a substance, so far forth as it can subsist by itself or without a 
" ' substratum.' 

" A new era has thus dawned upon logic. A grand discovery 
" is on the eve of rendering her power irresistible, and her reign 
" everlasting and glorious. It is to be henceforth no longer ne- 
" cessary for us to prove an affirmative : assert what we may, no 
t; one dare deny our assertions. For to prove beyond contra - 
" diction the utter absurdity of such denial, we have only to put 
" a brave face on it, and throw a defiance in the teeth of our 
" opponent to prove the negative. 

" But waiving, in the meantime, our plea of want of evidence 
" for the affirmative, a simple man would say in relation to the 
" case before us, that substance possesses attraction, which 
" extension does not; that it is observed under a thousand va- 
" rieties of figure, density, colour, motion, taste, odour, combus- 

tion, crystallization, &c. which neither extension nor infinity 
" ever is, or can in its nature be. lie might, in his deplorable 
u ignorance, ask if ever infinity was weighed, or extension ana- 
\* lyzed and its elements reduced to gas ? This would, I dare 
" say, only evince in the eyes of the theologian, that such a per- 
%i son had no idea of the very convenient art of applying meta- 
•• physical language to things physical; whereby a mere abstrac- 
# " tion, or at most a property of something else, can so easily be 
; ' charmed into a reality. His showing why infinity of exten- 
• ; sion is not a substance, therefore, would be set down as grovel- 
" ling and common-place, and, by consequence, useless. 

" After all, however, how does the notable proposition stand, 
" that there is necessarily a Being of infinity of extension ? The 
•• principle of the argument brought up in support of it — the 
■■ dilemma, in short — gives way on every side. It stands with- 
" out a vestige of backing, except from the vain and swelling 
" words of a blustering defiance, the value of which no one but a 
" fool could be at a loss to estimate. 

" The author himself, indeed, seems not half sure of having 
" made good the doctrine he has announced : for after having 
" done all he could do, by the foisting in of a substratum upon 
;t extension to the destruction of its necessary existence, — he 
" comforts himself with the reflection, that it is of very little con- 



APPENDIX, 



289 



" sequence whether men will or will not consent to call this sub- 
" stratum by the name of being or substance, because * 'tis cer- 
" ' tain that the word substance or being, has never been em- 
" ' ployed, can never be employed, to stand for anything more, 
" ' at least, than the substratum of infinity of extension.' It is, 
" of course, of no manner of importance whether men consent to 
" do what they always have done and must continue to do, or 
" whether they will not. But how far is the because and its cer- 
" tainty consistent with the lurking suspicion of the honoured 
" name of Being or substance being refused to his unsupported 
" substratum ? Yet, on the very heels of this misgiving, he con- 
" eludes, — ' There is, then, necessarily, a Being of infinity of 
" ' extension.' The worthy old father of the church, who de- 
" clared his belief of a christian dogma because it was impossible. 
" is not far from having a logician of the mathematical school to 
" keep him in countenance. Mr Gillespie frames a most abso- 
" lute conclusion with his premises dubiously faltering on his 
" lips." 



EDINBURGH 
PRINTED BJ J. OREIG, LAWNM ARRET. 



I 



r 



I 



Notices of 

Gillespie's " Necessary Existence of GOD." 

NEW EDITION. 



"I read Mr Gillespie's work on the argument, a priori, with much 
"interest. — I consider it a valuable addition to the science of Natural 
" Theology." 

Henry Lord Brougham, Author of " A Discourse 
of Natural Theology ," &c. &c. 

" I do not, I can assure Mr Gillespie, mean to flatter him, in saying, 
" I consider his work on the Necessary Existence of God, among the 
" very ablest specimens of speculative philosophy which this country 
" has latterly exhibited." 

Sir William Hamilton, Bart., Professor of Logic 
and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh. 

" I quite agree in a% Mr Gillespie says as to the labours of Dr Clarice 
" and the other a priori Divines. I think, Mr Gillespie has put the 
ee argument, a priori, on a far better, and more correct, basis than any 
" of them ; and I am happy to tbink, he has brought it to such a felici- 
" tous conclusion. I think, that, in his hands, the argument stands 
t{ more firm and stable than it ever did before." 

John S. More, Esq. Advocate, Professor of Scots 
-'f.-Law in the University of Edinburgh. 

"■A most worthy and excellent design, most ably executed." 

James Augustus St John, Esq., Author of " The 
History of the Manners, Customs, Arts, &c, of 
Ancient Greece,^ &c. &c. 



" Mr Gillespie's book I have read with great interest, as a new form 
" of an argument on the most profound of all subjects — -the being of a 

" God. It is a work of deep thought, and no common research. 

" Mr Gillespie's book is the production of an ingenious and a well- 
" exercised mind." 

" Mr Gillesjrimis at perfect liberty to use my opinion in any way he 
" thinks proper, for I have written nothing which I do not sincerely 
t' believe." 

The Right Rev. M. Russel, D.D. Bishop of Glasgow, 
Author of " The Connection of Sacred and Pro- 
fane Hisforfr," &c. &c. 



• I have- no hesitation in saying, that I consider Mr Gillespie's work 
" as one of the ablest, >n<>s/ ingenious, and best reasoned works, which 
'• have appeared, on the subject of Natural Religion — and that it is an 
" important and seasonable addition to the many valuable illustrations 
'• we possess of those ultimate truths in Theology on which the whole 
fabric of .Revealed Religion rests." 

John Brown, D.D. Professor of Exegetical Theology 
to the United Secession Church. 

" The subject to which Mr Gillespie 's work relates is truly profound, 
" and the manner in which Mr Gillespie has treated it, reflects great 
" honour on him. His work is most useful, not only by the direct iu- 
" struction it imparts respecting the Foundation of all Religion, but by 
" the thoughts it suggests to every intelligent reader. — 

Me Gillesp'u has rendered good service in a cause so intimately 
connected with the best, the highest, the most enduring interests of 
" man. His work has already been most useful ; and I know that it is 
" highly appreciated by competent judges." 

D. Dewak, D.D. Principal of tjte Marischal College, 
Aberdeen. 

Mr Gilles/>i<:'s ability as a close reasoner is well-known." 

Rev. Makcus Dods, Author ojf the work " On tie 
Incarnation of the Eternal Word." 



" Gillespietj Necessary Existence''' is referred to in the 7th, or last, 
Edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, as a* work of authority 

on the subject to which it relates. The Article wherein the reference 
occurs, is by the Rev. W. L. Alexander, A.M. of the Independent 
Church. Argyb' Square, Edinburgh. 




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